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ABSTRACT
BETWEEN THE BLACK DIASPORA OF ENSLAVEMENT AND
THE NIGERIAN DIASPORA SINCE THE DEMISE OF
COLONIALISM: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF
TWO HISTORIC MIGRATIONS TO THE UNITED STATES
MAY 2007
NSIKAN-ABASI PAUL E. UDOFIA, B.A. TEXAS SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY
M.A., TEXAS SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS BOSTON
Ph. D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor John Bracey, Jr.
Based on the research questions employed in this study, the Nigerian
immigrant community which first began with student sojourners, is currently more
effective within the African-American context. This community would perhaps have
been much slower in evolving but for the crisis of institutional instability back in the
Nigerian homeland as well as the policies of two American presidents. The major
features of the Nigerian immigrant community with varying degrees of influences in
America are: the Nigerian offspring, the Nigerian church, the Nigerian community
media, the Nigeria women association, the Nigerian attorneys and physicians.
The Nigerian offspring represent a conciliatory generation to Black America,
the Nigerian homeland, Euro-America, and the most favorable orbit of incorporating
Nigerian indices into the American mosaic. Houston, Dallas, and Atlanta exhibit one
vii
of the strongest evidences of the Southern typology of Nigerian immigrants in the
U.S. Within this setting, the socio-cultural experiences of Nigerians and African-
Americans are closely related. Both in their American agenda as well as aspirations
toward the homelands, Nigerians are replaying the earlier generational schemes of
Black America. Analyses of the descendants of forced migration and voluntary
Nigerian migration in the media conform to a greater degree of understanding than
misunderstanding on prospects of ancestral solidarity and collective development.
The benefits derived from the two historic migrations of black Africans to the
U.S. were found to be lopsided. Predisposed to neither assimilation nor integration,
the Nigerian diaspora—in particular—exhibited a carefully selective pattern of
socioeconomic identification, which corresponded with segregated incorporation.
Generally, the incorporation of the African diaspora of colonialism in America
favors a north to-east to-south thrust of the races of Africa. Accordingly, Africans
from West and Central Africa, where a majority of the forced migrants were taken,
are more likely to occupy an unfavorable orbit of American incorporation.
Due mostly to racial slavery, the Nigerian-African variable represents the
most distinctive phase of reactive-global migration into the U.S. after decolonization.
The predicted problem of "color line in the twentieth century" corresponded with the
reactive patterns of cross-cultural migration particularly of the races of color and
mostly at the intersection of the "fifth wave" of global migration. Sustained medium
of exchanges between Nigeria and the U.S. therefore began with the "fifth wave" of
reactive global migration. This marks an important historic new phase in the
development and integration of Nigerian-African indices into the post-modern era.
viii
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INTRODUCTION
The status of African immigrants as well as Africa, to a certain
extent, is directly related to the issue of race, and the political
status of Black Americans.
--Paul Udofia 1
In the case of the African and American Negro, it is more often
the later who causes the African to complain. On the other hand,
with American Negro and the West Indian, it is usually the latter
who becomes the source of conflict and irritation.
-Harold Cruse2
There is now a basis for examining two historic migrations of Africans to the
United States. According to the U.S. Bureau of the Census, African-American
population rose from about 30,000,000 in 1990 to over 36,000,000 in 2000.3 The
vast majority of these African-Americans are descendants of the 400,000 black
Africans who were forced into North America before the United States banned the
slave trade in the first decade of the nineteenth century.4
After about four centuries of that traumatic separation from the homelands,
black Africans are voluntarily migrating to the United States and settling almost
along the same lanes with their ancestral kin. A majority of the about 1,000,000
African immigrants recorded in the United States in 2000 were sub-Saharan
'Paul Udofia, "The Political Issues for African Immigrants in the United States," in Trotter
Review: Immigration. Ethnicity, and the Black Community in the United States (Boston:
The William Monroe Trotter Institute, University of Massachusetts Boston, Summer 1996),
p. 32.
2
Harold Cruse, The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual: A Historical Analysis of the Failure of
Black Leadership (New York: Quill, 1984), p. 435.
3
See, for example, U.S. Bureau of the Census: Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2002
[122nd Edition] (Washington, B.C., 2001), p. 18.
4
For example, see Philip D. Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census (Madison: The
University of Wisconsin Press, 1969), p. 268; Thomas C. Holt, "Africans," in Harvard
Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups , eds., Stephan Thernstorm et al (Cambridge
University Press, 1980), p. 5.
1
Africans. 1 By 2000, the sub-Saharan ancestry group population rose to 1,422,006
compared to about 260,000 in 1990. 2 Until the 1960s, the U.S. had no clear record
on the country of origin of immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa. Only a very few
Africans entered the U.S. voluntarily from the nineteenth to the mid-twentieth
century.
3
Table 1 substantiates the growth of the sub-Saharan African ancestry
population in the U.S. During the 1980s, its ancestry population increased by 0.1
percent.
4
Specifically, in the three decades preceding 2000, the Nigerian ancestry
group populations were the largest: for example, in 1990 the Nigerian ancestry
population was 91,688 compared to Cape Verdean (50,772), and Ethiopian (30,581).
By 2000, the Nigerian ancestry population rose to 137,002 compared to Cape
Verdean (79,366), Ethiopian (73,661), and Ghanaian (41,563). 5
Admittedly, these sub-Saharan Africans have now a clearer demographic
base within the U.S. both in their regional distribution as well as in settlement
patterns. This development is particularly stronger for their Nigerian variable. For
example, in 2000, the Nigerian population alone rose to about 134,000. During the
'This is based on the U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2000; Kofi Apraku, African Emigres in the
United States: A Missing Link in Africa's Economic and Social Development (New York
and London: Praeger, 1991), pp. 41-3.
2
Ibid., U.S. Bureau of the Census, Ancestry Group Population 2000; and Table 1, p. 3.
3Thomas C. Holt, "Africans," in Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups
, p. 5; Ira
de Reid, The Negro Immigrant: His background. Characteristics and Social adjustment,
1899-1937 (New York: Arno Press, 1963), p. 24; O.C. Wortham, "Contemporary Black
Immigration to the United States," in Contemporary American Immigration: Interpretive
Essays
,
ed., Dennis Laurence Cuddy (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1982), p. 201; April A.
Gordon, Nigeria's Diverse Peoples: A Reference SourceBook (Denver, Colorado: ABC-
CLIO, Inc., 2003), p. 234.
4
U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990 Census of Population: Supplementary Reports, 1990 CP-
S-1.2, Detailed Ancestry Groups for States (Washington, DC: Department of Commerce
Economics and Statistics Administration, 1990), Table 2, p. 4.
5
For example, see Tables 1 and 2.
2
same period (Table 1), its numerical representation had the largest share of the
current build-up of black Africans in urban America. 1 In 1980, these Nigerians were
the most educated African-born group. By 1990, about 64 percent of them had at
least four year college degree, while some 84 percent were in work force.2 On the
other hand, by mid-1990s, about 21,000 Nigerian medical doctors were reportedly in
the U.S.
3
Table 1
The sub-Saharan African Ancestry
Groups in the United States,
by Region, by Populations, by Decade, 1980-2000
Region 1980 Region 1990 Region 2000
TOTAL 203,791 TOTAL 245,845 TOTAL 1,422,006
C. Verdean 23,215 C. Verdean 60,722 C. Verdean 79,366
Ethiopian 7,641 Eritrean 4,270 Ethiopian 73,661
Ghanaian 6,775 Ethiopian 30,581 Ghanaian 41,563
Nigerian 47,857 Ghanaian 20,066 Kenyan 14,875
S. African 8,568 Kenyan 4,639 Liberian 28,983
*Others 31,442 Liberian 8,797 Nigerian 137,002
Nigerian 91,688 Senegalese 3,640
S. Leonean 4,627 S. Leonean 6,165
S. African 17,992 Somalian 17,314
Sudanese 3,623 S. African 37,357
Ugandan 2,681 Sudanese 12,161
African, nec 20,607 Ugandan 4,721
Zairian
Zimbabwean 1,407
African 923,667
*Other Sub-Saharans 40,112
Sources: U,S. Bureau of the Census, "Ancestry Group Report for the United States,"
Detailed in the Census of the Population (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1980),
Table 2, p. 13.; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990 Census of Population: Supplementary Reports, 1990
CP-S-1.2, Detailed Ancestry Groups for States (Washington, DC: Department of Commerce
Economics and Statistics Administration, 1990), Table 2, p. 4; U.S. Census Bureau, Ancestry-first
Reported Universe-Total Population: Census 2000 Supplementary Survey Summary rPCT0241 Tables
(Washing ton, D. C: Department of Commerce, 2000). *Note that the data shown here include
ancestry groups from other regions of Africa, who may be of European/Asian ancestry, etc.
'For example, see Tables 1 and 2.
2Gordon, Nigeria's Diverse Peoples
,
p. 236.
3
Ibid. Also, see: Soumana Sako, in "Brain Drain and Africa's Development: A Reflection,"
African Issues. XXX (1), 2000, p. 26.
3
This build-up of Nigerians represents the largest concentration of a specific
sub-Saharan African national group in the U.S. since the demise of the foreign slave
trade and colonialism. The Nigerian variable therefore provides a clearer specific
context in which to examine the relationships of two historic migrations of black
Africans to the U.S. Together, the black American population in 2000 and those
whose ancestors came from Nigeria as well as those who were themselves either
born within or outside Nigeria totaled about 37, 000,000.'
Historical Significance of the Nigerian Variable
Several factors accounted for the significance of the Nigerian variable in this
study. First, Nigeria is where more than four centuries of transatlantic slave traffic
"left a psychological legacy of suspicion, servility, or hostility which has been one of
the most serious obstacles in Eurafrican relations." Second, until the middle of the
nineteenth century, the current location of Nigeria, along with the Gulf of Guinea,
was tied to the "Slave Coast."
2
Third, the total number of slaves' exported from the
Yoruba Coast and Bonny trading centers to the Americas during the closing years of
the Atlantic slave trade "approached an annual peak of 30,000."
3 During the height
of the slave trade, "almost one third of the slaves came from Nigeria."
4
Besides this,
one out of every four African slaves in the U.S. came from the Nigerian region.
5
'
Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2002 . p. 18 and Tables 1 and 2 of this dissertation.
2James Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism (Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1960), pp. 1 1-13, 39-41.
3
Richard Olaniyan, "The Atlantic slave trade," in Nigerian History and Culture , ed., Richard
Olaniyan (Ikeja and Ibadan: Longman Nigeria Limited, 1985), pp. 1 19-120.
4Gordon, Nigeria's Diverse Peoples
,
p. 54.
5Kalu Ogbaa, The Nigerian Americans (Westport, Connecticut and London: Greenwood
Press, 2003), p. 113.
4
The unique role played by the Nigerian region was crucial in the making of
the black diaspora, and ultimately of their freedom. The forced migration of
Olaudah Equiano—the Ibo slave—testifies to the importance of the current location
of modern Nigeria in the making of the black diaspora of enslavement. 1
Nigeria stands at the crossroads of continuing introduction of Africanisms
into modern American cultures. Most of the Africanisms that survived the Middle
Passage derived from the Nigerian background. 2 Such groups as Ibo, Yoruba, Efik,
Ibibio, Ijo, Hausa-Fulani, Edo, and Bini, who comprised the majority of the forced
migrants, are almost evenly represented in the current build-up of the Nigerian
diaspora of colonialism in the U.S. 3 Nigeria's representation offers an opportunity
for linking and explaining the relationships between the civil rights legislations of
the 1960s and post- 1960s African immigration to the U.S. within the context of the
black experience.
4
Modern Nigeria, with a population of 122,635,626 in 2001, is currently the
most populous African nation, and is expected to play a more prominent role of
'David Richardson, "Through a Looking Glass: Olaudah Equiano and African Experiences
of the British Atlantic Slave Trade," in Black Experience and Empire , eds., Philip D.
Morgan and Sean Hawkins (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 59-66.
2
Ibid. Richardson, pp. 66-7; ; James Oliver Horton and Lois E. Horton, Hard Road to
Freedom: The Story of African America (New Brunswick, New Jersey, and London: Rutgers
University Press, 2003), pp. 7-16); "The Interesting Narrative of the Life Olaudah Equiano
or Gustavus Vassa, The African," in The Classic Slave Narratives , ed., Henry Louis Gates,
Jr. (New York: Penguin Books USA, Inc., 1987, pp. 1 1-39, 98-182; Eric Lincoln, The Negro
Pilgrimage in America (New York: Bantam Books, 1967), pp. 1-3; Melville J. Herskovits,
The Mvth of the Negro Past (Boston: Beacon Press, 1990), Chapters I and 2, particularly pp.
61-85; Joseph E. Holloway, "The Origins of the African American Culture," in Africanisms
in American Culture , ed., Joseph P. Holloway (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana
University Press, 1990), chapters 1-2.
3
Ibid.; Udofia, Research Report, pp. 11-25, 29-40; Gordon, Nigeria's Diverse Peoples , pp.
10-18, 54, 236-8.
4Ronald Segal, The Black Diaspora: Five Centuries of the Black Experience Outside Africa
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1995), p. 261; Udofia, "Toward an Understanding of
Nigerian Immigrants: The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 60-73.
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collective partnership with black America toward regeneration, which can serve as a
sustainable basis of Euro-American and African relations. 1 Whereas the black
diaspora of enslavement represent the most economically and politically developed
English-speaking base within the capitalist world economy, the Nigerian diaspora of
colonialism—also largely English speaking—represent the most economically,
politically, and educationally active base of the black African settlers in America. 2
The vast concentration of Nigerians in America provides a basis for
understanding the extent to which the descendants of slaves and post-colonial
African immigration have shared experience as "Africans and African descendants
abroad."3 Much like the black diaspora of enslavement, the socio-cultural orbit of
the Nigerian diaspora of colonialism is plagued by the inherent conflict of racial
"otherness."
4
A majority of the black African settlers, interestingly enough, are in regions
which have dense population of African-Americans, as well as strong visibility of
'ibid. For example, according to the world population control, Nigeria's population of over
126,000,000 in 2001 is expected to rise to the fourth position around the early decades of the
twenty-first century. Also, see: "Reaching Out to the African Diaspora: The Need for
Vision," in U.S. Embassy: Public Affairs Section, Information Section Crossroads , Vol. 10,
No. 1 (Abuja: The Embassy of the United States of America in Nigeria, January 2003), pp.
1-2; also see http://usembassy.state.gov/nigeria/wwwhxian03g.html : accessed 4/19/2006,
along with the related emphases in chapters 3 and 6; Udofia, Research Report, pp. 20-25, 40-
3.
2
Ibid.; Ali A. Mazrui, "The World Economy and the African/Afro-American Connection," in
Dynamics of the African/Afro-American Connection: From Dependency to Self-Reliance
,
ed., Adelaide M. Cromwell (Washington, D.C. Howard University Press, 1982), pp. 48-53;
Udofia, Trotter Review, pp. 30-3; Udofia, Research Report, pp. 1-3, 12-25, 40-3, 49-53.
3
Also, see data by U.S. Census Bureau on foreign-born population, 1970-2000; Tables 1 and
2 of this dissertation; Kwaku Danso, in Trotter Review, p. 29; P. O. Esedebe, Pan
Africanism: The Idea and Movement, 1776-1963 (Washington, D.C: Howard University
Press, 1982), p. 3; Legum, Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide , pp. 14-23.
4
Ibid. See further explanation of background in Coleman, Nigeria: Background to
Nationalism , p. 41; and Emmanuel A. Ayandele, Educated Elite in the Nigerian Society
(Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1974), pp. 9-52.
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black-owned institutions. Together, both the black diaspora of enslavement and the
Nigerian diaspora of colonialism represent two historic populations worth examining
collectively with due regard to the emerging new lanes of race relations in the U.S. 1
The question worth asking at this juncture is: Do Nigerians, as black people
and as the most populous African immigrant group, have a special role to play in
furthering an understanding of race matters in the U.S.? Does their current build-up
represent an opportunity for sustained reconstruction of ancestral relationships with
African-Americans, as well as improved relations with Euro-Americans, or future
crisis?
2
Answers to the above queries are almost similar to those identified for
African-Americans and Latinos by political scientist James Jennings: "The social
and political relationships between Blacks and Latinos in big cities of America will
be one of the most pressing issues for urban politics in the 1990s."
A more general issue therefore concerns the effects that the Nigerian build-up
can be expected to have on the broader socio-cultural context of the black experience
in American society. The first quotation on this chapter suggests one possible result.
The second quotation from Harold Cruse suggests a strong likelihood of conflict
shaped by varying orbits of socio-cultural differences.
'See U.S. Bureau of the Census Report for 2000; and Kwaku Danso "Explanation for
African immigration," Trotter Review , p. 29, and Patrick A, "The Invisible Africans," The
Catalyst: The Coalition of Concerned Africans News Letter (Atlanta, GA, May 1998), p. 1 1.
2
Ibid. Also, see: Udofia, Trotter Review , pp. 32-3; Paul Udofia, "Toward an Understanding
of Nigerian Immigrants in the United States: The Status of the Relationship with African
Americans," Master's Thesis (Boston: University of Massachusetts Boston, June, 1994),
pp.1-14, 264-284; Paul Udofia, "Nigerians in the United States: Potentialities and Crises,"
Research Report , No.30 (Boston: William Monroe Trotter Institute: University of
Massachusetts Boston, Spring 1996), pp. 3, 14, 40-3, 50.
3James Jennings "Black and Latino in the American City in the 1900s: Toward Political
Alliances or Social Conflict?" National Political Science Review vol. 3 (1992), pp. 158-62.
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The main purpose of this dissertation is to examine the relationships between
the black diaspora of enslavement and the Nigerian diaspora of colonialism and the
extent to which the historical context of the former either positively or negatively
influences the development of the latter. Using the Nigerian variable, this
dissertation also examines the relationships between the two historic migrations of
Africans to the United States. Further, it explains the links between the forced and
voluntary migrations from sub-Sahara Africa to the United States, showing the
extent to which post-colonial Nigerian migration represents the most distinctive
wave of reactive migration since both the demise of the foreign slave trade as well as
decolonization.
The five research questions employed in examining the major focus of this
dissertation are:
1. To what extent did the historical cycles of the black diaspora of
enslavement in the U.S. influence the development of a Nigerian
immigrant community?
2. Did the current build-up of the Nigerian diaspora of colonialism around
the black diaspora of enslavement in the U.S. enhance greater
understanding or misunderstanding, favorable or unfavorable disposition
based on shared historical commonalities and differences?
3. Did the involuntary migration of black Africans as slaves and voluntary
post-colonial migration of Nigerians to the U.S. represent gains or losses?
4. In what ways did the dense concentration of Nigerian and African-
American cultures in Southern U.S. offer the prospect for both sustained
and improved relationships? How did the American-born offspring of
Nigerian immigrants perceive themselves and to what extent were they
agents of regeneration between Black America and the Nigerian
homeland, as well as with Euro-America. ... in the twenty-first century?
5. To what extent was the forced migration of black Africans slaves linked
to voluntary post-colonial migration of Nigerians as well as to the larger
trend of worldwide migration into the U.S?
8
This dissertation employed four fundamental assumptions to examine the
above research questions. The first is that the crisis of American slavery and
European colonialism defined the socio-cultural orbit of African-Americans and
Nigerians on the basis of their racial background. This served as the basis of
collective solidarity and development. Second, the experience of African-Americans
under slavery and Nigerians under colonial dispossession was as related as it was
dissimilar.
1
This resulted in understanding as well as misunderstanding, similarities
as well as dissimilarities in their relationships after freedom. Third, the forced
migration of black Africans and voluntary Nigerian migration had both advantages
and disadvantages. Finally, there is a new basis for Afro-Atlantic accord involving
African-Americans and American-born offspring of Nigerian immigrants, as well as
Euro-Americans in the twenty-first century.
On matters of cross-cultural relations, the data employed in this dissertation
were either specifically Nigerian, or taken from a broader base of the African
immigrant communities in the United States. Because of the need to understand
personal viewpoints of Nigerians and African-Americans, in this study, more
attention was given to the editorial and feature columns of the Nigerian community
media. A significant portion of this study focuses on Nigerians and African-
Americans in the Southern cities of Atlanta and Dallas, with Houston as a case study.
'Cruse, The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual , pp. 421-436;Colin Legum, Pan Africanism: A
Short Political Guide (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962), pp. 13-24; Joseph Harris, ed., The
Global Dimension of the African Diaspora (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press,
1982), pp. 5, 74.
2
Ibid.
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Methodology; An Interpretation
The collection of data used in this dissertation evolved in three phases from
March 1991 to July 2005. Phase 1, beginning with Master's work in American
Civilization, University of Massachusetts Boston, lasted from January 6 to March 3,
1992. This phase, mostly designed to examine Nigerian and African-American
relations within a more specific context in the U. S.,
1
involved an exploratory
fieldwork of the Nigerians/Africans and African-Americans context in three
Southern cities: Dallas, Houston, and Atlanta. The cities were chosen because they
represented the major enclaves of African-Americans and Nigerian immigrants in
Southern United States. The fieldwork yielded valuable research materials through
contacts with Nigerian/African churches and media, including some interviews.
Examples of data collected while in the South included: (I) an official
pamphlet highlighting Akwa-Ibom (Nigerian) Youth Christian and Cultural Group at
an African-American Baptist church, Wheeler Avenue during the "1993 Black
History Month Celebration;" (II) Excerpts on the Nigerian community from the
Houston Chronicle and The Houston Post ; Examination of African-Nigerian archives
at Texas Southern University; Examination of Nigerian community records; (III)
Examination of a KHOU TV documentary produced by African-Americans entitled
Let Me Tell You About Africa [profile of Nigerian/African African-American
relations]; (IV) All Nations For Christ, Redemption , a religious magazine published
in Benin City, Nigeria, 1992, highlighting a continuing relationship between a
Nigerian church and an African-American church; (V) Data on The Brotherhood of
'Udofia, "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 16-20.
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the Cross and Star; and Excerpts on African Business Directories in the South and
across the U.S. (See Appendix B.3).
Phase 11 (1993-1998), marked the archival of Nigerian (African) database
during the bulk of this author's professional years focusing on American cultures,
black communities, and foreign-born communities in the U.S. During this phase, the
Directory of Nigerian Physicians in the United States and Canada from 1994-1996
was examined to determine the demography of Nigerian medical scientists who
emigrated from Nigerian/African universities, etc. In addition, exploratory surveys
of Nigerian/African medical scientists and related professionals and personal
attendances at African community functions, were undertaken to complement the
information obtained from their directories. Other relevant samples were collected
and recorded and later utilized to locate needed information on Nigerians/Africans
and African-Americans in the U.S.
Phase III—1999 to 2004—was an extension of all the previous phases in that
it required reviews of newer trends and adjustments of my earlier premises and data
to changes that occurred over the past fourteen years in the patterns of
Nigerian/African immigration and context of ancestral relationships with African-
Americans, etc. The significance of this phase lies in the fact that, in becoming a
doctoral student, my general grasp of the historiography of African world
immigration to the Western Hemisphere was enormously improved by newer
insights. This background was further supported by my access to the current data on
the directories on Nigerian Physicians in the United States and Canada in 2000,
along those published in the Saravic Directory of African Businesses in America and
11
American Companies that do Business in Africa 1999 and 2000 . coupled with other
sources. Collectively, these profiles exposed this author to further details both
within a specific as well as broader context of African immigrants in the U.S.
Data Selection
On matters of cultural contacts/exchanges between Nigerians and African-
Americans within the U.S., data were mostly collected from their U.S.-based media,
African Business Directories, African Community Organizations/Businesses,
African/Nigerian-owned Churches, African Civic and Political Organizations,
African Professional Organizations, African-American Churches, Directory of
Nigerian Physicians, and the Nigerian Consulates. Other related data selected and
examined included: Nigerian immigrants, African-Americans, Asiatic immigrants,
and European immigrants. Also included in his category was a comparative survey
of the historiography of forced migration of Africans to the Americas, especially to
mainland North America; survey of the literature on the communities of color and
Pan-Africanism and the U. S.-African relations.
Sample Selection of Media
On coverage of African-Americans by Nigerian community media, a method
of sample selection was adopted in two phases. During the first phase—from 1 990
to 1992—a total of eighty-eight (88) editions of Nigerian/African community media
were randomly selected from eight different Nigerian/African community-owned
media. Due to their broad demographic reach, fifteen editions were finally sample
selected from three Nigerian-owned media in Southern U.S. The newspapers were:
12
(I) The Nigerian News Digest (renamed African News Weekly before going out of
business), a weekly publication based in Ashville, and later in Charlotte, North
Carolina since 1990; (II) The Good Hope News: The African Perspective (renamed
The African Herald) a monthly newspaper based in Dallas, Texas since 1990; and
(III) The African Business Source Magazine , a monthly magazine published in
Houston since 1990. 1
During the second phase (2004-2005), some fifty newspapers were randomly
selected from The African Herald (1993-2000), and The African News Weekly
(1993-2000)/ Fourteen editions were finally sample selected and content analyzed.
African Business Source Magazine was not included in the 1993-2000 content
analyses. The African Herald and African News Weekly had more favorable
demographic reach across the Southern landscape.
General Criteria of Data Treatment
The overall data were examined to determine: (I) the regional distribution of
Nigerian immigrants; (II) the course of ancestral relationships between native-born
blacks and Nigerian/Africans immigrants; (III) how the socio-cultural settings of the
two groups either facilitated cooperation or misunderstanding; (IV) the extent to
which the African-American context was either positive or negative toward the
development of Nigerians; and (V) the relationships between forced and voluntary
migrations, and other patterns of contemporary immigration to the U.S.
On coverage of African-Americans by the Nigerian media, every news item
was searched and recorded as straight news, editorial/opinion piece, feature, or
'ibid., especially pp. 16-17.
2The result of sample selection of The African Herald yielded in favor of editions from 1996
to 2000. The African News Weekly yielded in favor of editions from 1993 to 1996.
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picture news under four categories: (I) date of coverage; (II) type of coverage; (III)
frequency of coverage; and (IV) the major-issue categories of coverage. 1 These were
finally content-analyzed to uncover the extent to which the writers either
understood/misunderstood African-American and Nigerian (Africans) issues, or
showed favorable or unfavorable disposition.
A system of subject categories was utilized to code the main issue-positions
of the content analyses under: (I) Race Relations-Racism: RRR; (II) Racial
Solidarity: Pan-Africanism: RSP; (III) Special Events-Black-American Personages:
SEBAP; (IV) Civil Rights-Race Politics: CRRP; and (V) Opinion-Attitude-About
American Blacks: OAAAB. Finally, data accessed through both an examination of
the Nigerian informational sources as well as the related literature, were employed to
back-up the content analyses of African Americans and the conclusion of the
dissertation.
Dissertation Outline
This dissertation was conceived largely from a Nigerian/African community
perspective in eight chapters, and an introduction. Chapter 1 reviews the general
demographic history of the Nigerian/African immigrants in the U.S. from 1960s to
1990s, the historical relationships between the black diaspora of enslavement and the
black diaspora of colonialism, their socio-cultural context and existing problem.
Chapter 2 reviews the transatlantic slave trade, showing its particular West
African background, ties with the Guinea Coast, the current location of modern
'See Herbert G. Gans, Deciding What is News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC
Nightly News, and News Week and Time (New York: Vintage Books, 1980), p. 5, for some
patterns of the media analyses employed in the dissertation.
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Nigeria, along with the demography of slaves exported to mainland North America.
Chapters 3 and 4 explain the pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial backgrounds of
modern Nigeria, Nigerian immigration to the U.S., and the development of a
Nigerian immigrant community.
Chapter 5 explains the nature and effects of the socio-cultural tensions
confronting native-born black Americans on Nigerian immigrants. This chapter also
examines the problems of traditions and changes in Nigerian marriages and the crises
arising between Nigerian parents and their offspring.
Chapter 6 examines the Southern concentration of Nigerians in such cities as
Atlanta, Dallas, and Houston. Other issues examined include the influences of the
Nigerian media and churches, cultural exchanges with African-Americans, the role
of Nigerian/African offspring, and the socio-cultural crises of Nigerians in the South,
particularly their development in Houston. While Chapter 7 is an analysis of the
published views of Nigerians/Africans and Africans, Chapter 8 highlights and
summarizes the major emphases/analyses, and concludes the dissertation.
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CHAPTER 1
NIGERIAN-AFRICAN
IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES
This chapter explains the general demographic composition of the Nigerian-
African settlers in the United States. It also reviews the much earlier and the
continuing relationships between African-Americans and ancestral Africa, as well as
the context of their socio-cultural conflict.
Part 1: Nigerian-African Immigrants in the U.S., 1960-1990:
A General Review of Demographic History
Since the 1970s the African-born population in the United States has grown
steadily in numbers. Close to one million Africans were counted in this country in
2000. Some two-thirds of the Africans currently in the U.S. arrived after 1980.
Collectively, more than 50 percent of this population arrived between 1980s and
1990s. About 45 to 50 percent of these Africans were already within the American
mosaic between 1970s and 1980s. 1 This build-up has resulted in the visibility ofnew
generations of African identities in urban America.
2
For example, in October 28,
1996, Nigerian, Mr. Seyi Ipaye, was "named a city manager of Palestine, Texas."
In 1997, another Nigerian, Rev. Emmanuel W. Onunwor, became the first elected
'U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Foreign-born Population," Detailed Tables: PQ39: Place of
Birth By Citizenship Status For the Foreign-born Population, Supplementary Report Survey
Summary Tables (Washington, DC: Department of Commerce, 2000); Danso, "Explanation
for African Immigration," p. 29; Udofia, Trotter Review , pp.3 1-3; Udofia, Research Report.
pp.1 0-13; David Levinson and Melvin Ember, eds., American Immigrant Cultures: Builders
of a Nation , Volume 2 (New York: Simon & Schuster Macmillan, 1997), p. 946.
2John A. Arthur, Invisible Sojourners: African Immigrant Diaspora in the United States
(Praeger: Westport, Connecticut and London, 2000), p. 3.
3
R. O. Nwachukwu, "A Nigerian Named City Manager of Palestine," The African Herald
(Dallas Texas, December, 1996), pp. 1, 10.
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mayor of an American city in East Cleveland, Ohio. 1 In May 1998, Mr. Makia Epie,
Cameroonian, "became the Mayor-protem of the city of Cedar Hill in Dallas county,
Texas."
2
So, with the election of Barack Obama in 2004, son of a Kenyan father and
an American mother to the U.S. Senate, the tide in the political images of the
newcomers from sub-Saharan Africa in America appears to have entered into a new
era of structural transformation. And with the Obama success, the political spotlight
in the nation began to focus on the implications of the new waves of African-
American immigrants to the United States, as distinct from those of descendants of
slaves.
3
Clearly, Obama—as a descendant of largely voluntary post-colonial African
immigration—symbolizes the emerging new status of the generation of the second
historic dispersal of Africans to America. The Obama generation, therefore,
represents the increasing maturity in the U.S. of a new generation of voluntary black
African immigrants side by side with the descendants of forced migration.
As we saw earlier, the over 36,000,000 population of African-Americans
recorded by the U.S. Census Bureau in 2000 represented the accumulated build-up of
the generation of 399,000 who were forced against their will as slaves to mainland
North America during the first historic dispersal.
4
Throughout the gruesome struggle
from slavery to freedom or from plantation to ghetto, these descendants of forced
migration attempted to ameliorate the negative image imposed upon them and upon
'Ogbaa, The Nigerian Americans , p. 143.
2
R. O. Nwachukwu, "Mayor-Protem; To Run for JP in Dallas County," The African Herald
(Dallas, Texas, September 1998), pp. 1, 29.
3
For background on descendants of slaves, see Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census
p, 268. However, in James A. Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade: A History (New York
and London: W. W. & Norton and Company, 1981), p. 428, the estimate is slightly higher,
"ibid.; U.S. Bureau of the Census [1 12th Edition], p. 18.
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their ancestral homelands by racial slavery. 1 Accordingly, after many centuries of
the heinous experience of forced migration, sub-Saharan Africans—following a
different but almost similar course—are voluntarily immigrating to the U.S. Like the
first dispersal, the second one was prompted mostly by the consequences of
European colonial legacies.2
Not surprisingly, President Olesegun Obasanjo of Nigeria told his American
audience at Harvard University in 1999 that the post-colonial crisis of African states
begun to establish "its stranglehold on a continent that had already been devastated
and depopulated by the trans-Atlantic slave trade." As President Obasanjo observed,
the crises of this background corresponded with the current status of human
underdevelopment in Africa since the end of alien rule.3
One of the high water marks of this underdevelopment, as President
Obasanjo further observed, was obvious enough in the increased loss of much
needed manpower of African skilled class to the Western Hemisphere.4 To political
'John Hope Franklin and Alfred M. Moss, Jr., From Slavery to Freedom: A History of
African Americans. Volume Two: From the Civil War to the Present (New York and
London: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1998); August Meier and Elliott, From Plantation to Ghetto .
Third Edition (New York: Hill and Wang, 1976); Milfred C. Fierce, The Pan-African Idea in
the United States 1900-1919: African American Interest in Africa and the Interaction with
West Africa (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1993), pp. vii-xxii.
2
Apraku, African Emigres in the United States , pp. xv-xvii, ix-xxiii, 1-17, 41-2; Basil
Davidson, The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State (New York:
Times Book, 1992), pp. 9-14, 89-117, 190-242; Myron Weiner, The Global Migration
Crisis: Challenges to States and to Human Rights (New York: Harper Collins College
Publishers, 1995), pp. 22-25; Danso, Trotter Review, p. 28; Udofia, Research Report, pp.
2
—25; Authur, Invisible Sojourners , pp. 5-6, 23; Roland Oliver, The African Experience:
From Olduvai George to the 21
s
' century
.
Second Edition (Boulder, Colorado, 2000), pp.
307- 313.
3Democracy and Development in Africa: From Transition to Transformation. Address by His
Excellency President Olusegun Obasanjo, President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria at
Harvard University; ARCO Forum for Public Affairs. Kennedy School of Government
(Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA, October 30, 1999), p. 1.
4
Ibid.
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scientist Mazrui, the preceding background vividly illuminated the beginning of a
new era of Afro-atlantic relations in the U.S. In a speech at the University of Texas
at Austin in 1999, Mazrui observed that the new phase of Afro-atlantic relations had
brought two generations of Africans much closer to each other than ever before in
the U.S. This was the link between the forced migration via the slave trade and
voluntary postcolonial African migration via institutional disruption. According to
Mazrui, African immigrants "are casualties of the displacement caused either directly
by colonialism or by the aftermath of colonial and post-colonial disruption." These
Africans, he further observed, constituted the bulk of first or second-generation
immigrants. As citizens or permanent residents, they constituted the core of the
"Diaspora of colonialism."
1
Table 2 shows the general growth pattern of African immigrants in the
U.S. from 1960 to 2000. During the four decades preceding the 2000 census, their
population recorded increases of 127 percent (1960-1969), representing a change of
an additional 44, 788 population. From 1970 to 1979, their population increased to
149 percent, representing 119,580 change; and from 1980 to 1990 it increased to
82.2 percent, representing 164,096 change; and finally to 131 percent from 1991 to
2000—representing a change of 475,728.
Further, in terms of the increase (change) in African immigrant as a whole,
the decade between 1990 and 2000 witnessed the highest number of Africans
entering the U.S. However, the highest growth rate was observed between the
'Richard Nwachukwu, "Dr. Ali Mazrui Speaks at UTA African Lecture Series, Africans and
African Americans on the eve of the 21
st
Century: Between Ancestry and Anticipation," The
African Herald , Vol. 10, No. 3 (Dallas-Texas, March 1999), p. 8.
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decades of the 1970-1980 (Table 2), when Egypt—with 43,424, and Nigeria with 25,
528—recorded the largest population of African immigrants in the U.S. 1
Table 2
Populations of Immigrants in the United States
by Decade, 1960-2000
Decade All
Immigrants
Africans Nigeria Growth rate of African and Nigeria
Immigrants by Decade, 1960-2000
Change in
Immigrants
Nigeria Africa
Growth Rate (%)
Nigeria Africa
1960 9,738,091 35,355
1970 9,619,202 80,143 44,788 127
1980 1,4079.906 199,723 25,526 119,580 149
1990 19,767,316 363,819 55,350 29,824 164,096 117 82
2000 30,466,222 839,547 134,000 78,650 475,728 142 131
Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States Colonial Time
Till 1970 (11)—1980 Detailed Population Characteristics, Chapter D, U.S. Summary ; and
The Foreign Born Population in the United States: 1990, CPH-L-9JL Ethnic and Hispanic
Branch Population Division (Washington, DC: Department of Commerce, 1990), Table 14,
p. 85); U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Foreign-born Population," Detailed Tables: PQ39: Place
of Birth By Citizenship Status For the Foreign-born Population, Supplementary Report
Survey Summary Tables (Washington, DC: Department of Commerce, 2000).
Too, for Africa as a whole, the 1990 to 2000 growth of its population could
have been attributed to the Diversity Visa Program, which, as we shall hopefully see
in Chapter 3, represented the most distinctive wave of African immigration to the
U.S. For Nigerian immigrants, to be sure, the 1990 to 2000 decade witnessed a
remarkable leap in the number of those who entered the U.S.: on the average, their
proportion of total population of African immigrants rose to about 12 percent.
Although the Nigerian build-up in the U.S. during the 1970s and 1980s was
largely of males, nonetheless, female immigrants also comprised a significant
'U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Socio-economic Characteristics of the U.S. Foreign-born
Population: Detailed in Census Bureau Tabulations," United States Department of
Commerce News (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of the Census [CB84-179], October 17,
1984), p. 4.
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proportion of its settlers. Their male-female ratio increased from 1.5 males per
females in 1980 to 1.3 males per female in 1990. 1 Overall, the black African
immigration showed a strong female-male pairing since the 1970s from such
countries as South Africa, Nigeria, Cape Verde, and Ethiopia.2 This reflected their
general growth pattern between the mid-1970s and late 1980s. For example,
between 1977 and 1988 the regional flow of sub-Saharans to the U.S. increased from
47 percent and 65 percent respectively. 3
By 1990s, when immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa were of fewer students
than previously, most of them were skilled class; others were married couples,
political exiles, and refugees. 4 About 194,942 of them were "Never married"
compared to 198,706 "now Married," 21,784 divorced, some 12,924 separated, and
8,924 widowed. 5
Again, in 1990, of the 354,861 persons recorded in the African-born
households, 119,092 of them, representing (33.6 percent)—were family
householders—compared to 53,501 non-family holders and 82,312 householders
owned by spouses. 6 By late 1990s, about 25 percent African women reportedly lived
in married families with or without children of their own. During a similar period,
approximately 4 percent of African immigrant households were headed by single
'David Levinson and Melvin Ember, American Immigrant Cultures: Builders of a Nation ,
Volume 2 (New York: Simon &Schuster Macmillan, 1997), p. 950.
2
Ibid. Also, see: "Socio-economic Characteristics of the U.S. Foreign-born Population,
United States Department of Commerce News , pp. 3, 6.
3
Ibid., Apraku, African Emigres in the United States , p. 42.
4
Ibid., Apraku, pp. 3-9. See further emphases in chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation.
5Susan J. Lapham, Profiles of the Foreign-born Population: Selected Characteristics by Place
of Birth. CPH-L-148 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Ethnic and Hispanic
Division, 1990), p. 13.
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women, with or without children. 1 In 1990s, as 2000, Africans immigrants were
densely concentrated in the urban centers of the Northeast, South, Middle Atlantic,
West, and South Atlantic. During this period, their regional general distribution
reflected a strong Southern pull along African-American lanes.2
On the other hand, more than most non-European foreign-born groups,
African immigrants are mostly English-speaking. Their levels of high school and
college education are comparatively higher compared to those from Europe, North
America, Asia, and Latin America.3
For example, in 1989 when the per capita income of foreign-born Africans
recorded $20,117, that of Asians was $16,661, and Central Americans $9,446.
Family poverty rates also varied for the same groups from 11.7 percent for foreign-
born Africans to 13.1 percent for Asians to 20.9 percent for Central Americans.
4 By
early 1990s, an economically cohesive class of African skilled professionals had
converged on American shore. Their impressive educational status corresponded
with their per capita income compared to the 1970s. About 35 percent of them were
in managerial and professional work; others in technical sales and administrative
work. During a similar period their family income of "$30,000" compared with
'Levinson and Ember, American Immigrant Cultures , p. 950.
2James P. Allen and Eugene J. Turner, We the People: Atlas of America's Ethnic Diversity
(New York: Macmillan, 1988), pp. 143-8; Udofia, Research Report, p. 20. Gordon, Nigeria's
Diverse Peoples
, p. 238. Also see Chapter 3.
3
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pp. 1-9; Authur, Invisible Sojourners , pp. 20-21, 46-8.
Ibid., Lapham, "Census Bureau Finds Significant Demographic Differences Among
Immigrant Groups," Public Information Office , #CB93-165 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Bureau of the Census, 1993); Udofia, Trotter Review , p. 31; Levinson and Ember, American
Immigrant Cultures, p. 950.
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"$21, 000" for African-Americans. 1 Apraku's study further found increases salaries
Africans salaries ranging from $59,999 to $100,000 and over.2 By 1997, when the
average family income for African immigrant house was $38,794 per year, its elite
segment of 6 percent earned more than $100,000 a year.3 By 2000, their median
income of $40,300 was one of the highest among the black family-households in
America. 4
Part 2: The Black Diaspora and African Connection 1780-1900:
A Review of Historical Context
Since their freedom from slavery, the descendants of African slaves in
America, "supposedly the most civilized portion of the black race,"
5 have confronted
problems arising from the fact of their color.
6 Whether in appealing to scriptural or
scientific evidence, or to Darwinism—or to the scientific classification of American
races by scholars in The Bell Curve
7
—the generations of whites have used the
background of racial slavery to rationalize their superiority over their counterparts
who were forced as slaves in chains to America.
The above historical tension has persisted against the descendants of the slave
trade even as recorded facts have shown that they have made important marks on the
'ibid.; especially Authur, Invisible Sojourners , p. 48.
2
Apraku, African Emigres in the United States , p. 7.
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character of American civilization. 1 Given the nature of their racial dilemma, they
have often focused on their ancestral homeland. With the coming of freedom, the
need to redress the degraded status of their ancestral homeland formed the core of
the missions of African redemption and later of organized Pan-African conferences.2
Thus, between 1 808 and 1 860 the Northern free blacks used the occasion of
their freedom orations to reconstruct the degraded images of their ancestral
homelands. Henry Sipkins, who saw himself and fellow blacks as the "descendants
of Africa," used the platform of the freedom oration to argue that Africa might truly
be called "paradise." Sipkins believed that "Africa was in a state of perfection"
before European contact, and "exhibits the most blissful regions... productive of life,
almost independent of the arms of husbandry." Its innocent inhabitants, he argued,
"enjoyed with an uninterrupted pleasure the state which, by the beneficent hand of
nature they were placed."
Russell Parrott, on the other hand, argued that it was the excessive European
impulse for "universal gain" which removed the African from a state of civilization
'Harvard Sitkoff, The Struggle for Black Equality 1954-1992 (New York: Hill and Wang,
1993), p. 4; A. Leon Higginbotham, Shades of Freedom: Racial Politics and Presumptions of
the American Legal Process (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 7.
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Brotherhood: Afro-Americans and Africa (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and
Company, 1971), pp. IX-97; John Bracey et al., Black Nationalism in America (New York:
The Bobbs Merrill Company, 1970), pp. 128-9; George Shepperson, "Notes on Negro
American Influences on the Emergence of Africa Nationalism," Journal of African History
(1960), pp. 301-312; Esedebe, Pan-Africanism: The Idea and Movement, pp. Chapters 1-3;
Skinner, In Defense of Black Nationality , pp. 7-10; Vincent B. Thompson, Africa and Unity:
The Evolution of Pan-Africanism (London: Longman, 1969), Chapters 1-3; Elliott P.
Skinner, African Americans and U.S. Policy Toward Africa. 1850-1924: In Defense of
Black Nationality (Washington, D.C: Howard University Press, 1992), pp. 7-10; Yetkutiel
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3Henry Sipkins, An Oration of the Abolition of the Slave Trade: Delivered in the African
Church, in the City of New York. January 2. 1809. Bv Henry Sipkins. A Descendant of
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24
"which his natural genius entitled him to enjoy." 1 Yet, despite their romanticized
consciousness, no amount of effort to recast the glories of ancient Africa could
console the free Northern blacks from the remorse of an increasing resentment
produced by the effects of American slavery. "We have mournfully observed the fall
of those institutions that shed luster on our mother country, and extended to Greece
and Rome those refinements that made them objects of admiration to the cultivations
of science." Almost similar to the stance later adopted by David Walker, they
acknowledged that, in "no country under heaven have descendants of an ancestry
once enrolled in the history of fame . . . been reduced to such degrading servitude" as
that under which they confronted from American prejudice. 2
Other blacks, however, shared in the opinion that slavery was divinely
ordained for the 88purpose of African regeneration. This concept corresponded
somewhat with some of the early ideology of Negro American leaders whom
historian Julie Winch terms the "Black Elite."3 To these blacks, therefore, it was the
circumstances of racial slavery, as ordained by providence that endowed them with
the moral, economic, and cultural authority necessary to lead the way toward the
regeneration of ancestral Africa. This was exactly the manner that Absalom Jones
'ibid. Also, see: William B. Gravely, "The Dialectic of Double Consciousness in Black
American Freedom Celebrations, 1808-1863," Journal of Negro History (Winter 1982), pp.
306-1 1; An Oration on the Abolition of the Slave Trade, by Russell Parrott. Delivered on the
First of January 1814. at the African Church of St. Thomas (Philadelphia: Printed for the
Different Societies by Thomas T. Stiles, 1814), in Porter, Ed., Early Negro Writing, p. 385.
2
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Reform Society, September, 1838), p. 1 1.
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cast his views in the oration of 1808. 1 Not quite certain as to why slavery was tied
directly to Africans, Jones reasoned that "perhaps" it was divinely ordained to
convert Africa to Christianity. He looked toward a time when a "Joseph" would
emerge from the ranks of the Negroes to be the "instrument of feeding the African
nations with the bread of life," and of leading them away from "sin and Satan."2
Unlike Jones, however, Russell Parrott more directly acknowledged that
Africa was slowly moving toward Christianity and away from "error and
paganism."3 Gloucester, on the other hand, saw the slavery-African-Christian link as
a misused opportunity. 4 Rather than extending the "blessings of improved politics,
and the comfortable and cheering light of the Christian religion," he observed that
Africans were being "bestowed a monopoly of the miseries of the world." 5
Gloucester did not conceive of ancient Africa as being in an idyllic state before the
arrival of the Europeans. His knowledge of Africa was linked to his steadfast
opposition to the policies of the American Colonization Society. 6 On the other hand,
Gloucester, Jr., lamented that the "unhappy sons and daughters of Africa were being
made to take upon their neck the galling yoke of slavery, for no other offense than
that they were born black."
7
'Absalom Jones, A Thanksgiving Sermon. Preached January 1, 1808. in St Thomas' African
Episcopal Church, Philadelphia: On Account of the Abolition of the African Slave Trade by
the Congress of the United States (Philadelphia: Fry and Kammerer, 1 808), in Dorothy B.
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There is reason then for believing that both the historical crisis of black
national identity and the mission of African-redemption were rooted in the profound
contradictions of the black experience in America. Thus, in striving toward the
redemption of their ancestral homelands, the descendants of slaves often perceived
themselves as "the children of Africa in this land," and as medium of lifting the veil
of degradation placed against their brethren. 1 This idea of African redemption can
also be traced to the "Biblical Root" of the Jewish experience. With a similar
emotion, it shows that the black diaspora yearned for a return to the homeland just as
the former had done while in captivity in Egypt and Babylon. Shepperson and
Skinner associated this notion of redemption in the Hebrew Scriptures, Psalms 68:31,
by reference to the old prophesy that, "Ethiopia shall soon stretch out her hands unto
God;" and "Prince shall come out of Egypt." In Acts 8:26-39, the conversion of a
man of Ethiopia
2
symbolized personal transformation and triumph against odds.
Thus, the Biblical Moses, as recorded for the faithful, allegedly led the
Hebrews out of Egyptian captivity. Such figures as Toussaint L'Ouverture,
Denmark Vesy, and Nat Turner, who attempted to lead black people to freedom, also
placed the tradition of the black struggle for freedom within the context of the Jewish
experience.
3
Unsurprisingly, prior to the inauguration of formal Pan-Africanism in
1900 the mission of African redemption served as the historical function of re-union
between blacks in the Americas and the homelands. As historian Okon E. Uya
documents: "The diasporic concept—that black in the Americas, as well as other
'Bracey, Black Nationalism in America, pp. 128-9.
2Shepperson, "African Diaspora: Concept and Context," in Global Dimensions of the
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blacks within the western hemisphere, are merely "Africans abroad"—appears to be
winning adherents in both Africa and the New World." 1 Over the span of their stay
abroad, African-descended people in the Americas were unfailing in their positive
role toward the development of the ancestral homelands.2
Despite occasional periods of changes in attitudes toward ancestral Africa,
the mission of African redemption attracted a steady consensus of favorable support
among the descendants of slaves. From slavery to freedom and beyond, the
memories of ancestral Africa existed in the consciousness of blacks—in their
spirituals, in their sorrow songs, in their religious cultures, and in the shifting
attachments of African names to their American institutions. But by way of physical
contacts with the homelands through missionary and educational projects, the black
diaspora exemplified their aspirations toward the regeneration of the ancestral
homelands.4 No wonder Milfred Fierce observes that, "African American interaction
with Africa is not at all a brand new phenomenon."
5
As Fierce further writes: "the nexus between Black America and Africa
—
especially West Africa—has been an ordered theme in African American history,
dating from the onset of the first direct traffic in slaves from West Africa to the
'Okon Edet Uya, ed., Black Brotherhood: Afro-Americans and Africa (Lexington,
Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1971), pp. ix-97.
2
Ibid.; Skinner, In Defense of Black Nationality , pp. 7-8
3
Ibid., Skinner, especially 63-91., 201-2, and "Rescuing Black South Africans;" Fierce, The
Pan-African Idea, p. 3.
4
Ibid., Skinner, "The Dialectic between Diasporas and Homelands," p. 17; Uya, BJacJc
Brotherhood ; R. D. Ralston and Albuquerque Mourao, "Africa and the New World," in
Unesco General History of Africa: Africa under Colonial Domination 1880-1935, Volume
VI 1, ed., A. Adu Boahen (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1985, pp. 755-769;
Ronald W. Walters, Pan-Africanism in the African Diaspora: An Analysis of Modern
Afrocentric Political Movements (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1993), pp. 101-8.
5
Thid.: Fierce. Pan-African Idea, p. 3; Ralston and Mourao, "Africa and the New World," pp.
747, 752-5.
28
Americas in the early part of the sixteenth century." 1 In fact there was no historical
period "when some blacks in the Americas did not hope to return to the land of their
forebears."
2 Many blacks in fact did return to Africa from Brazil and other parts of
the West Indies, etc. 3
Seen then within the context of the transatlantic slave trade and the resulting
colonial dispossession, the idea of redemption served as historical bond in the
peculiar relationships between descendants of slaves and continental Africans. To
African-descended Americans, therefore, enslavement meant being forcibly uprooted
and exiled under heinous degradation and exploitation in a hostile environment. This
applies to the concept of deracination—of seeking recovery from being pulled away
from the root of one's culture and existence. To continental Africans, colonialism
and the implicit effects of racial slavery served as the basis for redemption. As
Legum observed, with slavery and colonialism came economic, social, political, and
mental colonialism, persecution, inferiority, discrimination, and dependency.
4
The Black Diasporic-African
Contacts via Emigration/Colonization
One of the major features of the mission of African redemption was
expressed through the ideology of emigration or colonization. This involved blacks
who believed returning to ancestral Africa would help in advancing the course of
civilizing their brethren via the exposure to Western education, Christianity, and
modern cultures. For example, Paul Cuffe—a relatively well-to-do Negro from
Massachusetts—was a pioneer in the emigration of blacks to Sierra-Leone between
'Ibid.
2
Ibid.
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Ibid.
4Legum, Pan Africanism: A Short Political Guide , p. 15.
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1811 and 1815. Founder of the African Institution of Boston and the Friendly
Society of Sierra-Leone, he sought to settle emigrants from the diaspora in Sierra-
Leone so they could aid in the amelioration of "the negative image of Africa." 1 Like
so many who were to follow after him, Cuffe felt that African descendants in the
diaspora had a role to play in the uplift the homelands. 2 Moreover, he believed that:
If no Negro state of respectability be erected in Africa, prejudice in
general will make its obstinate stand against all the wealth, and
genius, and skill that may be exhibited by Negroes in North or South
America. The work is to be done in Africa. 3
Prominent among other American Blacks who followed in the footsteps of
Cuffe via physical contacts with Africa were Daniel Coker, Lott Cary, John
Russwurm, Edward Blyden, Martin Delaney, Alexander Crummell, and Bishop
Henry McNeal Turner.4 All of these leaders except Cuffe, Crummell, Delany, and
Turner died in West Africa. Like Cuffe, these men shared in the Christian-civilizing
role of ancestral Africa as well as in the moral, intellectual, and cultural uplift of the
race. Cary, who left the U.S. to settle in Liberia, was more certain of his status in
Africa than in America. As he stated:
I am an African; and in this country, however meritorious my conduct
and respectable my character, I cannot receive the credit due to either.
I wish to go to a country where I shall be estimated by my merits not
by my complexion, and I feel bound to labour for my suffering race.
Black leaders like Blyden, Delany, and Crummell emphasized the moral,
intellectual, and cultural uplift of the Black race. They called upon the children of
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Africa in the diaspora to turn their skills toward the uplift of the homelands: "We the
children of Africa in this land... are no way different from any other people in these
respects."
1
"For my part," Crummell observed, "I am satisfied that my field of labor
is with my own race in these times;" and, accordingly, that meant returning to the
service of his brethren in Liberia.2 Like Booker T. Washington and W. E. B. Du
Bois, Crummell believed that lifting the veil of ignorance and inferiority among
Africans required developed talents and experiences as well as the leadership of their
more enlightened brethren in the diaspora. Crummell honored this call for about
twenty years both as a missionary and as an educator in Liberia. There, he supported
Africans studying both in West Africa and in black colleges/universities in the U.S. 3
To this call Crummell believed that:
There seems to me to be a natural call upon the children of Africa in
foreign lands, to come and participate in the opening of treasures of
the lane of their fathers ... It has always been thus in the past, and
now as the resources of Africa are being more and more developed,
the extent of our interest therein is becoming more and more
diminutive ... It is the duty of black men to feel and labour for the
salvation of the mighty millions of their kin all through this
continent.
4
Because the notion of African redemption was also a response to the inherent
socio-cultural degradation of the black diaspora, the idea behind Christian-
missionary civilization of Africans was sometimes conflicting. After all, to a certain
extent, it was the presumed inferiority of Africans that justified enslavement and
hence their degradation. This same background later justified their enlightened
attitudes toward the regeneration of the homeland as well as ambivalence toward
'See, for example, Shepperson's "Notes;" Bracey, Black Nationalism , pp. 128-9.
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indigenous Africans. This problem was first inherent in the fact that the founding of
both the white-led and black-led colonization societies between 1816 and 1858 were
influenced by some negative images of Africa. This background might explain why
efforts to resettle blacks in Liberia were most successful among the more vulnerable
classes of blacks in the U.S. 1
So, accordingly, only a few black elites were willing to leave the American
shore for Liberia. Historian Julie Winch has argued that the early phases of the
American Colonization Society program to resettle blacks in Liberia had much to do
with those occupying the poorest socioeconomic status. Those who were closer to
an American niche were the elites and had a far lesser reason to consider leaving
America for Africa.
The prospect of positive development of blacks in Liberia through
emigration, as shared by Russwurm and Bylden, for instance, corresponded with the
attitude of a few elites who accepted the alternative of voluntary separation, rather
than continued degradation.
3
Others even expressed a preference for colonization in
Canada "because it would be better adapted to our constitution" and because it was
healthier in climate and "far more consonant with our views than with Africa."
4
By itself, however, the crises of resettlement in Liberia resulting from the
first waves of black settlers, had much in common with the attitudes of white-led
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founders ofACS and its patron, the U.S. government. 1 Thus, the attitude of the early
black colonists toward indigenous Africans was not much different from that of
whites. If "Martin Delany," with far stronger physical features of ancestral Africa as
well as feelings2 had problems understanding African ways, how much more the
profound uncertainties surrounding the first waves of less darker settlers in Liberia. 3
Delany' s support for the mission of African redemption, as depicted in his
Condition, Elevation, Emigration, and Destiny of the Colored People of the United
States in 1852, raised the prospect of success through emigration outside of Africa
for the descendants of slaves.
4
Fearing continued degradation in the land of their
birth, Delany urged his brethren to build themselves into a respectable people,
respectable trade, and respectable nation outside America.
5
Delany, of course, later accepted emigration to Liberia; visited Liberia and
Sierra-Leone and Nigeria on business trips, where he signed a treaty with the King of
Egba in Yorubaland for producing cotton. Yet his espousal of the notion of black
self-uplift through emigration did not materialize due to the American Civil War. He
later chose to serve as an army officer in the Civil War.
6
After the end of the war,
with the arduous crisis of the black struggle, Delany was unable to rekindle his
interest in the vision of emigration.
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Blyden's brand of colonization was closer to Crummell's belief in emigration
but somewhat different in approach. Crummell advocated a form voluntary
emigration skewed more toward the skilled or so-called "talented class" of African-
Americans rather than their less endowed brethren. He seemed less interested in the
prospect of emigration to areas of Africa other than Liberia. Yet, like Blyden, he
shared in the beliefs that providence was calling on the scattered children of Africa
in the diaspora to return to work toward the redemption of the ancestral homeland. 1
Blyden had far stronger roots in Liberia than Crummell. As President of Liberia
College, he wrote extensively on issues of African world and its related spheres of
human development. Born in St. Thomas, West Indies, he later became citizen of
Liberia, where he helped to plant the idea of black regeneration throughout Africa.
He was committed throughout his life to serving the cause of uplifting the race. Not
only did he see the scattering of Africans in the diaspora as similar to the experience
of the Jews in Egypt, he figured it as a form of divine plan toward their ultimate
regeneration. "Just as the history of the Israelites was directed by the hand of God,
so too, was the history of black America."
Collectively Delany, Blyden, Turner, and Garvey shared in the ideology of
"Africa for Africans," as well as the idea of black nationhood. But it was during the
redemptive efforts of Bishop Turner and Garvey that the idea received its fullest
attention and transformation.
3 The distinction between the two black personages lies
more in the fact that, despite some similarities, only one of them had direct contacts
with ancestral Africa.
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With Turner undoubtedly having some physical contacts with the homeland,
the concept of "back to Africa" reached its heights and bore some fruition. "Through
Bishop Turner's efforts, over 300 Afro-Americans emigrated to Liberia in March
1896." 1 Again, in 1896, he visited South Africa and Nyasaland, where he met with
Joseph Booth and John Chilembwe, and popularized the adoption of "Africa for
Africans." His related work with indigenous African Christian Union on economic,
political, and spiritual issues were influential in the evolution of the "South African
Ethiopianism Movement." Until his death in 1915, Turner played an important role
toward the emergence of an independent African Episcopal Church in South Africa.2
Like Turner, of course, Garvey sought through "the mission of African
redemption a pathway to restore respectability to "the stealing of Africans from
Africa."
3
Like Turner, moreover, he shared the strong convictions that whites could
never be trusted to cater to lasting development of the black race; for in his view,
"there is no manhood future in the United States for Negroes."
4
Thus, it was the
Garvey movement that ultimately transformed the ideology of "Africa for Africans"
and "back to Africa" from the earlier redemptive visions of Delany, Blyden, and
Turner into worldwide political and cultural force. His beliefs in the pride of the
race encouraged some blacks in Western Hemisphere to renew their faith and interest
in participating in the development of their ancestral homelands.
5
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The Garvey era coincided with the great urbanization resulting from the black
migration from the South to Northern and Mid-Western cities. His era was also
transformed by the emotional appeals that resulted from the Russian Revolution.
Both the First World War and the New Negro Renaissance served to rally and unite
the aspirations of American world blacks and the visiting African students in the
Americas and Europe, and back in Africa against European imperialism. 1
Due largely to this background, the Garvey movement had first seemed
capable of uniting the varied aspirations of blacks in the diaspora and the homelands.
His manifesto of the Universal Negro Improvement Association and the African
Committee League as well as appeals to the black proletariat of the world had
enormous influence on the visiting African students in the U. S., and later in the rise
of African liberation movements. Garvey' s call for "Africa for Africans" marked the
height of modern African nationalism. However, like his predecessors, he shared in
the inherent contradictions of the black experience. Although he wanted Africans to
"capture their resources," he looked up to whites to help in the effort. While
denouncing the light-skinned middle/upper class "Negroes" for being ashamed of
their black ancestry , his mission sought some forms of white patronage to uplift
blacks both in the diaspora and the homelands.
3
Like Turner, he gave enormous
support to the religious and political ferment of Ethiopianism movement in South
Africa and the rest of Africa.
4
'Ibid., pp. 761-6.
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Diaspora
, pp. 243-8.
3
Brotz, African American Social & Political Thought , pp. 555-8.
Vartin, "Scattered Africa," pp. 243-8.
36
Formal Pan-Africanism or Intra-Active Pan-Africanism
Formal Pan-Africanism emerged in 1900 as a more centralized re-
arrangements of the earlier missions of pan-Negro redemption missions to Africa.
According to Du Bois, this event which formed the core of "The idea of one Africa
to unite the thought and ideals of all native peoples of the dark continent belongs to
the twentieth century and stems naturally from West Indies and the United States." 1
More directly tied to the development of modern African nationalism, the
birth of formal Pan-Africanism could be traced to the effort of Henry Sylvester of
Trinidad and Alexander Walters of the United States. Collectively these two New
World Negro personages were the pioneers of the first Pan-African Conference, held
in London, in which Du Bois served as the Secretary.
Whereas the missions of African redemption were sometimes undertaken
through direct contacts with the ancestral homelands, formal Pan-Africanism did not
always require direct contacts. Rather, as Shepperson and Legum observed, its
medium of contacts with the African homelands were mostly through exchanges of
ideas involving African-descended races in the Americas, Europe, and Africa via the
Atlantic triangle.
Through this formal Pan-African medium the black diaspora of the Western
Hemisphere and continental Africans shared their experiences and exchanged their
emotional agonies against the negative effects of "racial otherness," which affected
them under alien. This was as well the forum for uniting their desire for an equal
place in the world. From 1900 to 1945—formal "Pan-Africanism"—supported
*W. E. B. Du Bois, The World and Africa (New York: Kraus-Thompson Organization
Limited, 1976, p. 7.
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mostly by American world blacks, served as the medium for rallying the battle cry of
collective development among the varying black worlds via the Atlantic triangle. 1
At this point, however, perhaps the term "intra-active Pan-Africanism" could
serve as a more adequate basis for explaining both the commonalities and differences
that occurred via the Atlantic triangle between the black diaspora of the Western
Hemisphere and Continental Africans. The idea of "intra-active Pan-Africanism"
means that shared commonalities among the varying black worlds in the Americas,
Europe, and Africa were also shaped by their distinctive cultural differences. With
the new climate of Afro-Atlantic triangle, "various groups, quite separate in origin,"
observed Du Bois, "became so united in experience and so exposed to the impact of
new cultures that they began to think of Africa as one idea and one land."2
Previously separated by centuries of transatlantic slave trade and slavery, and later
by colonialism, African students sojourning for education in the western hemisphere
had the rare opportunity of a-first-hand knowledge of the extent to which their
experience was as similar as it was somewhat dissimilar from that of the descendants
of slaves. Legum writes that from "its early phase, particularly from the middle of
the nineteenth century up to the turn of the twentieth century—the inhabitants of
Africa imbibed these new ideas from their studies mainly in the United States and
later in Britain."
'Shepperson's "Notes;" Legum, Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide, p. 14; I an
Duffield, "Pan Africanism since 1940," in The Cambridge History of Africa: from c. 1940 to
c. 1975, Volume 8, ed., Michael Crowder (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985),
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So, intra-active Pan-African contacts through the medium of Atlantic triangle
represented the cross-fertilization of ideas carried to and fro by African students in
the Americas, Europe and Africa vis-a-vis contacts with American world Negroes.
Through the varied processes of contacts, the benefits of enlightened recovery of
Africans from colonial rule found entry into the continent. 1
Returning to their respective homelands, the ability of these future leaders of
Africa to successfully draw from the formal and informal networks of intra-active
contacts further strengthened the basis of interactive Pan-Africanism within their
regional landscapes. Given the cross-cultural contamination of Africa especially
within its northern belt, the prospect of an interactive Pan-African unison
corresponded with the ideological variant of Africa's historical fracture.
Accordingly, interactive Pan-Africanism—with its internal variant into the Muslim
North and the Mediterranean Arab and the Far East—was further subdivided into
intra-active Pan-Africanism, and embraced the diverse unities of Afro-Arab-Asian
liberation movements.
2
Thus, the role of the black diaspora of enslavement in
shaping the rise of African nationalist liberation movements goes even further. For
example, both the principles of neutralism/alignment that found expression later at
'ibid. Also, see: Ralston and Mourao, "Africa and the World," pp. 746-781; Joseph E. Harris
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Chanaiwa, "Pan-Africanism and Liberation," in General History of Africa, Volume VI 11,
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Bandung, Cairo, and Accra conferences and later still across the diverse unities of
the less developed regions of the modern world before and after decolonization were
mostly the basic ideologies of blacks of the Western Hemisphere. 1
The above development meant that the evolutionary development of formal
Pan-Africanism from the 1900s to 1940s as well as later of the Afro-Asian liberation
movements had much to do with the systemic transformation of Negro world
influences within and beyond the Western Hemisphere. This same background
formed the basis for the broader global transformation of the colored proletariat.2
Accordingly, within the African theater of the Pan-Africanism, this involved a carry-
over via the Atlantic triangle of the principles of Negro-Americans by Western-
educated Africans. Some portion of Shepperson's appraisal of the trend is worth
highlighting here:
Negro America, in a complicated Atlantic triangle of influences, has
played a considerable part ideologically in the emergence of African
nationalism: in conceptualization, evocation of attitudes and through
*A. W. Singha and Shilley Hune, Non-alignment in an Age of Alignments (Westport,
Connecticut: Lawrence Hill & Company, 1986), especially "Introduction" and Chapters I-
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the provision of the raw material of history. If today, the new African
nation may be said to be of more value to Negro America than Negro
America to them, this should not be allowed to conceal the historical
role of the colored American in their emergence. 1
Shepperson's plea for the newly independent leaders of black Africa to
reciprocate the noble role of their ancestral kin therefore seems logical. There is here
the recognition that between 1900 and 1927, the New World Negro-led Pan African
Congresses2 heralded and dominated some of the principles that later formed the
basis of modern African nationalism. Consequently, the inauguration of intra-active
Pan-Africanism and later of its interactive continental wings provided another form
of ancestral solidarity to move the development of the homelands forward. Until
1945, Western Hemisphere blacks not only dominated intra-active Pan African
conferences, they also defended the "honor and the integrity of their ancestral
brothers under colonial yoke."3 As one scholar documents:
In the five international conferences held between 1900 and 1945, Afro-
Americans of the Pan-Africanist persuasion defended the honor and integrity
of their ancestral brothers under colonial yoke. They thereby laid the
foundation for the Post Second World War of African independence
movements, and rightly earned for themselves, the designation of the
vanguard of modern African nationalism.4
Sociologist St. Clair Drake observed that Pan-Africanism began as an event
involving "the beloved and scattered million" of the sons of Africa.
5
These
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conferences brought African-descended races into closer contacts to identify as well
as to solve the problems confronting their varying worlds in the modern world.
Through these forums, continental Africans enjoined themselves with their ancestral
kin to address their grievances before the conscience of the imperial European/Euro-
American powers. These were also the forums in which to address the inequality
imposed upon them largely because of their racial background. 1
George Washington Williams, Carter Woodson, George Padmore, Booker T.
Washington, W. E. B. Du Bois, and Carter Woodson, to mention but a few, were all
involved in the memorable events that formed the basis of intra-active Pan-
Africanism. Du Bois, in his writing and commitment, was the "Father of modern
African nationalism."
Du Bois tirelessly chaired most of the Pan-African conferences, and wrote
about African histories and cultures, urging understanding and respect. His
polemics, which show the ties between European colonial imperialism and the First
World War, were crucial to the re-direction of the relationships between the
historical struggle of blacks in the diaspora and the African homelands. Similarly,
they served as the crucial facilitators of understanding among the varying races of
color in the modern.
Historian Vincent Thompson refers to the program of African development
through intra-active Pan-Africanism as "a gift of the New World of America to the
'See, for example, Shepperson "Notes" on Pan-African Conferences between 1900 and
1945.
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Old World of Africa." 1 As Crummell would argue, this gift by the "Children of
Africa in this land"2 represented the hope that, despite the bitter experience of
slavery, blacks in the diaspora had as their aim the vision of uplifting the ancestral
homeland. This was not an irrational concept full of vague emotions, as the German
scholar Immanuel Geiss once argued. 3 Rather, according to historian O. P. Esedebe,
Pan-Africanism is "a political and cultural phenomenon which regards Africa,
Africans and African descendants abroad as a unit." 4
Pan-Africanism, therefore, seeks "to regenerate and unify Africa and promote
a feeling of oneness among people of the African world." By striving to glorify the
African past through the inculcation of pride in its values, it most assuredly ensures
the moral, political, economic, and cultural essence of its mission. 5 This foundation
was later to have a strong bearing on the transformation of black proletarian
internationalism. For, through intra-active Pan-Africanism—first dominated by
descendants of slaves and interactive Pan-Africanism dominated mostly by
indigenous Africans—came the diverse unities that facilitated the process toward
decolonization and political freedom from alien rule.
These Pan-Africa dialectics not only coincided with the birth of independent
African states, but were also unifying complementary of the strengths and
weaknesses of blacks in America and Africa throughout the varying stages of their
struggle for equal status. By 1920s, when the leap in the Negro America's world
'Thompson, African Unity , p. 3; Panikkar, Revolution in Africa, p. 104.
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thought reached Africans, the ideological dialectics of the Pan-Africanism centered
on "Africa for Africans," 1 and reflected the consummation of a much earlier vision
of American World Negro thought. As we saw earlier, this development was
inspirited by the emotional "back to Africa" of the Garvey era. 2
But, in the 1930s and 1940s, when the emphasis on Pan-Africanism shifted
toward securing the legitimate values of black culture wherever found, the ethos of
the Negritude movement emerged as the bridge of emotional and cultural continuity
of black aspirations in the world. 3 This period, as we also noted earlier, was marked
by a carry-over and later transformation of the related ideas that transpired via intra-
active triangles of Afro-atlantic contacts between the black diaspora of the Western
Hemisphere and Western-educated Africans.
The Black Diaspora and the New Nations of Africa: A Review
Of course, as we hinted earlier, there were eras of low tides in both the
perception as well as in the dialectics of Pan-African relations between blacks in the
diaspora and the homelands. During those eras, Africa and its peoples were
sometimes viewed as heathens, and as only fit to be directed by their more civilized
ancestral kin in the diaspora. This kind of attitude was probably strongest during the
eras of uncertainties in the black struggle in America. Professor Skinner writes that
Negro Americans "took a dim view of an ancestral land whose military and political
weaknesses permitted its inhabitants to be carried off and enslaved. They were
'Anne Forester Holloway, "Pan-African Activism in the 20th Century," in Black Man in
America: Integration and Separation , ed., James A. Moss (New York: A Delta Book, 1971),
pp. 143-5.
Ibid. Also, John Henrik Clarke, "The Afro-American Nationalism," Freedomways 1 (Fall
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pp. 346-58.
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scorned when Africa was colonized and conquered by outsiders who, convinced of
the sub-humanity of its inhabitants, felt called upon to Christianize and civilized
them."
1
The aforementioned background perhaps fully explains why, in 1958,
Kwame Nkrumah stated during the Sixth Pan-Africanist Conference held Ghana in
that, "Before many of us were conscious of our degradation, it was the New World
Negroes who raised the banner of African liberation."2 But, as Africans and African-
Americans gained new national and international image and respectability between
the mid-1950s and 1960s, the status of their ancestral relationships also improved
correspondingly. Skinner observes that: "The emergence into independence of the
sub-Saharan nations enormously changed the world-wide significance of the
American race problem and provided a considerable stimulus to the movement for
racial equality in the United States."3
By the 1960s, the bulk of the new leaders of Africa were men who had come
into contact with American world Negroes via intra-active Pan-Africanism.
Therefore, with the birth of an independent nation of Ghana in 1957 as well as the
related inauguration of the First Conference of African Independent States at Accra
in 1958, Africans witnessed the consummation of an idea that was first influenced by
American World Negroes.
4
Some African-Americans who could never have conceived that black people
would ever be rulers of nations, nor previously identified with Africans openly,
'Skinner, In Defense of Black Nationality , p. 10.
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began to identify with them as partners. Others went as far as assuring friends of
their special relationships with Africans and their new leaders. Thrilled by the birth
of the new nations of Africa as well as by the sights of the respectable receptions
accorded their dignitaries at the White House, African-Americans were filled with
joy and imagination regarding the new status of their ancestral kin on the world
scene.
The preceding development was also marked by increased identification with
the homelands. "An increasing number of Africans and Afro-Americans are now
looking back at their history and culture, and within themselves, for the spiritual and
philosophical stimulus for their survival and direction." 1 This development formed
the necessary bridge that underscored the nationalist focus of African liberation
movements as well as the transformation of black liberation movements across the
world.
2 By the 1960s, however, the ideological dialectics of black internationalism
revolved around securing the concept of power with which to address the varying
needs of the black masses in the world.
3
This phase was marked by more conscious
responses to both their internal and external crises. Malcolm X perhaps captured the
fullest essence of this era when he told an OAU submit that,
We in America, are your host brothers and sisters, and I am only to
remind you that our problems are your problems.... Your problems
will never be fully solved until and unless ours are solved. You will
never be fully respected unless we are also respected. You will never
be recognized as free human beings until and unless we are also
recognized and treated as human beings.
4
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The two poles of black internationalism came to the fore following the
alleged U.S. involvement in the murder of Patrice Lumumba, the Congolese Prime
Minister. Some African-Americans used the occasion to publicize their solidarity
with political events in their ancestral homelands. To others, of course, the murder
of Patrice Lumumba was the symbolic international lynching of a black man on the
altar of colonialism. 1
The opposition to the murder of Lumumba involved "more than fifty
Negroes" within the United Nations alone, ultimately succeeding forcing "the
Council President to call a half-hour recess."2 According to Harold Cruse, his death
was "the worst disorder in U.N. history."3 Extolled in various ceremonies by
African-Americans as the "best son of Africa," the "Lincoln of Africa," and the
"Black Messiah,"4 Lumumba's spirit—like that of Nat Turner—was portrayed as
roaming in majesty over the land of Africa against the forces of neocolonialism.
Definitely with the passage of the civil and voting rights legislations, along
with the corresponding amendment in the U.S. immigration law by around the mid-
1960s, African-Americans and Africans entered into a new era of bargains in
America and across the world. Despite continuing racial indifference, as a result of
those enactments, the number of African-Americans holding elective office and other
important public positions also began to rise steadily. For example, in the South the
number reached 5,000 in 1970 and 2,500 in 1980. This trend was followed by the
'Clarke, "Afro-American Nationalism," pp. 285-6, 294.
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rise in their national political representation from 300 in 1965 to 3,000 in 1975 and
from 5,000 in 1980 to more than 7,000 in 1992. 1
Barely two decades after the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts were
signed into law Jesse Jackson won wide national recognition as a presidential
candidate in 1984. His extensive grassroots mobilization of eligible voters attracted
blacks and whites, and as a result, black mayors in 1991 headed majority-white cities
with populations of 50,000 and more majority-black cities.2
Between the 1990s and mid-2000, the glaring evidences of how the
descendants of slaves were reshaping American ethos in bold, brilliant and unique
creative art forms—athletic, intellectual, and in popular cultures—were noticeable
and undeniable. Certainly from the 1 970s onward, there was no doubt that the gains
made by black-America also had some assuring results for black Africa and indeed
for Africans entering the U.S. Since the late 1980s, to be sure, the enormous
influences of the Black Political Caucus in Washington, D.C., along with
TransAfrica, have supported favorable U.S. policies toward Africa.
4
This can be
seen as the maturing of the earlier missions of African redemption and formal Pan-
Africanism.
Africans were equally in a position to complement the historic achievements
of their ancestral kin. Since the 1980s, in fact, the general course of the African and
'Sitoff, The Struggle for Racial Equality, p. 221. For a more contemporary summary, see
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African diaspora relationships has been evolving on the global context with the
consciousness of collective survival. For example, in January 1983, some scholars
and policy makers from five West African nations met in Monrovia, Liberia, with
their African-American kin under the auspices of the University of Sierra Leone and
the Afro-American Studies Program of Boston University to search for ways to
revitalize the economic and cultural networks that tied the two black worlds
together.
1
Also, in September 1987, thanks to the late Chief M.K.O. Abiola of
Nigeria, a summit addressing Africa's crisis in London attracted black scientists,
academicians, businessmen, politicians, and all others from all corners of the world
to brain storm on the solution to its growing problem.2 During the 1990s, the
renewed trend of Afro-Atlantic exchanges received further impulses by way of the
renaissance on African and African-American cultures across the world.
Generally, a more pro-active pattern of economic, cultural, and political
collaboration between the black diaspora and the ancestral homelands might have
been revealed in the attitudes of the former during a greater part of the 1990s. This
development was supported by Public Service Documentary highlighting visits to the
homelands by some African-Americans. Black American stars like Whoopi
Goldberg, A. J. Kool, and Michael Jackson visited the homelands. Significantly,
these exchanges coincided with an era when the status of blacks in the economic,
cultural, and political spheres had undeniable influences on a global scale.
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When more than 330 influential African-Americans met with their African
counterparts in the "First Historic Summit held in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, in August
1991," some saw it as a fulfillment of Pan-Africanist ideals. 1 Unlike the earlier Pan-
Africanist Summits,2 the Abidjan Submit which took place almost at the end of the
Cold War called for building "a bridge together that will help move Africa forward,
as it has never moved before." Reporting on the Abidjan submit, Whitaker observed
that, thereafter "neither Africa nor African-America would be the same."3
Even before Abidjan, the independence of Zimbabwe, the end of apartheid in
South Africa, and the support for democratic changes in Nigeria and Ghana as well
as Cameroon, were all enacted with the political pressure of black America. These
efforts were in keeping with earlier Pan-Africanist summons to work collectively
toward the regeneration of ancestral Africa. So, along with the Abidjan, and the end
of the European Cold War, black America and black Africa stood at the crossroad of
a new epoch.
4
These blacks saw the varied negative images in their racial
backgrounds in the ghettos of the Americas—in the U.S., Haiti, South Africa,
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Rwanda, Liberia, Congo, Angola, Somalia, Sudan, and Nigeria. Such scenes were
revealing of the strong disparities between them and other races of the modern
world. It also revealed the extent of their varied experiences under alien exploitation
as well as the context of their continuing struggle.
Context of an Existing Problem
Whether for Nigeria as a specific country or entire continent, the crisis of
institutional instability in post-colonial Africa has resulted in the largest voluntary
emigration of highly trained sectors of its personnel to America. 1 As we saw much
earlier in this chapter, this development represented the second historic dispersal of
black Africans, and undoubtedly requires at this point a review of their contextual
experience.
Surprisingly, this largely voluntary African build-up in America has as yet to
be clearly explained in relation to their status with the descendants of slaves. Yet
nearly all the socio-cultural orbits of these newest of America's immigrants from
sub-Saharan Africa are shaped by the generational experience of the descendants of
slaves. Although earlier effort suggested that the American orbit of Nigerian
immigrants, for example, was defined by African-Americans, not much was known
about the status of their incorporation within the American mosaic.
2
It still remains
to be seen how much has changed from the earlier effort and how much is indeed
similar to the experiences of the descendants of slaves.
'Apraku, African Emigres in the United States , pp. 1-17, 42-3, 45; Authur, Invisible
Sojourners
, pp. 1-26.
2
Udofia, "The Status of the Relationship with African-Americas," pp. iv-v, 1-23, 264-308,
did very little in explaining the socio-cultural context of Nigerians' incorporation into
American society.
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Ira Reid's Negro Immigrant ' may still represent the best attempt to explain
the socio-cultural milieu in which the descendants of involuntary and voluntary
migrations find themselves in America. Prior to Reid's work, however, the term
"African" or "black," which grouped together all persons of Negro extraction,
seldom referred to continental Africans. 2 The Negro immigrant not only was "a
phenomenon of the Western World," he was also largely "from the Caribbean area."3
Despite being highly educated and conceivably more inclined toward the
values of his former colonial masters, he was the most degraded and least
incorporated sector of American immigrants.4 Not surprisingly, the few Africans
entering America for education during the later colonial era were sometimes kept
apart from their ancestral kin. 5 Yet still, others were often stigmatized with the
socio-cultural stigma of racial degradation. 6 Generally, this background applies to
how African settlers in America in turn often misunderstand the deep-seated crises of
black Americans. On the other hand, however, efforts by some African-Americans
toward issues of African development were sometimes not linked to the concerns of
a majority of Africans in the U.S. 7 The continuing effects of the transatlantic slave
trade and colonialism seem to be the underlying explanation why the two related and
almost similarly affected groups, rarely have a clear understanding about each
'Reid, The Negro Immigrant especially "Introduction" and Chapters 1-4.
2
Ibid., p. 24; also, see: Wortham, "Contemporary Black Immigration to the United States," in
Contemporary American Immigration: Interpretive Essay
,
p. 201.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.;Reid, pp. 25-31.
5
Kenneth James King, Pan-Africanism and Education: A Study of Race Philanthropy in the
Southern States of America and East Africa (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), pp. 1-2.
6
Ibid., also, see background in Ali Mazrui, The African Condition: A Political Diagnosis
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 28-33; Skinner, "The Dialectic between
Diasporas and Homelands," pp. 39-41; Skinner, Defense of Black Nationality , pp. 7-1
1
7
Udofia, Trotter Review , p. 32.
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other's experiences and problems. This background, perhaps best explains why they
were sometimes suspicious of each other. Besides, it explains why they showed an
unwilling to reciprocate their historic relationship in a more respectable manner. 1 As
historian Joseph Harris documents:
In both Africa and the Diaspora, blacks were taught that they were
inferior to and dependent on whites. The black heritage was not a
worthy field of serious study. Until fairly recently—well into the
twentieth century—neither continental Africans nor their kin abroad
knew much about the other, and what they did know was often
distorted.
2
Despite the triumphs of black America and black Africa, the pace of their
human development is far behind. Neither the increased contacts between the two
black worlds nor the continuing renaissance in Afrocentric cultures have been able to
resolve the inherent split resulting from chattel slavery and colonial dispossession. 3
Cruse, in responding to the attitudes of some visiting African students toward
African Americans in the U.S., argued that their historical experience was similar yet
markedly unique. While their similarities were linked to the collective experience of
racial degradation and exploitation, yet differences abound due to the more traumatic
ordeal of slavery on the descendants of involuntary migration.
4
The Cruse theory, however, might not adequately explain the implications of
the current build-up of indigenous African population in America. It explains why,
'Alvin B. Tillery, Jr., "Black Americans and the Creation of America's Africa Policies: The
Deracialization of Pan-African Politics," in The African Diaspora: African Origins and New
World Identities, ed., Isidore Okpewho et al. (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana
University Press, 1999), pp. 518-521.
2
Harris, Global Dimension of the African Diaspora , p. 5.
3
For example, see Public Affairs Documentary: Back To Africa by F. Dennis shown in the
first week of the "Black History Month" (Feb., 1993), as well as a contrasting position in an
article written by Kwame Okoampa-Ahoofe, Jr., "Perverting the Afrocentric," Nigerian
News Digest (Charlotte, North Carolina, November 15, 1991), p. 18.
4
Cruse, Crisis of the Negro Intellectual , p. 342.
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as documented by Arthur M. Schlesinger, some black Americans prefer being called
"Black" to "African-American." 1 It might also explain why some African
immigrants were sometimes estranged from black Americans and why the latter
tended to believe that Africans showed an unwillingness to "identify with us."2
Clearly, some Africans and African-Americans have differing images in their minds
about themselves. While some black Americans perceived black Africans as
primitive people, the latter have stereotypical images of their ancestral kin as lazy in
the midst of enormous wealth.3
The problem of race and racism, along with its collective effects, has far
greater significance in defining the socio-cultural context of African-American and
Nigerian relations in America. According to Portes, Rumbaut and Apraku, African-
Americans and African immigrants are similarly affected on racial matters. Apraku
goes even further and concluded that 89 percent of his African respondents resented
the "racism and discrimination perpetuated against them because of their color."
About 40 percent of the Apraku respondents said they resented "the way white
Americans treat blacks in the United States." 4
Landry, on the other hand, argues persuasively that fully incorporating black
populations into mainstream America is a "societal problem." Centuries of racism,
which made it possible for "Asians to develop businesses that were patronized by the
'Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural
Society (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992), p. 88.
2
Skinner, Global Dimensions , pp. 39-41; Cruse, Crisis of the Negro Intellectual pp. 434;
Tillery, Jr., "Black Americans and the Creation of America's Africa Policies," p. 518.
3
Ibid., Cruse, pp. 435-8; Meier and Rudwick, From Plantation to Ghetto , p. 4.
"Alejandro Portes and Ruben G. Rumbaut, Immigrant America: A Portrait (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1990), pp. 81, 90-92, 94-7; Apraku, African Emigres in the
United States , pp. 19, 1 10.
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general white public," were marked by discriminatory legal and institutional
structures toward African-Americans in both the South and North "for 100 years
after slavery."
1
Landry thus offers an historical foothold for grasping the problem of blatant
racism and discrimination confronting Nigerians in urban America. Such cities as
Los Angeles, Washington, D.C., Houston, Atlanta, New York, and Dallas have high
incidences of racism directed toward African-Americans and African immigrants. 2
This makes large urban cities significant for examining the social crisis involving the
two historically related and affected groups.
Sowell's Race and Cultures , Mifirations and Cultures , and Conquests and
Cultures—similar to Denish D'Souza's End of Racism—supported the success of
some immigrant groups on the basis of their racial and cultural traits.
3
If Sowell, for
instance, is correct,
4
it might then mean that the forced migration of Africans to the
'Bart Landry, "The Enduring Dilemma of Race in America," in America at Century's End ,
ed., Alan Wolfe (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1991), pp. 202-203.
2
"I am not guilty, pleads Linus Okafor," in The Good Hope News: The African Perspective ,
Vol. 1, No. 6 (Dallas, Texas, June 1990), pp. 1 and 7; Eyo Ita, "Dallas Boils Over Nigerian
Mafia," Nigerian New Digest (Charlotte, N.C, November 27, 1991), pp. 1, 21; O.
Nwachukwu, "Preying on the Weak: KXAZ TV Zeroes in on Nigerians," The Good Hope
News: The African Perspective (Dallas: Nov.-Dec, 1991), pp. 1, 11; Susan Warren,
"Nigerian Ambassador to try to ease tensions in visit here," Houston Chronicle (February 9,
1992), pp. 1A, 19A; Ike Onyia, "The Making of a Scape-goat: Nigerians and the Image
Problem," African Business Source Magazine (Houston, Texas, November 1992), pp. 26 and
40; "Nigerian near dead due to Dallas police brutality," in The African Herald, Vol. 7, No. 8
(Dallas, Texas, August 1996), pp. 1 and 27. Also, see the report on the sensational acquittal
of "four police officers" in New York murder trial of "Amadou Diallo" in Time (March 6,
2000, pp. 24-28). .
3
Dinesh D'Sousa, The End of Racism: Principles for a Multicultural Society (New York:
The Free Press, 1995), pp. 397, 472-6, 526-8; Thomas Sowell, Race and Culture: A World
View (New York: Basic Books, 1994), pp. ix-xiv, 1-60; Thomas Sowell, Migrations and
Cultures; A World View (New York: Basic Books, 1996) "Chapter I: Migration Patterns;"
Thomas Sowell, Conquest and Cultures: An International History (New York: Basic Books,
1998), pp. ix-xi,3-20, 153-173.
4
Ibid especially Race and Culture and Mirations and Cultures.
55
U.S. along with their exploitation was not a relevant component of economic and
cultural development. Given the existence of copious evidences to the contrary, the
Sowell position is likely to be an uneasy one.
Again, Barone—seemingly supportive of Sowell and Souza—argues that
there are similarities between the Irish and black experience as well as between the
Jewish and Asian immigrants. 1 While this is somewhat true on the general human
plain, he appears to misunderstand the deeper roots of the crisis of the black
experience. Collectively, the Barone thesis—like Sowell and D' Souza—calls for a
clearer explanation of the similarities and dissimilarities of America's immigrants.
This is because, to another observer, America's experiences with the "melting pot" is
rather more dependent on the mutuality "to live in recognition" of its inherent racial
differences.
So, accordingly, the Barone summons to re-invent the "melting pot" is rather
suggestive of a need to examine the extent to which sustained stratification of
American races and racial indifferences were embedded within the "melting pot.
3
Earlier, anthropologist Ogbu posited the relationship between negative historical
cycle and the underdevelopment of some racial minorities in America.
4
His
'Michael Barone, The New Immigrants: How the Melting Pot Can Work Again
(Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing Inc., 2001), pp. 9-1 1, 17-21.
2
Robert Hughes, Culture and Complaint: The Fraying of America (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1993), pp. 12-13.
3Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1 944).
4
Ibid. For example, for differences of historical experiences, see John U. Ogbu, "The
consequences of American caste system," in The School Achievement of Minority Children,
U. Neisser, ed. (Hillside, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1986), pp. 19-56; and
Andrew Hacker, Two Nations: Black and White. Separate. Hostile. Unequal (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1992), especially chapters 1-4; Robin Blackburn, The Making of
the New World Slavery , pp. 3-4; and Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade, p. 5.
56
conclusion continues to correlate with patterns of underdevelopment found among
historically affected ethnic minorities, especially African descent groups.
Nor are works by some African writers any clearer in explaining the context
of the African-diasporic relations in the U.S. Although the experience of colonialism
was markedly dissimilar in its negative effects on Africans, 1 Darlington states that:
"The recent African immigrants were driven by the same force, which drove other
immigrant groups to come to America." As Darlington further documents: "Most of
these immigrant groups came for political, economic, and /or religious reasons."2
Darlington shows no clear grasp as to whether the "political, economic, and
religious reasons" of African immigration were rooted in its peculiar historical orbit
,
or in the crisis of colonial dispossession—or a combination of both. Obviously, his
view on the similarity between African immigration and other immigrations to the
U.S. is imprecise. The fact that the larger proportion of African immigration is the
result of the negative effects of colonial legacies makes other explanation inevitable. 3
The apparent oversight in Darlington's thesis perhaps lies in mis-
understanding the extent to which slavery and colonialism had affected black Africa
and the organization of African-descended races in the U.S. as well as post-colonial
institutions in Africa after decolonization. Such an experience, which corresponded
with negative attitudes toward the African region as well as toward its pattern of
postcolonial immigration to the U.S., might not be similar to that of the other
'Davidson, Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State , chapter 2, especially pp. 62-80.
2
Darlington I. Ndubike, The Struggle. Challenges, and Triumphs of the African Immigrants
in America (New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2002), pp. 39-40.
3
See earlier notes on President Olusegun Obasanjo and Ali Mazrui on the colonial crises.
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branches of American immigrants. 1 Of course, there are similar factors such as
political, socioeconomic and religious crises behind foreign-born immigration.2
That the above factors also influenced immigration from Nigeria to the U.S.,
just as from Asia and Europe, for example, cannot be denied. Nevertheless, the
emphasis here is that, the crisis of American slavery, which affected African-
Americans more directly, has strong bearing on the medium and character of post-
colonial African immigration to the U.S. This peculiar feature of post-colonial
immigration, when compared to that of non-African descent groups, would be seen
to be markedly dissimilar.
The preceding background in turn defines the pattern of incorporating the
black African immigrants into the American mosaic. Hawk and Skinner have argued
that the socio-cultural context of African immigrants was more likely to be dissimilar
from others of non-African descent groups due to the effects of slavery and
colonialism. African immigration along with its relationship to American
institutions as well as to the host society is more problematic and peculiar.
Consequently, African immigration is more clearly explained by the malfunctions of
post-colonial institutions as well as by the enduring effects of the first dispersal
under racial slavery. This trend, again, is not nearly as similar with the experience of
other non-African descent groups who immigrated to the U.S. particularly from the
1960s to the 1980s.
'See, for example, Blackburn, The New World Slavery , pp. 3-4; Beverly Hawk's "African
and the 1965 U.S. Immigration Law," Ph.D. Dissertation (Madison: University of
Wisconsin, 1988), p. 271; and Skinner, In Defense of Black Nationality , pp. 7-10.
2
Ndubike, The Struggle , pp. 39-40.
3
See earlier notes on Blackburn, The New World Slavery ; Hawk's "African and the 1965
U.S. Immigration Law," and Skinner, In Defense of Black Nationality .
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Within a specific context Ogbaa appears to have misunderstood the historical
links between African-Americans and Nigerians in attempting to explain the
Nigerian-U.S. connection. 1 As Ogbaa documents: "Nigerian Americans wondered
why the black political and civic leaders had not been able to persuade Congress and
the various American presidents (except Clinton) to develop foreign policies that
would have helped Nigerians as well as other Africans to develop democratic
governance that ensure social justice and economic stability for their people."2
Perhaps the Ogbaa problem is due more to a misunderstanding of the well-
known historiography of the black diaspora in influencing the course of African
world development. However, given some of the evidences posted in his references,
this weakness is rather surprising. 3 For, as our earlier emphases in this chapter
revealed, it is clear that even before President Clinton's era, black America was
fairly active in influencing the direction of U.S.-Nigerian/African relations.4
While Ndubike misunderstands the general historical context of African
immigration to the U.S., Ogbaa shows a similar problem within a specific context .
These weaknesses by otherwise well-intentioned Africans strongly call for a more
definitive re-examination of the relationships between the two historic migrations of
Africans to the U.S. The historiography of Afro-Atlantic experience should then be
linked and explained as apart of an organic unfolding of two related dispersals of
Africans to the United States due to the effects of European contacts. The problem
raised by Ogbaa, along with the centrality of Nigeria, calls for retracing some aspects
'Ogbaa, The Nigerian Americans , p. 1 15.
2
Ibid.
3
For example, some of the references highlighted by Ogbaa implied that there were far
stronger continuities than he had explained.
4
This is supported by our earlier references.
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of the forced and voluntary migrations of the black diaspora of enslavement and the
Nigerian diaspora of colonialism.
Summary
There are unquestionable evidences of the presence of Nigerian/African
immigrants in the U.S. as well as of the possibility of redirection in the ancestral
relationships between the descendants of forced migration and voluntary migration
from Africa south of the Sahara. These evidences are important for understanding
the current implications oftwo historic migrations of Africans to the U.S.
The Nigerian evidences, currently the most visible, provided the basis for re-
examining both the earlier as well as continuing themes in the African-diasporic
relations, along with the socio-cultural context of the black experience in America.
After about four centuries, a majority of voluntary post-colonial African settlers in
the U.S. are mostly from Nigeria. Nigerians constituted the largest most established
representation of the black diaspora of colonialism: they were both demographically
and culturally aligned along African-American lines (See Chapters 2, 3, 6).
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CHAPTER 2
EARLY PATTERNS OF EURO-AFRICAN CONTACT
WITH THE WEST COAST OF AFRICA
This Chapter is divided into four parts. The first part contains a brief review
of early Portuguese contacts with the West African Coast. The second part examines
the vast stretches of the Guinea Coast including the Delta region of modern Nigeria,
where a majority of the New World slaves were taken. The third section contains the
explanation of early European contacts and later still, the involvement of more
European slaving exploits in Niger Delta regions. The fourth part contains the
regional distribution of Nigerian/African slaves in the British mainland North
American colonies.
Part 1: An Overview of Forced Migration of West Africans
Figure 1 shows the major routes/lanes of commercial and cultural contacts
linking inland Africa to North Africa to Mediterranean Arab and to Europe, in what
can safely be termed medieval era. Also, it shows the strategic zones of early
medieval European-Mediterranean commercial contacts which by the 1500s became
the major pathways in the search for the bounty of the goldfields of inland Africa.
Further, with the opening of the modern era under the leadership of Iberian
Europe, the Iberian inroads into the Mediterranean and later into inland Africa
marked the beginning of the shift of world commerce/exchanges to the New World.
Both for inland Africa as well as Afro-Arab and the related regions of Southern
Europe in the Mediterranean, the Iberian era was marked by serious competitions
and rivalries. With the discovery of the New World, this interlude formed the basis
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of the most distinctive form of modern slavery via forced migration of West
Africans.
Figure 1
The Major Routes of Medieval trans-Saharan Caravan
Exchanges with inland Africa, North Africa,
Mediterranean Asia and Europe
Source: Hugh Thomas, The Slave Trade: The Story of
the Atlantic Slave
Trade. 1440-1870 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), p. 33.
In retrospect, however, the forced migration of Africans can
be traced to
1441, with its origin lying squarely in the official
attitude of Prince Henrique of
Portugal, later popularized as "Henry the Navigator."
From 1419 to 1460, Prince
Henry emerged as the foremost leader of Iberian Europe—
perhaps of the whole of
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Europe for encouraging a series of expeditions aimed at reaching the interior sources
of West African gold trade. 1
According to historian James Rawley, Henry's voyages of exploration were
first driven by "the zeal against Muslims, a greed for gold, and the quest for the
legendary kingdom of Prester John, and the search for Oriental spices."2 Other
historians, however, have varied in their explanation of the events leading to forced
migration of West Africans. For example, as John Iliffe states, "The Atlantic slave
trade began in 1441 when a young Portuguese sea-captain, Antam Gongcalvez,
kidnapped a man and woman on the Western Saharan Coast to please his employer,
Prince Henry the Navigator."3 So, according to Iliffe, the forced migration of West
Africans to the Atlantic coast, later to Europe, and finally to the New World, can be
traced to the attitude of early Portuguese explorers.
4
But historian Blackburn's interpretation of the forced migration is slightly
different from Iliffe's although somewhat similar to that of W. E. B. Du Bois. 5
Indeed, in Blackburn's view, it was rather the desire of Iberian merchants to strike
'See for example: Ira Berlin, Many Thousand Gone: The First Two Centuries of Slavery in
North America (Cambridge, MA, London, England: Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 1998), pp. 17-19, 24-8; Ira Berlin, Generation of Captivity: A History of African-
American Slaves (Cambridge, MA, and London, England: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 2003), pp. 23-30; Blackburn, The Making of the New World Slavery , pp.
3-4, 99; Vincent Bakpetu Thompson, The Making of the African Diaspora in the Americas
1441-1900 (New York: Longman, Inc., 1987), pp.78-81; J. D. Fage, A History of Africa
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), pp. 221-3.
2
Ibid., Thompson, pp. 41-2; James A. Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade: A History
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1981), p. 22; Hugh Thomas, The Slave Trade—The
Story of the Atlantic of the Atlantic Slave Trade: 1440-1870 (New York: Simon & Schuster,
1997), p. 52.
3
John Iliffe, Africans: The History of a Continent (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1995), pp. 127.
4
Ibid.
5W. E. B. Du Bois, Black Folk Then and Now: An Essav in the History and Sociology of the
Negro Race (New York: Octagon Books, 1973), p. 132.
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bargains over captured African victims that triggered the intricate prelude leading to
the forced migration of West Africans. This development, as Blackburn further tells
us, lies more in the afterthought. For after capturing two West African nobles in
1441, the Iberian merchants later exchanged them in return for gold. 1
But, in Du Bois's account of 1441, it is clear that the Portuguese had "seized
certain free Moors and the next year exchanged them for ten black slaves, a target of
hide, ostrich eggs, and some gold."2 If Du Bois and Blackburn's accounts are not
very clear, at least those offered by Iliffe and Hugh—similar to Rawley, Fage, and
Thompson—are clearly supportive and thus convincing. 3 One can therefore accept
some variant by Iliffe, Du Bois, and Blackburn on the take off of forced migration of
Africans without necessarily denying that the negative attitude of Iberian Europe,
and later of a succession of Western European states, had been poised against West
Africa right from the onset.4 Iliffe documents that back in Portugal, "Goncalvez was
knighted" for his act of plundering and "kidnapping Africans."
5
Thus, the combined historical emphases point to the fact that the beginning of
the transatlantic slave trade was associated with the kidnapping of Africans, and in
the later centuries by the deliberate act of economic competition among the major
'Blackburn, The Making ofNew World Slavery , p. 102.
2Du Bois, Black Folk Then and Now, p. 132.
3
Ibid.; Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery , p. 102; Iliffe, Africans , p. 127;
Thomas, The Slave Trade , pp. 21-5, 68-9; Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade , pp. 11,
21-2, 24; Fage, A History of Africa , pp. 215-17, 221-5; Thompson, The African Diaspora,
pp. 68-84.
4M. Malowist, "The struggle for international trade and its implications for Africa," in
General History of Africa: Africa from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century , Vol. V, ed.,
B. A. Ogot (Heinemann, California, and Unesco: University of California Press, 1992), pp.
1-16.
5
Ibid.; Iliffe, Africans , pp. 127, 130.
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Western European states. 1 Historian Rawley therefore makes the point that, when in
1444 Prince Henry further approved of the forceful removal of 235 Africans from the
West African Coast to Portugal, the Atlantic migration begun. 2
Gomes Eannes Zurara, an official chronicler of the court, who saw the awful
sight of the West African victims of Iberian plunders in Southern Europe, recorded
the following:
What heart could be so hard, as not to be pierced with piteous feeling
to see that company? For some kept their heads low, and their phases
bathed in tears, looking one upon another. Others stood groaning very
dolorously, looking up to the height of heaven, fixing their eyes upon
it, crying out loudly, as if asking help from the father of nature, others
struck their faces with the palms of their hands, throwing themselves
at full length upon the ground; while others made lamentations in the
manner of a dirge, after the custom of their country. 3
The preceding emphases perhaps adequately explain, why, in 1526, King
Alfonso of Kongo—an ally of Portugal—ranted in alarm over the news of the
suffering of thousands of African slaves shipped to the Atlantic coast and Europe:
Many of our subjects eagerly covet Portuguese merchandise, which
your people bring into our kingdoms. To satisfy this disordered
appetite, they seized numbers of our free or freed black subjects, and
even nobles, sons of nobles, even the members of our own family.
They sell them to the white people . . . This corruption and depravity
is so widespread that our land is entirely depopulated by it ... It is in
fact our wish that this kingdom should be a place neither of trade nor
of transit of slaves.
4
How then does one explain the historical context of the preceding
background? First, as our earlier emphases along with the court chronicle by Zurara
showed, the beginning of the transatlantic slavery and slave trade was closely linked
'Ibid.
2
Ibid., Iliffe, pp. 127-132; Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade , p. 22; Thomas, The Slave
Trade , pp. 21-5, 54-5; Blackburn, The Making of the New World Slavery , p. 102; Fage, A
History of Africa
, pp. 221-5.
3
Ibid., Thomas, especially the Chapter entitled, "What Heart Could Be So Hard?" p. 21.
4Quoted in Iliffe, Africans , p. 130; for further elaboration, see Blackburn, The Making of
New World Slavery , pp. 118-1 19.
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to the attitudes of the early Iberian merchants. Second, the ultimate transformation
of the commerce on racial slavery was linked to the desire of Iberian Europe to
control the new order of an expanding worldwide capitalism. Third, and perhaps of
far greater significance, the awful sight of African victims of the Iberian plunders
illuminated by Zurara represented the beginning of a markedly different cycle of
slavery from one which centered in the Mediterranean basin in the late medieval
period, and which involved mixed races. 1
The plunder of West Africans not only was the direct result of the rivalries
between Western Christendom and Islam, but also the beginning of a markedly
different cycles of race relations in the modern world. This then was the result of an
attitude first begun as an attempt to outflank the Arab middlemen in order to reach
the gold sources of interior Africa.2
King Alfonso's complaints to the Portuguese, which we illuminated earlier,
suggested that the prospects of establishing Mediterranean-type sugar plantations
along the Atlantic islands and later in the New World, had very little or nothing to do
'Charles Verlinden, The Beginning of Modern Colonization: Eleven Essays with an
Introduction (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1970), pp. 3-27; Patrick Manning,
Slavery and African Life: Occidental. Oriental, and African Slave Trades (New York and
Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 27-8; J. E. Inikori, "Africa in world history:
the export slave from Africa and the emergence of the Atlantic economic order," in General
History of Africa , Vol. V, pp. 74-5, Sydney M. Greenfield, "Plantations, Sugar Cane and
Slavery," in Plantation Societies in the Era of European Expansion , Vol. 18, ed., Judy
Bierber (Brookfield, VT: Variorum, 1997), pp. 1-2, 34-5; David Brion Davis, "Sugar and
Slavery from the Old World to the New World," in The Atlantic Slave Trade , Second
Edition, ed., David Northrup (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1999), pp. 18-
20; Robin Blackburn, "The Old World Background of European colonial Slavery," in The
Worlds of Unfree Labour: From Indentured Servants to Slavery , Vol. 16, ed., Colin Palmer
(Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing Co., 1998), pp. 65-70, 81; James H. Sweet, "The
Iberian Roots of American Racist Thought," in The Worlds of Unfree Labour: From
Indentured Servants to Slavery , Vol. 16, ed., Colin Palmer (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate
Publishing Co., 1998), pp. 1-2, 16-21.
2
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with the vision of an African world development. Having willingly accepted
Christianity and exchanged ambassadors with Southern Europe, the negative
attitudes of the Iberians toward both his kingdom and subjects, were not signs of
respectful diplomatic relations between mutually agreeable sovereigns. As historian
Anene documents: "Inspite of the appeals by the African rulers for assistance for the
peaceful modernization of the Kongo, the Portuguese turned their attention to the
slave trade, undermined the authority of the Mani-Kongo among his subordinate
chiefs, and the Kongo State collapsed and became nothing more than a haunt for
slaves across the Atlantic to Brazil."
1
Historian Sweet, who probes the early Iberian contacts with the Kongo, also
writes approvingly in support of Anene's thesis. "Despite some success in
converting the Kongolese royal court in the 1490s, no active steps were taken to
ensure that slaves were baptized until 1514." As regard the general welfare of
Africans in Lisbon, Sweet further documents that, "the bodies of dead African slaves
were discarded without Christian burial. In 1515, King Manuel I commented on the
growing number of dead Africans found in the streets of Lisbon."3
This background appears to be significant for evaluating the scholarly
controversies regarding the connection between Mediterranean and New World
slavery. For, these controversies appear to require an understanding of the nature of
the new cycle of socio-cultural crises unleashed by the attitudes of Iberian Europe
'J. C. Anene, "Slavery and the Slave Trade," in Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth
Centuries: A Handbook for Teachers and Students , eds., J.C. Anene and Godfrey Brown
(Ibadan: Ibadan University Press and Nelson, 1966), p. 107. Also, see: Iliffe, Africans, p.
130; Segal, The Black Diaspora , pp. 12-13; Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery ,
pp. 118-119; Horton and Horton, Hard Road to Freedom , p. 14.
Ibid.; Sweet, "The Iberian Root of American Racist Thought," p. 16.
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along the Afro-Asian lanes toward none-European races, especially toward West
Africans. Thus, against this background, some scholarly opinions are in sharp
contrast to historian Charles Verlinden's thesis of the cycle of continuities between
the Old World and New World patterns of European colonization. 1 To be sure, some
scholars have agreed that certain features of medieval Europe were recreated in the
pattern of New World's colonization as well as in the character of its slavery. But,
as regards the general relationship between the Old World and New World form of
slavery, the Verlinden thesis is plagued by inconsistencies. 2
This relationship between Atlantic colonization and the exploitation of
Africans as slaves—first in the Atlantic littoral and Europe and later in the New
World—was shaped by the more distinctive economic and political interests of the
major European states, following the opening of the modern era. Blackburn has
argued that the problem of inherited degradation of successive generations of blacks
during and after slavery in the New World was not characteristic of other forms of
European colonization. "Unlike Roman slavery, it afflicted only those of black
African origin or descent."
To historian Sweet, in the final analysis, it was the "legacy of Iberian racism
which would endure in the Americas."
4 Beyond this fact, however, Blackburn
'For example, the important conclusions by historian Verlinden on the cycles of continuities
in Atlantic migration/colonization, especially "Introduction" including Parts 1/ Part II, have
received almost an equal response among varying scholars. For some modified differences
in trend of historical continuities, see: Greenfield, "Plantations, Sugar Cane and Slavery,"
pp. 1-2, 34-5; Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery , pp. 3-8; Blackburn, "The Old
World Background of European colonial Slavery," pp. 65-70, 81, 85-9; Sweet, "The Iberian
Roots of American Racist Thought," pp. 1-2, 16-21.
2
Ibid.
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Ibid., The Making ofNew World Slavery , p. 102.
"Sweet, "The Iberian Roots of American Racist Thought," p. 24.
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contends that the character of European colonization "was a curse that even the
grandchildren of the grandchildren of the original African captive found it
exceedingly difficult to escape." 1 Consequently, the crisis of Atlantic colonization
signaled the beginning of an historic shift from the earlier more moderate character
of domestic slavery in West Africa. Also, it represented the beginning of deep-
seated racial indifference in the world scene, particularly in the Euro-African
relations.
Yet, historian Thornton has argued that" Africans were not under any direct
commercial or economic pressure to deal in slaves."3 Historian Eltis, on the other
hand, argues that "the slave trade was a symptom of African strength, not
weakness."
4
So, which one of these versions represents an appropriate appraisal of
the transatlantic cycle of Euro-African relations during the slave trade?
First, as we saw in the attitudes of the early Iberian explorers and later in the
accounts of the King Alfonso of the Kongo, the basis in which most West Africans
were to become active participants in the Atlantic slave can be explained by
responses to the attitudes and lures of the Iberian explorers.
5
Second, the peculiar
concern of the King and indeed of the general climate of European rivalries has
much in common with issues involving Africa's vulnerability within an expanding
worldwide capitalism. Accordingly, the willingness to supply the human cargoes
that transformed the new Atlantic system of world capitalism could not have meant
'Blackburn, The Making ofNew World Slavery , 1997, p. 4.
2
Ibid.
3John Thornton, Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400-1680 (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 98-99.
"David Eltis, The Rise of African Slavery in the Americas (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2000), p. 149.
5
For example, this is supported by earlier notes.
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that "African strength" had a stable context of collective development like Europe
under a brutal system of socio-economic exploitation, as Eltis appears to suggest. 1
Thus, the Thornton and Eltis theses require some careful evaluation. For, if
they are correct, their accuracy would at least have to be closely supported by such
characteristics as: (1) pre-European-type slavery in Africa (II) the early attitudes of
Iberian Europe, and (1 1 1) the character of European attitudes after the discovery of
the New World. To begin with, the magnitude of pre-European-type slavery in
West Africa, as we shall see further down, did not reach the scale later unleashed by
the mercantilist compulsions of European states. Nor did the character of Islamic
slavery reinforce such an aberrant degree of human degradation on the basis of racial
identity as one later contested and justified by European merchants on the West
African coastal plains and in the New World. 3
Given the nature of the rivalries among the major European states who were
involved in the transatlantic slave trade, it is difficult to go along particularly with
the Thornton thesis. The emphasis here lies more in what he views as "Africans
were not under any direct commercial or economic pressure to deal in slaves."
4
For,
again, given the nature of the internal and external interests of the major European
states, it would have been difficult to determine which of their attitudes toward
Africans were of "direct commercial or economic pressure" in influencing active
participation in the trade during the early centuries of racial capitalism.
'See earlier note on historian Eltis, The Rise of African Slavery in the Americas.
2
For example, their position is likely to be convincing if the emphases shown thus far are not
taken into consideration. We hope to return to this theme again down the pages.
3
Sweet, "Iberian Root of American Racist Thought," pp. 3-7, 16-17, 20; Blackburn, "The
Old World Background of European Colonial Slavery," pp. 99-100, 118-119.
4
Thornton Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, pp. 98.
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Whichever way, however, Africans were in a position to be lured into the
large-scale slaving activities where the openings of the sugar plantations in the
Atlantic islands and later still of large-scale plantations in the New World were
mostly in the interest of European states. 1 Thornton, moreover, does very little in
reconciling the related economic and cultural attitudes of early Iberian explorers on
the West African coast with those resulting from the larger rivalries among the major
European states before and during the plantation revolution. Yet, as we saw earlier,
it was the cultural grandeur of Iberian Europe—first embedded in the rivalries
between Muslims and Christians in the Mediterranean, and later in the shifting
phases of an expanding worldwide capitalism from the Afro-Asian lanes to the New
World—which invited both the vulnerability and exploitation of West Africans.
2
Those recurrent cycles of changes in both economic and cultural attitudes of
Europe should not be overlooked in explaining the active participation of Africans in
the transatlantic slave trade. This position has been supported by historians as well
as by some recurring evidences in this chapter.
3 Thornton thus appears to have
overlooked the processes in which the internal and external interests of European
states had first lured and later exploited Native Americans, in much the same way it
'Thompson, The Making of the African Diaspora , pp. 22-55, 72-3, 78-91.
2
Ibid. Also, see Anene, "Slavery and the Slave Trade," p. 107; Thomas, The Slave Trade ,
pp. 21-5, 54-5.
3
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Maizlish (College Station, TX, 1996), p. 62; Walter Rodney, "African Slavery and
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did to the Africans via the slave trade. 1 This is not to deny that some African
potentates, as in the case of the Niger Delta participated in the slave trade, and hence
encouraged the exploitation of their subjects.2 The expansion of racial capitalism
along with the successive waves of commercial and military rivalries among the
major states of Europe implied that Africans were more likely to be exploited both
for cheap labor as well as in the worrisome habit of slave trade.3
When, therefore, the Portuguese captains found that they could buy African
servants or slave-laborers and later resold them to either those involved in settling in
Atlantic islands or to the Spanish purchasers, the socio-cultural stigma of racial
slavery became associated with West Africans on the coastal regions.4 The most
important date in the historic shift from the Old World to New World cycle of
modern slavery was 1492. 5 This then was the result of the fateful accident of landing
in Hispaniola by Christopher Columbus. Not surprisingly, Columbus' earlier
familiarity with slavery in Madeira presaged the beginning of a new venture.
6
With the above development came the corresponding prospects for opening a
Mediterranean-type sugar plantation in the New World. This later served as the
'Edmund Morgan, American Slavery. American Freedom : Ordeal of Colonial Virginia (New
York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1975), pp. 6-43; Rawley, The Atlantic
Slave Trade , pp. 3-7; Iliffe, Africans , pp. 27-30; Horton and Horton, Hard Road to Freedom ,
pp. 12-13,36-7.
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Ibid., Horton and Horton. On the other hand, historian Thompson, in The Making of the
African Diaspora
, pp. 74-6, cites a representative background of this trend in the character of
some Niger Delta leaders of a much later phase of the slave trade.
3
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82; Thomas, The Slave Trade , pp. 153-195.
"Blackburn, The New World Slavery , pp. 97-100, 103-6; Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave
Trade , pp. 268-9; Thomas, The Slave Trade , pp. 68-107; K. O. Dike, Trade and Politics in
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prelude to the largest forced migration and degradation of human labor on a racial
basis in world history. "As sugar plantations spread westwards through the
Mediterranean to the Atlantic islands like Madeira and eventually to the Americas,
they depended increasingly on the slave labour. The Atlantic slave trade was largely
a response to their demand." 1
With regard to the economic prospects resulting from the opening the New
world, historian Morison recorded that Columbus himself boasted with no
exaggeration before his death that, "By the Divine will I have placed under the
sovereignty of the King and Queen an Other World, whereby Spain, which was
reckon poor, is to become the richest of all the countries."2 Morison' s observation
perhaps reflects the strong contrast between the early benefits of Iberian Europe and
later of the major states of Western Europe in the blunder of the New World and
West Africa. Thus not surprisingly, between the end of the eighteenth century and
late nineteenth century, all the major states of Europe involved in the slave trade
were positively transformed. On the other hand, however, Africa south of the Sahara
entered into another process from informal to formal colonialism under the varying
fragments of Europe.
'iliffe, Africans , pp. 127-129; Basil Davidson, "The Curse of Columbus," in A Search for
Africa: History. Culture, Politics (New York: Random House, 1994), pp. 334-42; Segal, The
Black Diaspora
,
pp. 15-18. On the other hand, however, Samuel Eliot Morison's The
Oxford History of the American People (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966, pp. 23-
3 1 ), has a glorified view of the Columbus expedition.
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Portugal and Spain were the two dominant European powers both on the
West Coast of Africa and the New World for more than a century before other
European states entered into competition. By 1500, when the Portuguese termini in
Sao Tome began to extend further into the Bight of Bonny, the Caravalies
(Ijo/Kalabari people) of the Delta were one of the earliest participants in traders. 1
Prior to the end of the sixteenth century, other European nations were not even
serious rivals against the Portuguese.
2
Again, prior to the entry of other European
states in about the middle of the seventeenth century, the Iberians had already
monopolized the trade in such items as pepper, spices, gold, and salt—that is, before
settling on slaves. By the end of the sixteenth century, however, the Dutch, English,
and French rivalries had all about succeeded in replacing the Iberians.
3
Thus, between the end of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Iberian
merchants transported thousands of West African slaves to work in their sugar
colonies of Sao Tome and Principe via the Gold Coast, the Benin River, and Niger
Delta basin ports. Some of these slaves were later transshipped to Europe.
4
This
development is supportive of historian Berlin's thesis that the forced migration of
African began in the netherworld between Africa and Europe: "first in Africa, then
Europe, and finally in the Americas."
5
'David Northrup, Trade Without Rulers: Pre-colonial Economic Development in South-
Eastern Nigeria (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), pp. 50-51.
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.Therefore, the bulk of the early waves of slaves transported from West Africa
to the Atlantic littoral were among the first to enter Iberian Europe before being
distributed to other parts of Europe, and later still, moreover, to the New World.
Blackburn writes that during the fifteenth century there were thousands of African
slaves in Portugal and Spain, but they were very rare elsewhere in Europe. 1 Between
1441 and 1448 about a thousand slaves were taken from West Africa to Portugal.
Some 10,000 of those who were in Lisbon composed about 10 percent of the city's
population.
Again, according to historian Harris, "between 1450 and 1500 Portugal
imported an estimated 700 to 900 African slaves annually."3 By the mid-sixteenth
century, Seville had about had 6,327 slaves out of a total population of 85,538, who
were mostly of mixed Africans and Turkish Arabs. By the early decades of the
seventeenth century, an estimated 100 000 slaves were in Portugal and its related
islands of Madeira.
4
However, as historian Manning reminds us, despite the growth of enslaved
Africans in Iberian Europe as well as across Europe "in 1500, Africans and persons
of African descent were a clear minority of the world's slave population."
Blackburn agrees, arguing that, until the early modern period, Africans were rarely
held as slaves—either in the ancient world or in medieval Europe. Not therefore
'Blackburn, "The Old World Background to European Colonial Slavery," p. 118; Iliffe,
Africans
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until the biblical interpretation had diffused the myth linking slavery to Africans, did
they begin to feature prominently as slaves. 1
Not surprisingly, from the 1600 to 1700 onward, Africans and persons of
African descent had become the majority of the world's slave population. 2 About
fifteen percent of the slaves forced out of Africa to the New World arrived between
1601 and 1700. As Thomas observes, however, the scale of the slave trade to the
Americas in the sixteenth and early seventeenth century was small. According to
him, "until the 1640s, when sugar took over from tobacco in the Caribbean
plantations," the slave trade "was still on a fairly small, and therefore a relatively
human, if not humane, scale."
By the late 1 600, about three percent of African slave population was shipped
to the New World. Although this volume was quite small during this century, some
370,000 slaves were taken from Africa.
4
Portugal alone is estimated to have taken
about 80,000 slaves from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe in the fifty years before
1492, or as many as 150,000 to 200,000 slaves between 1440 and the end of the
eighteenth century.
5
Williams—almost similar to Due Bois and Inikori—argues that there was a
close relationship between the exploitation of Africans under slavery and the rise of
'See, for example, Harris, "The African diaspora in the Old and the New Worlds," p. 113;
Blackburn, "The Old World Background to European Colonial Slavery," p. 90.
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English capitalism. 1 This position, as Williams further argues, was more obvious
during the eighteenth century, and rested more on the "economic, not racial"
slavery. Although Williams's economic thesis of slavery is controversial, his
underlying conclusion bears out the strong connection between slavery and the
subsequent transformation of English capitalism. 3 Historian Morison concurs.
"Negro slaves," he observes, were imported to "to do the heavy work that Indians
would not or could not do, and that Europeans were too proud or lazy to do."4 Thus,
it was not until the economic exploitation of African slaves had nurtured the seedling
of advanced capitalism that their racial background became inferior. 5
Harris, Sweet and Blackburn might argue that what Williams viewed as the
character of economic exploitation originated in the racist ideology of Iberia along
the Afro-Asian lanes. Their conclusions might also provide a strong argument that
the latter attitude presaged the character of the New World slavery. Besides, it
provided an additional basis for understanding the related cultural character of
Europeans toward non-Europeans.
6
While the seventeenth century was largely a take off period of the plantation
revolutions, eighteenth century marked the transformation of racial slavery and racial
'Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina,
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capitalism within the new Atlantic system. 1 The number of slaves taken out of
Africa during the seventeenth century rose to 1,870,000. By the eighteenth century,
the British merchants held the lion's share of the trade, which lasted for over two
centuries. This dominance corresponded with its transformation into higher orbits of
industrial revolution in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.2
Table 3 shows the dominant European nations involved in the transatlantic
slave trade at its peak during the eighteenth century. This was a period when the
overall English slave import from Africa to the New World was at its height and also
when the general slave population in the Americas rose steadily.
Table 3
The Transatlantic Slave Trade, by Major
European Nations, by Populations, 1700-1800
National Carrier Total
English 2,532,300
Portuguese 1,796,300
French 1,180,300
Dutch 350,900
North America 194,200
Danish 73,900
Other [Swedish Bradenburger] 5,000
Total 6,132,900
Source: Paul E. Lovejoy, "The Volume of the Atlantic
Slave Trade: A Synthesis," in Slave Trades: 1500-1800:
Globalization of Forced Labour, ed., Patrick Manning
(Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1996),
Table 4, p. 47; Robin Blackburn, The Making of New
World Slavery: From the Baroque to the Modern 1492-1800
(New York and London: Verso, 1997), p. 383.
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After the seventeenth century England began to occupy a dominant place in
the transatlantic slave trade. This took place after Portugal and Spain, and later the
Dutch were replaced. From 1700 to 1800 Portugal and France followed the English
lead, with the Dutch falling behind although ahead of North America. 1 During the
eighteenth century about 6,133,000 slaves were taken out of Africa. The overall
slave population of African origin during the same period "grew from about 330,000
in 1700 to over 1,870,000 in 1800."
2
After 1720, the annual supplies of slaves to the
Americas rose to about 50,000. The largest number of slaves exported in any decade
in the eighteenth century rose to about 797,000 during the 1780s. 3
From 1441 to 1870, therefore, the forced migration of Africans represented
the beginning of the most direct differentiation in the modern world of the races of
Africa, Asia, and the Americas from those of Europe. Some scholars have estimated
that between 11,000,000 and 12,000,000 slaves were taken from Africa during the
entire span of the transatlantic slave trade. These figures, mostly of male population,
represented only but the known-recorded numbers of human loss to Africa.
4
Historians are more certain of the number of African slaves distributed in the
Americas than the actual numbers taken from its varied regions. The actual numbers
'Ibid.
2
Blackburn, The New World Slavery , pp. 377, 380-1; Iliffe, Africans , pp. 130-1.
3
Ibid.
4
Curtin, Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census, pp. 33-4, 65, 77, 268; Palmer, "Introduction." in The
Worlds of Unfree Labour, p. xix; Blackburn, The Making ofNew World Slavery, p. 3. On the
other hand, however, there are variants among other scholars regarding the general population
of the slaves imported to the New World. See, for example, Walters, Pan Africanism in the
African Diaspora, pp. 15-16; Segal, The Black Diaspora, p. 4; Fage, A History of Africa, pp.
255; J. E. Inikori, "The Origin of the Diaspora: The Slave Trade from Africa," Tarikh, v iv,
(1978), 8; J F. Ade Ajayi and J E. Inikori, "An account of Research on the Slave Trade in
Nigeria," in The African Slave Trade from the Fifteenth to the Nineteenth Century (Paris:
UNESCO, 1979), p. 248; Iliffe, Africans , p. 131; Du Bois, The Negro, p. 93.
79
of those who died under the horrific conditions of transportation from the interior of
the slave coasts through the Middle Passage to New World are unknown. 1
Part 2: The West African Background of New World Slaves;
Ethno-Regional Typology of the Guinea Coast
Although Herskovits was probably the first widely recognized American
scholar to popularize the West African cultural zones African-Americans, where a
majority of the slaves came from, much of his arguments had already been noted by
earlier black writers even before the publication of The Negro in 191 5. 2 Later on,
however, the Herskovits The Myth of the Negro Past along with The Negro , for
example,3 served as important pioneering foundations for explaining the West
African origins of African-descended Americans in the U.S.
4
Undoubtedly a majority of the early waves of slaves exported to the
Americas were from West Africa. As time went on, however, West Central Africa
began to provide the majority of the slaves. 5 Anthropologist Herskovits identified
the basin of the Senegal River, the Guinea Coast, the Niger Delta, * and the Congo
region as the key zones that furnished the bulk of the slaves to New World.
6
Certainly one of largest proportions of the slaves exported to the Americas
came from the Niger Delta ports in the Bight of Biafra (Bonny). As we saw earlier,
'ibid.; Thomas, The Slave Trade , p. 406.
2
See, for example, The Negro , especially the chapters entitled "The Coming of Black Men'
and "The Guinea and Congo."
3
Ibid.; Melville Herskovits The Myth of the Negro Past (Boston: Beacon Press, 1941),
4
Ibid.'
5
Palmer, "Introduction," in The Worlds of Unfree Labour, p. xix.
6
Melville J. Herskovits, The New World Negro: Selected Papers in Afro-American Studies
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966), p. 116. This dissertation emphasizes the
crucial historiography of the Niger Delta regions in the making of the Euro-African slave
trade modern Nigeria, and of the Nigerian diaspora of colonialism in the United States.
80
by 1500 the Portuguese slave trade was underway in the Bight of Bonny, with Sao
Tome as one its earliest bases. Thus, by the mid-eighteenth century, the slave trade
in the Delta valleys had achieved a dominant position. In fact, until about the first
four decades of the nineteenth century, this region led the way throughout the peak
years in the supply of human cargoes to the slaving plantations of the Americas.
Therefore, Niger Delta regions, later to become modern Nigeria, formed the
macrocosm of the Euro-African slave trade. This background in turn explains the
intricate socioeconomic and politico-cultural forces that shaped the Euro-African
relations in the entire Delta region. As shall be seen later on, the varying slaving
circuits of the Guinea Coast were well known for the trauma surrounding the Euro-
African relations in the Niger Delta basin valleys. They were also inextricably
intertwined with the major commercial lanes of the Guinea Coast.
The relationship between the Guinea Coast and the Atlantic slave trade as
well as the flow of the human cargoes from the Niger Delta basin was important in
the making of the Atlantic capitalism. Until the middle of the nineteenth century, the
Guinea Coast and the Niger Delta were adjoined to the Gulf of Guinea and to the
Atlantic Ocean, as one of the defining commercial centers in West Africa. During
the seventeen and eighteen centuries in West Africa, both the Guinea Coast and the
Niger Delta complemented each other as important slave-trading marts.
1
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Figure 2
Map of West Africa in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries Showing the
Major Commercial Lanes of the Western Sudan, the Guinea Coast,
the Trading Centers, Rivers Ports/Towns/Cities, and Cultural Crossroads
f if i«m Jf f t~ 3t*U*
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Source: Basil Davidson, Africa in History: Themes and Outline (New York:
Macmillan Publishing Company, 1991), p. 228
Geographically, the Guinea Coast stretched from Sierra-Leone to Liberia to
the Ivory Coast. With its vast commercial and cultural links, stretching as far as the
coastal ports of Niger Delta states via the Bight of Bonny and the Bight of Benin,
this region also embraced the Gold Coast and Dahomey.
1
Historian Philip Curtin observes that the term "Guinea" was a geographical
designation capable of changing from century to century. During the early
sixteenth
century, the "Guinea" embraced the whole western coast of Africa
from the Senegal
River to the Orange River. Later on, however, this same region
stretched from Cape
Mount to the Bight of Benin.
2 By the eighteenth century, the climax of the
transatlantic slave trade, the region stretched from present-day
Gambia, Senegal, and
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Guinea Bissau to the area known as the "Guinea Coast." 1 But to historians Meier and
Rudwick, however, the Guinea formed an important part of the commercial nerve of
the region known as Beled es-Sudan in Medieval Muslim, or the "Land of Blacks."2
To W. E. B. Du Bois the Guinea was "where a marvelous drama of world history has
been enacted," and also the earliest region to be disrupted by the endemic effects of
the transatlantic slave trade.
3
Perhaps no one factor explains the diverse unities of the races inhabiting the
Guinea region more than the four main language families of Africa identified by
Joseph H. Greenberg: the Niger-Congo, the Nilo-Saharan, Afro-asiatic, and
Khoisan. These languages have over the millennia been known to have a common
bond among Africans within and beyond the continent. The Hausa-Fulani language
family spoken in Nigeria, stretches from the Sudan to North Africa to the Middle
East, and finds expression in the same language family as Berber and Arabic. On
the other hand, however, features of the Ibo language family can be heard as far
Ghana and Liberia. 5
Beyond the aforementioned fact, the Guinea region was "among the
important creative centers in the development of human culture."
6
Iron, gold, and
salt were produced in Africa many centuries before the contact with Europe and
'Ibid.
2
Meier and Rudwick, From Plantation to Ghetto , p. 6.
3Du Bois, The Negro , pp 36, 39-40; Du Bois, Black Folk: Then and Now, p. 54.
"Joseph H. Greenberg, The Languages of Africa (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1963,
pp. 38, 68; J. F. A. Ajayi, "The Survey of the Cultural and Political Regions of Africa at the
Beginning of the Nineteenth Century," in Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries:
A Handbook for Teachers and Students , eds., Joseph Anene and Godfrey Brown (Ibadan
University Press and Nelson, 1966), pp. 76-8.
5
Northrup, Trade Without Rulers , p. 14.
6
Meier and Rudwick, From Plantation to Ghetto , p. 8.
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Arab. "Cloth and clothing," as Thomas Sowell documents, "were manufactured in
Africa more than a thousand years before European colonization in the nineteenth
century."
1
Besides, its well-known artistic music forms, dance, iron smelting, and
religion are increasingly being noted with admiration around the world. 2
Africans had also advanced standards of agricultural system and animal
husbandry "for centuries before the Europeans came."3 Historians Meier and
Rudwick have observed that the agricultural skills of the varied races of the Sudanic
and forest areas of the Guinea have been identified as having unusually high
standards, and as comparable with those of the ancient Near East, the Indus of
Yellow River valleys, and Mesoamerica, Egypt, Mesopotamia, and China. These
skills are even believed in some cases to have surpassed those found in the Americas
and the Orient.
4
Also, centuries before European contact, the races of the Guinea region and
of the wider Sudanic belt had also evolved a high level of urban civilization. The
nature of their human organizations incorporated both centralized and decentralized
forms of social and political institutions. Along with their powerful monarchies,
these institutions were important in the day-to-day governance of the varied regions
and peoples, especially during the eras of the great medieval kingdoms and later of a
succession of lesser city-states of the forest kingdoms. Other forms of social
organization included sophisticated class differentiation of political structures, such
as in division of labor, for example, to achieve a high degree of productivity.
1
Sowell, Conquest and Cultures , p. 113.
2Meier and Rudwick, From Plantation to Ghetto , p. 8.
3
Sowell, Conquest and Cultures , p. 113.
4
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Women, like men
—
played an important part in the society in such areas as
agricultural work, cloth weaving, and pottery work. 1
These pre-colonial African civilizations were further transformed by the
introduction of Islam by around 1050 into the Kingdom of Ghana. From this
position Islam later gained further inroad and transformation into Mali, Songhai, and
Kanem-Bornu as a medium of cultural exchanges between the races of inland Africa
and the Mediterranean Middle East as well as Oriental Far East. 2 Thus through the
cultural bond with Islam and trans-Saharan commerce, Africans were able to forge
some strong links "between the Sudan and the Forest Areas."3
By around the thirteenth century Islam reached the Senegal Valleys.
Spreading from this location, it reached the Niger-Benue region of modern Nigeria
between the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Such cities as Zaria, Kano, and
Sokoto emerged as centers of learning and commerce as a result of Islamic
influences. More importantly, the Islamic factor enabled this region to share with, as
well as to borrow, new sociopolitical organizations from within and beyond in
varying art forms, commerce, architecture, and political institutions.
4
Early European Contacts with the Bights of Bonny and Benin:
Ethno-regional Background of the Niger Delta Basins, etc.
Writing in The Transatlantic Slave Trade , historian Rawley states that,
"Before the European came to trade Africans had developed long distance trade
'Du Bois, The Negro , pp. 36-9, 42-3; Lincoln, The Negro Pilgrimage in America, p. 3;
Meier and Rudwick, From Plantation to Ghetto , pp. 6, 12-18.
2
Fage, A History of Africa , p. 216; J. J. Saunders, A History of Medieval Islam (London and
New York: Routeledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1965), pp. 187-8, 192-5.
3
Ajayi, Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries , p. 78.
"ibid., pp. 79-81; Basil Davidson, Africa in History: Themes and Outlines [Revised Edition]
(New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1974), pp. 154-5; Davidson, The Search for
Africa
, pp. 34-38, 65; Horton and Horton, Hard Road to Freedom , pp. 8-10.
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routes."
1
This further confirms our earlier hint that, foremost among the ancient
routes of contacts by early Iberian explorers and merchants with the races of inland
Africa, were those tied to the Sudanic belt as well as to the "trans-Sahara trade [in]
gold and slaves."2 The position by Rawley, and later still by Sowell and Northrup, is
therefore fully supportive that long-distance trade existed in Africa before the era of
European contact. 3
For example, in the particular case of South-eastern Nigeria, Northrup makes
it plain that, "by the arrival of the Portuguese the region was already a veteran of
long-distant trade both up the Niger and westward to the Gold Coast." He further
tells us that "in the case of inter-coastal trade it was the Europeans who had to make
the adaptation to the existing African patterns."
4 Rawley concurs: "it seems probable
that people along the Gulf of Guinea, from western Ghana to the Bight of Biafra,
carried on a maritime trade before the arrival of the Portuguese."
5
Accordingly, both
Northrup and Rawley observations point toward the kind of structural changes
brought about by European contacts. Rawley, in fact, makes another observation
that might have accounted for a much deeper crisis in the Euro-African relations:
The Atlantic slave trade, therefore, did not initiate long-distance trade
among the Africans; rather it redirected trade from a south to north
movement to a north to south flow . An effect of the trade was to
require the establishment or expansion of trade centers along the
coast , where African and Europeans could engage in the trade.
'Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade , p. 268.
2
Ibid., p. 269
3
Ibid; p. 268; Sowell, Conquest and Cultures , p. 1 13; Northrup, Trade Without Rulers, p. 22;
Northrup, "West Africans and the Atlantic, 1 550-1 800,"in Black Experience and Empire,
pp. 35-7
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At this point, however, it is important to note the structural effects of the new
changes brought upon Africa by the slave trade as well as upon the subsequent
exports of slaves from the West African coastal plains to the Americas. For, this
reversed pattern "from a south to north movement to a north to south flow" had far
reaching consequences in the overall cycle of Euro-African and non-African world
relations. Therefore, what Rawley saw as the "expansion of trade centers along the
coast"
1
signaled as well the beginning of more serious upset against the downward
and upward pull of human development which linked inland Africa via the more
familiar Sudanic belt and also via the eastern coastal plains with the outside world.
As we hope to see again in mainland North America, almost a similar pattern
as above expressed itself in the manner in which the generation of African slaves
during and after slavery inherited a spiral "south to North movement to a north to
south flow." The mainland North American fluctuation of this dynamic was to
coincide with the variant between slave societies and societies with slaves, as well as
with the regional contradictions leading to the American Civil War.
Therefore, in retrospect to the African experience, despite the modern
benefits resulting from the Euro-African relations, it still cannot be denied that the
deflection of human movements from the more familiar ancient lanes to the coastal
plains were least favorable to West Africans. Given their technological lag in swift
oceanic navigation and transportation compared to the early Portuguese, the ultimate
loss of well-known medium of exchanges with the outside meant serious structural
crisis. In other words, the Iberian incursion represented the strongest contraction
of
the ancient pathway of inland Africa along the Afro-Asian lanes (See Figure 1).
'Ibid.
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It is therefore not necessarily true, as historians Oliver and Atmore have
argued that, "By the eighteenth century, the opening of the Atlantic trade by the
Europeans had made a crucial change only among the states of the woodland and the
forest zones to the south of the Savannah belt." 1 This is especially disturbing, if,
according to same version, it is also true that: "From their earliest days, these states
had all in their external relations faced toward the north."2
First, until the Iberian Europeans reached the West African coast in the
fifteenth century, the Mediterranean was the major commercial contact of Europe. 3
Second, by the eighteenth century, it would have been impossible not to see the
effects of the broader disruption deflected by the new Atlantic capitalism against
Afro-Asia [northern Africa], for example, which included its related unities in the
Mediterranean Arab/Asia.
The above development was certain to upset the wider commercial, political,
cultural and military alliances that later emerged along the Afro-Asian lanes. The
changes brought by the new Atlantic capitalism on the earlier status of inland Africa
can then be explained in terms of the varying degrees of structural effects along the
major unities of Afro-Asia, as well as across its more vulnerable regions. That is,
while the degree of the structural effect was stronger "among the states of the
woodland and the forest zones to the south of the savannah belt,"
4
the basis of the
general disruption had serious global implications for the races of Afro-Asia.
Certainly, it represented the formative basis especially of the crisis of modern Africa.
'Roland Oliver and Anthony Atmore, Africa Since 1 800 , Fifth Edition (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 15.
2
Ibid.
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88
It is our understanding that the preceding development, which corresponded
with the early strivings of Iberian Europe to reach inner Africa, began in North
Africa. As we saw much earlier, the ultimate success of this venture corresponded
with the beginning of the shift from "a south to north movement," 1 which further
compounded and weakened the status of inland Africa. Harris, Thomas and
Blackburn have observed that this development was first shaped by the capture of
Ceuta in 1415 .
2
This victory was the "turning point for European journeys to West
Africa."
3 Being one of the greatest trading centers on the Mediterranean's south
coast, Ceuta intersected with several linkages to the caravan routes. Historian
Blackburn argues that its capture raised the hope of the whole of Christian Europe,
marking the beginning of the demise of Muslim Arabs and a turning point first for
Iberian Europe and later for the whole of Europe in the Afro-Asian power contest.4
With the capture of Ceuta, the Portuguese enclaves in North Africa began to
serve "as a convenient conduit for trade, a circumstance of special interest to Genoa
and Venice." 5 Besides, its strategic position placed the Portuguese in a position to
lay siege of Algericas and Tangiers, as well as to expand colonization into Madeira
in 1419. Later on, of course, it secured the access to the capture and settlement of
the Azores between 1427 and 1450. While Cape Bojador fell in 1434, the
Portuguese reached the Senegal in 1444. Between 1450 and 1460, they settled in the
Cape Verde Islands. Reaching the Gold Coast between 1470 and 1490, they built
'Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade , p. 269.
2
Ibid., pp. 21-2; Harris, "The African diaspora in the Old and New Worlds," Unesco General
History of Africa, Vol. V, p. 1 13; Thomas, The Slave Trade , p. 51; Blackburn, The Making
ofNew World Slavery , pp. 98-100.
3
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Forts at El-mina and Axim. 1 Except, therefore, for the intermittent attempts by the
Portuguese to Christianize the peoples of Benin and Warri, the contacts with the
Bights of Bonny and Benin, which dates back to the fifteenth century, symbolized
the beginning of a markedly different era. 2 Similar to the experiences in the Kongo,
early Portuguese contacts with the Niger Delta and the Cross River regions had
seemed poised right from the onset to be least favorable. 3
The Iberian intrusion therefore marked the beginning of sustainable contacts
between Europeans and the Niger Delta valley peoples in the modern era. This came
to the fore with the visit of two Portuguese explorers: Fernando Po and Pero de
Centra, in 1472 and 1473.4 By 1485, when Jao Alfonzo d'Aveiro reportedly reached
Benin, all the strategic lanes of earlier commercial contacts with the outside world
had been disrupted. Similarly, nearly all the ancient routes linking the Guinea Coast
to the wider Sudanic transitional belt into North Africa had been sealed. The eastern
coastal routes via the Indian Ocean to the Orient were also affected.
5
This
development probably completed the shift from a "south to North movement to a
north to south flow."
6
'ibid., Blackburn, pp. 102-3; Dike, Trade and Politics , pp. 1-3. 5; Fage, A History of Africa,
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.By itself, however, the beginning of this more intensive cycle of commerce
on human cargoes signaled the demise of Africa's more favorable status along the
ancient lanes. It also marked the beginning of the demise of interactive pull of
downward and upward exchanges and human development along the Afro-
Arab/Asian lanes. The ancient lanes of pre-European era, although less advanced in
terms of techniques of human exchanges and development, were at least more
favorable to activities of downward and upward development, which tied inland
Africa to the outside world.
1
It is most unlikely, as sometimes alleged, that it was the absence of essential
items of global commerce which lured West Africans into active involvement in the
slave trade. Such a position is not likely to explain the relationship between their
exploitation and the development of early phases of the Atlantic capitalism. 2 There
are in fact some hints that, until the discovery of the New World, the onset of
commercial exchanges were more favorable to West Africans than to the Portuguese.
As historian Northrup writes, "To earn sufficient capital to buy the Asian and
African products they desired, the Portuguese were forced to enter into carrying the
trade, plying ancient routes between traditional customers." There are even strong
evidences that West Africans possessed and produced high quality of indigenous
'ibid. The emphases by Horton and Horton, Thomas, Blackburn, Davidson, Levtzion, and
Segal, for example, corresponded with a reversal in the earlier trends of downward and
upward development of inland Africa along the Afro-Asian lanes. On the other hand,
however, the enormous advancement of the races of mankind since the opening of the
modern era seems not to have lessened the still evolving crisis of the ancient pathway of
inland Africa.
2
For example, this is supported by the advantages of African labor over Indians and indeed
whites indentured servants during the early phases of the Atlantic capitalism. See earlier
notes on Williams, Capitalism and Slavery ; and Morison, History of the American Peop le.
3
Northrup, Trade Without Rulers , p. 22.
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items like metals, iron, gold, wood work, ivory, and cloth, for example, before
European contact.
1
Hence, the Atlantic slave trade shifted the early phases of
positive transformation which were more favorable to inland Africa within and far
beyond toward areas of extreme oppositional rewards.
Beyond the above fact, however, it is worth noting that both for the early
Iberian merchants as well as for succession of other competing Europeans, the
underlying reason of the early contacts was the search for legitimate commercial
partnership with inland Africans. Historian Northrup again captures an excellent
trend in the preceding development in the particular case of the arrival of English
merchants in the Kingdom of Benin in 1553. He observes that the early interest of
the English merchants in the Niger Delta was to purchase "large quantity of Benin's
pungent pepper, which the Portuguese had earlier introduced to Europe."
Responding to this desire, "the Oba arranged for the visitors to inspect the sacks of
peppercorns in a nearby warehouse."
3
Thus, during the pre-Iberian contact, the slave trade was not as dominant an
item of trade in West Africa as non-human products. "Within Guinea itself," as
Segal also documented, "stone and glass beads, cloth and trinkets were
manufactured, especially in Yorubaland, for sale to communities elsewhere in the
area."
4 Corresponding with this development, the indigenous peoples of the Delta
traded among themselves in gold, malaguetta, Benin pepper, salt, ivory, palm oil,
and timber. Later on, however, with the contacts of European merchants, items
of
'David Northrup, Africa's Discovery of Europe. 1450-1850 (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2000), pp. 80-6.
2
This is supported by earlier notes.
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Northrup, "West Africans and the Atlantic, 1 550-1 800," p. 35.
"Segal, Race War, p. 36.
trade shifted to "sylvan products," where such items—as gold, hides, palm oil, salt,
and pepper—were often exchanged for Portuguese beads, spirit, brass pots, bracelets,
knives, and cloth, etc. On the larger human plains, a majority of the Delta peoples
were fishermen, farmers, canoe makers, potters, iron smelters, salt makers, cloth
dyers, leather makers, blacksmith, artisans, and wood carvers. 1
Even with the disadvantage of not having large sized sea-faring ships to
facilitate swift movements as the early Iberian and the later waves of European
merchants, the Delta middlemen were undoubtedly in advantageous positions over
their counterparts in the coastal plains. Of course, until the mid-sixteenth century,
the Euro-African slave trade was not a significant arm of commerce among the
varied races that converged on the shores of the Niger Delta basins. Segal further
documents that:
What seems to be significantly missing as a major item in the early
Guinea trade is the slave. Certainly there were slaves in the forest
regions, as agricultural laborers, porters and domestic servants; but
trade in slaves on any significant scale seems only to have begun after
the growth of Islam in the Sudan and to have reached the coastlands
only with the development of the European demand from the
sixteenth century onwards.
3
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Admittedly, prior to 1500, the forms of slavery that existed in the Niger Delta
basin regions were largely based on domestic services, and mostly employed in
military services of the city-states, agricultural works, and related services within
family households. Despite the inherent socio-cultural stigma of slavery
everywhere, its pre-European experience was fairly mild. 1
As for the people taken into slavery, they were usually those accused of
deviant social behavior, such as debtors and war captives. 2 The enslaved sometimes
had the good fortune of being assimilated as members of society with full support to
express their freedom and to own land in which to build homes. Others could play
vital roles in society, with little or no social stigma on their status, while "the
intelligent, loyal and hardworking slave enjoyed the confidence of his master and
this ensured his economic advantage."
Nor does the preceding mean that, pre-European slavery among the Delta
peoples was a comfortable experience. For, according to Dike, it was not. "It cannot
be denied that an element of cruelty an even brutality was ever present. A cruel
master could, on occasion, take the life of his slave for very trifling offenses."
4
'ibid., Dike, Trade and Politics , pp. 35-7.
2
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Evidences abound within and beyond the Delta region in support of the
exploitation of the enslaved. For example, the existence of ancient commercial lanes
linking the Niger Delta states to the Guinea Coast to the wider Sudanic belt, meant
that some form of brutality went along with the hunting down, selling, and crossing
of slaves via the Sahara to North Africa to the Mediterranean world. 1 Yet, as we
pointed out earlier, slavery in West Africa differed from that of the New World.
Both its hereditary effects on the descendants of slaves and the general attitude of
racial differentiation triggered by the Portuguese mission, was bound to negatively
impact upon the varying Delta regions and peoples.2
By the late sixteenth when Euro-African relations in the Delta entered a
markedly dissimilar historical cycle, the socio-cultural orbit of its ancient system of
slavery also shifted.
3
This era was marked by intense fluctuations in both the
cultural and commercial values of the dominant states of Southern and Western
Europe between the Afro-Asian peripheries and West Africa as well as the New
World. As we have attempted to show all along, it was this development that formed
the basis of the subsequent exploitation of West Africans under racial slavery.
4
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First, during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when Iberian Europe
dominated West African commerce, "gold constituted the main quest," and Africans
as well as Europeans shared the benefits of commercial relations almost on mutual
and basis. 1 Second, when in 1530, "the golden age of the Guinea traffic in so far as
Portugal was concerned ended," the traumatic cycle of Euro-African slave trade
begun to enforce its claws more strongly Africans.2 With this development, the
commercial interests of the competing states of Europe began to correspond with
fierce rivalries on the West coast of Africa as well as in the New World. Within the
Niger Delta basins, the new cycle was marked by increased export of slaves to the
Americas. 3 According to historian Vincent Thompson, this new order of Euro-
African slave-trade was determined largely by the interests of European merchants.
Marginalized slave-trading profits thus began to transform the ancient order of
internal slavery among the varying West African coastal potentates.
Thus, the mercantilist interests of the competing states of Europe were later
to transform the earlier character of domestic slavery in West Africa. It was this
development, to a large extent, which made the West African region and its peoples
the target of exploited labor pull to the European plantations in the Americas.
5
'ibid., Dike, pp. 4-9; Gordon, Nigeria's Diverse Peoples , pp. 46-8, 54.
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Between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the slave merchants of the
Dutch Netherlands, England, France, Portugal, and Spain frequented the Bights of
Bonny and Benin. The result was increased slave imports to the Americas. 1 The
particular reference to England is significant. For, it dominated the commerce of the
Delta basins for over two hundred years. 2 Its successful challenge to the Portuguese
dominance can be traced to 1553. This was when Captain Windham, the first British
to explore the Niger Delta basin, reached the Bight of Bonny. His arrival, along with
some merchants, who later visited the Oba of Benin, formed an important basis in
the subsequent overthrow of Portuguese commercial monopoly in the Niger Delta. 3
Historian Inikori, almost like historian Northrup, argues that the primary
intention of early Iberians—as for the English merchants—was influenced by "the
desire to develop trade with Africa in the products of her soil
—
gold, pepper, ivory,
etc."
4
This twin mission of the early Iberian Europe, and later of some European
states, and particularly of England—was to make the Niger Delta region one of the
most active commercial marts in the history of the transatlantic slave trade. As we
indicated earlier, it was the emergence of the plantation revolution in the New World
'Dike and Ekejiuba, The Aro of south-eastern Nigeria , pp. 31-3; Manning, Slavery and
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97
that triggered a corresponding hunt for slaves in West Africa. 1 As historian
Richardson observes, in the 245 years separating the first known English slaving
voyage to Africa in 1562 and its abolition in 1807, its merchants dispatched about
10,000 voyages to Africa. Overall these English ships carried about "3.4 million or
more enslaved Africans to the Americas."2 This meant that "one in three or four of
all enslaved Africans entering the Atlantic slave trade during its history," did so via
the English ships.
Map 3.1 shows the major Euro-African commercial routes in the Niger Delta
valleys in the bulk of the era of the English dominance of the slave trade and later of
the trading on palm oil. It shows as well the major port-cities, regions, and varied
geographical zones and diverse unities of the peoples. As shown, the Niger Delta
valleys occupied the greater part of the lowland belt: to the west, it was bounded by
the Benin River and to the east by the Cross River basin, and from these enclaves,
stretches to include the coast and sea lanes of the Cameroon Mountains. With an
area of 270 miles along the Atlantic Coast, it covers about 120 miles in depth.
4
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, p. 113; Dike and Ekejiuba, The Aro of South-eastern Nigeria, pp. 32-3;
Fage, A History of Africa , p. 266; Ikime, in Groundwork of Nigerian History , pp. 102-8;
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1550-1800," pp. 41-6; Richardson, "Through a Looking Class," pp. 66-8.
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Map 3.2 is a more complete representation of the major commercial centers
along with the physical features of the Niger Delta basins in the nineteenth century.
As shown by the data, the varied regions and peoples of the Delta basins were as
culturally related as they were dissimilar, yet apparently very closely intertwined in
their commercial organizations (Figures 3.1 and 3.2). Their language families
formed the basic features of commonalities and differences. For example, while the
Ibo and Ibibio are culturally closer, they are in the opposite sides of the Niger Kongo
language family. Similarly, while the Ibo is the easternmost extension of the Kwa
sub-family of Niger Kongo language, the Ibibio is its westernmost extension of the
Benue-Congo sub-family. To the eastern Delta lies the Cross River basin, inhabited
mostly by the Efik people and their related Ibibio brethren, along with related Bantu-
speaking groups to the north.
1
Further subdivision shows that the Efik of Old Calabar, Ibibio, and Annang
were also related in pre-historic times and belonged to the Benue-Congo sub-family.
Elsewhere other sub-variations of the Ibo and Ibibio suggest that the former has close
affinity with the Sudanic sub-language families, while the latter shares some semi-
Bantu traits. On the other hand, however, the immediate Ibo and Ijo neighbors
belonged to the "kwa" sub-family of the Niger-Congo language family.
'Northrup, Trade Without Rulers , p. 14; Alagoa et al, Africa in the Nineteenth Century, p.
724. For further summaries of Nigeria's ethnic groups and language families, see Gordon,
Nigeria's Diverse Peoples , pp. 10-18.
2
Ibid. Also, see: J. H. Greenberg, The Languages of Africa (Indiana University Press,
1963), pp. 38, 68; Ajayi, Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, pp.76-8;
Iliffe.'Africans , p. 11; Edet A. Udo, Who Are the Ibibio? (Onitsha: Africana-REP
Publishers Limited, 1983), pp. 106-7, 315.
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Figure 3.1
Map of the Niger Delta City-States Showing the Major
Slave-Trading and Palm Oil Routes, by the
Major Rivers/Ports and Cities in the Nineteenth Century
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Source: K. O. Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta 1830-1885: An
Introduction to the Political and Economic History of Nigeria (Oxford:
Clanderon Press, 1956), p. 18.
The Ijo people occupied a greater part of the coastal regions from the west,
comprising of creeks and swamplands. The small Itsekiri kingdom, with some
influence over the wide area of the Delta, was located in the western extremity of the
Niger Delta. To the immediate west was the once dominant political and cultural
polity of Benin and its related neighbors. 1 On the other hand, the Ibo and the Ijo in
the western banks of the lower Niger are extensions of their core group east of the
Niger. They stretched as far as the northern reaches of Cross River basin. The Ibo
'ibid.; Nwana Ezewunwa, "Pre-colonial Nigeria: east of the Niger," in Nigerian History and
Culture
, pp. 20-21.
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distribution, in particular, lies more to the easterly bend of the Niger Delta. 1 The
western delta was home to the Yoruba and to the Edo peoples. While the Edo people
were in the eastern part, the Yoruba—the most populous group—were in the western
and northern parts. The Yoruba had more established ancestral links as well as
closer coastal contacts with the Edo, Itsekiri, and the Egun. Alternately, the Edo had
closer coastal contacts with the Ibo, Urhobo, Ijo and Isoko. 2
Ethnic groups in the western Delta spoke languages that were not mutually
intelligible, but which belonged to a cluster of closely related "kwa" sub-group of the
Niger-Congo family. Their cultural and linguistic features are known to have
extended to the southwestern regions of the modern republic of Benin and Togo. 3
The area to the north of the Niger and Benue Rivers confluence was home to
a large number of ethnic groups with greater linguistic and cultural variations than to
east and west of the Niger Delta basins. The major ethnic groups in this region,
which included the Kanuri, the Hausa and later the Fulani, belong to the large Afro-
asiatic language family. This language family, with its diverse spread across the
Sudan and North Africa and the Middle East, is classified under the same language
family as Berber and Arabic.
4
Historians Falola and Adebayo have observed that the
pre-colonial peoples of the Niger-Benue confluence and later of modern Northern
'Ibid.
2
A. Akinjogbin and Biodun Adediran, "Pre-colonial Nigeria: west of the Niger," in Nigerian
History and Culture , p. 35.
3
Ibid.
"iliffe, Africans , pp. 10-11; Ayaji, in Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries , p.
87.
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Nigeria were the more fortunate ones. 1 This was because their favorable location in
the savannah belt allowed for the domestication of animals and agricultural
productivity. Besides, this region and its peoples were more prone to contacts with
the outside world.
Figure 3.2
Map Showing the Geographic Zones of the Niger Delta and
the Cameroon, by Major Slave-Trading Routes, by Modern Port-Towns
and Cities and River lanes in the Nineteenth Century
Source: EJ. Alagoa et al., "the Niger Delta and the Cameroon", in General
History of Africa in the Nineteenth Century until 1880s, Vol. VI, ed., J.E. Ade Ajayi
(Unesco, 1989), p. 725.
One of the results of these contacts was the introduction of Islamic values and
related institutions into the region. With this development came human adjustment
'Toyin Falola and A. Adebayo, "Pre-colonial Nigeria: north of the Niger-Benue," in
Nigerian History and Culture , pp. 56-78.
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to foreign ideas via North Africa, Southern Europe, and Asia. The inhabitants of the
Niger-Benue confluence were highly advanced in such professions as artisanship,
animal skin work, leatherwork, and manufacturing businesses. 1
The Niger Delta City-States in the Era of the Atlantic Slave Trade
Historian Dike's Trade and Politics , especially the first four chapters, serves
as a central source of information in this author's discussing of the Euro-African
slave trade connection in the Niger Delta valleys. This means that, while other
relevant sources are employed, Dike's work forms a major source of reference.
First, some of the emphases in his pioneering work are still relevant to understanding
this particular section of the dissertation. Dike's pioneering work was among the
first to defend the existence of viable institutions of the Niger Delta city-states during
the era of the transatlantic slave trade. Given the recurring crisis of post-colonial
institutions in modern Nigeria, there seems even a need for re-evaluating some
aspects of the Dike thesis both on the impact of the Euro-African relations as well as
on the character of modern Nigeria.
For example, beginning in the sixteenth century, and lasting about four
hundred years, the commerce on "living tools became the main export of the Niger
Delta and provided the wealth upon which the city-states of Brass, Bonny, New
'Ibid.
2
Ibid., pp. 30-39. Also, see for further explanation of this background on the pre-colonial
history of Niger Delta/Cross River and Euro-African relations: Coleman, Nigeria:
Background to Nationalism , pp. 36-44; Alagoa., Unesco General History of Africa in the
Nineteenth Century , pp. 724-7; Latham, Old Calabar ; Northrup, Trade Without Rulers;
Okwudiba Nnoli, "A Short History of Nigerian Underdevelopment," in Path to Nigerian
Development
,
ed., Okwudiba Nnoli (Dakar, Senegal: Codesria, 1981), pp. 94-134; Wright,
Nigeria: Struggle for Stability , pp. 20-27. However, a greater part of Dike's pioneering thesis
forms a major portion in this section of the dissertation.
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Calabar and Old Calabar throve." 1 Dike's work also gives accounts of the existence
of some influential socio-political institutions, with strong indigenous representation
and interests in the commercial transactions of the Niger Delta city-states. He
argues that, collectively, they were the nerves of the varying coastal trading centers
before the demise of the slave trade. Until 1807, which marked the beginning of
legitimate trade, the city-states served as the central unifying impulse of human
interactions among the varying coastal races. 2
Dike and Alagoa as well as Northrup have observed that a majority of these
"city-states or trading centers" developed before the external trade with European
merchants. But with the expansion of slave trade in the seventeenth century, they
began to organize in response to their varied interests. 3
Ultimately, it was the British Parliamentary Act of 1807 abolishing the
foreign slave trade that tilted the earlier direction of the Euro-African commercial
relations in the Niger Delta basins. Prior to this, many clusters of city-states, with
their political as well as social institutions, were more interested in serving the
diverse interests of the coastal peoples. The available commercial options during the
early contact periods required collaboration with the indigenous peoples.
4
This was
when the European flag did not follow trade, and when "The lands of Guinea
remained under native governments and the Europeans concerned themselves almost
'Ayandele, The Missionary Impact on Modern Nigeria, p. 3.
2
Ibid.; Dike, Trade and Politics , Chapters 1-3, especially pp. iii-iv.
3
Ibid.; Alagoa, Africa in the Nineteenth Century , pp. 724-748; E. J. Alagoa "Long Distant
Trade and States in the Niger delta," Journal of African History, Vol. 1 1, No. 3. 1970, p. 23;
E. J. Alagoa, "Peoples of the Cross River Valley and the Eastern Niger Delta," in
Groundwork of Nigerian History , ed., Obaro Ikime (Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books
(Nigeria) Pic, 1999), pp. 68-72. See earlier notes on Northrup, Trade Without Rulers .
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exclusively with trade." 1 So, before the displacement of the Delta middlemen, the
concept of the Niger Delta city-states—like that of the Greek city-states—rested
upon several clusters of commercially related or unrelated ethnic groups. Despite
their diverse origins, their interests were closely tied via the varying trading centers
by mutual alliances and shared sense of collective survival.
The process of founding and establishing the city-states or trading centers
with working social institutions, was probably completed by the end of the sixteenth
century. Founded with the sole desire to participate in the lucrative commerce of the
"Atlantic community," these city-states had the underlying design of strengthening
the role of indigenous merchants of the Delta. As Dike's account shows, the city-
states were divided into two broad political groups: the first group, which included
the monarchies and the republic, embraced the coastal areas of Bonny, New Calabar,
and Warri, Bell Town, and Aqua Town in the Cameroon. The second group
including the republics and represented by single trading units, were politically
divided into Old Calabar, Brass, and the Cameroon.
Characteristically, the city-states, as noted earlier, were based on the loose
unities of varying "tribal states" and peoples who bore collective interest to shared
values. Despite cultural difference, they were indissolubly bound together by strong
economic ties. Within this framework, the varying peoples of the Niger Delta
valleys and their interior regions bonded together due to the existence of internally
derived institutions. The residents of the major trading centers united as a group
'Dike, Trade and Politics , pp. 4, 7, 10-1 1, 18-19, 30-1, 47.
2
Ibid., pp. 28,31.
3
Ibid., pp. 30-1
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rather than as distant descent groups. 1 Because no single Delta tribe had a monopoly
over others on items of trade, such ethnic groups as the Yoruba, Edo, Bini, Ijo, Ibo,
Ekoi, Ibibio, and Efik, were in commercial and cultural exchanges with linguistically
distinctive races like the Kanuri, Hausa and Fulani. While these groups were people
apart, collectively they represented the clashing of cultures of the tribal hinterland
and the Atlantic community. For instance, the demographic composition of Old
Calabar comprised inhabitants of almost any Delta state, or represented "about 13
different tribes."
2
Historian Edet Udo observes that, as a result of the slave trade and
later of the legitimate trade, "Calabar became a sort ofNew York City of Ibibioland,
harbouring hundreds of peoples from many areas" of the Niger Delta. 3
Certainly between the seventeenth and eighteenth century, "the Delta was one
of the most important, if not the leading, slaving mart in West Africa."4 Upon this
region and its varied peoples rested the enormous crisis resulting from centuries of
European commercial rivalries during the era of the transatlantic slave trade that "left
a psychological legacy of suspicion, servility, or hostility which has been one of the
most serious obstacles in Eurafrican relations," as well as a major cause of human
underdevelopment. 5 The transformation of this crisis was particularly much stronger
from the eighteenth century to the early decades of the nineteenth century. However,
'ibid., pp. 19-30. Northrup, in "West Africans and the Atlantic, 1550-1800" (pp. 35-7),
appears to have complemented this development in reference to the pattern of shared inter-
regional trade.
2
Ibid., pp. 20-6; Udo, Who Are the Ibibio , pp. 8-9.
3
Ibid.; Udo, p. 50.
4
Dike, Trade and Politics , pp. x, 1-3; Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism , pp. 39-
41.
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Ibid.; Dike, pp. 47-56; Ayandele, The Missionary Impact on Modern Nigeria, pp. 3-9;
Olaniyan, Nigerian History and Culture , p. 120; Richardson, "Through a Looking Class," in
Black Experience and the Empire , pp. 61-8.
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the leap toward the traumatic cycle of the Atlantic slave trade in the Niger Delta
basins can be traced to the sixteenth century. But from the seventeenth to the late
nineteenth century, especially the eighteenth, the slave trade became entrenched as
the nerves of Delta basins, and such groups as Ijo, Efik, Itsekiri, Urhobo, Isoko, Bini,
Yoruba, and Hausa/Fulani also became susceptible to its lures. 1
Probably the Ijo people, Kalahari or Caravalies were among the earliest to
participate in large numbers in the transatlantic slave trade from present-day location
of Nigeria. 2 This makes sense in light of the fact that, before the arrival of the
Portuguese, they possessed large canoes that facilitated access to the major trading
port-centers of the Niger Delta. Their canoes were effective in facilitating
commercial interactions between the creek and the interior of the hinterland of the
slave-coasts. These advantages later translated into the success of the Ijo
middlemen. These middlemen were already well established in trading valuable
items such as salt and fish, for example, which they later exchanged for copper/
bracelets with the Portuguese. This position also later yielded to their advantage.
The sources for acquiring slaves varied from one region of the Delta to
another. For example, in the particular case of the Bight of Bonny, the sources
varied from raiding for slaves to warfare, crime, kidnapping, failure to adhere to the
law, and debt.
4 From the 1520 onward, when the Cross River and Bonny enclaves
'ibid., Olaniyan, p. 119; Alagoa, Unesco History of Africa in the Nineteenth Century, pp.
724-7; Latham, Old Calabar, pp. 17-21; Ikime, Groundwork of Nigerian History, pp. 89,
102-8; J. F. Ade Ajayi, "Ethnicity and Nationalism in Nigeria," in Tradition and Change in
Africa
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ed., Toyin Falola (Trenton, NJ: African World Press, 2000), p. 263.
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Ibid., Olaniyan; Northrup, Trade Without Rulers , pp. 50-51; Thomas, The Slave Trade, p.
169; Gordon, Nigeria's Diverse Peoples , pp. 46-7.
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began to surpass Benin as leading slave-trading centers of Niger Delta, most of the
slaves were taken in inter-community conflicts as war captives. Generally between
the 1480 and the 1520, when the slave-trading mart extended to Ijebu and the
kingdom of Benin, slaves sold to the Portuguese were mostly taken in wars. Yoruba
slaves taken as captives were brought all the way from the interior to the major port-
cities for sale; others were taken from the hinterland north of the Niger Delta basin. 1
From about the mid-sixteenth century to the late-eighteenth century,
therefore, the Cross River and Bonny enclaves were among the busiest slave-trading
markets in West Africa. This rise of the slave-trading mart of Old Calabar and
Bonny was probably due more to the fading influences of the slave trade in Benin in
the western Delta during the late seventeenth century. The explanation advanced by
some historians is closely associated with religious considerations. This was also
linked to the banning on the sale of male slaves to the Portuguese from 1516 to the
close of the seventeenth century. Iliffe's observation is supportive that, from the
1516 onward, when "Benin ceased to export male slaves, fearing to loss manpower,"
most of the slaves sold to the Portuguese "came from the Niger Delta and Igbo
country to the east."
2
This further explains why, the Benin ports, which were
initially useful in the slave trade, later had limited role for the next two centuries.
3
The above in turn explains why—until the ban on Benin was lifted between
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—the port-cities of Old Calabar and Bonny
were among the most attractive slave-trading marts in West Africa. Besides, a
'Alagoa, Africa in the Nineteenth Century , pp. 724-7
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Ibid.; Olaniyan, Nigerian History and Culture, p. 114; Iliffe, Africans, pp. 129-130; Ryder,
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majority of the slaves exported from the Bight of Bonny and the Cross river were
from Iboland. 1 As a matter of fact, for 190 years—that is, from 1650 to 1841—Old
Calabar and Bonny led the way as both the busiest and most important slaving ports
of the Niger Delta. 2
As in the sixteenth century, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
and indeed some part of the nineteenth century, the bulk of the slaves from the Old
Calabar and Bonny—including Benin and the related enclaves of Itsekiri—were
either prisoners of war, or taken during slaving expeditions. 3 Such powerful
kingdoms as Dahomey, Benin, and Oyo also acquired their human cargoes through
military expansion and conquest.4 But, in the case of Benin, historian Ryder has
argued that the acquisition of slaves during the last decade of the seventeenth century
and greater part of the eighteenth century was marked by palace crises. This
background led directly to civil war as well as to the outward increases in the number
of people captured and exported as rebels to the New World. 5
Therefore, Bonny not only occupied a strategic position in the organization of
the Niger Delta city-states but was also considered the best port of commercial
exchange and contacts of the Delta. Throughout a greater part of Euro-African
relations, it dominated as "the economic and political center of the Niger Delta."
6
Well-suited for European ships due to its proximity to the sea and connection with
'ibid.; Northrup, "West Africans and the Atlantic, 1550-1800," pp. 42-46; ; Northrup, Trade
Without Rulers , pp. 52-61 ; Richardson, "Through a Looking Glass," pp. 65-8.
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Ibid.; Herskovits, The Myth of the Negro Past , p. 36; Dike, Trade and Politics , pp. 28-9;
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the great rivers of Central Africa, it justifiably served as the principal seat of slave
voyages to the Americas. 1 Also, as a leading slave-trading mart from the close of the
seventeenth century to the end of the eighteenth century, Bonny was ahead of
Calabar and other port-cities of the Niger-Delta. Due to its strategic location, its vast
trading markets stretched as far as Iboland and the Cross River basin areas. 2
The port of Old Calabar was similar to Bonny although second in importance
as a slave-trading mart. Next to Bonny and Calabar was the port of Opobo, which
emerged as another important slave-trading nerve of the Delta from the mid-
eighteenth to some part of the nineteenth century. 3
Significantly, the high volume of slaves exported from the Niger Delta
basins, especially during the eighteenth century, was to transform the character of
slavery among the varied institutions of the city-states. The slave merchants of Old
Calabar, Bonny, and Ijo, for example, began to exploit these indigenous institutions
to supply the human cargoes. Old Calabar, with the Ekpe Society, emerged as a
commercial clearinghouse for debt collection. This secret society controlled the flow
of human cargoes east of the Bight of Bonny during the second half of the eighteenth
century. It also facilitated the flow of the human cargoes exported to the Americas. 4
In Iboland was the popular Aro Chukwu Oracle. This institution played a
key role east and west of the Niger Delta as a catchman network during the slave
trade.
5 Among the Ijo people emerged the "canoe house," a slaving institution
'ibid., p. 24. Also, see earlier notes on Latham, Northrup and Richardson.
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comprised of descent group, slave-trading merchants, and political faction groups.
Their members paddled the canoes up the Niger hunting and collecting slaves. 1
Collectively, these varied commercial institutions served as important slave-
trading networks linking east and west of the Niger belt to its northern hinterland.
Until the destruction of the Aro Chukwu Oracle by the British expeditionary force in
1900, its Long Juju determined the course of the slave trade in Iboland land and
beyond. Probably the influences of the "Ekpe secret society" and the "Aro Chukwu
Oracle," as well as Ijo "canoe house," could explain why Old Calabar and Bonny
were widely known for their role in the shipments of slaves to New World. 2
To the west of the Delta Yorubaland, the heartland of the once powerful Oyo
Empire, the slave middlemen had their commercial centers for running and
administering the major trading routes from the interior to the coast. These
commercial centers served as channels for collecting taxes and fees on the trade as
well as for controlling the passage of the northern merchants into the major slaving
centers.
3 The varying socio-political institutions that emerged in support of the
foreign slave trade in the Niger Delta suggested that the alternative provided by the
Euro-African connection was seated in the future disruption of their diverse unities.
The Niger Delta City-States and the Transatlantic Slave Trade:
Exports and Demography, 1480-1800
There is need then to look at the demography of the Euro-African slave trade
in the region of the Niger Delta valleys. The nucleus of an elaborate system of
forced migration from the Niger Delta to the Atlantic Coast to Europe can be traced
'Ibid.
2
Northrup, Trade Without Rulers , Chapter V, especially, pp. 114-131; Olaniyan, Nigerian
History and Culture , p. 118.
3
Ibid.
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to the period between 1479 and 1480, and probably with its controlling point at Sao
Tome. 1 During the early contact period, Portuguese merchants made a round trip to
the Niger Delta that yielded some 400 slaves, who were later sold in the Gold Coast.2
By the early decade of the 1600s, the Portuguese and Spanish ships were known to
be involved in commerce of the human cargoes over all West Africa. From 1480 to
1630, an estimated 2,000 slaves were annually taken out of the Niger Delta shores. 3
As we saw earlier, the genesis of this early phase of slave exports was closely
linked to the Atlantic islands and from there later still, into Europe. For, with the
expansion of the sugar plantations in the Atlantic islands, the Portuguese began to
pay regular visits to the rivers west of Niger Delta, taking back slaves via their ships.
By 1485, they had established some slaving contacts with the kingdom of Benin, and
were in a favorable position to extend their slaving mart to the Ijebu Kingdom west
of the Niger Delta. This venture not only was the prelude to large scale slavery and
slave trade in the region, it was later accompanied by the opening of other slave-
trading posts at Ughoton on the Benin River, Itsekiri and the western Ijo basin areas.4
The period from 1630 to 1730, which represented the leap in the cycle ofNew World
plantation revolutions, therefore, corresponded with increases in the exports of slaves
from the Niger Delta regions. During this period, the number of slaves exported
from the shores of the Niger Delta basins probably exceeded 5,000 annually.
5
Thus,
the volume of slaves taken from the port-cities of the Niger Delta to the Americas
'ibid., Northrup, p. 51.
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began to peak from the mid-seventeenth century onward. By 1672, one record stated
that the demand for slaves in Old Calabar and Bonny "began to outstrip the supply,"
and the English merchants were able to ship about 210 slaves from this region to
Barbados. 1
After the Anglo-French wars, when England emerged as the unquestionable
leader of the Atlantic commerce, its slave merchants controlled the dominant share
of the trade on human cargoes along the West African coast. 2 Figure 4 shows a
graphic overview of the frequency of the Liverpool slaving contacts at the West
African ports during the eighteenth century. Of the 1 ,099 ships that left Liverpool
for West Africa between 1795 and 1804, the Old Calabar and Bonny ports were
among their main areas of embarkation. Again, of the 24 captains who harbored at
the port of Calabar between 1785 and 1787, "at least 13 were Liverpool men."3
According to historian Curtin, the total population of slaves exported per
decade from the Bight of Bonny rose to 4,500 between 1721 and 1730.
4
After 1730,
when the volume rose due to increased demand for slaves, an average of 7,100 slaves
per annum was shipped between 1741 and 1750; moreover, another 12,500 per
annum was shipped between 1760 and 1770. The peak period of this export from the
Bight of Bonny in the 1790s averaged some 17,400 slaves per year.
5 The overall
exports of slaves rose to 139,000 between 1761 and 1770, and finally to 137,600
between 1791 and 1800 (Table 4).
6 Between 1711 and 1811, about 823,700 slaves
'Latham, Old Calabar, pp. 17-18, 20-1; Northrup, Trade Without Rulers, pp. 52-3.
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were reportedly exported from the Niger Delta to New World. 1 The data on Table 4
show the projected exports of the British and French slave trade within identifiable
regions of the coastal origins in West Africa during the bulk of the eighteenth
century. As shown, the data confirm the general flow of the export of slaves to the
Americas within the major enclaves of the West African coastal plains. This
represented the apogee of the transatlantic slave trade among the major European
states in the Niger Delta regions. The Delta region exported 139,000 slaves around
the mid-eighteenth century and another estimated 1 16,000 between 1771 and 1810.
Figure 4
Graphic Overview of Liverpool Merchants' Slave-Trading/
Shipping Contacts to West Africa/Bight of Bonny, 1709-1807
(09) 1730 40 SO 60 70 SO 90 IgOO 8
Source: A.J.H. Latham, Old Calabar 1600-1891 , pi 9.
As the data on Table 4 further show, during the early and later peak
periods,
the Delta region exported the largest number of slaves to the Americas.
Overall, its
'ibid., pp. 1 16-26; Latham, Old Calabar, p. 1 8.
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export status was the highest in the West African coastal plains from the mid-
eighteenth century to the first decade of the nineteenth century. 1
Table 4
Estimated Number of Slaves Exported from the
West African Coast to the New World, 1711-1810
Coastal Region Early Peak Slaves Subsequent decades and Decades with
Decade Exported average number of slaves exports in excess
transported in them of early peak
Senegambia 1711-1720 31,000 1721-1790 22,000
Sierra Leone 1741-1750 18,000 1751-1810 7,000
Grain/I. Coast 1741-1750 65,000 1751-1790 43,000 1
Gold Coast 1741-1750 67,000 1751-1790 50,000
Slave Coast 1711-1720 72,000 1721-1790 45,000 1
Niger Delta 1761-1770 139,000 1771-1810 116,000
Source: J. D. Fage, A History of Africa (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), p. 266.
These data were first adopted and modified by Fage from Philip Curtin's The
Atlantic Slave Trade , Table 66, p. 221
.
Table 5 shows the amount of slaves carried by European ships from the ports
of Old/New Calabar and Bonny between 1752 and 1799. More than any other region
of the Niger Delta basins, Bonny and Calabar provided more slaves to the New
World via the Liverpool ships than any other region of West Africa.
Between 1752 and 1799 the number of slaves exported from the Delta region
of Bonny was much higher. Calabar alone "provided about 16.25 percent of the
slaves carried from the Bight of Biafra in Liverpool ships."
3
Again, as shown in
Table 5, the frequency of commercial contacts between European slave-trading ships
and the Bight of Bonny was particularly high during the eighteenth century. Some of
the export figures of slaves examined by Latham derived from entries in the Antera
'Ayandele, The Missionary Impact on Modern Nigeria, p. 3.
2
Latham, Old Calabar, pp. 18-20.
3
Ibid., pp. 20-22.
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Duke's Diary at Old Calabar. As he himself tells us, the actual numbers carried
away were not clearly represented. 1
Table 5
Africans Exported to the New World by Liverpool Merchants from
New Calabar/Old Calabar, and Bonny, by Period and Number, 1752-1799
Dates New Calabar Ships - Bonny Ships - Old Calabar Ships
Slaves Slaves - Slaves
1752 62,260 124,670 83,130
1771 31,050 166,850 113,250
1784 114,210 136,900 114,200
1785 155,450 148,600 83,150(2,504)
1786 62,200 115,750 135,150(2,828)
1787 51,860 96,650 72,360 (2,545)
1788 113,234 3,414,078 62,473
1799 82,583 3,714,945 62,275
Source: A. J. H. Latham, Old Calabar 1600-1891: The Impact of the
International Economy Upon a Traditional Society (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1973), p. 21.
Nonetheless, during this period, contacts by the merchant slave-trading
ships of Liverpool were particularly regular at the port-cities of Old Calabar and
Bonny.
2
This is supported by the fact that, by 1798, Britain exported around 38,000
slaves annually from West Africa, the French 20,000, the Dutch 4,000, and the
Portuguese 10,000. During this same period, the official British Foreign Office
annual total moved to about 100,000.
3
The Niger Delta City-States and Transatlantic Slave Trade in
the Era of Legitimate Trade, 1807-1870
By 1807, however, the Euro-African trade relations in the Niger Delta valleys
entered an era of drastic shift. This signaled the collapse of the "400 years old"
'ibid. For example, such figures in Table 5 as 2,504 as recorded for Old Calabar for 1785
and 2828 for 1786, and 2,545—1787, when compared to other sources, suggest that not all
the numbers of slaves carried away were recorded in the Antera Duke Diary (Latham, p. 20).
2
Ibid., pp. 17-21.
3
Dike, Trade and Politics , p. 47.
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system of inter-regional political system and commercial organization. Throughout
the early decades of 1 800s, these changes ushered in a new order of internal turmoil
among the varying socio-political institutions of the Niger Delta city-states. By the
1830s, the long-standing trading and political institutions that once held them
together were either undermined or forcefully overthrown. 1
The sharp demise of the Niger Delta city-states was due also to the fact that
for more than "two hundred years Britain had controlled the lion's share of this
[slave] traffic;" hence, "her dramatic withdrawal in 1 807 precipitated economic crisis
among African traders." The fact that "the British merchant and the slave traders
had sunk much capital in the African trade," meant that none of the parties could
retire without financial ruin. The new epoch of so-called "legitimate trade,"
supported by the British Naval Squadron along with its "gun boat politics," was
more favorable to the merchants of Liverpool and of Bristol.
3
British merchants
were now "the legitimate traders;" their indigenous Delta counterparts "man
stealers."
4
Rather than hastening the end of the foreign slave trade, the British
Parliamentary Act of 1 807 turned the Delta region into an enclave of violence and
rivalries among the major European nations and their indigenous collaborators. With
the growing demand for cheap workforce, thousands of people were violently seized
and shipped as slaves from the Bights of Bonny and Benin to either the cotton belt of
'Ibid., p. 149, including Dike, Trade and Politics , pp. 4-11, 49-50, 61; Alagoa et al, in
Africa
in the Nineteenth Century , pp. 730-1, 734.
2
Ibid., Dike, pp. 47-8, 72-4, 93.
3
Ibid.; Latham, Old Calabar, p. 22.
4
Ibid.
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the Southern U.S., or the sugar plantations in Cuba and Brazil. 1 Compared to the
eighteenth century pattern of exporting slaves from the Delta region, a majority of its
exports in the nineteenth century were taken from the interior of the hinterlands.
These slaves were largely male, a large proportion being women and children.
According to historian Inikori, while the Niger Delta region exported the largest
proportion of female slaves to the Americas, the Kongo/Angola exported males. 2
The Bight of Bonny averaged about 12,500 per year in its export of slaves to
the Americas between 1821 and 1830, with its peak in 1825 reaching 17,000. 3 Much
of the slave-trading marts of Old Calabar, Bonny, Warri, Opobo, Lagos, and Badagry
during the early decades of the nineteenth century
—
just as in some parts of the
seventeenth and certainly during the eighteen centuries—dominated as the leading
slave-exporting centers. This was particularly true for Calabar and Bonny than for
other port-cities, where, for example, "Between October 1820 and July 1821, 162
cargoes of slaves left Old Calabar" for the Americas.
4
Bonny, again, was the busiest slaving mart in the Niger Delta basin during
the preceding period. In 1822, it controlled the largest share of the slaves in the
Niger Delta, selling not fewer than 20,000 annually; some 16,000 of these slaves
were "members of one nation called Heebo [the Ibos]."
5
Reportedly, not less than
320,000 Ibos were taken to the Americas during the early decades of the nineteenth
'Dike, Trade and Politics , pp. 51-4; Manning, "The Impact on Africans, Africa, and the New
World," Globalization of Forced Labour, p. xxi.
2
Ibid.; Northrup, Trade Without Rulers , pp. 77-80; Inikori, "Africa in world history....," in
General History of Africa , Volume V, pp. 103-104.
3
Ibid., Northrup, p. 57.
"Latham, Old Calabar, p. 20.
5Dike Trade and Politics , pp. 29; Olaniyan, Nigerian History and Culture, pp. 115-116.
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century.
1
Overall, the Ibo slaves probably reached about 370,000; about 20,000 of
the others were "Ibbibbys /Ibibios or Quaws" and "natives of the brass country" from
the Cross River basin. 2 Also included in the ethnic origin were the Hausas. 3
Another variant in estimate is that the Niger Delta exported "at the lowest
calculation" about 200,000 slaves between 1827 and 1834 to the New World.4 Old
Calabar alone probably exported between 133,600 and 250,000 slaves. 5 Between the
latel820s and early 1830s, the British trading on palm oil rose from 4,700 tons to
13,945 tons, "besides exporting, at the lowest calculation, during the same period,
200,000 slaves."6 Northrup, on the other hand, concludes that "some 227,000 slaves
were shipped from this region [Bight of Biafra]." 7 While some of these accounts are
extraneous, given the position of recent scholarship on the number of West African
slaves exported to the New World, nevertheless, they suggest the extent to which the
o
region was involved in the slave trade.
For, undoubtedly, throughout the 1830s, the tensions between "man stealers"
and "the legitimate traders" shaped the political economy of the entire Niger Delta.
By 1833 the Delta allegedly had "thirty-six slavers," which included both Spanish
and French slave merchants scrambling in Old Calabar and Bonny.
9
The Bight of
Bonny, in retrospect, became the most likely area to meet "white crews of captured
'Ibid.
2
Ibid.
3
Northrup, Trade Without Rulers , pp. 60-61
.
4
Dike, Trade and Politics , p. 29.
5
Latham, Old Calabar, p. 23.
6Quoted in Dike, Trade and Politics , p. 5 1
.
7
Nothrup, Trade Without Rulers , p. 57.
8
Ibid.; Fage, A History of Africa , p. 266; Dike and Ekejiuba, The Aro , p. 33. Also see Tables
4-5, and 7.1.
9
Dike, Trade and Politics , pp. 52-3.
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slaves." Dike further tells us that these were victims of economic collision "dumped
at Delta ports without shelter or food." Between 1830 and 1840, "every Delta port"
especially Bonny and Calabar, was frequented by notorious Spanish and French
slave dealers.
1
Dike makes the point that the "Brass River had been, commercially
speaking, a Portuguese stronghold for upwards of two hundred centuries and was not
open to English legitimate trade until about 1850."2
Thus, with the introduction of legitimate trade, it was also the attitude of
Portuguese and French slaving merchants, as well as of the old British slave-trading
merchants that influenced the continued practice of the slave trade and slavery in the
Niger Delta basins. Despite the patrol of the British ships, until the 1850s no abrupt
drop occurred in the overall volume of the Atlantic slave trade. According to one
view, increased visibility of the French and Spanish slave-trading ships to Sao Tome,
along with those of the Brazilians, the Portuguese, and the Dutch, was to turn that
island region toward the demise of the trade on human cargoes—as at its beginning,
into "a collection point."
4
For the slave-trading centers of Old Calabar and Bonny, locations where the
British interests were more entrenched, the shift toward legitimate trade took various
directions. Despite the initial opposition to the suppression, between 1841 and 1842
the kings of Old Calabar signed a treaty with the British abolishing the foreign slave
trade.
5 Bonny also finally signed a treaty abolishing the foreign slave trade.
6
'Ibid.
2
lbid.
3
Ibid.; pp. 67-8, 84, 93-4.
4
Northrup, Trade Without Rulers , p. 55.
5
Dike, p. 87; Latham, Old Calabar , p. 22; Udo, Who Are the Ibibio, p. 10
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Downward the westward bend of the Niger Delta basin was the Yoruba
heartland. As we saw earlier, until the late eighteenth century, some part of this
region did not export huge volumes of slaves to the New World. Most of the slaves
exported to the New World from such powerful Kingdoms as Oyo and Benin had
passed through Dahomey. Similarly, from the close of the eighteenth to the opening
of the nineteenth century, a period when the numbers of Yoruba slaves exported to
the New World increased again, the bulk of the slaves from the Yoruba region
passed through Dahomey. 1
Probably during the later stages of the nineteenth century, the increases in the
volume of Yoruba slave exports were associated with the development of the ports of
Porto Nova, Badagry, and Lagos. Since the middle of the eighteenth century, the
"power politics" resulting from the collapse of the Oyo Empire provided most of the
slaves shipped via the latter region to the New World.2
The port of Lagos, which would become the first federal capital of
independent Nigeria, was—by the first decade of the nineteenth century—the leading
slave trade outlet. Lagos was an important point north of the Niger for exporting
large numbers of slaves to the Americas before and during the conflicting decades of
the legitimate trade.
3 Based one estimate, the total number of slaves shipped to the
New World from all the major ports of Nigeria "must have approached an annual
peak of 30,000."
4
Historian Lovejoy has observed that, until the 1850s, the Bights of
Bonny and Benin remained important sources of exporting slaves to the Americas.
'Olaniyan, Nigerian History and Culture , p.l 19; Gordon, Nigeria's Diverse Peoples, p. 47-8.
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But ironically, however, after 1830s the slave trade shifted its spheres of importance
from the Bight of Bonny to Bight of Benin. While the actual number of slaves
imported from Africa to the U.S. between 1808 and 1860 may still be indeterminate,
there is no doubt that a larger proportion was from the Bights of Bonny and Benin. 1
Thus, a majority of the reportedly 54,000 slaves imported into Southern U.S.
between 1 808 and 1 860, either directly from Africa or through Latin America, came
from the Bights of Bonny and Benin. 2 That is, there cannot be any doubt that
modern Nigeria had one of the most concentrated demographic representations of the
forced migrants from West Africa into mainland North America.
Part 3: The Enslavement of Africans in Mainland North America
Historians Berlin has provided some excellent evidences that the first
English settlers to arrive Virginia in 1607 shared in the notion of developing an
integrated biracial community. The fact that such biracial unison did actually occur
in colonial Virginia was seen in the early collaborative relations involving Native
Americans, the Spaniards, the Portuguese, and the English settlers.
As regards, for example, the so-called "twenty odd Negroes" brought into
colonial Virginia in 1619, the general historical emphasis of the early colonial era
strongly suggests that their status would not have differed very significantly from
'Lovejoy, "The Volume of the Atlantic Slave Trade," in Globalization of Forced Labour, p.
64.
2
Ibid., Dike. Trade and Politics , pp. 51-2, 81-2, estimated that "between 1808 and 1860,
300,000 slaves were imported into the U.S.A." This was cited from an earlier study by C.
Lloyd, The Naw and the Slave Trade (London, 1938, pp. 24-7). Dike's estimate appears to
be extraneous in light of Curtin's revisionist data (Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census, p. 87),
which estimated some 54,000 slaves imported into the U.S., for example, between 1808 and
1850. The Curtin position has found support in Rawley's The Transatlantic Slave Trade, p.
330.
. „
,
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that of European servants. While scholars have varied in their explanation of the
official status of these early Africans, however, the underlying emphasis is that they
were more of indentured servants than slaves. For, as Berlin states, "through the first
fifty years of English and African settlement in the Chesapeake, black and white
workers lived and worked together in ways that blurred racial lines." 1
Other scholars have argued that, from the onset of the colonial experience,
the racial distinctiveness of Africans placed them under a unique position of
degradation. Their more distinctive background also presaged their future status
both as slaves and later as a peculiar free people of African descent in America. 2
There is no doubt then that the early effort to exploit the African workforce was of
equal importance to the white merchants of the first thirteen British colonies of
mainland North America. 3
Despite the above fact, the attitude leading to the permanent enslavement of
Africans emerged rather slowly as well as manifested itself simultaneously at
different stages and at different locations in accordance to the inordinate-subordinate
'Ibid.
2
For this emphasis, see the literature in Chapter 1 of this dissertation. For other related
background, see example: Winthrop Jordan, White Over Black: American Attitude toward
the Negro. 1550-1812 (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1968), p. 73; Morgan, American
Slavery, American Freedom , pp. 1 54, 297; Meier and Rudwick, From Plantation to Ghetto ,
p. 41; Higginbotham, Jr., Shades of Freedom , pp. xxiii-xxxii, 3-27; Willie Lee Rose, ed., A
Documentary History of Slavery in North America (New York, London, Toronto: Oxford
University Press, 1976), pp. 15-16.
3
Ibid. Also see: E. Franklin Frazier, The Negro in the United States (New York: The
Macmillan Co., 1957), pp. 22-3; Benjamin Quarles, The Negro in the Making of America
(New York: Touchstone Books, 1987), pp. 42-3; Michael L. Conniff and Thomas J. Davis,
eds., Africans in the Americas: A History of the Black Diaspora (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1994), pp. 26-7; Edward Countryman, ed., How Did American Slavery Begin?
(Boston and New York: Bedford/St. Martin's, 1999), pp. 3-4, 17; Steven Deyle, "By Far the
Most Profitable Trade: Slave Trading in British Colonial North America," in Slave Trades,
1500-1800" Globalization of Forced Labour, Vol. 15, ed., Patrick Manning (Brookfield,
U.S.A: Variorum, 1996), pp. 107-8.
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status of black-white socioeconomic demand. 1 The large-scale origin of this labor
exploitation of Africans can be traced to the period between 1630s and early 1640s,
when it became apparent that they were unlike any other colonial peoples. 2
Historian Morgan has argued that the Chesapeake colonies of Virginia and
Maryland "would have expired without a steady flow of workers."3 Yet, as he
further tells us, the sharp increase in Virginia's population after 1644 was not due to
any serious corresponding rise in the number of new arrivals, but rather to the fact
that the newcomers were beginning to live much longer than previously.4
Throughout the 1640s, however, the classification of racial distinction
although present from the onset, was not very strong among the early populations of
white settlers and Africans. Both in colonial Virginia and Maryland, the required
workforce still rested heavily on their exploitation. 5 There is a firmer ground then
for surmising that a majority of Africans during the early colonial era were not slaves
in the later sense of the term. 6
On the other hand, however, historian Jordan argues that although Africans
occupied degraded status in Virginia from the onset, their overall status as slaves was
'Blackburn, The Making of the New World Slavery, p. 460; Horton and Horton, Hard Road
to Freedom , p. 28.
2Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom , pp. 154, 297-301; Lorenzo J. Greene, The
Negro in Colonial New England (New York: Athenaeum, 1974), pp. 15-21.
3
Ibid., Morgan, p. 180.
4
Ibid., pp. 154-7, 180-1.
5
Horton and Horton, Hard Road to Freedom , p. 29; Blackburn, The Making of New World
Slavery
, p. 460.
6
See, for example, Jordan, White Over Black , p. 73; Morgan, American Slavery American
Freedom
, pp. 298-301; Rose, Documentary History of Slavery in North America, pp. 15-16;
Quarles, The Negro in the Making of America, pp. 42-3; Conniff and Davis, Africans in the
Americas , pp. 26-7; Morris, Southern Slave Law. 1619-1860 (Chapel Hill and London:
University of North Carolina, 1996), pp. 40-1; Higginbotham, Jr., Shades of Freedom, pp.
15-6, 18-66; Berlin, Many Thousand Gone, p. 29; Deyle, "By Far the Most Profitable
Trade," pp. 107-8.
124
not clear.
1 The attitude leading to the permanent enslavement of Africans was
traceable to later developments, and these were closely linked to the birth of the
plantation revolutions. With the demand for cheap labor in Virginia and Maryland
between 1660 and 1664, Africans were increasingly being ushered into permanent
enslavement.
2
For example, in 1662, the Virginia statute laws took the first step in
Southern colonies of imposing the status of chattel slavery on Africans, thus
establishing the basis of their inferiority. The same law later provided a legal basis
for the enslavement of slaves' children as well as made a provision for them to
become either slaves, or free people in accordance to the status of their mothers. 3
Later on, of course, Maryland's slave code of 1715 made all blacks slaves,
along with "their children."
4 Nor was the classification of Africans in the
lowcountry Carolinas any different from one found in the Chesapeake colonies of
Virginia and Maryland. Indeed, the drive to enslave Africans on the basis of their
race due to the demand for cheap labor in South Carolina was a central colonial
experience that shaped the white-black relations since the early decades of the
eighteenth century. With this came the enactment of new civil codes aimed at the
general subordination of Africans.
5 The South Carolina rigid statute slave code of
1712 imposed a life- serving slavery for the Indians, mulattoes and blacks, including
'ibid., especially Jordan, White Over Black , p. 73, Horton and Horton, Hard Road to
Freedom
, p. 29; Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom , pp. 154-7.
2R0Se, Documentary History of Slavery in North America , pp. 17-24, Meier and Rudwick,
From Plantation to Ghetto , pp. 42-3; Higginbotham, Jr., Shades of Freedom, Jr., pp. 15-16,
18-66.
3
Ibid., Higginbotham, pp. 15, 31-8; Morris, Southern Slavery and Law, pp. 43-4.
"ibid., Morris, pp. 45-6.
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their children. The enactment of the North Carolina slave code in 1741 followed
closely the rigid measures of South Carolina. Georgia, the last of the English colonial
settlements, also adopted the South Carolina slave code in 1770 to sustain the
permanency of the African workforce under slavery.
But in the Northern colonies, where only some nine-tenths of the white
populations were farmers, and where domestic and personal needs were dominant,
the inclination toward the enslavement of Africans was early in the making although
less rigorous.
1
For example, in colonial New England and Pennsylvania, the
enslavement of Africans was somewhat less rigid as in the Southern colonies. With
increases of Africans in the general population and the corresponding demand for
cheap labor, the legal basis for their enslavement followed almost a similar pattern
found in the Southern colonies.
2
Lorenzo Greene argues that the basis of Negro servitude and enslavement in
New England existed before the establishment of the Massachusetts Bay colony in
1629. "It seems reasonable to conclude, however, that Negro slavery was introduced
into New England sometime between 1624 and 1638, with the weight of evidence
weighting toward the latter date."
3
If Lorenzo is correct, it would then mean that the general socio-cultural
platitude for enforcing legalized slavery on Africans in colonial New England was
'Morris, Southern Slavery and Law , pp. 45-6.
2Du Bois, The Suppression of the African Slave-Trade , pp. 27-31; Greene, The Negro in
Colonial New England , pp. 15-16; Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery, 460;
Berlin Many Thousand Gone , p. 54; Berlin, Generation of Captivity, pp. 22, 52, 81-3, 98;
Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade , pp. 307, 310; Horton and Horton, Hard Road
to
Freedom , pp. 34-5, 40-41.
3Greene. The Negro in Colonial New England , pp. 15-16, 17.
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fairly well established by the 1640s 1—that is—before the Southern colonies. Yet,
prior to this period, the New England colonists developed their resources without
resorting to extensive labor of even the white indentured servants. However,
between 1650 and 1708, its statutory slave codes were fairly well in place. Not only
did its codes follow the precedent set by Virginia, they formed the basis upon which
other Northern colonies enforced their legal status on African slaves.2
Only in the Dutch colony of New Netherland was the experience of Africans
under slavery relatively mild with the least form of legal codification. Of the status
of African slaves, Horton and Horton document that: "If they were free, blacks were
often accorded the same rights as whites in the colony. They could own property,
pursue trades, and even intermarry with Whites. Race was a factor in that being a
black carried with it a probability of being enslaved, but blacks were treated as free
people so long as their white neighbors knew that they were free."
3
Therefore, until
1664, when the Dutch colony passed hands under the British as New York, the rigid
attitude toward the permanent enslavement of Africans was least apparent.
4
In New York, the enslavement of Africans along with rigid legal measures,
developed between 1684 and 1706 around the major rural and urban centers. Similar
to the rigid slave laws in the Southern colonies, those in New York were designed to
impose complete enslavement of Africans for the required workforce. Furthermore,
its slave-merchants even established strong links with the major slaveholding
'ibid., pp. 18-21; Horton and Horton, Hard Road to Freedom , pp. 40-1;
Meier and Rudwick,
From Plantation to Ghetto , pp. 42-7.
3
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counties North of Maryland. 1 Consequently, by the early decades of the eighteenth
century, a system of hereditary slavery was fastened permanently upon Africans in
the colonies of British mainland North America. By 1706, the ruling that slaves
were not made free even by baptism affirmed their status in degraded servitude in the
colonies of Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, New York, and New Jersey.
From the 1720s onward, planters all the slaveholding colonies were irrevocably tied
to the permanent enslavement of Africans on the basis of their race and demand for
cheap labor.
By the Constitution of the new United States, Africans as slaves and as white
property, comprised only but three-fifth of a human being. 3 On the other hand, this
permanent enslavement of Africans went hand in hand with the explosive rivalries
among the major European powers involved in the commerce of racial capitalism.
Significantly, until the replacement of the Iberian leadership on the West
Coast of Africa and later in the Americas by the competing states of Western Europe,
the population of African slaves in mainland North America was fairly thin. For
example, in colonial Virginia and Maryland, it was not until after the closing decades
of the seventeenth century that the volumes of African-slaves began to increase.
And these increases, to be sure, occurred after England had achieved a dominant
status in the colonial struggle and after the plantation revolution had ordained and
indeed transformed the climate of racial commerce among the major powers.
'ibid., Horton and Horton, p. 37.
2
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Direct and Indirect Build-up of African Slaves, 1650-1750
So, the import of the African workforce into mainland North America was
fairly thin during the early colonial decades. Prior to 1650, for instance, only but a
very small proportion of them from time to time found entry into colonial Virginia. 1
Only between five and six percent of the slave population in the Americas entered
mainland North American colonies; about 95 percent were in the tropical colonies.2
The estimated 1,600 Africans in 1650 which entered the British North American
mainland represented their first serious build-up. Another wave of 3,900 slaves
arrived in 1675.
3
However, Africans were only of slight importance in the Chesapeake during
a greater part of the 1670s; their enslaved population represented less than 5 percent
of the inhabitants of Maryland and Virginia. Despite some 6,600 of them entering
the Chesapeake through Barbados in 1 680, historian Menard concludes that, "it was
very rare at this time to have a Negro ship come to this country directly from
Africa."
4 The next major waves of Africans numbering 23,000 arrived in 1700. 5
Between 1 700 and 1 720 most the slaves were imported directly from Africa.
An estimated 1,000 slaves per year entered the British North American colonies,
rising to "over 2,500 in the next two decades," and reaching "a peak of over 5,000
per year in the 1740s and 1750s."
6
Overall, between 1715 and 1750, an average of
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about 2,500 slaves was imported each year into North America. 1 If this figure is
compared to the total population of Africans in 1750, it becomes apparent that the
system of self-reproduction of slaves was an underlying factor of their population
growth during and after the peak decades of the eighteenth century. 2
Historian Berlin makes the point that these early waves of African slaves
were mostly "Atlantic Creoles," or in his preferred term, "the charter generation." If
so, they were often the offspring of mixed marriages with the early Iberian
merchants on the West Coast of Africa. 3 They bulk of them were familiar with
European ways. No wonder, being among the first to be imported via the Atlantic
coast and Europe to the Americas, they were somewhat more familiar with European
ways. Besides, their experiences were almost similar to those of white indentured
servants.
4
As the preceding emphases suggest, the medium of entry of the early waves
of African slaves into mainland America had varied, and requires some
understanding. This is important for ascertaining further clarity in explaining the
demographic varieties of racial capitalism. There is a basis then for surmising that
the early importation of slaves into mainland North America came through the West
Indies. "At first, Negroes imported to the English North American colonies came
primarily from the West Indies."
5
'Peter M. Bergman, The Chronological History of the Negro in America (New York: Harper
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To what extent then were the varied routes of importing slaves into the
Southern and Northern colonies relevant to an understanding the variant in the early
waves of the forced migration? To begin with, historian Rawley, for example, has
argued that there is inadequate explanation about the medium used in importing
slaves into the Northern and Southern colonies. Rawley further argues that the fact
that the West Indies was the primary source for American slaves until the American
Revolution may have led scholars to a hasty conclusion and misunderstanding. This
misunderstanding was due to the fact that the first Africans entered the mainland
North American colonies of Virginia and South Carolina through the West Indies. 1
But, according to historian Klein, until after the American Revolution,
nearly all the slaves imported into continental mainland North America entered by
way of the West Indies. Menard, responding to Klein's thesis, argues that African
slaves were imported from the West Indies as well as directly from Africa, that is,
almost simultaneously.
3
So, which medium was dominant? There cannot be any doubt that where the
West Indies had first served as the pioneer lanes of importing African slaves into
mainland North American colonies, the same medium could not have remained the
only one for obtaining large-scale shipments of workforce in the era of intensive
plantation agriculture and corresponding commercial and industrial revolutions.
Probably the American Revolution had some influence on the medium of
transshipment of African slaves at least within a specific historical period. For, with
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2
Herbert S. Klein, "Slaves and Shipping in Eighteenth Century Virginia," Journal of
Interdisciplinary History , III 1975, pp. 383-412; Morgan, American Slavery American
Freedom
, pp. 298-9; Menard, "From Servants to Slaves," in Unfree Labour, pp. 216-9, 231.
3
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the grievances of the British colonists, which later resulted in the "war with
American colonies" and later corresponded with the birth of an independent United
States of America, a smooth medium of importing slaves through the West Indies
was likely to be constrained. 1
Rawley again makes the point that the West Indies route was more applicable
to the Northern colonies while direct import from Africa was more applicable to the
Southern colonies. 2 Probably Rawley' s explanation is the more adequate for
understanding the early medium of slave imports into mainland North American
colonies. For the basis of his explanation lies more in understanding the early
relations between Southern and Northern colonies with the West Indies and Africa,
along with the instrumental colonial diplomacy that shaped the American Revolution
and the plantation revolutions. 3
Raw statistical arithmetic is equally supportive of differing concentration of
slaves in both the Southern and Northern colonies: of the 44,866 slaves in 1710 in
British colonial North America, 8,303 were in the North and 36,563 in the South. In
1715, when the overall population of British North America was 436,600, with
whites totaling 375,570, a majority of the 58,850 blacks were in the South.4
Furthermore, in 1720, when there were 68,839 slaves in British North
America, 14,091 of them were in the North—and 54,748 in the South.
5 Between
1715 and 1765, New York and New Jersey imported 4,551 slaves, of which "only
'Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade , pp. 202, 332; Edward Countryman, The American
Revolution (New York: Hill and Wang, 1985), 14-24; Segal, The Black Diaspora , p. 53.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
4
Bergman, Chronological History of the Negro in America, pp. 25-8; Berlin, Generations of
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, pp. 272-4.
5
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930 were from Africa." 1 When, on the other hand, New England's total population
was estimated at 90,000 in 1700, the black population was perhaps not "more than a
thousand." In 1715, the first general New England census by race recorded
approximately 158,000 whites, with only 4,150 blacks. Between 1771 and 1776
New England's black population rose to 16,034 in a total population of 659,466. 3
The Southern concentration of African slaves not only contrasted with the
Northern patterns, it also suggested the medium of imports. With the American
Revolution, the West Indies medium of transshipment of African slaves into
mainland North America could have been affected. This perhaps explains why direct
importation of slaves from Africa was more suitable to the Southern scheme, and
why such major slave societies as Virginia, Maryland, Georgia, and South Carolina,
for example, relied on the direct import of slaves from Africa. Virginians imported
far larger numbers of slaves direct from Africa than West Indies long before the
American Revolution.4 On the other hand, while South Carolina had its first
permanent settlement from the West Indies—like Virginia—it also imported directly
from Africa. Admittedly, of the 83,825 slaves entering South Carolina between 1700
and 1775, a majority of about 67,269 came directly from Africa.
5
Again, in retrospect, between 1700 and 1730 all but 5,000 of the over 54,000
Africans entering the Chesapeake came from Africa.
6
Virginia alone recorded
38,418 slaves between 1708 and 1750, or "roughly 45,000 slaves between 1700 and
'Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade , p. 332.
2
Greene, The Negro in Colonial New England , p. 73.
3
Ibid., pp. 73-4.
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Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade , pp. 332-3.
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Ibid.
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133
1750."' Of its 6,609 imports of slaves between June 1699 and October 1708, only
679 came through the West Indies. Moreover, of its 52,507 imports between 1710
and 1769, exactly 45,091 were from Africa; another 69,006 came between 1699 and
1775.
2
There is then a valid basis that the early waves of Africans first entered the
British mainland North America "primarily from the West Indies."3 As indicated
earlier, this medium was probably most viable when both the plantation and
commercial revolutions had not yet reached their take-off stages. As, for example, in
the case of colonial Virginia, Klein demonstrated that some 53 percent of its slave
imports between 1710 and 1718 entered via the West Indies. Only about 42 percent
were direct from Africa.4
Accordingly, Menard concludes that: "If it is assumed that all the ships
registered in Great Britain that appear in the records of slave imports from the West
Indies had in fact merely stopped at the islands on their way to the Chesapeake from
Africa, then only 16.5 percent of the slaves brought to Virginia between 1710 and
1718 were from the West Indies and 78 percent were from Africa." 5 Hence, even
where the observations by Rawley and Menard seem more convincing, the
differences between Southern and Northern colonies were glaring enough from the
onset. By mid- 1750s, of course, the Southern colonies had already begun to be
poised as the circumstantial homeland of a majority of the descendants of slaves
(Tables 6.1-6.3).
'Morgan, American Slavery. American Freedom , pp. 301, 308.
2
Holloway, Africanisms in American Culture , p. 10.
3Bergman, Chronological History of the Negro in America, p. 28.
4
Klein, "Slaves and Shipping in Eighteenth Century Virginia," pp. 383-412.
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Table 6.1
Slaves Populations in the Chesapeake/Upper Southern
Colonies/United States, 1680-1860
Colonies/
States
1680 1700 1720 1750 1770 1790 1810 1820 1840 1860
Chesapeake/
Upper South
4,876 20,752 42,749
171,84
O
332,84
5
520,96
9
810,62
4
965,514 1,215,497 1,530,229
Delaware 55 135 700 1,496 1,835 8,887 4,177 4,509 2,605 1,798
Maryland
1,611 3,227 12,499 4,350 3,681
103,03
6
1 1 1,50
2
107,397 89,373 87,189
Virginia
3,000 16,690 26,550
107,10 187,60 292,62
7
392,51
8
425,153 449,087 490,865
North Carolina
210 1,000 3,000 19,800 69,600
100,57
2
168,82
4
205,017 245,817 331,059
Kentucky 12,430 80,561 126,732 182,258 225,483
Missouri 3,011 10,222 85,240 114,931
Tennessee 3,417 44,528 80,107 183,059 275,719
District of
Columbia
5,395 6,377 4,694 3,185
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970 , (Washington, DC, 1995).
Vol. 2: 1 168; Ira Berlin, Generations of Captivity: A History of African American Slaves (Cambridge, MA, and London: The
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003), pp. 272-3.
Table 6.1 shows the slave populations of the Chesapeake. As shown, their
overall population was at its heights during the eighteenth century. From 1680 to
1740, Virginia, Maryland, and North Carolina had the largest population of slaves.
Between and 1720 and 1730, these slaves were employed in the tedious cultivation
of sugar and tobacco crops in Virginia and Maryland. Both climatic factors and the
required plantation workforce influenced their concentration.
1
Table 6.1 also shows the slave population of North Carolina. Prior to the
mid-century, its growth pattern was smaller compared to Virginia and Maryland.
Delaware had the smallest slave population, as well as the smallest distribution of the
African population.
2 From the 1770s onward, the growth of slaves in the
Chesapeake began to correspond with the active demand for their labor. By the
1790, Kentucky and Tennessee began to record their slave populations (Table 6.1).
'Blackburn, The Making ofNew World Slavery , pp. 465-6.
2
Berlin, The Generations of Captivity , pp. 272-3.
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Based on the data on Table 6.2, African slaves were densely concentrated in
the Lowcountry South Carolina from 1680 to 1750. With only 3,000 slaves recorded
in 1750, by 1720 the number rose to 11,828 and to 39,900 in 1750. Between 1768
and 1773, when tobacco, indigo, and rice were the three major plantation crops of the
Lowcountry, its slave populations increased in proportion to the general trend of the
labor demand. 1 By 1770, the figure rose to 92,178.
According to Table 6.2, Georgia was not involved in plantation slavery until
the mid-eighteenth century. Once involved, however, Georgia's planters not only
imported large quantities of slaves to work in their plantations, they also maintained
a distant second to South Carolina. With approximately 30,000 slaves by the
century's end, it had added considerably to the lowcountry black majorities.2
The variation both in the population and distribution of the African slaves in
the Lower Mississippi is noticeable enough: they had no recorded figures between
1680 and 1700. The scanty population of 1,385 slaves recorded in 1750, and the
almost 5,000 recorded in 1770—close to the eve of the Revolution—are strong
indicators of the late entry of the region into plantation economy based on racial
slavery. Another reason might have been the overall effect of high mortality deaths
of slaves in the region. For example, of the about first 2,000 population of slaves
brought into the colony during the early decades of 1700, less than 700 were alive by
October 1720. Also of the 450 imported directly from Africa in April of 1729, only
363 reached the Mississippi River.
3
'Blackburn, The Making ofNew World Slavery , p. 459; Berlin, Many Thousands Gone, pp.
64, 105; Morris, Southern Slavery and the Law , pp. 4-5.
2
Berlin, Generation of Captivity, p. 68.
3
Ibid.; Berlin, Many Thousands Gone , pp. 82-3.
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Table 6.2
Slave Populations in the Lowcountry/Lower South and
Lower Mississippi Valley Colonies/United States, 1680-1860
Colonies/
States
1680 1700 1720 1750 1770 1790 1810 1820 1840 1860
Lowcountry/
Lower South
200 3,000 11,838 39,900 92,178 136,932 303,234 408,129 633,699 926,349
South Carolina 200 3,000 11,828 39,000 75,178 107,094 196,365 258,475 327,038 402,406
Georgia 600 15,000 29,264 105,218 149,654 280,944 462,198
East Florida 300 2,000 574 1,651
Florida 25,717 61,745
L. M. Valley/
Deep South
1,385 4,730 7,100 18,700 51,748 145,394 637,130 1,497,11
8
Louisiana 1,385 4,730 5,600 18,700 34,660 69,064 168,452 331,726
West Florida 1,500
Alabama 41,879 253,532 435,080
Mississippi 17,088 32,814 195,211 436,631
Arkansas 1,617 19,935 111,115
Texas 182,566
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States. Colonial Times to 1970 ,
(Washington, D.C., 1995), vol. 2: 1168; Ira Berlin, Generations of Captivity: A History of African American
Slaves (Cambridge, MA, and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003), pp. 272-3.
Until the 1730s the termination of the enslavement of the Native Americans,
the importation of slaves into colonial Louisiana was less visible. This meant
increased importation of African slaves, as well as increased pattern of internal self-
reproduction in Louisiana and other related enclaves of the Lower Mississippi
Valley.
1 By 1731, for example, the black population of nearly 4,000 in Louisiana
not only outnumbered whites, but also represented about 60 percent of the entire
population. Louisiana, settled early in the eighteenth century by the French, had
about 4,700 slaves in 1746, whose prospects of future growth were bound to mature
in the era of the cotton kingdom.
By the early decades of the eighteenth century, the combined share of African
slaves in the Lowcountry and Mississippi Valley surpassed that in the Chesapeake
'Morris, Southern Slavery and Law , pp. 4-5.
2
Ibid.
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(Table 6.2). Prior to the cultivation of rice in South Carolina, Virginia had the
largest share and lead over the rest of the English colonies in its control of the total
population of slaves. By the eve of the Revolutionary War about four out of every
ten blacks lived in Virginia. 1
Similarly, after the first decades of the eighteenth century, the share of South
Carolina slave population began to surpass the numerical superiority of whites. By
1724, its African population of 32,000 contrasted sharply with only 14,000 for
whites. By the mid-century, blacks comprised about 90 percent of the population. 2
When blacks made up about 60 percent of the population in all but three
parishes of the Lowcountry in 1730, South Carolina countryside "looked more like a
negro country than like a country settled by white people."3 The least irony for the
build-up in the region was that the skill associated with their cultural background
facilitated their enslavement.
4
Collectively Tables 6.1 and 6.2 confirm that the strongest demographic
variant in the Southern colonies is evident in the sharp contrasts with their Northern
counterparts (Table 6.3). As shown, in 1680, only 1,895 slaves were recorded in the
entire Northern colonies. The population of these slaves rose to 5,206 in 1700 and to
14,081 in 1720. By mid-century, when the plantation revolutions were at their
heights in the South (Tables 6.1 and 6.2), only New York, New Jersey,
'ibid.; W. A. Low and Virgil A. Cliff, ed., Encyclopedia of Black America (New York:
McGraw Hill Book Company, 1981), p. 685; Morgan, American Slavery, American
Freedom , p.308.
2
Ibid.; Holloway, Africanisms in American Culture , p. 4; Horton and Horton, Hard Road to
Freedom
, p. 3 1 ; Berlin, Generation of Captivity , pp. 68, 272-3.
3
Ibid.; Holloway; Berlin, p. 68; Wood, Black Majority , p. 132
"Charles Joyner, Down by the Riverside: A Slave Carol ina Slave Community (Urbana and
Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1984), pp. 57-9, 71; Williams, Capitalism and Slavery,
pp. 6-8, 9.
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Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, were the most densely
or sparsely populated areas of African slaves. 1
Table 6.3
Slave Populations in the Northern Colonies/United States, 1680-1860
Colonies/States 1680 1700 1720 1750 1770 1790 1810 1820 1840 I860
North 1,895 5,206 14,081 30,172 47,735 40.420 17,081 19,108 1,113 64
N. Hampshire 75 130 170 550 654 158 1
Massachusetts 170 800 2,150 4,075 4,754
Connecticut 50 450 1,093 3,010 5,698 2,764 310 97 17
Rhode Island 175 300 543 3,347 3,761 948 108 48 5
New York 1,200 2,256 5,750 11,014 19,062 21,324 15,017 10,088 4
New Jersey 200 840 2,385 5,354 8,220 11,423 10,851 7,557 674
Pennsylvania 25 430 2,000 2,822 5,561 3,787 795 211 64
Source: Li.S. Bureau o the Census, Historical Statistics o f the U nited States,
Colonial Times to 1970, (Washington, DC, 1995), Vol. 2: 1168; Ira Berlin,
Generations of Captivity: A History of African American Slaves (Cambridge, MA,
and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 272-3.
Massachusetts, the largest slave holding colony in Southern New England,
did not have a uniform black population: it had no less than 200 slaves in the colony
in 1676.
2 By 1690, it had about 150 slaves and fewer than 500 in 1710, about 2,000
in 1715, and 2,600 in 1735.
3 By the mid-century, Massachusetts had the most
slaves—5,235 in a total of 224,185. In 1776, their population was 5, 249 in a total
population of349,094.
4
While Rhode Island had the largest proportion of slaves, New York had the
largest population of slaves in the entire North. By mid-century, its more than
10,000 slaves represented about 15 percent of the population, rising
again to "more
than nineteenth thousand slaves" on the eve of the Revolution.
5 When compared to
the South, however, the general growth pattern of Northern
slaves in the eighteenth
'See Tables 6.1-6.3; Berlin, The Generations of Captiv ity , pp. 272-4.
2
Greene, The Negro in Colonial New England, pp. 79-80.
3
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Ibid.; Morison, Oxford History of the United States, p. 149.
5Horton and Horton, Hard Road to Freedom, p. 37.
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century was as similar as it was markedly distinctive. 1 For example, during the first
century of settlement in the North, the black population comprised a small fraction of
the population in New England and the Middle Colonies.2 The black population
totaled only 8 percent of the population in New Jersey and less than 4 percent in
Massachusetts and Connecticut. 3 By mid-century, when slaves made up 61 percent
of the colonial population of South Carolina, 31 percent of them were in Maryland,
and 46 percent in Virginia—only 2 percent were in Pennsylvania, 7 percent in New
Jersey—and 14 percent in New York.4
Geographic and Demographic Varieties of Racial
Slavery and Racial Capitalism
Figure 5 shows the varying stages in the maturity of racial slavery and racial
capitalism in British mainland North America, later the United States from 1 660 to
1790: the first transformation begun along the major routes of imports and exports
within the American regions from the plantation revolution to industrial revolution.
Second, and perhaps of far greater significance of this development was tied to the
major lanes of commercial exchanges of slave societies and societies with slaves. 5
So each generational phase of human interaction in mainland North America,
that is, from the early colonial settlement to the birth of the United States,
corresponded with the expanding varieties of racial slavery and racial capitalism.
This development was closely linked to the evolving patterns of the major port-cities
'For example, the Southern and Northern colonies were as similar as they contrasted with
each other in their rigorous pattern of internal self-reproduction.
2
Frazier, The Negro in the United States , p. 34.
3
Berlin, Many Thousands Gone , p. 54.
"Horton and Horton, Hard Road to Freedom , pp. 33-34.
5
For example, see Berlin, Generation of Captivity , pp. 22, 52, 98.
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and port-towns in both the Southern slave societies and Northern societies with
slaves. The vast coastal plains of the Chesapeake, the Lowcountry, Middle colonies,
and Northern colonies evolved in accordance with the generational gravitation of
racial slavery within the new Atlantic system of world capitalism. These were later
to become the major industrial centers, with gigantic modern facilities, along with
dense populations. The known commercial varieties of the major port-colonies of
British mainland North America, later the U.S., dictated the distribution of the slave
workforce across the major regions (See Tables 6.1-6.3).
Such counties as Tidewater, which had the largest slave plantation in British
North America along with subtropical climate, were where the bulk of the slaves
converged.
1
This region was closer to the slave markets; moreover, its location
eased the gradual extension further inland long the dangerous frontier zones. This
perhaps best explains why most Southern port-centers such as in piedmont, Virginia,
and Charleston, South Carolina had large slave populations.
2
African slaves entering
South Carolina arrived via a single post.
Almost all the slaves in Carolina, and later Georgia and the East Florida,
representing about 40 percent of pre-Revolutionary population—first entered via the
port of Charleston. This was "the largest mainland slave mart;" and here "Africans
disembarked on its wharves by the thousands."
4
'Horton and Horton, Hard Road to Freedom , pp. 31-2; Berlin, Many Thousands Gone, p. 72;
Berlin, The Generations of Captivity , pp. 67-8, 70; Holloway, Africanisms in American
Culture
, p. 4; Wood, Black Majority , p. 132
2
Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery, p. 461; Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave
Trade
, p. 332.
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Again about 100,000 of the slaves entering the Charleston port-town were
bound for its rice-growing economy. These dominated the rice plantation parishes in
Charleston in about a ratio of three to one majority over white. Moreover, South
Carolina's wealthiest and most established plantations were also near the port of
Charleston. By the end of the eighteenth century, these plantations controlled more
than 60 percent of the slaves.
1
ibid., Horton and Horton, pp. 31-2; Berlin, pp. 68, 272-3;
Berlin, Many Thousands Gone , p.
72; Morris, Southern Slavery and Law , p. 4.
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Variations were noticeable in the settlement patterns as well as in the sizes of
slave households in the Chesapeake and the Lowcountry plantations. During the
1720s, for example, about 29 percent of the Lowcountry slaves were in estates of
thirty or more slaves. By 1749, this number rose to 54 percent, and before
stabilizing, about three quarters of the slaves resided in estates with fifty or more
slaves. Almost during a similar period, more than half of the slaves in the
Georgetown District lived on plantations of over fifty slaves, and more than one-fifth
ofthem were in units of one hundred slaves or more. 1
Similarly, "seven" of the bulk of the eighty-eight slaveholders owning from
300 hundred to over 500 slaves in the South Carolina, were located on the
Waccawaw, and in the All Saints rice plantations.2 An additional fourteen planters
owning "more than 500 slaves" were all located in the Waccamaw. Overall, South
Carolina had the largest slave plantations markets in British North America, and later
in the United States. 3
On the other hand, however, African slaves in the Chesapeake plantations
were brought entered via a variety of routes: port-towns and port-cities. This meant
the port-outlets were areas of dense concentration of African slaves. Virginia's early
and mid-eighteenth century concentration of Africans in the York and Rappahannock
river basins was triggered by the spread of tobacco into the Southside and central
piedmont. Those counties that produced the best grades of sweet-scented tobacco for
the English market had the highest concentration of slaves. Conversely, those
'ibid.; Blackburn, The Making ofNew World Slavery , p. 463.
2
Joyner, Down by the Riverside , p. 34.
3
Ibid., pp. 23, 34.
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counties with marginal producers of tobacco had the smallest proportion of slaves. 1
Generally, the concentration of slaves in Maryland diminished gradually as
one moved away from the York River to the bay areas. Their distribution across
other areas of the colony also stretched from Accomack to Northampton to the
Southside of the James River. Slaves were densely concentrated in the tobacco
growing counties of Central Western Shore-Calvert, Prince George's, and Anne
Arundel. Those counties with the heaviest investment in tobacco had about 30
percent blacks in their population. 2 Such counties as Charles, St. Mary's and
Baltimore had their enslaved populations ranging from 20 to 25 percent. With the
exception of Kent County, where the slave populations ranged from 10 percent to 15
percent in the Eastern shore region, the Eastern Shore had one of largest
concentrations, followed by their counterparts in Northern and Southern counties. 3
Unlike in the Lowcountry, large plantations in the Chesapeake had crews of
between ten to fifty slaves. Those with smaller plantations had fewer still.
4
In
Amelia County, Virginia, where the number of slave households increased from 23
percent to 76 percent between 1736 and 1782, the median number per household
rose from two to six. Compared to Chesterfield County established fourteen years
after Amelia County, with 40 percent proportion of adult African slaves in 1775, and
'Phillip D. Morgan & Michael L. Nicholls, "Slaves in Piedmont Virginia, 1720-1790," in
Plantation Societies in the Era of European Expansion, Vol. 18, ed., Judy Bierber
(Brookfield, VT: Variorum, 1997), p. 163; Barbara J. Fields, Slavery and Freedom on the
Middle Ground: Maryland during the Nineteenth Century (New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 1985), pp. 1-22; Menard, The Worlds of Unfree Labour, p. 233.
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about 27 percent in 1782.' Piedmont had the bulk of its slaves residing in plantation
quarters of fewer than ten slaves. After one or two decades, however, a majority
resided in plantations with more than ten slaves. By 1780, "about 40 percent of
slaves in most Piedmont counties lived on plantation of more than twenty slaves."2
Most piedmont slaves did not live in large plantations of thirty or more slaves
such as in All Saints South Carolina, but like in Middle ground colony, had a certain
degree of communal life. 3 However, compared to slave societies, societies with
slaves differed markedly in their application and distribution of the African-slave
workforce. Unlike in the North, with the large slave plantations and dense settlement
patterns of the Southland, slaves enjoyed greater communal bonding. In the North
not only were blacks both enslaved and free thinly populated, they exhibited a
scattered pattern of settlement.
4
Like their Southern counterparts, however, such
port-colonies like Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, New York, and Massachusetts, for
example, were enclaves of their dense populations.
5
During the first decades of the eighteenth century when slaves made up more
than one-sixth of the population of Philadelphia, their population seemed almost
representative of other Northern cities.
6
For example, in 1767, Philadelphia alone
had about 1,400 slaves living in no more than twenty blocks of developed urban
'Morgan & Nicholls, "Slaves in Piedmont Virginia, 1720-1790," p. 164.
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"Gary B. Nash, Forging Freedom: The Formation of Philadelphia's Black Community 1720-
1840 (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 1988), p. 14.
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spacing.
1
During the same period, this port-city was home to about 590 slave-
owners, with nearly 1,400 slaves in a total population of 18,600. Eight years later,
when the city recorded an overall 25,000 population, the number of slaveholders
declined to 376 and the slave population to less than 700.2 Slightly past the mid-
century, almost 8 percent of the blacks in Philadelphia were urban slaves. 3
Southern New England colonies/states of Massachusetts and Rhode Island
ranked first among the slave-trading regions. Their largest populations of slaves
were in the Bay region.4 Slaves were concentrated in Bristol, Plymouth, Lincoln,
Duke, Cumberland, Nantucket, Berkshire, Cambridge, and Worcester counties. 5
Boston, throughout the entire colonial era, had the largest number of blacks. As of
1687, "there was not a house in Boston that had not one or two slaves."
6
Rhode Island contained fully one-third of all slaves, with nearly half of them
in Newport. The largest number of the black population, comprising almost half was
in Newport. Connecticut's black slaves were densely concentrated in the port-cities
ofNew London and Hartford. 7
New York—unlike its counterparts in Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and
Rhode Island—had from one-fifth to one-third of its slave population in the rural
areas. Throughout the eighteenth century, its large slave populations were
concentrated in the Long Island estates and the Hudson River Valley.
8 New York's
'Nash, Forging Freedom , pp. 1 1, 14; Horton and Horton, Hard Road to Freedom , pp. 33-42.
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Narragansett region, where the tobacco growing was located, had the densest
concentration of slaves. This region looked more like South Carolina than any one
of the Northern colonies. 1 By mid-century, it had begun to lose its pre-eminence in
slave population to Charleston, then to New Orleans. From one-fifth to one-quarter
of all slaves in colonial New York were in New York City. 2
Northern slave-merchants were skewed more toward the ethno-regional
merits of their slaves. 3 Most Northern merchants—like those in piedmont—often
placed more value upon the youth and skill of their slaves. Compared to their
Southern counterparts, where most of the young slaves participated equally in the
tedious plantation routines, slaves (boys and girls) in the North were mostly in
domestic service. This had the predictable effects of allowing Northern slaveholders
to train their slaves in the required domestic activities.
4
Even where slaves were involved in the rigorous task of ship building in the
major port-cities of New York, Philadelphia, and Newport, for example, their tasks
were often flexible, and unlike the blatant exploitation characteristic of Southern
slavery.
5
This represented an important variant with its Southern counterparts, as
well as a decisive factor in their future rift.
Nigerian-West African Background of Slaves in
Mainland North America
As we saw much earlier in Chapter 1, the Nigerian background formed the
crux of the human cargoes that were shipped to the New World. This was
'Ibid.
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particularly the case during the eighteenth century, when, as Gordon documents,
"almost one-third of the slaves came from Nigeria." 1
Indeed, an estimated 3.5 million people from the Nigerian regions were
shipped to the New World over the entire span of the slave trade. 2 As we also saw
earlier, a majority of these slaves were from the Ibo and Yoruba ethnic origins,
followed by Efik/Ibibio, Hausa-Fulani, and Ijo. 3 Therefore, at this juncture, it might
be helpful to delineate their demographic distribution in mainland North America
(See Tables 7.1-7.3).
Table 7.1
Estimated Number of Slaves Exported from Africa,
by British Ships, by Region, by Period, 1662-1807
Period Senegambia
Sierra
Leome
Gold
Coast
Bight
of
Benin
Bight of
Biafra
Central
Africa
South
East
Africa
1662-70 1100 400 8000 13700 32500 4100 100
1671-80 3800 1300 17500 17200 22900 8300 300
1681-90 8000 2700 12700 40100 18200 19800 5400
1691-00 9800 3300 17100 33400 10500 17200 200
1700-09 7800 2600 47100 43500 15400 9300
1710-19 11200 5000 91100 47600 24500 17500 11000
1720-29 22900 8300 78900 50200 44700 61500 9400
1730-39 40300 5300 32000 25200 53300 136500
1740-49 6500 4400 51100 6700 95300 45100
1750-59 30100 41000 62600 14800 91300 33600 500
1760-69 40300 94200 79300 27100 145500 38200
1770-79 38100 77200 84800 24700 120400 16000
1780-89 6700 34700 71800 19000 157700 16600
1790-99 5200 37400 5310 20600 133900 100000
1800-07 3800 19400 46000 12500 101100 72500
Total 235600 337200 753100 396300 1067200 596200 26900
% Share 6.9 9.9 22.1 11.6 31.3 17.5 0.8
Source: David Richardson, "Through a Looking Glass," in Black
Experience and Empire, eds., Philip D. Morgan and Sean Hawkins
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 67.
'Gordon, Nigeria's Diverse Peoples , p. 54.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid. Also, see earlier notes on the demography of the slaves, including Tables 4-5.
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Table 7.1 shows a general overview of the regional estimates of slaves
exported from Africa via British Empire ships from 1662 to 1807. Based on the
data, the bulk of the British transshipments during the transatlantic slave trade came
from West Africa. Further revealing is that the major slave exporting centers were in
the Bight of Bonny, with 31.1 percent of the total share, followed by the Gold Coast
(22.1 percent), Central Africa (17.5 percent), and Bight of Benin (1 1.6 percent). 1
With regard to British mainland North America, about 40 percent of the
newly arrived slaves in the Chesapeake during the second and third decades of the
eighteenth century were from Calabar in the Cross River basin area and Iboland in
the Niger Delta basin region of the Bight of Bonny. 2 By the mid-eighteenth century,
the bulk of the "Guinea Africans" imported into Virginia were from Cross River
basin and the Niger Delta regions of Old Calabar and Bonny. 3
Based on Table 7.2 (1690 to 1807), the British importation from the Bight of
Bonny (30.1 percent), had the largest share among the major suppliers of slaves to
North America. Next was the Gold Coast, with 18.4 percent, followed by the
Windward Coast (1 1.6 percent), and the Bight of Benin (1 1.3 percent).
Table 7.2 confirms the data on Tables 5 and 7.1, particularly in relation to the
pattern of West African slaves entering mainland North America. For example, the
Bight of Bonny (Biafra) in modern Nigeria had the largest share of slaves imported
into Virginia between 1710 and 1769. Virginians received less than one-sixth of
'For detailed elaboration, see the insightful essay by historian Richardson, "Through a
Looking Glass," pp. 66-7.
2Holloway, Africanisms in American Culture , pp. 6-11; Berlin, The Generations of
Captivity
,
p. 59.
3
Ibid. Also, see Tables 4 and 5.
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their slaves from Senegambia, one-sixteenth from the Gold Coast, one-sixth from
Windward Coast, and about 38 percent from the Bight of Bonny region. 1
Table 7.2
African Slaves Imported into Mainland North America,
by Region, by Percentage, 1690-1807
Region/Coastal Origin Virginia South Carolina British Slave
1710-1769 1733-1807 Trade, 1690-1807
Senegambia 14.9 19.5 5.5
Sierra-Leone 5.3 6.8 4.3
Windward Coast 6.3 16.3 11.6
Gold Coast 16.0 13.3 18.4
Bight of Benin 1.6 11.3
Bight of Bonny [Biafra] 37.7 2.1 30.1
Angola 15.7 39.6 18.2
Mozambique/Madagascar 4.1 0.7
Others 0.6
Total 100 100 100
Source: Philip D. Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969, p. 157.
Similarly when Virginians imported some 52,000 slaves between 1710 and
1769, with the origin of 20,000 given as "Africa," some 9,224 ofthem—representing
the largest—were from the Bonny and Calabar in the Cross River basin and Niger
Delta regions.
2
This confirms that the bulk of the slaves imported into Virginia were
from present-day Nigeria, and mostly from the slave marts of Bonny and Calabar,
and Benin and Dahomey (See Tables 4 and 5).
3
For South Carolina slaveholders (Table 7.2), their imports were stronger from
Senegambia (19.5 percent) and Angola (39.6 percent), Windward Coast (16.3
percent), and Gold Coast (13.3 percent). Imports of slaves from the Bight of Benin
Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade , pp. 334-5. Also, see the Nigerian demographi
Chapter 3 of this dissertation, especially Figures 5 1-5.2 and Table 9.
2
Ibid.; Holloway, Africanisms in American Culture , p. 1 1
.
3
Ibid pp. 4-10; Berlin, Many Thousand Gone , pp. 144-5; Herskovits,
The Myth oi
Negro Past p. 36; Dike, Trade and Politics , pp. 28-9; Latham, Old
Calabar
, pp. 17-8, 20-
(1.6 percent) and Bight of Bonny (2.1 percent) comprised the lowest shares. 1 This
contrasted sharply with Virginia, which imported only 15.7 percent of its slaves
between 1710 and 1769 from Angola, compared to South Carolina's 40 percent.
Throughout a greater part of the eighteenth century, South Carolina imported
slaves from Central Africa than from any other region (Table 7.3). Like Virginia, a
majority of these slaves were primarily from the "Guinea" region. By the mid-
1700s, about 70 percent were of Bantu origin. This pattern continued up to the end
of the eighteenth century. 2
Unlike South Carolina, however, Virginia had a less restrictive policy in its
imports: a majority of its slaves were from the Bights of Bonny, followed closely by
the Gold Coast, Windward Coast and Senegambia. Virginians therefore imported
slaves from more diverse regions of Africa than South Carolinians. 3
A careful study of the overall population of slaves import into South Carolina
may even reveal that neither Angolans as a specific group nor Central Africans as a
general regional workforce were the majority in its population (Table 7.2). For
example, about 18,240 slaves imported into South Carolina between 1752 and 1807
were from the Guinea Coast, and reportedly taken from the Gold Coast to Calabar.
4
Collectively, slaves entering South Carolina from all the West African coastal plains
comprised about 60 percent from the eighteenth to early nineteenth centuries.
5
'Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade , p. 335.
2Wood, Black Majority, p. 6; Holloway, Africanisms in American Culture , pp. 6-10.
3
Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade , pp. 156-7; Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade , pp.
334-5; Berlin, Many Thousands Gone , pp. 144-5; Herskovits, The Myth of the Negro Past ,
p. 36; Dike, Trade and Politics , pp. 28-9; Latham, Old Calabar, pp. 17-8, 20-2; Holloway,
Africanisms in American Culture , pp. 4-1 1.
4
lbid., Holloway, p. 9.
5
Ibid., pp. 5-6. That is, from the Senegambia to the Bights of Benin to Bonny.
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Table 7.3
Nigerian-West African Background of Slaves Imported
into South Carolina, by Number, by Region,
by, 1733-1744
Coastal Region Number of Slaves Percentage
Senegambia 1,031 6.2
Sierra-Leone
Windward Coast 34 .2
Gold Coast 1,184 7.2
Bight of Benin
Bight of Bonny 609 3.7
Angola 9,831 59.7
Mozambique/Madagascar
Others 3,844 23.2
Total 16,533
i^/v/t-** » v" i-,
*"r^ *
* * 'VMM.v • • - — » *o — — " —
Africanisms in American Culture , ed., J.E. Holloway (Bloomington and
Indianapolis'. Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 7.
The difference in the above analogy appears then to have been closely
associated with the diverse concentration of slaves in the two Southern slave
societies. For example, the data on Table 7.2 confirmed that the imports of slaves
from the Bights of Bonny and Benin into South Carolina were not as concentrated as
in Virginia. During the early period—1733 to 1744—most of its slaves' imports
were from Angola, Windward Coast, and Senegambia. Only 609 slaves were from
the Bight of Bonny, with no recorded import for the Bight of Benin.
The preceding suggests the extent to which the slave merchants showed a
certain degree of preferences in their imports of West African slaves. First,
nearly
all the ethnic preferences of West African slaves in mainland North
America were
dictated by the needs of the plantation economy.
1 Second, the character of Southern
slave societies not only influenced the ideology of plantation
agriculture, but also
'Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade , p. 334
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how planters selected their human cargoes from one region of Africa over the other.
Often these preferences occurred because slave merchants wanted strong, full-grown
male slaves with the required skills who could endure the rigor of the plantation
workforce. 1 As, for example, in Virginia, where tobacco growing required brute
force, its slaveholders and plantation system exhibited a certain degree of flexibility
in their patterns of slave import. South Carolina's extensive rice plantations required
specific skills, so planters imported from Senegambia and Angola. Between 1683
and 1721, roughly half of Virginia's imports sailed from Senegambia—near the
Niger Valley. Reportedly, moreover, Virginia alone imported an average of about
800 slaves a year from the Bight of Bonny late in the second decade of eighteenth
century, and at least twice that number by the middle of the third decade. 3
Other evidences suggest that the attitudes of white slave merchants toward
slaves from regions of modern Nigeria were as mixed as they were often modified.
For example, the Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba slaves were among those who were
"artisans" and "house servants," for such were commonplace skills among them.
4
Their counterparts such as the Ibo and Calabar/Efik and Ibibio were mostly the field
hands. Indeed given the ethnic history of a majority of the slaves imported from the
Bights of Bonny and Benin [Nigeria], it is quite likely that a majority of them were
field hands. Consequently, some merchants imported slaves from certain regions
because they were known to be less prone to rebellion.
5
'Thomas, The Slave Trade , p. 403.
2
Berlin, The Generations of Captivity , p. 59.
3
Northrup, Trade Without Rulers , p. 54.
4
Holloway, Africanisms in American Culture , pp. 4-14; Thomas, The Slave Trade, pp. 399-
402; Berlin, Many Thousand Gone , pp. 144-5; Wood, Black Majority , pp. 12-15.
5
Ibid.
154
Within the superstructure of the Chesapeake and Lowcountry plantation
systems were the dreaded white overseers. Under them rested the supervision over
the varied hierarchic statuses of enslaved Africans: house servants, artisans, rice
cultivators, and field slaves. 1 Some slaves were considered less rebellious, and more
obedient, industrious, and submissive; such slaves, particularly the house servants,
often differed from the fieldworkers.2
General Growth and Transformation of Black Captivity
in the Era of Freedom: 1780-1865
The growth of the black population in colonial British North America, later
the United States, was due to both the considerable degree of self-sustaining
reproduction of slaves as well as direct importation. 3 This can be further explained
by understanding the pattern of fluctuation in the growth of slaves between the
Caribbean slave societies and mainland North America. For example, slaves in the
Caribbean were less likely than their counterparts in mainland North American
colonies to have large families of children.
4
Both socially and demographically, the practice of racial slavery and racial
capitalism was more freestanding and autonomous in the British colonies of
mainland North America and later the United States than in Central and South
'Ibid.
2
Ibid.
Stanley L. Engelmann, "Changes in Black Fertility, 1880-1940," in Family and Population
in Nineteenth Century America, ed., Tamara K. Hareven and Maris A. Vinovskis (NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 126; Segal, The Black Diaspora , pp. 60-1; Blackburn,
The Making ofNew World Slavery, p. 460.
4
Ibid.
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Americas, This meant that colonial slavery survived more independently in North
America. 1
When an estimated 264,000 slaves were imported into the British West Indies
between 1640 and 1700, the total black population was about 100,000. Similarly,
between 1712 and 1762 the importation of 150,000 slaves to Barbados only raised
the black population to 28,000.2 Brazil's import of about 4 million slaves over the
entire span of the Atlantic slave trade represented some 38 percent. Yet, about 33
percent of the number comprised local Brazilians population when slavery ended,
and only 36 percent were Afro-Americans of the Western Hemisphere. 3 Similarly,
the Caribbean import of 5 million slaves represented 43 percent of the total trade,
with only 3 million Afro-Americans when slavery ended in 1866. This number
represented an average of 60 percent of its local population, comprising only 18
percent of the total population of Afro-Americans in the Western Hemisphere.
4
Table 8 shows the general pattern of the growth of black population from
1620 to 1860: a period representing the colonial and birth of an independent United
States. This growth represented the fastest in the entire Western Hemisphere.
5
About eighty years after their first settlement in North America, slaves numbered
27,000 by 1700, representing some one-sixth in the British Caribbean.
6 By 1720, in
fact, more blacks were born in the colonies than were being imported; by 1740, they
'Ibid., Blackburn, pp. 459-60.
2Morgan, American Slavery. American Freedom , p. 301.
3
Knight et al., in General History of Africa in the Nineteenth Century, Vol. VI, p. 766.
4
Ibid.
.
,
,
5Manuel D. Plotkin, "Current Population Reports, Special Studies," in The Social and
Economic Status of the Black Population in the United States: An Historical Review, 1790-
1978 , Series P. 23, No. 80 (Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1790-1978), p. ix.
6
Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade , pp. 329-30.
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were mostly American-born, with about fourteen percent of them being represented
in the entire population. 1
Furthermore, their general growth pattern represented about eighty percent of
the entire population of the British and French Caribbean. Apparently this same
population increased twice as rapidly as the rate of importation between 1700 and
1780.
2
Slaves, who produced about three-quarters of the exports around 1770 in
mainland North America, comprised 18 percent of the colonial population and 40
percent of the population of the Southern colonies. This meant that the slave
population of North America was larger in the Americas in 1770 than it had been
throughout the Americas in the 1700.
Between 1700 and 1750, for example, the Chesapeake colony of Virginia,
which imported roughly 45,000 slaves, had a black population increase ranging from
8,000 or 10,000 to over 100,000.
4 By the 1760s, on the other hand, South Carolina
had a clear black demographic distinction over white. Also, by mid-century onward,
its percentage share of black population ranked first in the entire American
population.
5
'Coniff and Davis, Africans in the Americas , p. 132.
2Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade , p. 330.
3
Blackburn, The Making ofNew World Slavery, pp. 459-60.
4Mr,rPan American Slavery, American Freedom, pp. 301,
308.
5W.A Low and Virgil A. Cliff, ed., Encyclopedia of Black America (New York:
McGraw
Hill Book Co., 1981), p. 685.
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Table 8
General Growth Pattern of African-American and White
Populations, by Percentage, by Decade, 1619/20-1860
Year-Decade Afro-American White Percent Afro-
American of
Total Population
11
1619/20 20 2,180 1.0
1630 60 4,586 2.0
1640 597 26,037 2.3
1650 1,600 48,758 3.2
1660 2,920 72,138 3.9
1670 4,535 107,400 4.0
1680 6,971 144,536 4.6
1690 16,729 193,643 8.0
1700 27,000 223,000 11.1
1710 44,000 286,000 13.5
1720 68,000 397,000 14.8
1730 91,000 538,000 14.5
1740 160,000 745,000 17.7
1650 236,000 934,000 20.2
1760 325,000 1,267,000 20.4
1770 459,000 1,588,000 21.4
1780 575,000 2,204,000 20.7
1790 757,000 3,172,000 19.3
1800 1,002,000 4,305,000 18.9
1810 1,378,000 5,862,000 19.0
1820 1,772,000 7,867,000 18.4
1830 2,329,000 10,537,000 18.1
1840 2,874,000 14,196,000 16.8
1850 3,639,000 19,553,000 15.7
1860 4,442,000 26,923,000 14.1
Source: W. A. Low and Virgil A. Cliff, ed.. Encyclopedia of Black
America (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1981), p. 685.
At the birth of the new nation, the black population was estimated at about
"462,000 for 1770 and 562,000 for 1780."' The bulk of blacks, representing about
85 percent of all mainland slaves, were in the South, and mostly in four states:
Virginia, the largest, held 220,582 slaves; South Carolina had 97,000; North Carolina
held 91,000 slaves; and Maryland had 80,515. South Carolina's black majority
comprised some two-fifths of Virginia's population, compared to one-third in North
'Plotkin, "Current Population Reports, Special Studies," p. 6.
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Carolina and Maryland. 1 New York, the fifth largest slave colony, had 21,054
Blacks, followed closely by Georgia with 20,83 1 ?
By the late 1780s, when all of New England had abolished the foreign slave
trade and slavery, all the leading slave societies of the Southern states were entering
another era of boom in cotton production based on intensive slave labor. 3 By the
1790s, therefore, all Northern slaving institutions entered a course toward a mixed
climate of voluntary4 formal extinction of the foreign slave trade via gradual
emancipation.
Definitely by 1790, the American-born progeny of slaves numbered 757,208
in a total population of 3,929,2 14. 5 Ironically, the first U.S. Census taken during this
same period showed that four Southern slave states were the major enclaves of black
America: Virginia, Maryland, North Carolina and South Carolina. Of the 86 percent
of blacks under slavery during the pre-War era, about 90 percent resided in the
South.
6
Also, in 1790, of the 67,120 or 67, 474 of blacks in the North, some 40,087
were slaves. New York, with 25,978 blacks and New Jersey, with 14,185 blacks,
held the edge over the rest of Northern states for both the numbers of enslaved and
free blacks. Massachusetts' 6,001 blacks were all free compared to about 2,700 in
'Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade , pp. 33 1-2.
2
Ibid.
3Du Bois, Black Reconstruction in America, pp. 3-4; Greene, The Negro in Colonial New
England
, pp. 75-6.
4Leon F. Litwack, North of Slavery: The Negro in the Free States 1790-1860 (Chicago and
London: University of Chicago Press, 1961), pp. vii-ix, 3-6, 39-41.
5Countryman, How American Slavery Began, pp. 4-5
6
Frazier, The Negro in the United States , p. 34; Plotkin, "Current Population Reports,
Special' Studies," pp. ix, 6; Berlin, Many Thousands Gone, pp. 372-3; Berlin,
The
Generations of Captivity
, pp. 272-4.
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Connecticut still under slavery. 1 By early nineteenth century, more than 2 million
blacks from the Atlantic seaboard to Delaware to Florida to east of the Mississippi
river, were in the former slave societies. 2
Accordingly, by 1810, the year of the first U.S. Census after the abolition of
the foreign slave by the Congress in 1808, about 1,377,080 blacks were recorded in
the population. Of this number 1,191,362 were slaves, 186,466 or some thirteen
percent freemen.3 Almost at about the same time, South Carolina "legally imported
nearly 40,000 Africans."
4
From 1790s to 1850s, which was the height of cotton productions, was
marked by the growth of black population in Virginia, North Carolina, Missouri,
Kentucky, South Carolina, Georgia, Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, and
Tennessee.
5 On the other hand, however, was virtually abolished in the North by
1830. Ironically, at about a similar period, Missouri had 25,000 slaves. By 1850,
when Georgia and South Carolina had each over 380,000 slaves, Virginia recorded
470,000 on its count. Louisiana, with a slave population of 34,000 during the 1810
Census, had about 245,000 in 1850.
6 By 1860, when ninety percent of blacks were
American-born, the U.S. produced five million bales of cotton, as compared to three
million in 1852 and one and a half million in 1822.
7 Only two million of the seven
'Ibid.
2
Knight et al., in General History of Africa in the Nineteenth Century, Vol. VI, p. 760.
3
Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade , p. 329; Bergman, Negro History, p. 92.
4David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770- 1823 (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1975), p. 121.
5Du Bois, Black Reconstruction , pp. 3-4; Plotkin, "Current Population Reports, Special
Studies," p. 6. Also, see Tables 6.1-6.3.
6
Litwack, North of Slavery , p. 14; Morris, Southern Slavery and Law , pp. 4-5; Berlin, Many
Thousands Gone , pp. 82-4.
7Bergman, Negro History ; Du Bois, Black Reconstruction , pp. 3-4.
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million whites in the South owned slaves during this same period. About seven
percent of the white population in the South owned "nearly 3,000,000 of the 3,953,
760 slaves." 1
By 1860, only 448,070 of blacks were free out of a total of 4,441,830. 2
About seventy years after, the black population had grown from "almost six-fold to
4.4 million."
3
Thus, very little variation occurred in the proportion of enslaved black
population after the legal prohibition of the practice by the U.S. Congress. This
meant that the law in fact had little or no impact on the growth of the slave
population, or on the illegal importation of slaves into the country. 4
Both enslaved and free blacks made up a sizeable proportion of city
populations of pre-Civil War Southern and Northern states. Baltimore's 28,000
blacks represented the largest in the nation, seconded by New Orleans with more
than 24,000. Charleston—with 17,146 blacks was followed closely by Richmond
(14,275), and Washington (10,893).
5
On the other hand, in Northern states pre-Civil War black population was
much less conspicuous and much smaller: their densest concentrations were in New
York, Boston, and Philadelphia. Within these areas their patterns of urban settlement
were also far stronger than for most Americans. These Northern blacks made up
between 1 and 3 percent of the population of large cities.
6
"ibid.
2
Ibid., Bergman, p. 221.
3
Plotkin, "Current Population Reports, Special Studies."
4
Ibid.
5
Bayrd Still, Urban America: A History with Documents (Boston: Little Brown and Co.,
1974), p. 132.
6
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Although the proportion of their total population dropped between 1840 and
1 860, this did not seriously affect their patterns of urban cluster. Philadelphia, which
abolished slavery in 1808, had the largest Northern black community in 1860: its
22,185 blacks represented nearly 4 percent of the total population. Other Northern
cities with sizeable black populations included: Brooklyn (4,313), Cincinnati (3,731),
and Boston (2,261). Newark, Pittsburgh, and Detroit had black populations
exceeding one thousand. 1
When President Lincoln signed the Emancipation Proclamation in 1865,
abolishing chattel slavery forever, the U.S. had about 4.5 million African-Africans. 2
As Americans of a peculiar history, this marked the beginning of a new cycle of
struggle for the generation black captivity.
Summary
A majority of the varied West African slaves imported into mainland North
America/U.S. from the Bights of Bonny and Benin were from the present-day
location of modern Nigeria. Slaves imported from these regions were mostly from
the Niger Delta/Niger-Benue and the Cross River basins.
Based on the data on Tables 4-5 and Tables 7.1-7.2, slaves imported from the
Bights of Bonny and Benin were greater in the Southern slave societies of
Chesapeake than in the Lowcountry South Carolina.
3 The distribution of slaves of
'Ibid., p. 127; Nash, Forging Freedom , p. 14.
2
Ibid.; Knight et al., p. 766.
3
For example, see Tables 6.1-6.3; Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade, pp. 156-157.
*Note that
the demography of West African slaves, largely of the "Niger Delta valleys"
and the related
regions of the "Guinea," forms the central basis in our explanation as
well as summary of the
Nigerian background of American slaves.
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the Nigerian ethnicity had one of the widest spread: one out of every four Africans
forced in chains into mainland North America was from the Nigerian region. 1 The
spread of these Nigerian ethnic traits went as far as the former Senegambia and the
Gold Coast.2
'Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade , pp. 156-157; Holloway, Africanisms in American
Culture
, pp. 7-12; Ogbaa, The Nigerian Americans , p. 1 13; and Tables 4-5, 7.1 and 7.2,
2
Ibid, Curtin, p. 156; Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade , pp. 334-5; Holloway,
Africanisms in American Culture , pp. 4-11.
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CHAPTER 3
MODERN NIGERIA: A REVIEW
The first section of this chapter examines the pre-colonial settings of modern
Nigeria, its geographic and ethno-regional zones before and after the beginning of
the British colonial rule, and the activities leading to the unification of the Northern
and Southern Protectorate in 1914. The second section discusses the differences
between Southern and Northern peoples of Nigeria: both in relation to the Islamic
cultures as well as European colonial/Christian Missionary influences, it explains the
extent to which the ethno-regional differences of Nigerians, particularly in
preferential policies, are the products of the colonial era. Additionally, it explains
the pattern of Nigerian immigration to the United States, along with the regional
distribution of Nigerians.
Background and Demographics
Modern Nigeria, with a compact area of 373,250 square miles is located in
the extreme corner of the Gulf of Guinea, in West Africa, and extends from the Gulf
Guinea in the South to embrace the Sahara Desert in the North. Its North-South
geographic features have two distinctive yearly climatic zones: the dry season and
the rainy season. The dry season, beginning from November to March is often
driven by strong Harmattan winds from the Sahara Desert in the north. The rainy
season, which lasts from April to October, is moisture-laden southwest trade winds
blowing on-shore toward the interior and toward other parts of the country. Modern
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Nigeria is bounded on the west and north by Dahomey and the Niger Republic and in
the east by Lake Chad and the Cameroon. 1
The physical features of Nigeria can further be divided into two geographical
zones, with the open savannah zone lying to the north, and the southern forest zones
adjoined at the middle Niger and Benue rivers.2 Often viewed as separate zones, the
Niger and Benue rivers form the heartland of the "middle belt." On the other hand,
however, they are important transitional points between the peoples of the savannah
and the southern forest zones. Also, these rivers are not only important compacts
between the savannah belt and the forest zones, but can be seen stretching across the
mountains to the northeast of Sierra-Leone to embrace the whole of the French
Sudan before entering via the south of the Gulf of Guinea. 3 Nigeria has other
important rivers such as Bonny, Qua Iboe, Delta, and Katsina-ala. The presence of
Kainji hydroelectric dam has made some of these rivers navigable all year round
within West Africa and far beyond.
Prior to European contact, these vast geographic regions were linked to
distant civilizations.
4
Historian Collins observes that although the Sahara has been
known to affect contacts with the outside world, "its barren wastes have never totally
prevented contact between Africa and the Mediterranean world."
5
'Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism , p. 1 1.
2Biodun Adediran, "The Origins of Nigerian Peoples," in Nigerian History and Culture), p.
10.
3Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism , p. 1 1
.
"Robert O. Collins, Western African History: Text and Readings (New York: Markus
Wiener Publishing, Inc., 1990), p. 3.
5
Ibid. Also, see Chapter 2 of this dissertation.
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Part 1: Alien Influence in Pre-colonial Nigeria: Islamic Factor
As we saw briefly in Chapter 2, the Islamic factor in pre-colonial Nigeria,
especially in its Northern region, had tied its peoples to the outside world and hence
to the influences of alien cultures. The introduction of Islam into this region in about
the fourteenth century not only preceded European contacts but formed the basis of
human development as well as crisis in the unity of the peoples of pre-colonial
Nigeria during both the colonial and post-colonial Nigeria. 1 So before the imposition
of informal British mandate in the Niger Delta basins, Islam had already been a
dominant religion in the bulk of the Hausa-Fulani north. This region was inhabited
mostly by a race of cattle breeders, who lived a nomadic life. According to tradition,
they had emigrated from the Senegal River Valley to Northern Nigeria around the
beginning of the twelfth century. By the late sixteenth century several clans in what
is today Northern Nigeria had come under the influence of Islam and the Fulani.
These influences, along with their subsequent distribution across the region,
extended throughout Hausaland as far as east of modern Adamawa.
By the early nineteenth century, the Fulani nomads under the leadership of a
famous scholar in Gobir, Usman dan Fodio began to expand the spheres of Islamic
influence in Northern Nigeria. The roots of this expansion began in 1 804, when dan
Fodio led a Jihad or Holy War aimed at establishing a pure form of Islam upon the
'This is in reference to the Euro-African relations in the Niger Delta basins; see earlier notes
in Chapter 2.
2
See, for example, Ajayi, Tradition and Change in Africa , pp. 264-5; Akin Olorunfemi, "The
Fulani Jihad and the Sokoto Caliphate in the nineteenth century," in Nigerian History and
Culture
,
ed., Richard Olaniyan (Ikeja, Ibadan, Owerri: Longman Group Limited, 1985), pp.
123, 128-133; J. O. Hunwick, "The Nineteenth-Century Jihads," in Africa in the Nineteenth
and Twentieth Centuries , eds., Joseph Anene and Godfrey N. Brown (Ibadan and Nelson:
Ibadan University Press, 1966), pp.291, 293-8.
166
so-called infidel. Within a few years, dan Fodio and his adherents had succeeded in
overthrowing most of the Hausa kings and, with the exception of Bornu, had
established the Fulani rule throughout Northern Nigeria. 1 Between 1807 and 1830,
the Fulani Jihad extended to such great ancient cities as Katsina and Kano, and later
still the across the whole of Northern Nigeria (although with the exception of Bornu,
parts of Kebbi and Gobir, and the hilly areas of the Middle Belt). With Islamic
expansion, the Hausa states in Northern Nigeria, and those as far as Southwestern
Nigeria, came under the Fulani domination. The greatest achievements of the Fulani
Empire over a vast area of Northern Nigeria were in the development of commerce
and stimulation of learning. 2
If one considers, therefore, the introduction of Islamic civilization as an alien
culture into Northern Nigeria before European contacts, the inference would
certainly be that both the region and its peoples had had contacts with distant regions
of the ancient world. It would also be obvious that they had been exposed to some
trends of human development, and were therefore being shaped accordingly by the
exchanges occurring out of such contacts. There is then a basis for understanding the
nature of cultural exchanges, intellectual, scientific, architectural, and religious that
occurred via the downward and upward pulls of the Sudanic belt and North Africa,
Mediterranean Arab, Far-East Asia, and Europe.
3
Given the preceding background, Coleman's position that, the "physical
location of Nigeria in the Gulf of Guinea limited intercourse and encouraged
'Ibid.
2
Ibid.
3
For example, see this background in Chapter 2 of this dissertation.
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isolation,"
1
is correct but also somewhat misleading. As Coleman further
documents: "Until the modern development of roads, railroads, air travel, and ports
and harbors, however, neither the land-borne impact from the Middle east nor the
sea-born impact from Europe was of any great significance in bringing Nigeria into
the general stream of world events and forces."2 Shaw agrees with Coleman, arguing
that until the European colonial era, Nigerians of the interior were isolated from the
3 •
rest of the world. Thus, in the opinion of both Coleman and Shaw, colonialism was
a central factor in integrating the varied races of pre-colonial Nigeria into the modern
world. This position later received extensive elaboration by such scholars as Gann
and Duignan who emphasized the benefits of European colonialism in black Africa.4
This consideration goes along with the processes in which tropical Africa, according
to Immanuel Wallerstein, gradually became integrated into the capitalist world
economy. 5
It cannot be denied that colonialism was a major factor in the integration of
tropical Africa into the modern world. It does seem however that there is an over
emphasis regarding the extent to which the current location of modern Nigeria was
isolated from the outside world. As we noted earlier, prior to European contacts,
commercial and cultural exchanges from the current location of modern Nigeria had
taken place with the outside world. While the exchanges might not have been as
'Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism , p. 12.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.; Thurstan Shaw, "Prehistory," in Groundwork of Nigerian History, ed., Obara Ikime
(Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books), pp. 35-6..
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L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan, Burden of Empire: An Appraisal ofWestern Colonialism in
Africa South of the Sahara (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford
University, 1977), pp. vii-xvii, 3-47, especially, 119-161.
5
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huge as those occurring between North Africa and the Mediterranean world, or
between the Swahili coastal city-states and Far East Asia, as well as with Europe, its
functional existence through contacts with the outside world cannot be denied. 1
Indeed, as we saw earlier—that is, prior to 1914—it would have been
misleading to deny vital contacts among the varying ethno-cultural zones of the
Niger Delta regions. Taken together, "the pre-amalgamation history of Nigeria is not
just the individual stories of diverse groups but a credible story of meaningful
contact and dynamic relationships between various groups."2 Contacts among pre-
colonial Nigerians were able to link traders and scholars through the signing of
treaties and through warfare, regional expansion and integration, and through
cultural and religious borrowings. There is hardly any disagreement about the
significant cultural impact of the Fulani on the Hausa or the Yoruba on the Bini, or
of the Ibo on the Ijo and Efik/Ibibio vis-a-vis, nor of their involvement with the
outside world of the pre-European era through commercial exchange. 3
Perhaps, as we also hinted earlier, one explanation for the isolation of pre-
colonial Nigeria from outside contacts lies in the often misunderstood pathways of
its ancient exchanges. For, in attempting to explain the isolation of tropical Africa
from the rest of the world, it may not be right to overlook the relationship between
the ordered geographic pathway of the ancient world and its pattern of development.
This misunderstanding appears to have deepened, rather than lessening the conflict
ofmodern Africa, especially in the sub-Saharan regions.
'Dike, Trade and Politics , p. 5; Aderidan, Nigerian History and Culture , pp. 10-18; Falola,
Nigerian History and Culture , pp. 56-7; Sowell. Conquest and Cultures , pp. 112-113.
201aniyan, Nigerian History and Culture , p. 4.
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Sowell, for instance, places the problem of underdevelopment and isolation
of tropical Africa on its insufficient river lanes and absence of linkages to the major
water highways of the world. He shows great understanding in pointing to the
clearly perceptive facts of modern geographical factors. 1 Regrettably, however, he
does not explain the relationships between the ecological changes taking place in
Africa over a broad span of historical cycles from that occurring purely due to
attitude of the modern world.
There is thus an understanding of the extent to which both the geographic and
commercial lanes linking inland Africa to the outside world are being
misunderstood. To be sure, this misunderstanding does not even include the failure
to explain the more visible modern crisis which began from the fifteenth century to
undermine the ordered pathways of ancient contacts in Africa with distant regions of
the world. For, while black Africa does not have great water highways and favorable
harbors like Europe and Asia, there seems to be more to this problem.
Of course, the enormous ability in explaining post-modern world problems of
human development does not quite justify ignoring the implications of the historic
shift that began to take place along the Afro-Asian lanes in the Mediterranean and
Indian Ocean from the fifteenth century onward. This has a lot to do with the current
status of modern Africa. It could very well be that some of the underlying problems
of Nigeria in the modern world, indeed of Africa south of the Sahara, are traceable to
the disruptions of ancient lanes by the expansion of world capitalism. It is not for
1
Sowell, Conquest and Cultures , p. 172
2
Ibid.
3
This is the ultimate consequences of the enclosure structural of Afro-Asian lanes which
began in Ceuta, North Africa, in 1415, which we mirrored as resulting in the sealing of the
major lanes of inland African contacts with outside world.
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nothing that the tenuous unities of the races of modern Nigeria are often shaped by
attitudes resulting from Western interests in the Mediterranean Asia. The Muslim
and Christian factions of modern Nigeria have traceable historical roots. This
suggests that the disruption of the ordered pathways of ancient exchanges has some
inescapable relationship with the current state of human underdevelopment in sub-
Saharan Africa. By the current state of world capitalism, perhaps this development
calls for greater understanding of the types of structural curves that began to take
place along the Afro-Asian lanes from the fifteenth century onward. 1
Historian Rawley makes the point which suggests that the Euro-African
contacts during the opening of the modern era were oppositional to the earlier pattern
of commercial organization: "it seems probable that people along the Gulf of Guinea,
from western Ghana to the Bight of Biafra, carried on a maritime trade before the
arrival of the Portuguese. The Atlantic slave trade, therefore, did not initiate long-
distance trade among the Africans; rather, it tended to redirect trade from a south to
north movement to a north to south flow."
2
Clearly, based on the previous chapter, as well as an unequal pattern of Euro-
African world exchanges, the above observation by Rawley appears to point toward
the origin of the bulk of the current problem of modern Africa. Even while he did go
far enough in exploring the effects of that historic shift on the status of Africa south
of the Sahara, his hints strongly suggest the beginning of the contraction of the
ancient lanes of Africa's exchanges with the outside world. This development
applies as well to the loss of its strategic lanes which had hitherto supported the
'Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade , pp. 268-9.
2
Ibid.
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downward and upward pull of commerce and cultural exchanges via the Afro-Asian
lanes. Prior to the 1500s, these were more favorable to inland Africa. 1 No wonder,
historian Ajayi argues that, in the particular case of pre-colonial Nigeria, the
emergent colonial mandate did little to foster linkages along earlier lanes of regional
contacts. Ajayi is even conclusive that, while "they [British/Europeans] ignored the
traditional trade routes," they lured improvements toward railways and seaports, for
example, to ensure transshipments in their interests.2 Earlier, historian Dike argued
that the impenetrability of the West African interior by Europeans was due more to
the strategic position of its middlemen during a particular historical era rather than
the claims of the diseases and swampy forests of West Africa. 3
While diseases and swampy forests were there, nevertheless, indigenous
African merchants and their European counterparts worked as partners on the Niger
Delta coastal basins for more than "400 years." Until Europeans possessed enough
military technology to conquer as well as to penetrate into the interior of the Delta
hinterlands, their merchants were neither able to compete effectively in the lucrative
coastal trade nor to outmatch indigenous Africans.
4 Nor should it be forgotten that
the achievements of the Great Medieval Kingdoms of the Western Sudan
transcended the boundaries of Mediterranean Asia and Europe, while those in the
forest states of inland Africa, preceded the era of European dominance.
5 We are
likely to see further down this chapter that it may even be that the Islamic intrusion
'For example, see Chapter 2, early pattern of European contacts with the Delta basins, etc.
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did not adversely, undermine the ethno-cultural stability of pre-colonial Nigeria as
did European attitudes and influences later on. 1 The difference, therefore, in the
beginning of a dominant British cycle in the Niger Delta valleys had a lot to do with
both the development of modern Nigeria as well as the making of its current crisis.
Alien Influence in Pre-colonial and Colonial Nigeria 1830-1950:
The British and Christian Missionary Factor
For Great Britain, therefore, the road to the historic Berlin Conference of
1884 and 1885 that partitioned Africa among the major European powers lies in its
desire to control the Niger Delta Valleys . Dike argues that it was the desire of the
British to dominate the trade in the Niger Delta and later of the entire political
boundaries of the Niger basins that influenced its position in the Berlin Conference
of 1884 and 1885, and later resulted in the creation of the fragile unity of Nigeria in
1914.
2 The desire to control the Niger Delta valleys can be traced through the varied
cycles of informal colonialism, particularly from the 1830s- 1860s. This involved the
peoples to the east and west of the Niger Delta basins and Niger-Benue confluence,
as well as the Cross River.
3
The era of informal British colonialism, beginning with the new epoch of so-
called legitimate trade, was influenced by the British Parliamentary Act of 1807.
This alternative to the abolition of the foreign slave trade was supported by the
British Naval Squadron. This marked as well the beginning of a new round of "gun
'in addition, the earlier background in Chapter 2, especially on the Niger Delta basins
mirrors some insightful regional differences that further reveal the thrust of the imposition of
Islam and Western influences.
2
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3See further details of the diverse unities of the pre-colonial peoples of modern Nigeria in
Chapter 2, the background on Niger Delta basin regions, especially Figures 2.1 and 2.2.
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boat diplomacy," in which the indigenous Delta peoples were coerced into
commercial and political treaties in the interests of the British merchants and the
metropolitan power. 1
On the other hand, however, formal colonialism in the Niger Delta valleys
commenced from 1861 onward when Lagos became a Crown Colony of Great
Britain. Dike, in further elaboration of this background, argues that the often-
worrisome commercial rivalries between the varied peoples of the Niger Delta
valleys and the British merchants presaged the latter development. 2 Just as the
British merchants dominated the trade on the human cargoes, they also dominated
the era of legitimate trade on palm oil.3
The preceding emphases meant that between 1830 and 1885, the major geo-
political crucibles of the former Niger Delta city-states formed the corner stone of
modern Nigeria. Similar to the experience of Native Americans in colonial North
America, the British imperial mandate succeeded in welding its political and
commercial interests through coerced treaties that included "all territories in the
basin of the Niger and its affluent, which are and may be for the time being subject
to the government of the National African Company."
4
By 1900, however, the British Government took over from the Royal Niger
Company and proclaimed it the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria. This move was
later to result in consolidating power over the peoples north of the Niger-Benue
'Dike, Trade and Politics , pp. 47-8, 72-4, 93; Latham, Old Calabar, p. 22.
2
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basin. Besides, it enabled the British mandate in 1900 to take over the Niger Coastal
Protectorate and renamed it the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. It was this
background, which in 1906, made it much easier for Sir Frederick Lord Lugard to
merge the Crown Colony of Lagos with the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. Again,
it made it much easier later to merge the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria and the
Crown Colony as well as the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria in 1914 into one
Protectorate known as Nigeria. This then was how the varying similarities and
dissimilarities of the former regions of the Niger Delta valleys and the Cross River
were welded into modern Nigeria. 1
As, for example, the negative implications of the coerced union of Southern
and Northern Nigeria, Sowell observes: "What the British attempted [in Nigeria] was
what might be called low budget imperialism."2 By this inference, it is clear that the
British colonial interests far exceeded those of the indigenous peoples. For, as
Sowell further documents: "The very idea of making such disparage regions of the
British empire in West Africa into one country was a belated and perhaps ill-advised
decision."
3
Thus, it cannot be denied that the consequences of the new era of the British
legitimate trade in the Niger Delta basins were revealed in the vast disruption of
ethno-cultural zones. This was also in direct opposition to the diverse commercial
unities that had previously tied the Bights of Bonny and Benin across Wes Africa
and beyond. With the more insidious conflict of colonial dispossession, the new
'Dike, Trade and Politics , p. v.
2Thomas Sowell, Affirmative Action Around the World: An Empirical Study (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2004), p. 98.
3
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cycle of British commerce was accompanied by unusual relocation of the indigenous
peoples across geographic zones under the colonial mandate. While some parts of
Yorubaland, Hausa-Fulani states, and Efik/Ibibio people were under the British,
others were under the French, and others were thrown into Benin Republic (former
Dahomey) and Togo, with others still spreading along the West Coast of Africa. 1
To what extent then was the apparent disregard for the future cohesion of the
varied peoples of the Niger Delta valleys by the colonial administration to blame for
the state of human crisis and underdevelopment in post-colonial Nigeria? First,
based on our discussion thus far, there cannot be any doubt that modern Nigeria
began as an artificial British creation. Second, it cannot be denied either that its
creation was mostly designed to ease the burden of administrative nuances in the
interests of the empire state. Both the ethno-regional variant as well as the
corresponding tension of modern Nigeria meant that it would be difficult to foster the
diverse unities among people who were coerced into one country.
This first official seedling of Nigeria's "artificiality" lies in the historic
venture of 1900. "The present unity of Nigeria, as well as its disunity, is in part a
reflection of the form and character of the common government."
3
In order to upset
financial problems, Lord Lugard, the Chief British architect of indirect rule, ignored
every opposition to merging culturally dissimilar regions and groups together in
1914.
4 Wright has observed that it was this background that lured Lugard into the
'Coleman, Nigeria: Background , pp. 41-49; Alogoa et al., pp. 724-7.
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prescription of "indirect rule" in Nigeria. Further, according to Wright, this
Lugardian policy,
enabled revenues from the southwest to be drawn on by other regions,
particularly the hard pressed north; but he maintained separate
bureaucracies to run the north and south. A system of "indirect rule"
evolved in the northern region to facilitate taxation and avoid
stretching the colonial administration's limited staff. The emirate
mechanism openly admired by most colonial officials and by the
influential Mary Kingsley for its ability to control and tax the northern
population, was retained to levy taxes to be passed over to the
colonial authorities in return for allowing the emirs to retain some
traditional power and authority within the region—even though the
north was still under the supreme authority of the crown. 1
If the substance of success of the British Protectorate Administration through
the system of "indirect rule" was somewhat clearer in the North, this was not the
case in the South. Initiated in Western Nigeria between 1916 and 1919 and Eastern
Nigeria in 1927, indirect rule was directly and indirectly irreconcilable and
problematic. For example, in the South
—
particularly in the eastern region—where
the notion of chieftaincy was loosely defined, indirect rule was a marked failure.
For, its mandate through "warrant chiefs" or "white man's chiefs," as well as through
the new cadet of district officers and clerks, collided against the earlier patterns of
organizing the diverse unities of Nigerians.
Between 1900 and 1930s, and—indeed up to the 1 940s—neither the general
policies of formal colonialism nor the more specific projection of indirect rule
'Ibid.
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showed that the British colonial administration seriously intended to unite the varied
ethno-regional zones and peoples later to become the nucleus of an independent
Nigeria. Nowhere were these differences as revealing as in the manner in which the
British colonial and Christian Missionary policies attempted to assimilate the peoples
of Southern and Northern Nigerians into European cultures. Through both its
unification act of 1914 and the official attitudes of indirect rule, as well as the
Christian missionary programs, the colonial mandate placed the ethno-regional unity
of Nigerians in a unique state of inevitable centrifugal crisis.
But how did the above design begin? First, as Coleman tells us, by
emphasizing ethno-regional differences rather than similarities, "Few Nigerians were
aware that they belonged to any other community than their lineage, their tribe, or
their race." Second, such identification was later to favor the "subordination to a
race of the opposite color." 1 Ajayi, on the other hand, argues that the colonial
assumption believed "Nigeria was a collection of self-contained static tribes with no
previous history of contacts." So, accordingly, the colonial agenda
.... failed to realize that they reason [pre-colonial Nigerians] could not
maintain a viable boundary between Benin and Yorubaland in
Southern Nigeria, or between Ilorin and Nupe in Northern Nigeria and
Yorubaland in Southern Nigeria was because of the history of pre-
colonial inter-group linkages. They [colonial officials] did little to
foster these pre-colonial linkages—for example, they ignored the
traditional trade routes—though the institutions they created promoted
other types of linkages to the new urban centers of British
administration, ports, major railway stations.... and motor roads. 2
As Ajayi further elaborates, under colonialism,
Every Nigerian was classified into a tribe. The tribes were labeled as
to certain characteristics perceived by the British which, for example,
'Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism , p. 210.
2
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made the Tiv and Idoma more suitable as army recruits, the Yoruba
and Igbo as non-combatant auxiliaries and the Hausa as non-
commissioned officers. The "tribes" also began to be classified
according to the degree of privilege they could expect: centralized
communities were easier to deal with than "stateless" ones; Muslims
were better behaved than Christians. The Hausa were better people
than the Tiv; etc. Thus, colonialism did much to foster a new sense of
"tribal" and ethnic consciousness. 1
Ebenezer O. Aka, Jr., following almost a similar line as Coleman and Ajayi,
argues that the British colonial mandate was the chief cause of inter-ethnic rivalries
and fierce competition for the dominance of the nation by one region over. Aka
further argues that the British colonial mandate had shaped the attitudes of its
subjects toward recognizing their differences among member regional and national
groups.
2
If the aforementioned emphases are correct, then, the idea of preferential
policies or even of affirmative actions for some Nigerians—especially Northern
Nigerians3—cannot be viewed as a healthy exercise but certainly as a development
requiring a more careful examination. This calls for explaining the relationships
between the races of Northern and Southern Nigeria side by side with the attributes
of both the British and the Christian Missionary missions.
For, as Coleman's emphases suggest, the disparity between Northern and
Southern Nigeria
—
particularly in terms of varying modes of human development
—
had corresponded with the manner in which the two regions came into contact with
European cultures. If so, there are some factors that can explain the cycles of human
underdevelopment in modern Nigeria. First, to a certain extent, both the relationship
'Ibid., p. 270.
2
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between the coastal plains, where Southern Nigerians first met European merchants
and the marked distance of this background from Northern Nigerians, corresponded
with both their national and cultural differences. Thus, the effect of early isolation of
the Hausa-Fulani North from European cultural influences cannot be denied. 1 Yet,
even this understanding does seem an inadequate basis in explaining the profound
issue of regional and national underdevelopment of Nigeria.
Aside from the problem of an unequal degree of early exposure of the two
regions to European contacts, both the official policies of the colonials and the
Christian Missionary mandates had varying impacts on the socio-cultural orbits of
Southern and Northern peoples of Nigeria. 2 For example, in 1900, Lord Lugard, the
British Commissioner, reportedly "agreed to maintain, on behalf of Queen Victoria,
all pledges and understandings which had been assumed by the Royal Niger
Company, including its policy of not supporting Christian missions in the Muslim
North."3 This agreement, allegedly in keeping with the request of the Emirs of some
part of Northern Nigeria, might support Sowell's view that the Muslim North did not
want the infiltration of Christian Missionary schools.
4
Retrospectively, however, the preceding development only confirmed the
extent to which Northern Emirs were later to be faulted for an act that was inherent
in the colonial stratagem.
5
For this later corresponded with the attitude of the
Northern Emirs toward Western education as well as with the fact that the leaders of
'ibid., Preferential Policies , especially pp. 70-1; Coleman, Nigeria: Background to
Nationalism
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the feudal North were to blame for the lag in the human capitals of their region.
Sowell, in fact, argues that such an attitude was disastrous in the general thrust of
human development of the Nigerian nation. 1 That such an attitude later corresponded
with the backwardness of the largely Hausa-Fulani North in Western education, as
well as resulted in the burdensome policies of quota system and preferential
treatment in postcolonial Nigeria, cannot therefore be denied.2
However, to digress a little on the side of popular viewpoint, there are
undeniable evidences that both the colonial and Christian missionary education did
reach Northern Nigerians. Moreover, other evidences are supportive of the Christian
missionary educational activities in some sectors of the Islamic North. There are
even some evidences that—through the same official invitation of its Emir—the
Church Missionary Society (CMS) did open a school in Nupe in 1903, and in Zaria
in 1905.
3
Yet, comparably, apart from the elevation of the Katsina Teacher Training
College to the status of a full secondary school by the colonial government, along
with the training of Northern artisans as agricultural inspectors, not much had
occurred in the Muslim North via the colonial and Christian missionaries mandates.
The original plan to develop Katsina College into a University College—similar to
the Yaba College in the South—was later abandoned.
4
Probably it was in the predominantly Muslim Hausa-Fulani North that the
notion of "low budget imperialism," alluded to earlier,
5 had its strongest human toll
in colonial Nigeria. Certainly while fiscal constraints accounted for some of the
'ibid., Sowell, pp.99-1 14; Preferential Policies , pp. 70-6.
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attitudes of the British colonial mandate in the North: such was not nearly the case in
the South. Equally significant, while some of the alien cultures were helpful in
laying the foundation for the Northern awakening, its continuing lag behind Southern
Nigeria cannot be blamed on negligence alone. 1
Indeed, in approaching the largely Muslim North, "Christianity and mission
schools were not excluded simply because their presence would indirectly violate a
promise or would offend the religious sensibilities of the Muslim population." But,
as Coleman concluded, the "reason was Lugard's beliefs that Christian and Western
education will militate against the successful development of his system of indirect
rule." On the other hand, a far stronger basis therefore exists which may explain the
early isolation of the Muslim North from Western education: this was probably due
mostly to the colonial and Christian Missionary attitudes toward the races of tropical
Africa. These attitudes had some enduring effects on the general development of the
region and its human capitals. 3 When the statistics of the Christian Missionaries and
British colonial policies, along with those of their related visions of human
development are carefully examined, the differences are likely to be seen in terms of
the varying effects of projected policies of divide and rule in Nigeria.
By 1926, when there were 138,349 Nigerian children in primary schools,
only 5,210 were in Northern Nigeria. "Of the 518 secondary schools, none was in
the north."
4 By 1947, only 251 students in the North—a figure representing 2.5
percent of the total enrollment in secondary school in Nigeria—were at attendance in
'ibid.
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secondary schools. This was when it controlled 54 population of Nigeria. 1 Too, of
the total population of seven years of age examined in Nigeria in 1952, "8.5 percent
were literate in roman script in all Nigeria, 16 percent in the Eastern Region, 18
percent in the Western Region, and 2 percent in the Northern Region."2
By itself, of course, within Northern Nigeria, the so-called pagan provinces
of the Middle Belt that had come under the influences of Western education recorded
some 3.3 percent literacy rate for its people, compared to only 1.4 percent in the
predominantly Muslim provinces. 3 By 1959, in fact, the North with 55 percent of
Nigeria's population had 9 percent of Nigeria's population, with only 4 percent in its
secondary school population. The representation was equally low in higher
education: by 1937, only one Northerner attended Yaba College; and by 1951, only
one person had a university degree. 4
Southern Nigerians dominated in higher studies overseas as well as in higher
education within Nigeria itself. While Northerners were 9 percent of the 1,051
students at the University of Ibadan in the academic year of 1959 to 1960, only 2
percent of them [Hausa-Fulani] were among those studying abroad as of 1966. 5
Similarly, while there were 160 physicians in Nigeria by late 1950—76 of them
Yoruba and 49 Ibo—only one was Hausa-Fulani. Again, of the estimated three-
quarters of the riflemen in the army who were Hausa-Fulani, four-fifths of the
Nigerian officers commissioned before independence were from other regions.
Together, these strange disparities perhaps best explain why, in the Muslim North,
'Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism , pp. 133-5.
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professional jobs requiring Western education were dominated either by foreigners,
or by Southern Nigerians. 1
Even if Lord Lugard's policy of indirect rule in Northern Nigeria had no
serious constraints, it is doubtful that it would have been able to sustain the rift
between the natives and Europeans. It is also doubtful whether it would have been
able to contain the built-in intra-regional "class distinctions," which was an
extension of the British colonial super structure as well as an underlying contention
of inter-ethnic differentiations among Western-educated Nigerians. The colonial
mandate even feared that the premature teaching of English to its subjects would
inevitably lead to utter disrespect "for British and native ideals."2
... by far the most important single feature of British policy was the
effort made to preserve the Muslim North in its pristine Islamic purity
by excluding Christian missionaries and limiting Western education,
by denying northern leaders representation in the central Nigeria
Legislative Council during the period 1923-1947, and by minimizing
the contact between the northern peoples and the more sophisticated
and nationally-minded southerners temporarily resident in the north.
All these aspects of British policy, and others, tended to perpetuate
the individuality and separateness of the north. 3
Whereas the orientation toward Western values was somewhat deep-seated in
Southern Nigeria among the Christian adherents, in the North both the attitudes of
the colonials and the Christian missionaries were tactfully oppositional. Even in the
South, evidences of blatant racism and discrimination by Christian missionaries
toward the "Saros" confirmed that mutual exchanges rarely took place with the most
direct admirers of European ideals. The Saros were the ex-slave re-captives freed by
the British Naval Squadron from the high seas, following the Parliamentary Act
'ibid., p. 71.
2Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism , pp. 136-7.
3
Ibid., p. 322.
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abolishing the foreign slave trade in 1807. 1 These were among the most educated of
the indigenous peoples of Nigeria to embrace the values of Western civilization.
Desirous of moving themselves and those who had sold them toward development
along Western lines, the history of their efforts and of their inherent contradictions,
as well as ultimate betrayal by both the colonial and the Christian leaderships, is
indeed a sad one. Thus, in every sense, these were Southern experiences that
mirrored both the attitudes of the colonial and Christian missionary policies toward
the predominantly Hausa-Fulani Muslim North.
Southern Nigeria then—more than its Northern counterpart—occupied a
unique position in the early development of nationalist thought in Nigeria. By the
early decades of the twentieth century, it had already involved its varying masses in
opposition against oppressive colonial policies. This early political ferment was
stronger in the Southwestern region. This was also where the emerging indigenous
political leaders and organizational structures were much stronger.
Prior to the entry of Northern Nigerians into the national liberation struggle,
Southerners as a whole dominated the political scene. By 1947, Northern Nigeria
had neither identified its national identity nor developed a united political front, for
example, with such Southern political parties as National Council of Nigeria and the
Cameroons (NCNC). In 1948, however, the stake involved in further loss of its
'E. A. Ayandele, The Educated Elites in the Nigerian Society (Ibadan: University Press,
1974), pp. 22-41
2Moyibi Amoda, "Background to the Conflict: A Summary of Nigeria's Political History
from 1914-1964," in Nigeria: Dilemma of Nationhood—An African Analysis of the Biafran
Conflict
,
ed., Joseph Okpaku (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Company,
1972), pp. 16-19, Coleman, Nigeria: Background , pp. 196-200, 220-5, 227-9; Wilfred Cartey
and Martin Kilson, eds., "Early Political Organization in Nigeria: Obafemi Awolowo," in
The Africa Reader: Independent Africa (New York: Random House, 1970), pp. 77-80.
185
colonial status to the South led directly to the formation of the Northern People's
Congress (NPC). With the founding of NPC, such leaders as Aminu Kano, Sir
Tafawa Balewa, and the Sarduana of Sokoto began to identify themselves with the
idea of nationalism. 1
If the preceding emphases are correct, it would mean that a major proportion
of the thesis on preferential policies in post-colonial Nigeria2 requires more
substantial re-examination than even what is being attempted here. The conclusion
then has to be that the presumption of the thesis is not clearly validated by all the
underlying historical crises in modern Nigeria: that is, from pre-colonial to colonial
to post-colonial eras.
The preceding might explain why, until the late 1990s, the amalgamation
historiography of Southern and Northern Protectorates in 1914 had been unable to
document a viable chapter of human development in Nigeria based on the British
model.
4
This strongly suggests that there is an underlying problem of explaining the
relationships between colonial benefits and the pace of human development in post-
colonial Nigeria.
First, from a cultural point of view, it has to be noted that the lag in the
human capitals among Northern Nigerians—a position luring the nation into the
unfruitful policies of preferential policies—may not necessarily have been due to the
constrained medium of Western cultural values, especially in education. One can
accept the value of Western education without necessarily arguing that it is the
'ibid., Moyibi Amoda, pp. 22-3.
2
For example, see: Sowell, Preferential Policies , pp. 70-2.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid., p. 210; Aka, Jr., Regional Disparities , pp. 116-118.
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reason for all the major phases of national underdevelopment in Nigeria, as
suggested, for example, by Professor Sowell. 1 Second, the long duration of Hausa-
Fulani dominance in Nigeria may not be explained solely as emanating from undue
imposition of political and economic interests over their more educated Southern
counterparts. Prior to late- 1990s, the dominance of political power in Nigeria by
Hausa-Fulani Nigerians as well as other related northerners corresponded with their
cultural advantages over the more obvious weaknesses of a majority of their
Christian-based Southern counterparts.
Similarly, Islam exhibited a more commendable basis of regional unity
among Northern Nigerians. This development sometimes embraced Nigerians who
were not of Islamic adherents. Again prior to the late- 1990s, these Northern cultural
features appeared to have positively influenced the regional dominance of political
power among a majority of Northern Nigerians at the national level than necessarily
the case for their Southern-Christian counterparts. This is not an acquiescence of the
obvious weaknesses of some Northern political and cultural leaders of modern
Nigeria. Rather, it is worth point out again that, whereas Western education has been
an undeniable basis for the acquired skills of most Southern Nigerians in
administrative—in medical, in the military, and in political advantages over the
1
Sowell, Preferential Policies , pp. 70-3.
2
Ibid., p. 70. This is an excellent position by Professor Sowell although one requiring an
understanding of the inherent disunity among Southern Nigerians. This Islamic factor has a
general socio-cultural impact on the attitudes of non-Muslims in the Hausa-Fulani dominated
Northern Nigeria. Northern minorities, who are Christians, sometimes differed significantly
with their Southern counterparts. This might reflect their perception of the balance of power
within both the regional as well as the larger national context. Besides, there is Nigerian
Southern-Christian arrogance with regard to cultural and intellectual endowment over the so-
called backward North, which most Northern Nigerians resent.
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feudal north
1
—the strange irony still lies in the internally sustained incrimination of
the latter along lines of excessive European cultural influences.
The author of this dissertation argues that the Northern Hausa-Fulani
underdevelopment of its human capitals in post-colonial Nigeria was first embedded
in the colonial policies. Even the moral basis for the attitude of "Northernization" in
the Hausa-Fulani North can be traced to the official policies of the British mandate. 2
Professor Ajayi has observed that the British practice of trying "to run Northern and
Southern Nigeria as two separate countries" encouraged rather than discouraged
regional differences. "In Northern Nigeria, southern immigrants were located in
"zangos (strangers quarters) separate from the Hausa towns."3 This perhaps best
explains why the largely Muslim North—with Hausa as lingua franca—was
restricted to the activities of Christian missionaries. It explains as well why the
predominantly Christian South encouraged missionary activities.
4
The British colonial and Christian-missionary attributes were later translated
into the strengths and weakness of one region over the other.
5
Northern Nigeria
occupied an unfavorable status compared to Southern Nigerian in the overall geo-
strategic schemes of British imperialism in tropical Africa. It is therefore doubtful
that the position which Sowell admits regarding the dissimilarities between the two
Nigerian regions could have failed to correspond with human underdevelopment
'ibid.; Preferential Policies , pp. 70-3. On the other hand, however, Ayandele, The Educated
Elites in the Nigerian Society , pp. 24-47, is still an excellent framework for understanding
the extent of the cultural incrimination of Western-educated Southern Nigerians.
2
Ibid. For British colonial attitudes, see earlier notes on Aka, Jr., Regional Disparities;
Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism ; and Ajayi, Tradition and Change in Africa.
3
Ibid., Ajayi, pp. 269-70
4
Ibid.
5
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during and after decolonization. Sowell, in fact, does not refute the inevitable
outcome.
1
To be sure, as hinted much earlier, before colonial rule was established in
Northern Nigeria, Christianity and Western education had had a foothold in Southern
Nigeria for "nearly fifty years."2 If one goes far enough with the broader effects of
British colonial and Christian missionary mandates in Nigeria, it could even be seen
that the unhealthy policy of "Northernization"3 was indeed a reflex of the inherent
tensions between Southern and Northern peoples. For example, Southern Nigerians
featured prominently in the British expeditionary force of 1903 that invaded and
defeated the so-called backward Hausa-Fulani North.4
Surprisingly, however, it is even rarely remembered that during the colonial
era, the largely Muslim North enjoyed a somewhat more favorable cultural status
than the Christian South in the eyes of the British colonials. As historian Ajayi
explains it, because the Hausa language had been written in Arabic as early as the
1 7th century, the colonials had no problem—as compared to their experience in the
whole of Southern Nigeria—in selecting which written form of Hausa to be included
in Romans script. 5 Besides Hausa being the officially sanctioned medium of
administration in Northern Nigeria, it was also the lingua franca of the Nigerian
Army . The written form of Hausa was more adequate and successful than written
form of Ibo and Yoruba. The success of written form of Hausa therefore acceded to
1
Sowell, Preferential Policies , pp. 70-3; Sowell, Affirmative Action Around the World , pp.
98, 110-111.
2Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism , p. 137.
3
Sowell, Preferential Policies , p. 73.
4
Wright, Struggle for Stability, p. 14.
5
Ajayi, Tradition and Change in Africa , pp. 268-9.
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the North "the growth and expansion of pan-Hausa culture." 1 This internally
respectable foundation of cultural cohesion in the predominantly Muslim North
under Islam, has a yet to be more carefully examined and compared to the obvious
fracture of Southern Nigerians under both the British colonial and Christian cultural
orientations.
Prior to 1800, furthermore, both in the eyes of early visitors and scholars
alike, the so-called backward Hausa-Fulani North was far more advanced in some
aspects of cultural, literal, administrative and commercial organizations than
Southern Nigeria. We pointed out earlier that this was due mostly to its strategic
location, which was closer to the Sudanic belt, and which facilitated contacts with
Islamic civilization within and beyond. So, the variant in scale both in the British
colonial attitudes and European-Christian missionaries visions toward Southern and
Northern Nigerians represented the making of lopsided patterns of human
development in post-colonial Nigeria.
Between the 1940s and early1950s, a more sporadic split occurred in the
unity of Southern political leaders under the NCNC. This resulted in the emergence
in 1951 of an opposition political party known as Action Group (AG). This built-in
conflict among Southern Nigerians pointed toward greater ethno-regional differences
with the far more distinctive and culturally perceptive peoples of Northern Nigeria.
The most explicit evidence of this development took off in 1941 with the "fateful
Ikoli-Akinsanya incident," and revolved around the Nigerian Youth Movement.
'Ibid.
2
Ibid. Also, see the related emphases in Chapter 2.
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This represented the making of future national conflict. 1 That the Southern fracture
first took off among the elite branches of Western-educated Southerners, may even
suggest that the current underdevelopment of Nigeria has perhaps its strongest
corroboration in the attitudes of Southern Nigerians. If so, this fact is closely linked
to deep-seated socio-cultural crisis of colonial incrimination.2
Surprisingly, this readily traceable character of the incrimination of Southern
Nigerians under both colonialism and Western-Christendom appears to have been
overlooked. With freedom from alien rule, the Hausa-Fulani North knew too well
how to exploit the profound weaknesses of the Christian South. One of these
weaknesses manifested itself through a military coup, allegedly dominated by
Southern Nigerians.
3 We hope to show slightly down this chapter that this attitude4
reflected the height of the Southern misunderstanding of their Northern counterparts.
Besides, this development corresponded with the consummation of the intricate
crises of ethno-regional attributes sanctioned in Southern and Northern Nigeria under
both the Christian Mission as well as the colonial policies.
Despite the preceding emphases, however, the diverse unities between the
Southern and Northern political representatives under colonial rule prevailed in full
gears throughout the struggle for independence in Nigeria. Collectively, their
agitation for freedom from the late 1940s to the 1950s earned for Nigeria the official
representation within the colonial mandate. Between 1953 in London and 1954 in
'ibid., Sowell, Preferential Policies , pp. 70-6; Sowell, Affirmative Action Around the World,
pp. 98-99,109, 112-114; Amoda, Dilemma of Nationhood , pp. 18-21; Coleman, Nigeria:
Background to Nationalism , pp. 227-8.
2
Ibid., Amoda, pp. 18-21; Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism , pp. 227-8.
3
01iver, The African Experience , pp. 267-9.
4
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Lagos, their collective effort was to open the door to Constitutional Conferences that
framed, albeit hurriedly, the birth of an independent nation in I960. 1
This ultimate birth of an independent Nigeria can be traced to the emergence
of a new order of indigenous nationalist liberation movement from the 1920s.
Within the colonial super structure, the attitudes of these nationalists were somewhat
more favorably aligned with American than the British colonial ideals.2 By the late-
1930s, especially after the Second World War, the struggle for freedom in Nigeria
began to shift from the leadership of the Lagosians—mostly of Yoruba-brand of
British-educated nationalists—to American educated nationalists. This shift was
influenced by the American-inspired nationalist ferment of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe.
His emergence as the ablest leader in rallying the battle cry of Nigerian liberation
movement from colonial yoke marked a turning point in the struggle for
independence.
With his newspaper, West African Pilot , the Zik brand of nationalism
reflected the beliefs in the soundness of American institutions. His political struggle
was based on beliefs in the effectiveness of America's practical education, and the
uniqueness of the racial character of the black experience. The latter reflected his
beliefs in the black struggle for freedom from slavery in the Americas to colonial
liberation in Nigeria as well as the entire continental African landscape.
4
Therefore,
along with the freedom of a majority of African states from alien rule in the 1960s,
'Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism , pp. 183-191, 369-378; Amoda, Dilemma of
Nationhood
, pp. 16-23; Robert Emerson and Martin Kilson, eds., The Political Awakening
of Africa (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prince Hall, Inc., 1965), pp. 55-60, 63-73.
2
Ibid., Coleman, pp. 220-225, 239-246.
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the birth of independent nation of Nigeria—including the much earlier one in Ghana,
in 1957—marked the beginning of a new cycle of race relations between Africans in
the diaspora and the homelands. This was the consummation of the broader Afro-
atlantic historical struggle for equal place first begun by the descendants of slaves.
This as well was the crowning result of the influences of New World blacks on
African students—vis-a-vis the Atlantic triangle. 1 During the colonial era, as in
post-colonial Nigeria, the Nigerian media remained one of the most potent
institutions for the elaboration of the new order of changes. Their enormous public
influences represented and still represent one of the most lasting legacies of
America's political media heralded by Nnamdi Azikiwe, the first elected Executive
President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
Part 2: The Nigerian Nation 1960-1990: A Review
Accordingly, both the concept and character of modern Nigeria as well as of
its ultimate birth, was a British conjecture. 2 Therefore, in becoming a new nation in
October 1960 and a federal republic in 1963, Nigeria inherited the nature of internal
colonial fractures, which as we saw earlier, were bound to be problematic and
overwhelming for its varying peoples. Some of these fractures were to be revealed
in the expanding imbalances of its pre-colonial, colonial, and postcolonial ethno-
regional peoples and populations. With more than forty years after independence,
Nigeria is currently the most populous African nation. In 1960, its population was
'This is in further support of our earlier emphases in Chapter 1, as referenced , for example,
in Shepperson, "Notes;" Legum, Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide , p. 14; Colin
Legum, "The Roots of Pan-Africanism," in Africa: A Handbook to the Continent, ed., Colin
Legum (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1968), pp. 413-414.
2Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism , p. 45.
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estimated to be 55,000,000. By 1970, this population rose to 70,000,000; in 1980, it
rose to 80,000,000; in 1990, it reached 1 17,000,000, and 126,000,000 in 2000.
So, as the evidence suggests, post-colonial populations of Nigerians have
evolved in direct correlation with their ethno-regional growth. Nigeria alone has
more people than the whole French-speaking West Africa and Equatorial Africa: one
out of every eight Africans is a Nigerian. 1 The major ethnic groups are the
mainspring giving shape to the dialectical variants among Nigerians, as well as to the
politico-cultural features that define their directions within the larger nation-state.
We saw earlier that these dialects have either slight or closer affinities or more
distinctive dissimilarities to the major language families within or beyond Africa. 2
Thus, the difference between the colonial and post-colonial eras in Nigeria is
revealed in the very fact of an evolving ethnographic demography. This explains the
links between the earlier colonial fracture and efforts made by the emerging leaders
since becoming a nation to reconcile the imbalances imposed upon modern Nigeria.
Wright, writing about the struggle for stability in Nigeria, observes that, "By the
1960s . . . ethnicity appeared to be the primary determinant of political life,
• • 3
undermining the wider attachment to the concept of Nigeria."
As Figure 6.1 shows, the major ethnic confluences of modern Nigeria—as in
pre-colonial times (Chapter 2)—comprise of diverse geographic zones, along with
some inherent ethnographic distributions. With more than 350 hundred dialects
formed around the three major ethnic groups—Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Ibo—each
'Sowell, Affirmative Action Around the World , pp. 95-6; Mazrui, Dynamics of the
African/Afro-American Connection , pp. 42, 50.
2
Ajayi, Tradition and Change in Africa , p. 264. Also, see earlier notes on Joseph Greenberg
and others on African language families on Chapter 2.
3
Wright, Nigeria: Struggle for Stability, p. 32.
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numbers about half the population dominating the region into which the country was
divided between 1939 and 1963. 1 Apparently eight other ethnic groups comprised
about 30 percent of Nigeria's population: the Kanuri to the north-eastern corner of
Lake Chad; to the north of the Niger-Benue Rivers are the Junkun, Nupe, Borgu,
Igalla, Tiv, and Idoma; the Efik-Ibibio are to the Southeast; the Ijo of the Delta are in
both the Mid-West and the East, and to the West are the Edo and Itsekiri.2
Figure 6.1
Map of Nigeria Showing the Major Ethnic Groups
Sources: James S. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism
p. 15; (Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1960);
Stephen Wright, Nigeria: Struggle for Stability (Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 1 998), p. 32.
The varied ethnic dialects of Nigerians, along with their traditional cultures,
make Nigeria truly multilingual—with English as the official language of business
and political transactions. This "English language" factor remains the most potent
legacy of British imperialism. Despite a troubling political climate, Nigeria has
'Ajayi, in Tradition and Change in Africa, p. 262.
2
Ibid.; Biodun Adediran, Nigerian History and Culture , pp. 10, 21,35; K. O. Dike, Trade and
Politics , pp. 1-46, and Alogoa et al., pp. 724-40.
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managed to maintain a high level of press freedom within its many dialects perhaps
more than most African nations.
Table 9 and Figure 6.2 show the evolving dissection of the Nigerian
federation along ethnically approximate lines. Beginning in 1964, when the
federation comprised four regions, the Hausa-Fulani peoples collectively controlled
the largest share of Nigeria. Although ethnically Nigeria has no national majority,
this background perhaps best explains why the First Republic attempted to absorb
the ethno-regional sympathies of the dominant groups. 1
Northern Nigeria—by far the largest region—is predominantly Muslim: with
between 28 and 30 percent of the population. The Yoruba, with 17 percent and the
with Ibo 1 8 percent—mostly Christians—live in the Southwestern and Southeastern
sections of Nigeria. This vast lead of Northern Nigeria over the rest of the Nigerian
regions appears to have justified the creation of eight additional states in 1967,
bringing the total number to twelve (Figure 6.2 and Table 9).
Table 9 also summarizes the beginning and perhaps the end of the numerous
re-arrangements of Nigeria's Federal Republic along multi-ethnic lanes. What is
different between 1964 and 1996 in the re-arrangements of Nigeria into thirty-six
states, has been most revealing in both the regional and national liberation of the
dialects of the much smaller ethnic minorities from those of the dominant groups.
As hinted earlier, this first began as an effort to both correct as well as reconcile the
'Wright, Struggle for Stability and Status , p. 33.
2
Ibid. Sowell, Affirmative Action Around the World , pp. 95-6; Moses S. Osaghae, "What
Have We Achieved," Nigerian News Digest (Charlotte, North Carolina, October 4, 1991), p.
6.
3
Wright, Struggle for Stability , pp. 50-51, 67-8; Oliver and Anthony Atmore, Africa Since
1800
. pp. 307-8.
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undue imbalances in the political relations between the dominant and peripheral
ethnic Nigeria. Ironically, the creation of more states was not largely because one
group did not understand the dialects of other due to irreconcilable ethno-regional
differences. Rather, it was mostly because of failure among the dominant groups to
intimate a stronger sense of collective survival with their less influential ethnic
counterparts both regionally and nationally.
Moving the country from four states in 1 964 to twelve states in the federation
in 1967 might have been a sound basis for re-ordering some of the well-known
ethno-regional imbalances of Nigerians (Table 9 and Figure 6.2). But this effort was
to mark the beginning of the systemic dissection of Nigeria's national mind. Rather
than uniting the country, the result was further fragmentation along ethnic lines. 1
Seven more states were created in 1976, bringing the total to nineteenth
within the federation. By 1987, when the new military leaders felt that the problem
of an unequal distribution of the national resources was unresolved, two additional
states were added bringing the number to twenty-one. Another set of military
leadership carved out nine more states in 1991, bringing the number to thirty states.
Finally, in 1996, under General Abacha, the number reached thirty-six states.
3
This
then were the corresponding imbalances emanating from "Nigeria's constitution,"
which, according to Oliver and Atmore, "had been negotiated with great care by the
British government with the Nigerian politicians" to provide "for a federal structure
with a central authority and three partially autonomous regions.
'Wright, Struggle for Stability , pp. 50-51, 67-8.
2
Ibid.
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Figure 6.2
Map of Nigeria Showing the First Four, and
Twelve States, and last Thirty-Sixth States
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1964-1996
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Table 9
The Multi-Statal Reconfiguration of the Nigerian Federal Republic,
by Ethnic Regions, by Major Historical Eras, by Number, 1964-1996
bokoto
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Taraba IiujouI dVVd
Kaduna Kwara
Sokoto Katsina
Niger Benue-Plateau Kano
Bomo Kwara Jigawa
Sokoto Bauchi Kogi Anambra
Niger Gongola Kano Enugu
Bomo Kaduna Jigawa Imo
Bauchi Katsina Anambra Abia
Gongola Benue-Plateau Enugu Ebonyi
Kaduna Kwara Imo Cross R Akwa
Northwestern Benue-Plateau Kano Abia Ibom
Northeastern Kwara Anambra Cross R Akwa Rivers
North-Central Kano Imo Ibom Bayelsa
Benue-Plateau Anambra Cross R Akwa Rivers Oyo
West Central Imo Ibom Oyo Oshun
Kano Cross R Rivers Oshun Ogun
Northern East-Central Rivers Oyo Ogun Ondo
Eastern Southeastern Oyo Ogun Ondo Ekiti
Western Rivers Ogun Ondo Edo Edo
Mid-West Western Ondo Bendel Delta Delta
Federal Mid-Western Bendel Lagos Lagos Lagos
Capital Lagos Lagos Abuja Abuja Abuja
1964 1967 1976 1987 1991 1996
Source: Based on Stephen Wright, Nigeria: Struggle for Stability and Status
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998), p. 51.
Nigerian-American Relations, 1960-1990
Immanuel Wallerstein has argued that understanding the basis of America's
foreign policy toward Africa requires one to place Africa and America in their
historical relationship within an evolving world economy.
1
So, given both the
effects of the Atlantic slave trade and of the colonial factor, as well as of the late-
entry of the U.S. foreign policy into Africa, the absence of the long duration of
linkage between the two regions meant that there was very little opportunity for what
'Wallerstein, Africa and the Modern World , p. 78.
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Wallerstein again terms as "overt diplomacy" from 1789 to 1960. American
approach toward Africa during a greater part of this period was marked by a "foreign
policy of indifference." 1 Not only was the American foreign policy toward Africa
far apart and behind, it also corresponded with the expectations of the old colonial
states of Europe.
Not until around or after the 1960s did Nigeria begin to enter into an historic
relationship with the United States. This was due largely to its wealth as the richest
and most populous African country. Since then, the viability of Nigeria emerging as
a pro-western democratic leader has been the cornerstone of the U.S. policy. 2 These
hopes were realized in 1979, when the government of President Shehu Shagari
commenced on the same pattern of the American constitutional structure. Similarly,
along with its extensive population, size, and untapped wealth, Nigeria has since then
continued to have a close economic relationship with the United States. This
partnership has been especially stronger in the realm of oil businesses than other
areas. For instance, in 1973, Nigeria emerged as a major oil supplier to the U.S. due
to the Middle East War and the subsequent oil embargo produced by the crisis.
3
Except for some part of the 1970s and 1980, when Nigeria's political
relationship with the U.S. was not as good as its economic phase, the two countries
often sought and maintained a good working understanding. By itself, however,
these grievances corresponded with the fact that, up to 1960, "the economic histories
'ibid., p. 80.
2
African Observations on the Impact of American Foreign Policy and Development
Programs in Six African Countries , Report of a Congressional Study Mission Zimbabwe,
South Africa. Kenya. Somalia. Angola, and Nigeria. August 4-22. 1981 Submitted to the
Committee on Foreign Affairs U.S. House of Representatives (Washington, DC, U.S.
Government Press, June, 1982), pp. 50-1.
3
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of the two regions have had mutually no direct linkage." A greater part of American
interests after the World War II focused on Asia rather than Africa. 1 Political
scientist Mazrui has observed that ambivalence existed between the two countries
due to changes in political and economic circumstances during the presidencies of
Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan. 2 The Reagan era represented a direct
nullification of the somewhat more favorable goodwill engendered toward Nigeria
and sub-Saharan Africa during the Carter presidency. 3
For, as the greatest country in Africa, American policies toward other parts of
Africa required some consultation with the Nigerian government. Sadly enough,
such was rarely the case during the Nixon and Reagan eras. American policies
during the bulk of the Nixon and Reagan presidencies were neither respectful of the
concerns of a majority of Africans nor willing to consult nor to collaborate with
Nigeria as the major spokesman of African affairs.4 The Nixon era, just as during
the Reagan era, was noted for its negative attitudes toward black America and black
Africa. Hersh—like Apraku
—
painted a picture of officially sanctioned racial slurs
during the Nixon and Reagan eras and among their officials that reinforced open
bigotry toward African-descended peoples as a group.
5
The Nixon era, in particular, was a period when the White House officials
were cynical of African diplomatic corps in America. The fact that African
diplomatic representatives—like their black American counterparts—were
'Wallerstein, Africa and the Modern World , pp. 80, 93.
2
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sometimes viewed as inferior and as "jungle bunnies," probably explains why some
White House representatives in Washington could not stand their "smell." Nor did
the varying strivings among African diplomatic corps to occupy "all the good
embassy spots" make them acceptable to the Nixon White House officials. Rather,
the inroad of an unwanted African diplomatic representation might explain why
some White House officials felt they "couldn't live on Sixteenth Street any more"
due to their "dusky friends." 1
Not surprisingly, by mid- 1990, some American scholars identified not
Nigeria, Ghana and Liberia, for example, but Mexico, Brazil, Algeria, Egypt, South
Africa, Turkey, India, Pakistan, and Indonesia as among the new U.S. foreign policy
"dominoes," worthy of geo-strategic alliances, as well as general support. The U.S.,
as they even argued, needed to prioritize pivotal states in order to effectively manage
the delicate relationships involving the major global powers of Western Europe with
Japan, Russia, and China, along with such powerful allies "as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
South Korea, and Israel."
3
Since the U.S. "has the most to lose," it was argued that
"its interests lie in the status quo." This background, in part, perhaps best explains
why the Clinton administration was less inclined to get involved in the crisis in
Rwanda during the summer of 1994. 4
However, despite the crises of the Nixon and Reagan eras, along with their
foreign policy of indifferences toward black Africa, from the early to mid- 1990,
Nigeria has continued to maintain economic and political partnership with the U.S.
'Ibid.
2
See, for example, Robert S. Chase, Emily B. Hill, and Paul Kennedy, "Pivotal States and
U.S. Strategy," Foreign Affairs (January/February, 1996), pp. 33-5 1, especially, p. 37.
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This partnership has also continued to be due largely to its enormous oil resources
and strategic importance. 1 Besides its size, during the 1970s and 1980s, its politico-
economic partnerships with the U.S. acceded to Nigeria the largest share of African
immigration into this country. These immigrants, along with the much earlier and
continuing settlers, testified to the carry-over by American-educated Nigerians of the
influences of American institutions. This further explains the extent to which
American institutions have influenced modern Nigeria and its post-colonial cultures. 2
Nonetheless, it is worth noting in retrospect that it was not until the late
1970s, when President Carter established a ground-breaking policy of respectable
relationships with African states—that a new course in the U.S.-African partnership
really began to be poised. The significance of his historic visits to Liberia and
Nigeria lies in the fact that it occurred as an alternation from some of his favorable
policies toward black America. For, one of the great heights of the Carter presidency
was his appointment of Andrew Young, as the first black U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations. This appointment was to become supportive of the independence of
Zimbabwe and later of other African states—including the collective struggle around
the world to end apartheid policy in South Africa. As we hope to show again slightly
down, the Carter era along with his rapport with black America as well as black
Africa, had some relationship with the build-up of African immigrants in the U.S.,
especially between the late 1970s and 1990s.
3
'Time Magazine (January 16, 1984), p. 24.
2Coleman, Nigeria Background to Nationalism , pp. 241-6; Geiss, Pan-African Movement,
pp. 374-38 1 ; Trotter Review , p.32; Ogbaa, The Nigerian Americans , pp. 23-30.
3
For example, see Chapter 4. Also, for the corresponding links to this background, see
Roberts, Afro-Arab Fraternity: The Roots of Terramedia , p. 101; Trotter Review, pp. 24-6,
31; Oliver, The African Experience , pp. 307-8.
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Generally, from the 1990s onward, African issues began to receive greater
attention in American foreign policy agenda. Since then, Nigeria also entered into a
new cycle of political and economic relationship with the U.S. For example, under
President Clinton, Nigeria and America entered into what might be safely regarded
as an era of cooperative partnership. President Clinton, like President Carter, made
attempts to show some sympathy with Africa's issues and image. Collectively,
during their eras, Nigeria also attempted to push forward with democratic
institutions, as well as with policies that were seemingly supportive of reforms,
however the obvious violations of human rights in the bulk of the military era. 1 By
around mid- 1990, Jonathan Winer observed that: "Nigeria's size, population and
influence in Africa—and increasingly elsewhere in the world, dictate well-defined
foreign policy objectives" by the United States. 2
Nigeria's status within the U.S. foreign policy consideration, in turn, sets "the
context of ongoing diplomatic efforts to promote a speedy transition to civilian,
democratic rule and respect for human rights."3
As Winer further noted,
With some $4 billion of U.S. investment in Nigeria, we also have
significant economic interests, principally in the petroleum sector. As
with every large and influential nation, we also have with Nigeria the
objective of enlisting and sustaining Nigeria's cooperation on a range
of regional and international issues. We also realize that, without
doubt, every interest we have in Nigeria, including law enforcement,
'Olusegun Obasanjo, Democracy and Development in Africa From Transition to
Transformation: Address by His Excellency President Olusegun Obasanio. President of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria, at Harvard University (Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA:
ARCO Forum for Public Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, October 30, 1999), pp. 4-
8-
2
Winer, Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House International Relations
Committee , p. 2.
3
Ibid.
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is directly tied to the Nigerian Government's... its own citizenry
according to international standards. 1
What is depicted above as a new working relationship between Nigeria and
the U.S. was probably strongest in their joint fight against international narcotics.
On the other hand, however, the origin of Nigeria's association with international
narcotics probably came to the fore during the Reagan era. We are likely to see in
Chapters 4 and 6 that the alternatives presented by the Reagan policies were such
that had the likelihood of luring some Nigerian immigrants who were stranded into
deviant social behaviors.
2 By the time that Winer made his report to the United
States Subcommittee on Africa, both the Nigerian nation and Nigerians had become
one of the most identifiable groups in international narcotics and fraudulent network.
Winer's report shows further understanding of this trend:
Our law enforcement agencies attest that Nigerian criminal
enterprises are organized and active in at least 60 countries around the
world. They are adaptable, polychrome organizations. They launder
money in Hong Kong, buy cocaine in Andes, run prostitution and
gambling rings in Spain and Italy, and corrupt legitimate business in
Great Britain with their financial crimes.
3
Thus, from President Clinton to President George Bush, Jr., one can surmise
that, in the face of crises resulting from an intense global integration of the capitalist
world economy, the U.S. foreign policy toward sub-Saharan Africa has the effect of
strengthening the status of the Nigerian-U.S. partnership than ever before. With the
political campaign and ultimate election of President Olusegun Obasanjo in Nigeria
in 1998, this partnership continued to show signs of steadfastness and maturity.
'Ibid.
2
Apraku, African Emigres in the United States , p. 110; Ken Igboanugo, The Experience:
Nigerians in America (Houston, Texas: Global Publishing House, 1992), pp. 27-9.
3
Winer, Statement before the U.S. Subcommittee on Africa , p. 2.
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Speaking at the Harvard University Forum for Public Affairs in 1999, President
Obasanjo assured his distinguished audience that:
our commitment to democracy and its values is not at all a theoretical
matter. It is not a leisured pretense for one constitutional norm against
others. It is, on the contrary, a gut reaction to a lived and abhorrent
experience. We uphold today the principles of freedom and individual
liberty, and renounce tyranny in all its forms, because we have seen
where dictatorship can lead us, what it can do to the human soul. 1
Evidences of continuing collaboration between Nigeria and the U.S. were
obvious enough in such areas as community policing and shared information on
international terrorism from the 1 990s to the opening of the new millennium. These
collaborative efforts were transformed between December 2003 and March 2004,
when Mr. Tafa Balogun, Inspector General of Police in Nigeria, visited three major
American cities—Houston, Atlanta, and Chicago—to examine and extract some
lessons on effective implementation of community policing back in the homeland.
More significant, in taking after American system, Nigeria seems poised to establish
a more secure political structure for its suffering masses. By the early 2000, this fact
corresponded with the efforts to develop joint economic partnerships with the United
States toward further constructive democratic changes. It is widely believed that
these efforts could open doors for sustained partnership between the two countries in
a greater part of the twenty-first century.
3
'This based on the excerpt of President Obasanjo, Address at Harvard , p. 4.
2
This conclusion was supported by the exploratory survey of U.S.-Nigerian relations in the
United States.
3
Ibid. This fact is supported by earlier notes on President Obsanjo's Address at Harvard;
Winer's Address to the Congressional Subcommittee on Africa : African Observations on the
Impact of American Foreign Policy , p. 51; Eyobong Ita and Helen Okpokowuruk, "Come
and Invest: IBB Urges Foreigners," Nigerian News Digest (Ashville, North Carolina,
November 15, 1991), pp. 1,3.
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Internal and External Crisis of Post-colonial Nigeria
It is worth noting at this point that, some of the weak links in the Nigerian-
U.S. relations, particularly during the 1970s and 1980s, emanated from both the
internal and external crises of post-colonial Nigeria. Within its external front, it is
probable that the misunderstanding alluded to earlier between Nigeria and the United
States, was due more to the absence of a substantive diplomatic base from Nigeria in
Washington, D.C. For, this was a period of incessant political changes in Nigeria,
when the initiatives of its diplomatic representation in America did not always reflect
effective choices by the central leadership. During this period, moreover, the
diplomatic initiatives of the Nigerian representatives revealed neither a clear
perception nor a clear understanding of the Nigerian national crisis.
Neither did the official attitudes of its diplomatic corps reveal any clear
mastery of the socio-cultural crises confronting most Nigerian immigrants.
1
Rather,
the 1980s was a period when—in responding to the increased retardation of both its
national and international ego—the Federal Government in Nigeria undertook a
serious effort in Washington, D.C, to polish its American status. This began by
hiring an image-building and crisis-sensitive public relations agent.
But, whether, and in what sense, this approach was helpful in restoring the
low image of Nigeria's diplomatic corps and of the Nigeria nation among Americans
and Nigerian immigrants, is as yet to be clearly explained. Within both the
American and Nigerian national contexts, the 1980s marked the beginning of far
more serious crises for Nigerians. Given the overwhelming crises confronting
'For example, see "Nigerian Embassy Reaches Out," Newsbreed Magazine (Chicago, July,
1991), pp. 8, 10, 12.
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Nigerians in the U.S. and back in the homeland during the same period, it is doubtful
that the expenses incurred in hiring a public relations agent were of much help. 1
And, it cannot be determined any clearly what type of relationship Nigeria
had had with black America between late 1970s and early 1980s. For, aside from the
historic visit by President Jimmy Carter to Nigeria in 1979, in which Andrew
Young—the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. was a key player—it is generally doubtful
that much had taken place as regard sustained relationship between Nigeria and
black America.2
This external fracture in the Nigerian-U.S. diplomatic relations was mostly a
deflection of the internal crisis of post-colonial Nigeria. It does seem that a brief
explanation of the pattern of this internal fracture will shed further insight to the still
evolving crisis of modern Nigeria. For, as shown so far, the ineffectual
representation of Nigeria and of Nigerians in Washington emanated from the crisis
of the homeland. This crisis, as our emphases have also shown all along, began
almost with the birth of the nation, and can be traced to the fragile union between the
largely Muslim North and the largely Christian South.3
This then was the clearest evidence of the consequences of the coerced union
between Southern and Northern Nigeria discussed earlier in this chapter. The climax
of this crisis reached its height on May 1967 when Eastern Nigeria under the
leadership of Colonel Ojukwu declared its new sovereignty as the republic of Biafra.
This development, along with its related civil unrest, was to result in the so-called
'"Nigeria hires a public relations firm in U.S." The Good Hope News: The African
Perspective (Good Hope Publishing Enterprise, Dallas, June, 1990), p. 6.
2
Udofia, "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 81-2.
3
For example, see earlier notes on Coleman, Sowell, Wright, and Aka, Jr.
208
War of Nigerian Unity. 1 By the time this war began, Biafra had neither a clear
strategy for resolving the central concerns of its varying smaller ethnic minorities nor
the precise forums to direct its interests in what would certainly have been an Ibo-
centered government. By all the available criteria, Biafra was an experiment that a
majority of Ibos nearly accepted while its peripheral but strategic ethnic minorities
openly rejected.
The euphoria of the Northern based federation to re-unite Nigeria also lacked
a concise vision of national direction. Besides, their initiative toward national unity
envisioned through the creation of states along ethnic lines, seemed to be a basic
strategy for dismembering the Ibo-dominated Biafra. Most Southeastern Nigerians
believed that the creation of twelve states in July 1967 from the existing four in 1964
by Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon was designed as a knell against their status within an
internally tense inter-ethnic federation.
3
Of course, the above perception was particularly influential among the Ibos.
They were the most affected base of ethnic Nigeria in the largely Northern counter
military coup d'etat of July 1967 that overthrew the Supreme Military Government
of General Aguiyi Ironsi. This view might have been justified because—along with
the corresponding attitudes of the Muslim North and of its related ethnic minority
groups within the federation—the coup was mostly targeted unfriendly toward
Eastern Nigerians, especially the Ibos. Specifically, this development exposed them
to greater ill-treatment and murder as well as to insecurity at the hands of their fellow
"Sir Rex Niven, The War ofNigerian Unity (New Jersey: Rowland and Littlefield, 1971).
2
Peter N. Ekeh, "Citizenship and Political Conflict: A Sociological Interpretation of the
Nigerian Conflict," in Nigeria: Dilemma of Nationhood , ed., Joseph Okpaku (Westport,
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1971), pp. 105-1 1 1.
3
Ibid.
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national brethren. This resulted in enormous loss of their hard-earned property in
both Northern non-South-eastern regions of the Nigerian federation. 1 This should be
remembered as a sad era in the struggle ofNigeria for stability after alien rule.
Nonetheless, the manner in which the first republic was terminated by the
alleged Ibo-dominated military coup might explain the attitude of the counter coup.
It might also explain why there emerged between 1967 and mid-1990s in Nigeria, a
more direct Northern dominance of political power. The death tolls accompanying
the first coup that affected the Moslem Hausa-Fulani Nigerians than Nigerian-
Christians galvanized deep-seated suspicions and fears among the major political
contenders. Worse still, the succeeding military government of General Aguiyi
Ironsi failed to demonstrate a proper contextual mastery over the delicate set-up of
the Nigerian peoples and regions. His thrust toward a unitary government, amidst
the existing political ferment, only helped to deepen the crisis and to unite the
Northern fears about a possible Southern domination of the federation.
Certainly, General Ironsi 's thrust toward unitary government was a bold act
of statesmanship. Given the political context in Nigeria, he nearly exonerated the
Ibos—in particular—as more conscious advocates of national unity.
3
But, given the
underlying ethno-regional disparities during the first military coup, his attempt was
viewed as inimical to the interests of Northern Nigerians, particularly to those of the
'Sowell, Preferential Policies , pp. 75-8; Sowell, Affirmative Action Around the World , pp.
103-4.
2
Udofia, Research Report , p. 5-8; Olesegun Obasanjo, Nzeogwu: An intimate Portrait of
Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, 1987), p. 107; also
see, "The 30-Month Tragedy: A Nation is Engulfed in Fratricidal War," African Concord,
No.' 151 (Ikeja: Lagos, July 21, 1987), p. 16; Sowell Preferential Policies , pp.75-6; Sowell,
Affirmative Action Around the World , pp. 103-4.
3
Ibid.; Sowell; Amoda, Nigeria: Dilemma ofNationhood , pp. 165-174.
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dominant Hausa-Fulani enclaves. This perception also tended to have corresponded
with how some Christian and Muslim ethnic minorities within Northern Nigeria
mirrored in themselves as well as their interests in responding to the first Ibo-
dominated coup. 1 Hence, General Ironsi's unification decree was totally at variance
with the Northern interests:
Despite enormous support in the South and the army for the
abolition of regionalism and inauguration of a unitary state, the
very mention of amalgamation with the south, other than on basis
of northern control, was enough to send the North to the war
path, which was exactly what happened. 2
To surmise, however, that "the basis of northern control" alone explains the
alternative to the "war path" in Nigeria is somewhat misleading. 3 If the counter
military coup of 1967 dominated by Hausa-Fulani officers, is seen as a direct
reaction to the one dominated by Ibo military officers, the alternative to the "war
path" may ultimately be traced to a web of irreconcilable ethno-regional differences
that were compounded by the miscalculation produced and politicized by the first
coup.
4
This particular military coup probably most succeeded in compounding the
ethno-regional as well as national political miscalculation of Southern Nigerians.
Moreover, it revealed a greater part of post- 1960s Southern miscalculations in
'This fact is supported by the general socio-cultural attitude of non-Muslim Nigerians in
Northern Nigeria toward their Southern counterparts, especially the Ibos. Real or unreal, the
uneven death tolls resulting from the first coup had the chief effect of uniting even the
Northern Christians against the fear of Ibo domination in their region as well as in the
federation. General Obasanjo, in his Nzeogwu , pp. 107, 134-6, attempted to explain this
overstretched blames on the Ibos during the first coup.
2
Ibid.; see, "The 30-Month Tragedy: A Nation is Engulfed in Fratricidal War," p. 16.
3Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism , pp. 332-367.
4
Ibid. For example, in the immediate cause of the crises leading to the civil war, General
Obasanjo' s account states that: "Nzeogwu was by nature and upbringing, incapable of
planning, let alone executing a coup d' etat to deliberately suppress one tribe politically"
(p.107).
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approaching the so-called largely backward Muslim Hausa-Fulani North. Thus, in
Obasanjo's explanation one sees only the outer layers of events pertaining to the
North-South variant within the nation-state but certainly not the actual origin of the
conflict.
1 Even if the Nigerian Civil War was long overdue,2 the most direct catalyst
lies in the character of Southern Nigerians as well as in their miscalculation
.
3
First,
as we saw earlier, the first coup that toppled the republic not only was dominated by
Ibo military officers in fact its execution was most successful in the Muslim North.
Second, and perhaps the most significant, the irony of the failure of the coup in the
largely Christian-Southeastern Nigeria, where the majority of the coup planners
originated, made it difficult to rationalize the tragic disparity of ethno-regional loss.4
So, how does one honestly reconcile the historic disparity that occurred in
terms of the loss during the first military coup in Nigeria? This had a lot in common
with later course of events in Nigeria. Undoubtedly, the Northern counter coup of
July 1967 was more of a response to the first . As terrible as it was, it was as well the
result of the "miscalculation" of the so-called Ibo-dominated military coup.
5
The term "miscalculation" is real, because, it means that the failure of an
earlier action had left open conceivable possibilities that were otherwise very
'ibid. Also, see: Wright. Nigeria: Struggle for Stability , pp. 12-26.
2
Ibid.; Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism , pp.347-8; Amoda, Nigeria: Dilemma
ofNationhood ,, pp.52-60, 94, 167-8.
3
Ibid.; Sowell, Preferential Policies , pp. 75-6; Sowell, Affirmative Action Around the World,
pp. 98-104.
4
Ibid. Also, see Amoda, Nigeria: Dilemma ofNationhood , pp. 176-8; Obasanjo, Nzeogwu,
p. 107; "The 30-Month Tragedy," p. 16. Actually, the references cited here did not seem to
have calmed the nerves among Nigerians in the unfortunate cycle of their post-colonial
history. Rather, they provided a basis for grasping the larger trend in the ethno-regional
tensions unleashed during the first and second coups, along with a succession of all others.
5
Sowell, Preferential Policies , pp. 75-6; Sowell, Affirmative Action Around the World, pp.
98-104.
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dangerous. It was this background, as already indicated, which later came to merge
into the facts of Nigerians' regional fears, disparities, and ethno-regional differences.
This might mean that, much of the later attitudes of Northern Nigerians toward the
Ibos were embedded in the bitter ethno-regional expression of cultural indifferences
within the conflicting political setting of post-colonial Nigeria. Scholars like Sowell,
for example, tend to downplay the extent to which post-colonial crises in Nigeria are
the basic transformations of the inherent contradictions of the colonial mandates.
Yet, from 1914 to the current period, these crises have had very strong bearings with
the making of the national contest between the peoples of Northern and Southern
Nigeria. This has been particularly evident in their national orientations. 1
On the other hand, however, at stake was that the success of the Ibo
dominated coup was mostly celebrated in the Southeastern region as a triumph over
backward Northern-influenced federalism. The so-called backward attitude of the
Hausa-Fulani dominated government was to blame for the crises of the new nation.
It did not even occur to a majority of Ibos that, a change of the Federal
Government that was more successful in violently eliminating principal cultural
figures of the Hausa-Fulani North was, by Islamic principle, an act of war. Further
exacerbating the regional tension was the immediate striving toward a new
framework of unitary system within the nation-state.
3 Where this seemingly honest
'Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism , pp. 332-367, especially 347-8; Ajayi,
Tradition and Change in Africa, pp. 62-275.
2
For example, from a Western point of view, Sowell, Preferential Policies , pp. 69-76; and
Sowell, Affirmative Action Around the World , pp. 93-1 14, have perhaps the most developed
summary of this background of human crises of underdevelopment among Nigerians and
their nation.
3
Ibid.; Hersh, The Price of Power, pp. 104-5, 144-5; Amoda, Nigeria: Dilemma of
Nationhood
, pp. 167-172.
213
proposition could not diffuse the perceived variances in regional and cultural
grievances, it badly succeeded in furthering the North-South variant at a historically
sensitive intersection of Nigeria's philosophical direction. Between 1943 and 1948,
the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), comprising mostly of
Southwestern and Southeastern national political strands, advocated "a federal
system of government for Nigeria based strictly upon tribal unit." But, according to
Coleman, "at the NCNC convention held at Kano in September, 1951, the NCNC
leaders suddenly decided to abandon federalism and switch to a unitary position,
because of their belief that the government and anti-NCNC Nigerian were using
federalism as a cloak for dismembering Nigeria." 1
Barely sixteen years after the Kano Conference, Ironsi's Unitarianism had the
most direct effect of resurrecting earlier grievances of Nigeria's federalism in which
the North and South only managed to forge hurriedly between early and late 1950s in
order to be granted independence in 1960. The resolution of this development was
one reason for the intricate crises surrounding the substance of Nigeria's institution,
as written and as influenced by Britain on the eve of independence.
The above then was a background that the so-called Ibo-led coup probably
misunderstood and hence miscalculated in approaching the North. Consequently,
between mid-1960s and late- 1990s, the devastating result of this contest was
ultimately to reveal how the first coup had succeeded in transforming the unsettled
backgrounds of the 1940s and 1950s in favor of Northern dominance of the federal
republic of Nigeria.
'Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism , pp. 347-8; Amoda, Nigeria: Dilemma of
Nationhood , pp. 52-60, 167-8, Ekeh, Nigeria, Dilemma of Nationhood , p. 94
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Therefore, military intrusion into the affairs of Nigeria, or claims by military
leaders to save the republic from politicians who were ruining it, could not have
meant that they would be more effective in directing the delicate marriage between
culturally dissimilar groups and regions. 1 Even if the resultant War of Nigerian
Unity
, as Sir Rex Niven later argued, began with the understanding that national
stability and pride in the oneness of Nigeria would be restored, evidences of such
rationalizations were long openly rejected. 2 From the beginning of the Civil War in
1967 to its end in 1970, neither the resolute determination of the Northern influenced
federalism to re-unite the country nor the policies that resulted from their leadership
able to resolved the crises which directly led Nigerians to the Civil War. The end of
the war was rather remarkable for the emergence of a more structured ethno-
centrism, along with accompanying mismanagement and corruption at the highest
places of leadership.
3
Having demonstrated some of the ethno-regional grievances surrounding the
idea of unitary federalism proposed by General Ironsi, let us briefly tackle some of
the official choices of his successor, Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon: a Christian
of Northern ethnic minority. As army Chief of Staff in the Nigerian Army, it can be
argued that Gowon was ushered into national leadership by the Northern dominated
military coup of July 1967. First, it should be noted here that it was a Christian of
ethic minority from the dominant Muslim North that led Nigerians through one of its
'Obasanjo, Nzeogwu , pp. 82-99.
2
Research Report
, p. 6; Sir Niven, The War of Nigerian Unity .
3Chido Nwangu and Lai Adelagun, "Change Is Imminent in Nigeria," African Business
Source Magazine (Houston, Texas, May/June, 1991), p. 40; Jack E. White, "Shamed by
Their Nation," Time Magazine (September 6, 1993), p. 36; Sowell, Preferential Policies, pp.
69-76; Sowell, Affirmative Action around the World , pp. 98-1 14.
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darkest periods in history. Second, the pre-eminence of his leadership at that
particular historical intersection strongly suggests that the Nigerian crisis required
more substantive explanation than one often offered by most Nigerians and others.
It is well to keep in mind, as we hinted earlier, that the counter military coup
that overthrew General Ironsi and brought in Lt. Colonel Gowon included Northern
soldiers who were of ethnic minorities: both Christians and Muslims. Second, it
seems quite likely that, as a Christian of ethnic minority background, Gowon himself
had some experience that strengthened his insight to reconcile and re-unite the
fragile emblem of ethnic Nigeria within a federal body. By moving Nigeria from
four states to twelve states, he inspired goodwill and hope among the more affected
ethnic minorities.
1
The question worth asking at this point is: to what extent then was the
creation of additional states by Gowon before the secession of Eastern region as a
sovereign state of Biafra in July 1967 a design to weaken the Ibo-dominated
republic? To begin with, we saw earlier that the creation of additional four regional
states, making a total of twelve states in the federation by Gowon, could be seen as
an attempt to dismember the Ibo-dominated Biafra. There cannot be any doubt that
he intended to exploit the ethno-regional differences within the new nation to
advance his federal and national status. Yet, the Gowon interlude on the state
creation in Nigeria at the time requires a more careful evaluation. This is because
both the first and second counter coups in Nigeria had already imposed very clear
political options that were supportive of a genuine effort to reconcile the centrifugal
imbalances between the dominant ethnic groups and their peripheral ethnic
'Wright, Nigeria: Struggle for Stability, p. 33.
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minorities. Thus, the Gowon era coincided with an era when most Nigerians,
especially the ethnic minorities, were either striving to recover from the loss of their
regional and national imbalance, or to sustain their interests among the dominant
ethnies. A more fundamental ambivalent within the Hausa-Fulani influenced
federation from July 1967 to 1975 may have been in the fact that Gowon was both a
Christian as well as a representative of the ethnic minorities' struggle for status
within the Northern belt as well as larger nation-state. 1
Given the tenacity of ethno-regional rivalries among the dominant ethnic
groups in modern Nigeria, it may not be an overstatement to surmise that their much
smaller ethnic minorities have often shown greater desire for the unity of the nation-
state, as the core of collective aspirations. The underlying historical circumstances
that propelled Gowon to the center of Nigerian leadership)—that is, after General
Ironsi—seems to have borne out this fact, however some of the questionable ethics
of his era and of his officials. Coincidentally, the breakdown of the alphabets in
"Gowon" reads: "go on with one Nigeria."
How the preceding background influenced the policy of creating additional
states in Nigeria, as a response to the declaration of Biafra, can then be viewed with
greater insight with regard to the re-direction of the varying interests of the peoples
of Nigeria. Writing of the Gowon era, Wright observes: "Immediately prior to the
civil war, Yakubu Gowon attempted to diffuse ethnic competition by creating twelve
states out of what was four regions."
2
Fundamentally, as we hinted earlier, the
ultimate execution of the Nigerian Civil War, which Gowon first undertook as a
'Wright, Struggle for Stability , pp. 30-2.
2
Ibid.,p. 33.
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punitive police action and later under full-scale military operation against a deviant
Southeastern region, lay in the irreconcilable backgrounds of the 1940s and 1950s. 1
If the preceding is true, how do we explain the attitude of some Nigerians
toward such changes affected them after the first military coup? That is, to what
extent was the overthrow of the first republic by force justified? For, some Nigerians
have varying opinions about the coup. Among them, therefore, the extent to which
the official corruption, bribery, greed or excessive display of tribalism and
ethnocentrism
—
justified the overthrow of the First Republic2—is still debatable. 3
And often these debates have seemed irreconcilable.4 This is because between 1960
,
when Nigeria became an autonomous nation and early 1966 , when the republic was
finally overthrown, some Nigerians were aware that both the country and its leaders
would have been unable to master all the complex structures of a new nation-state.
There were others as well who supported the criteria first employed under the unitary
system to resolve the expanded centrifugal contradictions of colonialism in Nigeria. 5
By forcefully overthrowing the first republic, and going as far as eliminating
the core principal political and cultural leaders of influence in the largely Muslim
North at both the regional and national levels, the first coup inadvertently released
the deeper centrifugal layers of the Nigerian nation. This might explain why the
'Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism , pp. 319-366; Okpaku, Nigeria: Dilemma of
Nationhood
, pp. 14-131; Wright, Nigeria: Struggle for Stability , pp. 20-27.
2
Obasanjo, Nzegwu, pp. 82-99.
3
Nearly all the chapters in Okpaku 's Nigeria: Dilemma of Nationhood are attempts by
scholars to substantiate the nature of the centrifugal contradictions which some Nigerians
misunderstand. Also see, Part 1 & 2 of Monday O. Anigboro's article entitled, "Has Nigeria
Fared Better Under Military Regimes," African Business Source (Houston, Texas, May
1992), pp.26-7 and (June/July 1992), pp.26-7.
4
Ibid.
5Amoda, Nigeria: Dilemma of Nationhood , pp. 167-173; Sowell, Preferential Policies, pp.
75-6.
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Northern counter offensive had a swift advantage over the weakness of the Ibo
dominated coup in bringing about a clear and resolute determination to influence the
direction of the nation. Between 1967 and late- 1990s there emerged a more
structured ethno-centered national configuration of Northern Nigerians in nearly all
phases of the military and political establishments. We have already argued that
these were not necessarily adherents of Hausa-Fulani faith, but almost of an equal
representation of Northerners of both the Christian and Muslim faiths. They were all
in a position to reap from the weaknesses of their Southern counterparts. From the
presidential crisis of 1993, when the election of M. K. O Abiola—a Yoruba of
Muslim background was annulled—to the era of General Sani Abacha, Nigerians
were acting out the external convulsions of an internally explicit cycles of their
historical crises.
1
The preceding emphases were due mostly to the profound disunity among
Southern Nigerians . Until the late 1990s, the absent of a united Southern front, along
with its inherent fracture within both the regional as well as national context, had
either directly justified or indirectly made it much easier for Northerners to dominate
the country. This background is an important basis for understanding the seedling of
the dangerous policies of quotas and preferential treatment as well as of the
underdevelopment of Nigeria.
2 More insight appears to be required in explaining the
thesis of human underdevelopment in post-colonial Nigeria.
Since the 1960s, what the British colonizers anticipated and strategically
calculated, by way of indirect and indirect rule in Nigeria, some Southern Nigerians
'Wright, Struggle for Stability, pp. 30-52, 67-96;
2
Ibid.
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and Nigerians misunderstood. 1 This poor grasp of their historical context has
determined how most Nigerians related with their country, with each other, with
themselves, and with the vital course of international affairs in an era of explosive
competition and confrontation. If Nigeria's national crises are more operative within
its tribal and ethno-regional lanes, this is precisely the case because its center has for
too long been paralyzed by political opportunism among its dominant blocs.2
Due mostly to this background, nation-state culture in Nigeria is highly
dysfunctional because it has never been properly instituted and because it is deeply
engrained in vigorous tribalism and ethnocentrism. 3 This unhealthy background
corresponded with the chronology of sustained military rule in Nigeria, as well as
with their dominance over every important arm of its economic and political
establishments. After General Gowon came General Murtala Mohammed in a
bloodless palace military coup in 1975.
Except therefore for the brief period of General Olesegun Obasanjo (1975-
1 979), following the assassination of Mohammed, and later of the interim Presidency
'ibid. On the other hand, SowelPs examination of "Nigeria" in his Preferential Policies along
with his Affirmative Action Around the World are two important documentations on issues
of vital concern in the development of modern Nigeria. However, his important
contributions might even have been much stronger if he explained the clearly recognizable
implications of "low budget imperialism" (pp. 98, 102), which he noted with regard to the
British colonial attitudes in Nigeria/tropical Africa. On the other hand, however, most of the
backgrounds he referenced in Coleman's Nigeria: Background to Nationalism contained
information that could have offered further insights on the irreconcilable nature of ethnic and
regional differences before and after freedom from foreign rule.
2
Udofia, "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," p. 85. See Jack E.
White's article "Shamed by their Nation, Time (1993); Dr. Beford N. Umez, "May Case with
a Typical Nigerian," The Good Hope News: The African Perspective (September 1991), pp.
12, 14;Beford Umez. "State Creation in Nigeria is Bum Kum" (Good Hope Publishing
Enterprise, February, 1992), p. 12, 14; "Religious Riots in Kano: Over 300 Killed" and
"Important Dates in Nigeria's History," African News Weekly (Charlotte, North Carolina,
October 1, 1993), p. 3.
3
Udofia, Research Report
,
p. 8.
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of Ernest Shoneka—after the annulment of the Presidential election of Chief Abiola
in 1992—Northern military leaders dominated Nigeria. 1 Since 1960, Nigeria has
moved through seven different phases of government: from parliamentary
democracy (1960-1966) to military dictatorship (1966-1979); presidential democracy
(1979-1983); military dictatorship (1983-1993); make-shift interim civil/military
government (1993); a full-scale return to military dictatorship (1993-1998); and back
again to parliamentary democracy (1999).2
The cycles of Nigeria's historical struggle for stability appear to have entered
a period of some maturity with the re-entry of Olusegun Obasanjo, who was
democratically elected as President in 1999. Elected with the support of American
republic during both the first and second terms, the Obasanjo era perhaps represented
the beginning of power shift from the largely Muslim North to the somewhat largely
Christian-South.
If the current trend represents the pattern of the future, there is then a basis
for making an educated guess about the future gravitation of political power in
modern Nigeria: that is, more than thirty-five years since the Nigerian Civil War, the
annulment of the Presidential election of Chief Abiola in 1992, marked an important
transitional point in the power shift from the North to the South. The future of this
development may depend on the maturity and wisdom of the emerging Southern and
Northern political elites.
Another educated guess is that the current thrust of political power in Nigeria
suggests the beginning of maturity in mastering its centrifugal question since its birth
'ibid., p. 68.
2Osagae "What Have We Achieved," p. 6; Oliver and Atmore, Africa Since 1800, p. 362.
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as a nation.
1
Generally, the political and social metamorphoses of Nigeria described
thus far, have meant crisis for its enormous populace, particularly in the spheres of
economic development. As Onoche S. Ikedionwu noted:
Nigeria has gone from the fertilities or riches of the 1960s and 1970s
to the fallows or failures of the 1980s... The 1970s brought abundant
but ill managed oil resources and revenue to Nigeria. The future of
the 1980s include the unabated sky rocketing public expenditures and
the mismanagement of the funds thereof. Cost efficiency and cost
effectiveness were utterly ignored.2
Because of poor management and the decline in its oil revenue and foreign
exchange reserve in the 1980s, Nigeria became a debtor nation, with liabilities in the
billions. "Nigeria's external debt grew from $12.7 billion in 1985 to $35 billion in
1990."3 But, as President Obasanjo told his Harvard audience in 1999: "It is at the
level of international economic relations that the idea of free market economy begins
to show the contradictions and distortions inherent in it."4 Further, he observed that,
during the "mid-seventies" the U.S. Agency for International Development even had
to suspend aid to Nigeria because it believed "Nigeria did not ... require
international financial aid, mainly because of the revenue ... from oil exports."5
According to President Obasanjo, during the said period, a great deal of pressure was
put on successive Nigerian governments of the time
by international financial institutions and multi-national companies, to
go out and borrow. Successful borrowing, the governments were told,
was a persuasive index of the financial and economic health of the
country. The first "jumbo" loan was obtained from the World Bank at
'Davidson, Africa in Modern History, pp. 301-302, 322-323.
2Onochie S. Ikeduonwu, "Perpetual Creation of New States: A Mythical Conception,"
Nigerian News Digest (Charlotte, North Carolina, February 14, 1992), p. 4.
3Time Magazine (1984), p. 24; Samuel Esemuede, "The Good Borrower, A Desirable Title?"
Nigerian News Digest (Ashville, North Carolina, December, 31, 1991), p. 4.
4
President Obasanjo, Address at Harvard , p. 7.
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this time. It was, in relation to the massive indebtedness of Nigeria
today, a mere pittance.
1
The huge debt crisis explains why, in an effort to lure foreign investors into
the country in 1991 alone, the Federal Government of Nigeria allocated $3 billions
of its foreign exchange for only debt servicing. 2 By 1999, as President Obasanjo
further disclosed, "Nigeria's debt burden stands at over 30 billion U.S. dollars, and
continues to escalate, not because of any further borrowing, but because of the
interest that continues to accrue on the money already borrowed." So, in asking for
relief from the huge interests accrued in the debt, he argued that such an avenue
"would naturally leave us with greater resources to dispose not only of our domestic
responsibilities, but also of our international obligations."3
When the industrialized nations convened in a Summit in Scotland in July 4,
2005, Nigeria's foreign debt reportedly stood at $35 billion.4 That this crisis affected
the Nigerian nation to the extent it did was revealed in the general spheres of the
Nigerian nation between the 1970s and 1980s, as well as in the corresponding
unwillingness of Nigerian students in the U.S. to return to the homeland after studies.
Once among the foremost group of immigrants to return to the homeland, Nigerians
began to reverse that pattern.
5 By early 1990s, they represented the largest build-up
of what Apraku correctly entitled, African Emigres in the United States: A Missing
'Ibid.
2
Ibid. Samuel Esemuede, "The Good Borrower, A Desirable Title?" Nigerian News Digest
(Charlotte, North Carolina, December, 31, 1991), p. 4.
President Obasanjo, Address at Harvard , pp. 7-8.
"This is based on the "Meeting of the Industrialized Nations in Scotland," CNN News
Around the World Report, July 4, 2005. This Report focused on economic crises in Africa,
especially on Nigeria.
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Link in Africa's Social and Economic Development .' This calls for an evaluation of
the general pattern of Nigerian immigration to the U.S.—from pre-colonial to
colonial to post-colonial eras.
Part 3: A Review of Pre-colonial and Colonial Immigration
from Nigeria/Africa to the United States, 1820-1950
Table 10.1 represents the general pattern of foreign-born immigration to the
U.S. from 1821 to 1880. For Nigerians as a specific group or Africans within the
larger context, this pattern of American immigration, which falls under the pre-
colonial era, had no determinate relationship. This was a period when their
representation in voluntary American immigration was either largely non-existent or
regionally constrained. Between 1821 and 1880, the population of European
immigrants admitted rose to about 8,981,565 compared to Asian (230,683), North
American (744,1 13), and South American (8,715). Only 1,005 entered from Africa.
The most adequate explanation for this low level of African immigration was
racial slavery . The fact that transatlantic slavery intersected with largely voluntary
immigration of the races of Europe, Asia, and the Americas to the U.S., meant that
the general flow of immigration from Africa was bound to be affected. A greater
part of the era identified as pre-colonial in Table 10.1 was one in which more slaves
were shipped from the Bights of Bonny and Benin to Latin America as well as to the
U.S. Also, this was when the current location of modern Nigeria featured as one of
the major regions where the 54,000 slaves exported into the U.S. between 1808 and
1850 were taken.
2
This background in turn has a lot in common with the later
'Apraku.. African Emigres in the United States .
2
Lovejoy, Globalization of Forced Labour, p. 64; Curtin, Atlantic Slave Trade, p. 87;
Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade, p. 330.
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distinctiveness of post-colonial black African immigration to America. Besides, it
sheds further light on the general pattern of voluntary African immigration to the
Western Hemisphere in the decades following decolonization.
Table 10.1
Foreign-born Immigration to the United States
by Regions, by Decades, 1821-1880
Continent 1821-1830 1831-1840 1841-1850 1851-1860 1861-1870 1871-1880
Europe 98,797 495,681 1,597,442 2,452,577 2,065,141 2,271,925
Asia 30 55 141 41,538 64,759 124,160
N. America 11,033 32,568 58,890 73,496 165,210 402,916
S. America 531 856 3,579 1,224 1,397 1,128
Africa 16 54 55 210 312 358
Aus., N.Z. 36 9,886
Not Specified 33,032 69,911 53,144 29,169 17,969 1,818
Source: U.S. Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
1982 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 1985).
Skinner argues that the transatlantic slave trade created an atmosphere in which
the degradation of African-Americans under slavery also influenced how voluntary
African contacts with the U.S. were likely to be shaped. The Skinner observation
appears to be a likely explanation why very few Nigerians/Africans sojourned in the
U.S. for Western education during the colonial era. Unlike white ethnics and Asians
"who arrived on the shores of the future United States of America from recognizable
nation-states or empires, the Africans were plucked from societies that had no
political status in the emerging concert of nations and sold as servants."
1
'Skinner, In Defense of Black Nationality , pp. 7-8.
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As Table 10.2 shows, the small proportion of pre-colonial African immigration
to America was somewhat slightly higher during the colonial era. Based on the data,
some 32,421 Africans were admitted into the U.S. between 1881 and 1950,
compared to Europeans (24,100.633), Asians (876,083), North Americans
(3,868,468), and South Americans (96,257). Even with the slight increases over the
previous cycle, a specific basis for determining immigration from Nigeria (1820-
1900) is still indeterminate. Only a few Africans, representing less than 30 per
year—were able to enter the U.S. voluntarily during the 19th century (Tables 10.1
and 10.2). 1
Table 10.2
Foreign-born Immigration to the United States
by Regions, by Decades, 1881-1950
Continent 1881-1890 1891-1900 1901-1910 1911-1920 1921-1930 1931-1940 1941-1950
Europe 4,735,484 3,555,352 8,056,040 4,321,887 2,463,194 347,552 621,124
Asia 69,942 74,862 323,543 247,236 112,059 16,081 32,360
N. America 424,663 37,897 344,608 1,101,772 1,474,501 152,234 332,973
S. America 2,304 1,075 17,280 41,899 42,215 7,803 21,831
Africa 857 350 7,368 8,443 6,286 1,750 7,367
Aus., N.Z. 7,017 2,740 11,975 12,348 8,299 2,231 13,805
Source: J.S. Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
1982 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 1985).
The patterns of immigration from "Africa" to the U.S. began to have some
identifiable phases during the early decades of the twentieth century. Exceptions
were slightly more favorable between World War I and World War II than any other
period. This was when African immigration recorded its highest entries, with its
'For example, see: U.S. Foreign-born Immigration by Continents and by Decades, Statistical
Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. 1982 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of Justice, 1985). For specific explanation of especially post 1900s African
immigration, see Thomas C. Holt, "Africans," in Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic
Groups, ed. Stephan Thernstorm et al. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980),p. 5.
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average closer to 1,000 a year. 1 After the first and second world wars, both the Great
Depression and restrictive legislations affected African immigration to the U.S. In
addressing this background, Hawk observed that, "Africans under European
colonization seldom enjoyed the freedom of international travel."2 From the 1900s
to 1950s, the effects of the restrictive immigration legislations were unfavorable to
African immigration. A greater part of the varied restrictive laws passed by the U.S.
Congress were designed to preserve the ethnic composition of the Anglo-Saxon
ideals in the U.S. "Black migrants from Africa and the Caribbean were seen as a
threat."
3
Until the early decades of the twentieth century, the bulk of Africans entered
the U.S. via the medium of African-American missionaries and White Philanthropic
organizations. Such a white Philanthropic organization like the Phelps Stokes, for
example, played a major part in the 1920s in the immigration of African students to
the U.S. for training in vocational education.
4
The Phelps Stokes stamp on the
vocational education of Africans was based on the Hampton and the Tuskegee
models. The basis for sponsoring these Africans to the U.S. was to acquire a
medium of education in agricultural science to function under colonialism
capitalism.
5 The attachment of the Hampton-Phelps Stokes-Tuskegee models to
African education in the U.S. was closely linked to the historical relationships
'Ibid.
2Hawk, "African and the 1965 U.S. Immigration Law," p. 261.
3
Ibid.
"Kenneth James King, Pan-Africanism and Education: A Study of Race Philanthropy and
Education in the Southern States of America (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), pp. 103,
especially chapters 2-3.
5
Ibid.; William H. Watkins, The White Architects of Black Education: Ideology and Power
in America, 1865-1954 (New York and London: Teachers College, Columbia University,
2001), pp. 9-23.
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between chattel slavery and colonial dispossession. This early effort represented an
attempt to educate and assimilate blacks both in America and Africa under the
inordinate-subordinate order of the newly industrializing and expanding worldwide
capitalism.
1
Significantly, after slavery, the pattern of voluntary African immigration to
the U.S. differed from that of Europeans and Asians. Whereas immigrants entering
the U.S. from Europe, Asia, and other parts of the Americas (Tables 10.1 and 10.2)
were mostly labor-driven , their counterparts from black Africa were largely
education-driven . These Africans were mostly students who first attended
predominantly black American colleges and universities.4
Table 1 1 shows the beginning of clearer pattern of a specific immigration
from Nigeria to the U.S. during the colonial era. As shown, between the late 1930s
and mid-1950s, Nigerian immigration to the U.S. was mostly education-driven.
Table 1 1 is further supportive that the decades after the first and the second world
wars were when most of the educational waves of Nigerian [African] immigration to
the U.S. in the colonial era occurred.
5 By 1938, some twenty Nigerian students
entering the U.S. were mostly sponsored by the missionary societies for religious
"Ibid.
2
David M. Reimers, Still the Golden Door: The Third World Comes to America
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), pp. 2-7.
3Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism , pp. 239-248; King, Pan-Africanism and
Education , pp. 103, especially Chapters 2-3, Adell Paton, Jr., "Howard University and
Meharry Medical Schools in the Training of African Physicians, 1968-1978," pp. 149-151;
Geiss, The Pan-African Movement, pp. 374-376.
"Ibid.
"
5Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism , p. 242; Geiss, The Pan-African Movement,
pp. 374-375.
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studies.
1 Between 1938 and 1945, twelve Nigerians sailed for America. After the
World War II, however, some 175 of them entered between 1946 and 1948, with
another 318 entering between 1953 and 1954 (Table ll).2 During the three decades
preceding the 1960 (Table 11), both Southeastern and Southwestern Nigerians
comprised the dominant waves of Nigerian immigration to the U.S.
Table 11
The Population of Nigerians Educated in the United States, 1938-1954
Period Ibo: Number Percent Yoruba Efik/Ibibio Others Total
Pre- 193 8 1 5 5 2 12 20
1938-1945 8 67 1 3 12
1946-1948 114 65 45 11 5 175
1953-1954 168 51 51 38 43 318
Sources: James S. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism , p. 246.
From Southeastern Nigeria came such ethnic groups as Ibo, Efik, Ibibio and
Ijo. From Southwestern region came the Yoruba and the related ethnic groups. Over
the entire colonial period, the Ibos of Southeastern Nigeria had a striking lead in the
share of Nigerian students who sojourned in America for the purpose of Western
education. Until the late 1940s, more than two-thirds of Nigerian students were Ibo.
Up to the late 1954, Ibos comprised a majority of the Nigerian immigrants in
America. Given the proportion of their American and Nigerian regional shares, the
Yoruba were next to the Ibo, followed by the Efik/Ibibio and Ijo.
Also, the specific pattern of Nigerian immigration during the colonial era
corresponded with the earlier pattern of African concentration at predominantly
black-owned colleges/universities. One reason for this choice might have been racial
'Ibid.; Coleman, p. 246.
.
2
Paton, Jr., "Howard University and Meharry Medical Schools in the Training of African
Physicians', 1968-1978," pp. 149-151; Geiss, The Pan-African Movement, pp. 374-376.
3Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism , pp. 245-6.
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constraints. However, after being seasoned in predominantly black institutions, they
usually transferred to predominantly white colleges/universities for further studies. 1
Consequently, a majority of the early waves of Nigerian/African immigrants (1920s-
1950s) had very little or no need to remain in America after their studies.2
As already hinted, of course, there was the natural difficulty of being able to
function effectively during the early post-Reconstruction era due to the racial factor
of the black experience. Hawk observes that this was a period when "Black
Americans were considered a problem to be assimilated."3 Reid agrees, arguing that
this was also an era when the fragmented racial backgrounds of the Old and New
Worlds of the Negro immigrant affected his American assimilation.4 Although
Nigerians/Africans were foremost among those who found supports from the black
American institutions, they were unable to establish themselves in America as a
settler community after their studies. They were more certain of their future security
back in the homelands within the colonial structure. Their perceived aspirations as
the future leaders of independent Africa proved stronger in their decisions not settle
down, that is, to leave American shore.
Toward Post-colonial Immigration to the U.S.:
The Making of the Nigerian Diaspora of Colonialism, 1960-1990
Prior to the 1960s, black Africa had no recognizable status in the U.S. foreign
policies agenda capable of influencing the immigration of its varying peoples into
'ibid.; p. 242; Adell Paton, Jr., Global Dimensions of the African Diaspora, pp. 150-1;
Immanuel Geiss,, Pan-African Movement , pp. 375-6.
2
See, for example, Kenneth King James, especially, pp. 1-2 and his chapter 2; Patton, Jr.;
Shepperson, "Notes;" and Geiss.
3Hawk, "Africana and the 1965 U.S. Immigration Law," p. 262.
4
Reid, The Negro Immigrant pp. 107-1 17.
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the country. Even for such a populous nation as Nigeria, it was not until the 1960s
that American foreign policy began to show some understanding of its existence. 1
Only a few immigrants from Africa—as distinguished from those who
entered on student visas between some part of 1900 and 1960—were indigenous
Africans. For example, in 1910, 1930, and 1960, the U.S. Censuses show that 88
percent or 89 percent of African-born peoples entering were whites and were mostly
from British colonies. 2 This is not surprising because, prior to 1960, the U.S. Census
Bureau rarely recorded the specific regional origins of African immigration. 3 Even
the few identifiable African sojourners entering mostly as students around the World
War I and post-World War II eras often confronted socio-cultural stigma resulting
from their racial "otherness." During this period, some black African immigrants
were sometime kept apart from contacts with their ancestral kin. Despite the
constraint, approximately 14,000 entered the U.S. between 1951 and 1960.
Perhaps the rise in the number of African immigrants in the U.S. to 43,046
between 1950s and 1960s—although still much smaller compared to Europeans
(2,449,003) and Asians (577,877)—was influenced by the new U.S. immigration law
of 1965. 5 This represented the first significant recorded population of African
'See, for example, the earlier background by Immanuel Wallerstein on the African-US.
relations in this Chapter.
2
Holt, "Africans," Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups , p. 5.
3
Ibid.; Reid, The Negro Immigrant , p. 24; Wortham, "Contemporary Black Immigration to
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4
Ibid.; also, see Kenneth James King, Pan-Africanism and Education , especially pp. 1-2 and
Chapters I and II; Skinner, "The Dialectic between the Diasporas and Homelands," pp. 39-
41; Ali Mazrui, The African Condition: A Political Diagnosis (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1980,) pp. 21-43; Holt, "Africans," p. 5.
5Hawk, "Africans and the 1965 U.S. Immigration Law," p. 162; Gordon, Nigeria's Diverse
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immigration to the U.S. since the end of chattel slavery. 1 From the 1960s onward,
therefore, Nigerian immigration to the U.S. entered an era markedly dissimilar from
all the previous ones. As we saw earlier, the passage of the 1965 U.S. immigration
law accounted for this development.2 Hawk, in an excellent examination of "African
and the 1965 U.S Immigration Law," associated the prior policies of American law
with the constrained patterns of African immigration. 3
To a certain extent, the 1965 U.S. immigration law, resulting from an
amendment by the Congress to the McCarran Walter Act of 1952, had some effects
on the course of African immigration. This new law dealt perhaps more equitably
for the first time with the applicants into the U.S. on the basis of their skills, family
ties—not their race or place of birth. Hawk has argued that, with the new
immigration law, the dominant liberal civil rights spirit of the 1960s was committed
to correcting past failures, to respecting the equality of individual differences, and
"to the ideal that government could play a decisive role in making opportunity
available to those to whom it still remained elusive."4
After 1965, the U.S. Congress enacted other immigration laws in 1976 and
1978 that removed for the first time in its history the hemispheric limits on foreign
'ibid. Also, see for example, Tables 1-2, 13.1-13.2.
2
For some emphases on the 1965 U.S. immigration law, etc, and the new immigrants, see,
for example, Reed Ueda, Postwar Immigrant America: A Social History (Boston and New
York: St. Martins Press, 1997), pp.44-50; Michael J. Greenwood and John M. McDowell,
Legal U.S. Immigration: Influences on Gender. Age, and Skill Composition (Kalamazoo,
Michigan: W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 1999), pp. 20-25; Hawk,
"African and the 1965 U.S. Immigration Law," pp. 4-17; Michael Fix and Jeffrey Passel,
Immigration and Immigrants: Setting the Records Straight (Washington, DC: The Urban
Institute, 1994, p. 25); Quiroz,
"Community Innovation Project:" Together in Our
Differences an Communities (Washington, D.C.: The National Immigration Forum, 1995,
pp. 17-29).
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immigration, moving toward "a worldwide immigration system" based on "a single
policy that applies uniformly to all nations." 1 Between 1968 and 1995, 18.2 million
persons were legally admitted to the U.S. This represented an annual average of
651,716 and an average of 193 percent from 1820-1921, and 313 percent from 1922
to 1967. Thus, from the 1970s onward, Nigeria became the largest exporter of
largely voluntary immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa to the U.S. 3 This fact was
made more explicit by the corresponding uncertainties in the cycles of economic and
political stability in Nigeria.
4
Scholars have sometimes varied in their explanation of the factors leading to
the immigration of Nigerians (Africans) to the U.S. 5 For example the "push-pull"
model has received some attention as one of the causative factors behind African
immigration. Danso argues that, in the case of Africa, the "pull-push" factor tends to
overstress the "instrumental motivation" because it conflicts with the reasons people
immigrate from place to place. 6 Further, with regard to sub-Saharan Africa, Danso
argues that the causes of immigration are multi-faceted. High on the list is the fact
that the "push" causative factor has traditionally been economic. Africans immigrate
'Ueda, Immigrant America, pp. 44-5.
2Greenwood and McDowell, Legal U.S. Immigration , p. 20.
3
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to America largely in order to improve their economic condition and well-being. 1
Elsewhere, however, Apraku's study supports the crisis of Africa's institutions,
which serves as the underlying factor influencing the brain drain. This suggests that
the general state of institutional crisis in Africa has close links to its political and
economic instability, and hence a key influence on the decision by its skilled class to
emigrate to the U.S.2 But, as Danso argues: "The ease of entry of African
professionals into the international labor market has been facilitated by the non-
indigenous nature of African educational and training institutions. These
institutions, largely inherited from colonialism, prepare Africans for foreign-oriented
qualifications."
Thus, there is an undeniable basis that immigration from Nigeria to the U.S.
has its strongest historical roots in the character of colonial dispossession than in any
other features of post-colonial crisis.
4
Historian Davidson offers further explanation
that may help to understand this scope of the ongoing emigration of the African
skilled class to the U.S. Almost similar to Danso, he argues that black Africans
suffer largely from the crisis of inherited European "institutions," which were
constructed in opposition to their natural orbit of collective development.
5
These
imported institutions were direct nullification of pre-colonial African institutions,
and were the child bearers of frustration and anger, unstable leadership, ethnic
'Ibid.
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clientilism, military dictatorship, general political misrule, and indiscipline. 1
Considered along with evidences in Nigeria, the enormous problem of this
background was ultimately to lead to the American build-up of the Nigerian diaspora
of colonialism.
Figure 7 shows that prior to 1980s, there were three identifiable waves of
Nigerian immigration to the U.S. During the first wave, Nigerians made up less than
10 percent of the total number of African-born immigrants in the U.S.2 This
background suggests that the Nigerian Civil War did not really lead to an immediate
emigration. Thus, unlike Ethiopia, Rwanda, Liberia and Sudan, for example, whose
shares of American immigration were characterized by refugees, the Nigerian civil
crisis was not a clearly identifiable feature of its early immigration—although it
cannot be excluded as one of the features during the 1970s.
Other evidences suggest that the few Nigerians and other Africans who
immigrated to the U.S. prior to the 1970s and the early 1970s were those with high
skills. Of the 417 Nigerians admitted into the U.S. from June 1962 to June 1967,
255 were immigrants with skilled occupations; 131 were professionals and
technicians; 31 were engineers; 9 were physicians, while 34 were professional
nurses.
4 Between 1962 and 1972, some 2,334 African scientists and engineers, and
912 physicians and surgeons were admitted into the U.S.
5
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The second wave of Nigerian immigration began between 1970 and 1974.
With a strong leap in the numbers admitted to the U.S. during this period, the growth
of Nigerian immigrants ultimately rose to about 22 percent. It is probable that this
sharp increase in the growth of Nigerian immigration was a by-product of the civil
turbulence of the 1960s and the consequent oil boom economy accompanying the
end of the Nigerian Civil War. 1
Figure 7
Patterns and percentages of
Nigerian Immigration to the U.S., 1959-1980
<19SB 1960-1869 1970-1074 1975-1980
B Nigeria
Source: Based on "Socio-economic Characteristics of U.S. Foreign-
born Population: Detailed in the Census Bureau Tabulation,"
(Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of the Census Washington [C84-
179], October 17, 1984), Table 1, p. 3.
By itself, however, the early 1970s was a period when Nigeria enjoyed
enormous wealth and when a sizeable number of its immigrants in American
colleges and universities were either on federal government scholarships or were
'Udofia, Research Report
, p. 13; Levinson and Ember, American immigrant Cultures , p. 949.
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funded directly by their regional governments. 1 Similarly, the early 1970s waves of
Nigerian immigration were also linked to the beginning of serious political and
economic crises in Nigeria. This was a period when the political machinery of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria began to mismanage the oil resources of the country on
policies that were inimical to the future of the Nigerian nation.2 The 1970 to 1974
waves therefore reflects a mixed group of Nigerians: those who were self sponsored
and those who were on government scholarship, as well as those who left Nigeria
due to the mounting national crises that were later to result in the overthrow of
General Yakubu Gowon in 1975. 3 The 1970 to 1974 configuration represented the
very first clearly identifiable phase of Nigerian build-up in the U.S.4
The period between 1975 and 1980 marked the third wave of Nigerian
immigration to the U.S. Immigrants admitted during this phase from Nigeria into the
U.S. recorded well over 68 percent compared to Angola, for instance, with almost 70
percent.
5 The third phase of immigration was marked by increases in female pairing
for such sub-Saharan African groups as South Africa (8,250), Nigeria (6,733), Cape
Verde (5,119), and Ethiopia (3,256). Nigeria's rate of 279 males per 100 females'
immigrants was the highest in the entire African bloc, as well as greater part of non-
European immigration. This suggests that most Nigerians or Africans were married.
As Apraku's study later found, about 77 percent of African emigrants in the U.S.
'ibid.; Apraku, African Emigres in the United States , pp. 13-14; Allen and Turner, We the
People Atlas of America's ethnic Diversity
, pp. 150-1; Gordon, Nigeria's Diverse Peoples ,
p. 236.
Ibid.; Udofia, Research Report , p. 13.
3
Mazrui, Dynamics of the African/Afro-American Connection, pp. 50-1; Udofia, Research
Report
, pp. 13-14.
"Ibid.
5
U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Socioeconomic Characteristics of the U.S. Foreign-born
Population," Table 1, p. 3.
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were married. 1 Like their predecessors, Nigerians who migrated to the U.S. during
the third waves were mostly students. Taken as a block, the second and third waves
of Nigerian immigration constituted a major proportion of the American build-up of
the Nigerian diaspora of colonialism. The bulk of these predominantly student
immigrants did not all return home after studies; they were later to form the nucleus
of the Nigerian immigrant community in the United States.2
The third wave of Nigerian immigration can be explained in terms of
ancestral linkages with black America. When black America voted approvingly for
Jimmy Carter in 1976, his resultant policies generated internal changes that were
somewhat favorable to African Americans and hence to African states. African
build-up during that period also seems to correspond with the kind of domestic and
international policies that the Carter Administration generated toward black Africa.
The general pattern of African immigration during the 1970s showed that
Nigerians were the most identifiable group with wide ranging national support for
further studies in the U.S. Nigeria alone sent more college and university students to
the U.S. than any other country in Africa: its 16,000 students' body represented 37
percent of their ancestry group.
4
Nigerian immigrants also had substantially higher
educational status, especially among the sub-Sahara African groups in the U.S.: 96.7
'See, for example, U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Ancestry Group Report for the United
States," Detailed in the Census of the Population (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of
Commerce, 1980), Table 2, p. 13. Also see the 1980 and 1990 Nigerian ancestry population
cited in Chapters 1 and 3, along with the Nigerian foreign-born census population 1980-
1990, including the Apraku African Emigres in the United States , p. 2.
2
Udofia, Research Report
,
p. 14.
3
Ibid.; Trotter Review , p. 32.
"See, for example, U. S. Bureau of the Census, "Socioeconomic Characteristics of the
Foreign-born Population, Table 2, p. 5; Leon F. Bouvier and Robert W. Gordon,
"Immigration to the U.S.: The Unfinished Story," Population Bulletin (November 1986),
Table 8.; Allen and Turner, We the People Atlas of America's Ethnic Diversity , p. 150-1;
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percent of them had higher school diplomas while about 49 percent were college
graduates.
1
During the 1990s, moreover, Nigerians comprised the largest base of
educated foreign-born Africans in the U.S (Table 12.1). 2
From the mid-1980s onward, when the official U.S. immigration policy
toward the so-called Third World began to be stricter, the allotment accorded to
African immigrants compared, for example, to the Asians and Europeans also
became smaller. Not surprisingly, Nigerians admitted to the U.S. between the mid-
1980s and early 1990s were those in such highly skilled specialties as the medical
and technical sciences, academia, and administrative positions.4 Only a very small
number were in non-technical fields and fewer still had student visas. 5
Table 12.1
Overview of Nigerian Physicians in the United States
by Number, by Regions of Professional Certification, 1994
Region of Professional Number Percentage by
Certification Region
Africa 789 60
America 446 34
Europe 60 5
Middle East 14 1
Russia 5 .4
Total 1314 100
Source: Yinka Shoroye and Acho Emeruwa, eds., Directory
of Nigerian Physicians in the United States 1994 (Riverside,
CA: Nigerian Medical Directory, 1994).
'ibid. U.S. Bureau of the Census , "Socioeconomic Characteristics."
2Gordon, Nigeria's Diverse Peoples , p. 236-7.
3
Udofia, Research Report
, pp. 15, 47. For further demographic details, see, for example, Fix
and Passel, Immigration and Immigrants: Setting the records Straight , pp. 10-29, and INS
Statistical Report on Foreign-born Admittances 1970s- 1990s.
4
Apraku, African Emigres in the United States , pp. 2, 13-14, 43-6.
5
See, for example, INS Reports on demographic analyses of national categories of foreign-
born immigrants, admitted into the U.S. by country and regions of birth and by major
occupation categories, Fiscal Years 1985-1995. Statistics Division, Demographics Statistics
Branch (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Services, 1985-1995);
Udofia, Research Report
, pp. 1 5 and 47.
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Table 12.1 shows the number of registered Nigerian physicians practicing in
the United States in 1994 by region of professional certification. Based on the data,
more than 1,300 Nigerian physicians certified by ANPA were recorded in practice in
the U.S.: 60 percent of them were trained in Africa, 34 percent in America, and 5
percent in Europe.
Table 12.2 shows that on the average, the number of registered Nigerian
physicians from all regions in the Association of Nigerian Physicians in the
Americas (ANPA) almost doubled between 1994 and 1996. As shown, their number
rose from 789 to 1925—with an additional 1136 physicians—representing
percentage increases of about 100 percent (See Table 12.1). Almost a similar pattern
is reflected for other regions. But in terms of the proportion of regional certification
of Nigerian physicians, only those trained in Africa had a significant increased from
60 percent to 62.5 percent between 1994 and 1996 (Tables 12.1 and 12.2).
Table 12.2
Overview of Nigerian Physicians in the United States,
by Number, by Regions of Professional Certification, 1 996
Region Number Percentage
by regions
African 1925 62.5
Americas 960 31.2
Europe 134 4.4
Asia 31 1.0
Russia 29 0.9
Total 3079 100
Source: Based on data from Sunmolu Beckley,
Emeruwa, Shoroye, eds., Directory of Nigerian
Physicians in the United States and Canada, 1996
(Riverside, CA: ANPA, 1996), and Exploratory
Survey of Nigerian Physicians in the U.S.
Americas, on the other hand, experienced one percent drop in the proportion
of physicians by 2.7 percent: this represents a fall from 34 to 31.2 percent. Russia
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also witnessed an increase in its proportion of trained Nigerian physicians from 0.4
to 0.9 percent while Middle East and Europe had a slide increase of about 1 percent
each. This, in sum, would mean that the number of practicing Nigerian physicians in
the U.S. increased by over 100 percent from 1314 to 3079. 1
Some explanation of ANPA—an Association of registered Nigerian
physicians in the Americas—seems necessary at this point. First, it is worth noting
that not all the registered Nigerian Physicians were represented in the Nigerian
Medical Directory . For example, as of 1994, the Nigerian medical directory claimed
to have a record of "2000" practicing professionals in the U.S. "This maiden edition
lists all Nigerian Physicians—about 2,000—currently in the United States."
2
However, after examining this "maiden edition," the total count of Nigerian
physicians was 1,314, a bit way off from the recorded number.
3
But, with newer arrivals and certifications, the number of registered Nigerian
physicians is probably much higher than represented in the Medical Directory .
4
Indeed, the unofficial data on Nigerian physicians estimated a much higher
population than one recorded between 1994 and 1996 (Tables 12.1-12.2, Figures 8.1-
8.2).
5
Along, therefore, with other resident doctors who were [are] as yet to be
'Yinka Shoroye and Acho Emeruwa, eds., Directory of Nigerian Physicians in the United
States 1994 (Riverside, CA: Nigerian Medical directory, 1994; Sunmolu Beckley, Emeruwa,
Shoroye, eds., Directory of Nigerian Physicians in the United States and Canada, 1996
(Riverside, CA: Association of the Nigerian Physicians in the Americas, 1996).
2
Yinka Shoroye and Acho Emeruwa, eds., Directory of Nigerian Physicians in the United
States 1994 (Riverside, CA: Nigerian Medical directory, 1994), p. 1.
3
Udofia, Research Report
,
p. 47.
4
Ibid.
5
This fact is supported by exploratory examination of Nigerian physicians in the U.S.;
Sunmolu A. Beckley, eds., Who's Who of Nigerian Doctors in United States and Canada
2000: Special Edition (Riverside, CA: ANPA, 2000); and African Business Directories in
the United States , 1990-2005.
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registered in ANPA, the population of Nigerian physicians was more likely to be on
a higher scale by the end of 2000.' Going by the United Nation's Human
Development Report, there were about 21,000 Nigerian physicians in the U.S. in
1993.
2
This appears to have been the same figure that Gordon recalled in 2003. 3
Without any clear explanation, however, the estimation of "21,000" Nigerian
physicians in the U.S. by either 1993 or 2003, would appear somewhat extraneous.
If the numbers of Nigerian physicians were that high, then why they were not
registered in the ANPA medical directories between 1994 and 2000, requires some
explanation, which at this point is somewhat uncertain. Probably the general
population of Nigerian physicians in the U.S., including those in the related
paramedical profession, is somewhere between 10,000 and 12,000.4 Yet, between
1 993 and mid-2000, for example, the population of Nigerian physicians could have
risen to about 27,000 or even beyond. This would have been the case where all the
medical scientists trained in Nigeria/Africa or outside Africa currently in the U.S. not
certified as medical doctors (MD), but included in the United Nation's Human
Development Report. 5 Indeed, there are evidences that not all trained physicians
from Nigeria were certified as currently practicing in the U.S.
6
'
Research Report, p. 16.
2
Sako, in "Brain Drain and Africa's Development: A Reflection," African Issues, p. 26.
3Gordon, Nigeria's Diverse Peoples , p. 236.
4
This is based on my examination ofANPA and the general exploratory survey of the
Nigerian medical archives in the U.S. For example, most skilled Nigerians—particularly
those trained in Nigeria were working outside their fields in the U.S. Some Nigerian
physicians trained in Nigerian medical schools, or elsewhere, were often perceived as
emigrants from less developed region. Thus there are the problems of professional and
cultural adjustment, which could also explain why some of them were uncertified. Besides,
not all medical degrees awarded by Nigerian/African universities were explicable within the
American medical establishments.
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid.
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According to a study of ANPA's data in 1996, 1 about 24 percent of Nigerian
physicians currently practicing in the U.S. were certified in the 1970s. On the other
hand, however, a majority representing 64 percent were certified in the 1980s
(Figure 8.1). The likelihood of an American emigration for those trained in
indigenous African medical schools must have been at an all time high during the
1980s and thereafter.2
Figure 8.1
Graphic Overview ofNigerian Physicians in the United States,
by Decade of Professional Certification, 1950s- 1990s
70%
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40%
30%
20%
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'
T
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Source: Graphic tabulation is based on analyses of the data
on the Directory of Nigerian Physicians in the United
States, The Nigerian Medical Directory (Riverside:
California, 1994).
If one were to examine the socioeconomic and politico-cultural crises in
Nigeria—particularly from the mid- 1980 onward—the links between years of
professional certification of Nigerian physicians and American emigration would be
closely linked. As shown in Figure 8.2, a majority of these physicians came from the
more established traditional Nigerian medical schools: Ibadan over 35 percent, Lagos
over 20 percent and Nsukka over 1 5 percent.
'
Research Report , p. 16.
2
Ibid.
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Figure 8.2
Graphic Overview of Graduation Weight Levels of
Nigerian Physicians in the U.S. Educated at
African Universities, 1950s- 1990s
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Source: Graphic tabulation is based on The Nigerian Medical
Director (Riverside, CA, 1994) pp. 5-102.
Aside, therefore, from the intermittent leads held by Ethiopia from 1983 to
1985, and 1993 to 1994, more Nigerians were admitted to the U.S. than any other
sub-Saharan African groups between 1981 and 2000 period (Table 13). This pattern
of immigration can best be described as the "merging" of the first, second, and third
waves that also incorporated a succession of related waves that came much later. 1
This meant that a majority of Nigerians in the first, second, and third waves (1960s-
70s), who did not return home after their studies, were among the first to establish
their communal base on American soil. 2 These were mostly the pioneer-waves who
provided the required contextual plateau for the successive adjustments of other
waves of chain immigration from Nigeria from the mid-1980s onward.
3
'Udofia, Research Report
, p. 1 7.
2
Ibid.; Udofia, "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 217-219.
3
Ibid.; Research Report
,
p. 17.
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At this point, however, it is worthy noting that the "merging of the first,
second, and third waves" of Nigerians does not mean that a commonly identifiable
pattern of neighborhood settlement had occurred among their varying waves of
settlers in America. Such a view would be misleading. For, there are strong
socioeconomic and ethno-political as well as cultural constraints within both the
American and the Nigerian settings that tend to weaken the idea of sustained
neighborhood bonding among Nigerian immigrants. This context explains why
Nigerian immigrants are more susceptible to a detached neighborhood bonding with
African-Americans—even while they are demographically and culturally aligned. 1
Perhaps the most underlying reason for the detached pattern of neighborhood
distribution among Nigerian immigrants is associated with their socio-cultural
experience in America. Next is their internal ethno-regional fracture during and after
colonialism. But in America, this cycle of problem may have a lot in common with
the socio-cultural crisis confronting some Nigerians. To a certain extent, therefore,
this problem has further aggravated their inter-class conflict in the diaspora. So, in
retrospect, the merging of earlier and newer waves of Nigerian immigrants from the
1960s to 1970s with those in the early and mid-1980s meant that the former waves
had provided a broad contextual plateau which enabled the subsequent build-up of
Nigerians to converge in America. This development had the chief merit of
lessening the contextual tensions in the successive re-distribution of Nigerian
immigrants across the American landscape between mid-1980s and early 1990s.
'
Research Report
, pp. 20-1, 25.
2
Ibid., pp. 38-40. This development will be further elaborated in Chapter 4, particularly in
Chapter 6.
3
Research Report
,
p. 17.
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Consequently, the fourth wave of immigration began from the early to mid-
1980s as the political, and economic turbulence in Nigeria deepened. This wave
consisted of mostly of American-educated Nigerians who had returned to Nigeria
when the country was in a more stable condition. With despair and increasing
instability, they were first among those who seized upon the slightest opportunity to
re-emigrate back to the U.S. 1
The fifth wave of Nigerian immigration included those mostly educated in
Nigeria, or outside the American system, and followed similar cycles of
socioeconomic and politico-cultural turbulence that compelled their American-
trained counterparts to flee. A more evolving phenomenon, the sixth wave of
Nigerian immigration comprised mostly of political exiles who fearing persecution for
harboring views that were contradictory to ruling military dictatorship, took to flight in the
U.S.
2
The seventh wave of Nigerian immigration to the U.S. was built around the
foreign policy directives of post-modern America. Popularized as the "Diversity
Immigrant Visa Lottery," and designed as a part of supplementary program to the
Immigration Act of 1990, the INS made available about 55,000 permanent resident
visas annually to persons from countries with low rates of immigration to the U.S.
3
The fact that all African countries qualified for the DV Lottery programs, perhaps
'Ibid. See Figures 7, 8.1-8.2, Tables 12.1-12.2, 13.
2
Nigeria does not quite have a history of refugee immigration to the U.S., as do such
countries as Liberia, Ethiopia, Somalia, and the Sudan. Despite the enormous hardships, not
even the Nigerian Civil War was known to have triggered massive immigration of refugees
into the U.S. Prior to 1965, this problem seems to have been tied to the American foreign
policy, as well as to its ambivalence toward immigrants from the sub-Saharan Africa.
Generally, earlier emphases by Hawk and Skinner should then be viewed as considerations
which accounted for the small population of African immigration to the U.S.
3Badru Rabiu, "1996 Visa Lottery survives," African News Weekly (Charlotte, NC, October
17, 1996), p. 1; Gordon, Nigeria's Diverse Peoples , p. 235.
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because of the historic negligence accorded them by American institutions, also
explains why this marked the most unique wave of their immigration. 1
From 1994 1995, many Nigerians won the visa lottery and were admitted into
the U.S. By mid-1990s, however, when Africans won about 37 percent DV Lottery
program, highly diversified waves of immigrants were able to enter America. 2
Nigerians who entered the U.S. via the DV Lottery Program were among the least
prepared groups to emigrate to the U.S. This may explain why a majority of them
were those with minimal educational status. Thus, the seventh wave of Nigerian
immigration, as one might say for the general phase of African immigration, was
markedly dissimilar from all the previous ones. Collectively, the fifth to the seventh
waves represented the most direct loss of Nigeria's skilled manpower to America. 3
This seems to have been the core of what Gordon terms the "cream of the crop."4
One major difference between Nigerians who emigrated to the United States
prior to the fifth migration waves and those who came afterwards is that a sizeable
number of them
—
perhaps more than necessarily the case with other foreign-born
counterparts
5
—are often required to undergo further professional training or
orientation. This latter development, which is more characteristic of Nigerian
professionals in the technical and medical training, appears to correspond with the
general presumption that African immigrants are from cultural regions where
modern development along technical lines are least accessible. So along with their
'ibid. For the attitude U.S. Government toward African immigration, see: Hawk, "Africans
and the 1965 U.S. Immigration Law;" Skinner, In Defense of Black Nationality , pp. 7-11.
2Gordon, Nigeria's Diverse Peoples , p. 235.
3
Research Report
, pp. 19, 47-8.
"Gordon, Nigeria's Diverse Peoples , p. 235.
5
See, for example, Reid, The Negro Immigrant, especially the Chapter entitled,
"Characteristics of the Negro Immigrants."
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earlier backgrounds, re-adapting themselves to the socioeconomic milieu of
American civilization often requires complex patterns of intra-cultural adjustment.
Others, who had studied in fields not directly explicable to the American job
markets, are primarily among those returning to either full-time or part-time
schooling to re-orient their earlier fields, or even to take up new professions
altogether. Depending on their fields of expertise, this re-orientation or what this
author terms "re-negotiation," is often defined by the unfavorable racial character of
American civilization. 1
Regional Distribution of Nigerians in the United States
There is then a basis for understanding the regional distribution of Nigerian
immigrants in the U.S. As already hinted, the crisis of racial otherness, which
affected Nigerian immigrants, also corresponded with their regional concentrations.
This makes it somewhat easier to understand why their regional concentrations are
not truly united in terms of inter-ethnic cooperation among varying related and
unrelated national groups, or in terms of sustained partnerships within the black base
or mainstream America.
2
Beginning in 1980 with a population of 25,526 immigrants, Nigerians were
the largest sub-Saharan African-born group, and those with the highest ancestry
group figure (47,847).
3
If their ancestry group population of 1980 were compared to
'Hawk "Africans and the 1965 U.S. Immigration Law," pp. 261-2, 271; Portes and
Rumba'ut, Immigrant America, pp. 59-82, 90-92, 94-7; Apraku, African Emigres
In the
United States , pp. 19, 110; Skinner, In Defense of Black
Nationality, pp. 7-11; Landry,
America at Century's End , pp. 202-3. ,
2See earlier notes. We hope to show more details in this pattern of socio-cultural crises in
Chapters 5 and 6.
. ,„..„. f
3U S. Bureau of the Census, "Ancestry Group Report for the United States 1980, Census ot
the Population (Washington, DC, U.S. Printing Office, 1980), Table 2, p. 13.
249
1990, the growth level of the Nigerian ancestry over that decade would be 31
percent.
1
Table 14.1 shows that the regional distribution of the sub-Saharan African
ancestry group population in the new millennium follows the pattern characteristic of
the 1970s and 1980s.
Table 14.1
The Major Regional Distribution of sub-Saharan African Ancestry
Group Populations in the United States, by Countries, by Number, by Decade 2000
S.S. Countries Northeast Midwest South West
Sub-S. African 400,013 306,793 741,248 258,873
Cape Verdean 83,226 785 4,616 3,189
Ethiopian 8,670 14,175 35,385 27,373
Ghanaian 20,744 6,590 18,186 3,914
Kenyan 3,694 3,663 6,847 2,714
Liberian 9,496 5,855 8,284 1,505
Nigerian 41,692 24,217 75,332 20,427
Senegalese 2,787 700 1,924 508
Sierra-Leonean 3,153 964 7,252 870
Somalian 2,594 16,591 9,107 7,695
South African 8,018 5,370 14,867 13,577
Sudanese 2,729 3,923 5,565 2,418
Ugandan 1,326 678 1,457 1,166
Zairian 202 196 930 175
Zimbabwean 702 826 1,902 832
African 217,138 214,430 529,817 166,210
Other sub-Saharans 13,915 7,730 19,777 6,280
Source: U.S. Census, First Ancestry Reported: U.S. 2000 Summary File 3 (SF- 3), 2000.
Based on Table 14.1, the Southern geographical landscape (741,248)
continues to control the largest share of the inter-generational growth of African
ancestry, followed by the Northeast (400,013), Midwest (309,793), and the West
(258,874). Apart from an intermittent leads by Cape Verdean in the Northeast
(63,226) and Ethiopian in the West (27,373), the combined total of the Nigerian
'See INS Report on Naturalized Africans by Region and Origin (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of Commerce, 1995-2000); and Table 2.
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in the Northeast (41,629), the Midwest (24,317), and the South (75,332), were the
largest in 2000. For Nigerian immigrants, as for the related sub-Saharans, their
ancestry populations were also strongest along the Southern lanes, followed by the
Northeast, the Mid-west, and the West. In 1990, such states as Texas, the District of
Columbia, and Georgia were areas with large population of sub-Saharan African
ancestry group.
1
Table 14.2 confirms that a decade ago [1990], the general population of
Nigerians was denser in the South (26,033); South Atlantic (13,614); Northeast
(13,501); Middle Atlantic (11,202); South Central (10,693); Midwest (8,053)—and
the Pacific (6,669). During the same period, when the U.S. Census Bureau recorded
a total of 363,819 African immigrants, 123,933 of them were naturalized American
citizens. Of the 55,350 Nigerians included in the latter figure, only 10,036 were
naturalized Americans compared to 45,314 non-citizens (See Table 14.2). This
represented 46 percent growth over the one decade prior to 1990. Too, of the
131,487 naturalized African-born Americans in the U.S. between 1950 and 1994,
only 13,544 were Nigerians.
2 By 2000, when the U.S. Census Bureau recorded
about 1,000,000 Africans in the U.S., 282,247 were naturalized as American citizens
compared to 557,300 non-citizens. Nigerians—with 134, 000 in their population,
had one of the largest shares of naturalized American citizens.
3
Collectively, the
'For example, see Tables 13.1 and 13.2; and Allen and Turner, pp. 146-150.
2
Udofia, Research Report , p. 19.
3
Dennis D. Cordell and Manuel Garcia y Griego, Integration of Nigerian and Mexican
Immigrants in Dallas/Fort Worth, Texas: Working Paper (Dallas, and Arlington: Southern
Methodist University, Dallas, and University of Texas, Arlington, 2005), p. 4; and Census
Population of the United States, 2000 (www.census.gov).
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data on Tables 14.1 and 14.2 show the specific regional distributions of Ni
immigrants across the fifty American states.
Table 14.2
Census Population of Major Foreign Born Sub-Saharan
Africans in the United States, by American Geographical Regions,
by Citizenship and Non-Citizenship, 1 990
10. DATURA
-
II ADDLE SOUTH SOOTH E. A, R. A. E. S. A. S.
FOREICA MIED ROT A ATLAI- ATLAR- HID' ASA CERT- CERT- PA- CEAT- CERT- K0OA* CEAT-
COOATRIES BORA CITIJEA CITItlR A. EAST SOOT! TIC VEST TIC REST SRC-LARD RAL RAL CIFIC RAL RAL TAIR RAL
AFRICA MJ.UJ 123,935 239,186 123,760 115,619 89,789 82,902 77,026 41,53! 33,971 32,418 30,350 73,301 11,188 6,175 9,601 32,41!
AKQOLJI 2,25! 871 1,381 1,471 272 685 416 226 93 188 30 90 3(0 3 16 5! 30
CAHEROOB 3,161 463 2,(98 612 1,943 371 178 1,309 43! 241 574 271 156 157 (0 n 574
CAP! VERDE H, 36? 5,311 9,057 13,917 239 524 161 185 51 13,393 40 36 117 15 14 24 40
ETHIOPIA 31,805 6,900 27,905 4,6(1 14,154 3,378 11,918 10,464 4,07! 1,283 3,225 2,496 10,536 1,576 4(5 1,382 3,225
OHANA 20,889 5,180 15,709 9,751 6,596 8,426 2,045 5,018 2,497 1,325 1,378 2,019 1,780 478 200 2(5 1,378
KElill 14,371 3,743 10,(28 3,491 5,244 2,704 3,530 3,080 2,106 787 1,882 1,559 3,29! 547 282 238 1,882
LIBERIA 11,455 2,713 8,742 5,021 4,052 3,(88 891 3,126 1,491 1,333 761 884 826 107 1(5 65 761
AIOERIA 55,350 10,036 45,314 13,501 26,033 11,202 7,763 13,(14 8,053 2,299 10,693 5,918 (,(69 2,135 1,726 1,094 10,691
SEAECAL 2,287 332 1,955 1,484 374 1,228 284 304 145 256 56 116 253 79 14 31 56
SIERRA tEOHE 7,217 1,259 5,958 1,954 3,853 1,(03 843 3,171 5(7 351 552 351 801 Hi 130 4! 552
SOAAIIA 2,437 667 1,770 701 1,128 484 397 920 211 217 1(3 133 299 78 45 98 1(3
SOUTH AFRICA 34,707 13,537 21,170 8,566 9,900 5,978 12,577 5,824 3,664 2,588 3,225 2,785 10,9(9 879 851 1.588 3,225
TARZAAIA 5,282 2,466 3,816 1,701 2,1(6 1,439 1,695 1,(36 720 2(2 457 595 1,118 175 73 27! 457
U5ARDA G ,684 2,403 4,281 1,929 2,040 1,373 1,303 1,454 1,412 556 (78 1,109 1,189 303 108 114 478
(AIRE 3,387 735 2,652 806 1,396 633 662 1,175 523 173 199 298 5(3 225 22 99 199
IAHBIA 2,954 808 2,146 524 1,104 408 830 710 496 116 294 345 773 151 100 57 294
[IKBA8HE 4,767 1,373 3,394 1,106 1,568 851 1,575 871 518 255 510 327 1,313 191 187 262 510
OTHER AFRICA 136,446 11,135 26,267 13,97! 11,617 11,068 7,418 8,327 4,394 2,905 2,(33 3,120 6,300 1,274 (57 1,118 2,(33
Source: U. S. Bureau of Census, The Foreign Born Population in the United
States; (1990, PH-6-98), Ethnic and Hispanic Branch (Washington, D.C.: U. S.
Department of Commerce, 1990), Table 13, pp. 21-33.
The strong Southern pull of Nigerian or African immigrants can be explained
by geography, economics, and cultural history. 1 This fact is supported by the data on
Tables 14.1 and 14.2. Thus, it is in the Southern United States that the fullest scope
of the Nigerian concentration can be gauged. The make-up of this Southern
heartland of Nigerians reflects not only an understanding of favorable geographic
distribution of black communities in the Southern belt, but also of their proximity to
areas of black political and cultural institutions, and colleges/universities. Although
'ibid.; U.S. Census Demographic Profiles on the Foreign-born Pattern of Regional
Settlement in 2000.
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these factors are found in other regions, they are more directly identifiable in the
South.
1 Taken as a block, the entire Southern geographical landscape controlled
more than half of the population of Nigerian immigrants both in terms of their
number, as well as their ancestry group concentrations in America (Tables 2, 14.1
and 14.2). 2
Some explanation of this Southern thrust of Nigerian immigrants seems to be
in order at this juncture. For, as hinted earlier, their strong Southern build-up along
African American lines does not quite mean that the two groups have developed
sustained neighborhood cleavage as historically related and affected groups. Rather,
it means that the regional distribution of Nigerians follows a similar pattern of the
geographic and historical concentration of black America. How much of this is
influenced by a consciousness of racial "otherness" will hopefully be clearer in our
discussions in Chapters 5 and 6.
Table 15 is a highlight of the varying types of cultural groups catering to the
well-being of Nigerian immigrants. There are far stronger basis that the varying
ethnic clusters of Nigerian cultures/entertainments in the U.S. are dominated by
immigrants from Southern Nigeria, not only from Yoruba, as Levinson and Ember,
for example, observed.
4 By the early 2000, entertainment organizations comprising
the Yoruba and Ibo ethnic backgrounds constituted the dominant cultural wings of
Nigerian immigrants, followed by the Efik/Ibibio, Ijo, and Edo, etc. These were
'ijdofia, Research Report, p. 20; Allen and Turner, We the People: An Atlas of America's
Ethnic Diversity , pp. 146-150.
2
Ibid. Also, see Tables 2 and 13.1, as well as the U.S. Census Bureau on Ancestry Report,
2000.
3
Ibid.
4
Levinson and Ember, American Immigrant Cultures , p. 946.
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mostly from Southeastern and Southwestern regions of the Nigerian homeland.
They also constituted the largest rampart of the current build-up of the Nigerian
diaspora of colonialism in the U.S. 1
Too, based on Table 15, ethnic associations from Northern Nigerian or the
dominant Hausa-Fulani North, have the least demonstrative representation in
America. This might imply that the population of Hausa-Fulani peoples of Northern
Nigeria was not as much. If so, the emphasis is that, given the ascendancy of the
predominantly Northern Hausa-Fulani leadership in the homeland, their adherents
who were more likely to have fared better within the system were also less likely to
emigrate to the U.S.
2
Up to the 1980, the patterns of immigration of Northern Nigerians to the U.S.
were markedly dissimilar compared to those from Southern Nigeria. During a
similar period, the bulk of the immigrants from Northern Nigeria in the U.S. were
ethnic minorities, and mostly Christians than Muslims. Even these groups differed
somewhat in their general pattern of American concentration compared to a majority
of their counterparts from Southern Nigeria. But immigrants from the Hausa-Fulani
dominated Northern Nigeria began to be more visible in the U.S. from mid-1980s
onward. This development probably explains why they were less densely
concentrated in Southern U.S. as Southern Nigerians during a greater part of the
1980s and 1990s.3
'
Research Report, p. 20.
2
Ibid.
3
For example, this is based on Nigerian Business Directories in America. The extensive
population of the Nigerian/African immigrant churches provides the strongest basis for
evaluating the Judeo-Christian base of the largely Southern Nigerian immigrants in America.
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Table 15
Sample Profile of Nigerian Ethnic Organizations
in the United States
The Majestic Ekimogun Club, USA, Inc., Providence, RI
Calabar Cultural Dance Club, Washington, DC
The Greater Owerri Club, Houston, TX
Enugu State Women Cultural Group, Houston, TX
Oyemekun International Club, USA, Inc., Baltimore, MD
Fredimo Cross Cultural Production, Philadelphia, PA
Igbo Language Service, Washington, DC
Itsekiri Cultural Club, Southern California
The Ogor Okpala Women's Cultural Group, Houston
Umuahia Cultural Dance, Houston, TX
Owo Heritage Club, Dallas, TX
Akwa Ibom State Women Association, Houston, TX
Rivers State Association, Houston
Enugu State Association, Houston
The Wazobia Club, Washington, DC
Akwa Ibom Christian Fellowship and Cultural Club,
Houston
The Nigerian National Cultural Association
Akwa Ibom Dance Club
The Nka Nkaiso Obio Nyin Cultural Group
Umuahia Cultural Dance
Nigerian Eagle Soccer Club, Inc.
Akwa Ibom State Women Association
Ibo Congress Union, Houston
Ichie Association, Houston
Kalahari Association of Greater Houston
Enugu Provincial Association, Houston
Umuahia Association, Houston
The Yoruba International Association
The Ikwauno/Umuahia Association of Dallas
Mbaise Family Association
Nfokwa Association
Abia-Imo Union of North Carolina
Orlu People's Association
Ikwerre Community Association of S. California
Mbano People's Association
The Association of Nkporo People in America
Igbo Union, USA
Okigwe Family Union of Southern California
Oron Development Union
Ubiom Social Group
Ukwa Group
Ijebu Association
Ekite Association
Ibekwu Association, Houston
Etinan Group, Houston
Adamawa-Taraba Cultural Organization
Zumunta Organization, USA
Movement for Chubbunawa Unity
Club30ofAbuja
Club 30 of Lagos
Igbo Union of Atlanta
Eku's Organization, Inc.
Adamawa-Taraba Cultural Organization
Movement for Chubbunawa Unity
Organization for African Self-Determination
ThelgboUnionofAtlanta
Sources: (1) Exploratory Survey of Nigerian Immigration in the U.S. 1990-1994 and an examination
of three Nigerian Immigrant Community Media stationed in Southern in America.
The above then means that the largely Southern pull of Nigerians in the
U.S. is mostly Judeo-Christian-based, and mostly characteristic of immigrants from
Southern Nigeria.
1
This Judeo-Christian wing, as will be seen again in Chapters 4
and 6, represents the strongest institutional feature of Nigerians in the diaspora.
Besides, its socio-cultural experience also corresponds with the historical struggle of
the descendants of slaves.
'Udofia, Research Report
,
p. 20.
2
Ibid.
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Summary
Prior to the Islamic and European contacts, the current location of modern
Nigeria stood at the crossroads of ancient contacts with the other distant worlds.
While it was at the extreme end of human contacts, its peoples exchanged ideas with,
and borrowed via North Africa, Mediterranean Arab, Far East Asia, and Europe.
The introduction of Islam into Northern Nigeria around the 14th century provided
some crucial basis for commercial, administrative, cultural, and literary
development. This set the stage for an evolving pattern of internal and external
transformation. The 19th century Islamic Jihad or Holy War can also be seen as part
of an expanding integration of human organizations in cultural, economic, and
political spheres before being halted by the Europeans/British.
The differences between Northern and Southern Nigeria were sharpened by
the attitudes of the British-colonial and Christian missionary mandates from 1830 to
1861, and again from 1900 to 1940s—and thereafter. Prior to European contact,
such distinctions in differences as existed among the races of pre-colonial Niger
Delta valleys did not necessarily result in commercial or institutional disruptions
(Chapter 2). The distinctions produced by the effects of colonialism particularly
against the Islamic North were linked to the inimical policies of preferential policies.
Since the birth of the Nigerian nation, Southern Nigerians have tended to
misunderstand their national context in relating with the largely Muslim North. The
more sustained incrimination of Southern Nigerians under the British colonial and
Christian missionary mandates remains an underlying factor in their
misunderstanding of the Islamic North.
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Both the alleged Ibo-led military coup of 1966 and the counter coup
dominated by the Hausa-Fulani/northern soldiers were the enactments of
postcolonial ethno-regional contradictions. The current representation of thirty-six
states of the Federal Republic of Nigeria along ethnic lanes sums up the centrifugal
dissection of the Nigerian mind. The result of institution disruptions in Nigeria
corresponded with the immigration of skilled class of Nigerians to the U.S.
Prior to the 1950s, the general thrust of Nigerian immigration to the U.S. was
indeterminate. From 1820s to 1950s—representing pre-colonial and colonial eras,
the few Nigerians who came to America were students, compared to the vast volume
during slavery. Similarly, the early waves of post-colonial Nigerian immigration to
the U.S. were dominated by students, and later by Nigerians educated within and
outside Nigeria. The distribution of Nigerians in the U.S. has a strong Southern pull.
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CHAPTER 4
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NIGERIAN
IMMIGRANT COMMUNITY IN AMERICA
Chapter 4 contains the development of the Nigerian immigrant community in
the United States. The major emphases in this chapter are examined and discussed
under: (1) A Brief Historical Development (2) The Instruments of Nigerian
Community within the African American Context (3) Adjusting into the American
Mosaic, (4) and The Nigerian Immigrant Community Leadership.
Part 1: A Brief History, 1970-1990
As we saw earlier, prior to the early 1970s, the American build-up of
Nigerians was fairly thin. 1 This development in turn reflected the general pattern of
Nigerian or even of the entire African immigration to the U.S. prior to 1960s. Thus,
the 1970s pattern of Nigerian build-up in the U.S. reflected a shift from that of an era
when Nigerians were mostly trained at either the British or European
colleges/universities. Therefore from the mid-1970s onward, the contextual
visibility of Nigerian immigrants began to be more obvious in the U.S. This was
particularly the case in their distribution in the South, Northeast, and the Mid-West. 3
Against the preceding backdrop, the early waves of Nigerians comprised
mostly of the student sojourners. By all the available criteria, the nucleus of a
'For example, this is supported by evidences in Chapter 3.
2
Patton, Jr., "Howard University and Meharry Medical Schools in the Training of African
Physicians 1868-1978," pp. 143, 149-155; Igboanugo, Nigerians in America , p. 3; Ogbaa,
The Nigerian Americans , p. 23; Cordell and y Greigo, The Integration of Nigerian and
Mexican Immigrants in Dallas/Forth Worth. Texas: Working Paper, p. 7.
3
See, for example, Chapter 3 for demographic data; Apraku, African Emigres in the United
States
, pp. 13-14; Udofia, Research Report, p. 17; Oliver, The African Experience , p. 308;
Authur, Invisible Sojourners , pp. 3, 45.
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Nigerian community in America began with these early waves of students. 1 The
socio-cultural orbit of this new community reflected a strong Southern pull along
African American lanes. As we saw in earlier chapter, this Southern thrust was also
dominated by Nigerians from the Southern region of the homeland. 2
This build-up of Nigerians in the U.S., which was largely voluntary,
represented the second historic consolidation of Africans in this country since the
demise of chattel slavery and colonial rule. Seen within this context, the
development of "largely students' waves of a Nigerian immigrant community"
simply meant that these immigrants were unwilling to return voluntarily to the
homeland after their studies. They feared being unemployed or caught back in the
homeland in the web of incessant military coups and political changes that had
become characteristic of their nation between the mid-1960s and 1970s. Unlike most
immigrants fleeing political persecution or resettlement crisis as refugees, the early
build-up of Nigerians in America was due largely to the disruptions of civic
institutions in the homeland. This development in turn influenced the negative
cycles of economic and political instability in Nigeria, as well as the decision of
Nigerians to settle down after their studies in America.3
To a major extent, then, it was the attitude of the Federal Military
Government of Nigeria that dictated the choices which the large body of its students'
immigrants had to make regarding the decision to settle down in America. As we
saw earlier in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, the defeat of the secessionist wing of the
'Ibid., Udofia.
2
Ibid.
3
Igboanugo, Nigerians in America, p. 27; Apraku, African Emigres in the United States , pp.
13-32.
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Nigerian Federation and ultimate reconsolidation of power by General Yakubu
Gowon in the early 1970s did not necessarily lead to a viable vision of national
redirection or of a concise line of human development. The enormous oil boom
resources that provided most of the incentives for funding some Nigerian students in
American and British universities during the 1970s were squandered under the
Nigerian military. And the military government had no programmatic plans to
gainfully re-absorb those students studying abroad and willing to return to the
homeland. Ironically, this was period when the Federal Government of Nigeria
urged its citizens abroad to return and participate in the process of national
development. 1 As the crises in the Nigerian homeland deepened, Nigerian
immigrants were compelled to develop an historic foothold as a settler community in
America. The decades of rushing back to the homeland after studies had ended.
By mid-1980s, Nigerians had developed a strong consciousness of urban
clusters across major American cities. In such cities like New York, Washington,
D.C., Houston, Philadelphia, Atlanta, Dallas, and Los Angeles, their peculiar socio-
cultural orbit revealed the arrival of the newest of the "new Americans." Within
these urban centers, their collective strivings provided the necessary contextual
settings for the successive waves of later settlers from Nigeria to converge side by
'Osaghae, "What Have Achieved," p. 6; Part I of Monday O. Anigboro's article entitled,
"Has Nigeria Fared Better Under Military Regimes, African Business Source Magazine
(Houston, Texas, May, 1992), pp. 26-7, Part 2 (Houston, Texas, June/July, 1992), pp.
26-7.
2
For example, see the general build-up of Africans in Chapters 1 and 2, especially Tables 1
and 2, 12.1-15, including U.S. Bureau of the Census Report entitled, "U.S. Bureau of the
Census, Socio-Economic Characteristics of the U.S. foreign born population," Detailed in
Census Bureau Tabulations , Released CB 84-1679 (Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of
Commerce, 1984); Igboanugo, Nigerians in America, pp. 3, 27, 103; Apraku, African
Emigres in the United States , pp. 1-15, 42-3; Udofia, Research Report, pp. 14-15.
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side with the much earlier waves, as well as with those who were still students. 1
This would mean that the nucleus of a Nigerian immigrant community comprised
largely of the students from the first to the third waves. 2
Thus, the first successive consolidation of chain-waves of immigrants from
Nigeria in the U.S. was more closely identifiable among those who immigrated from
the fourth through the sixth waves. 3 These waves, which comprised mostly of
American-educated professionals, were later followed by Nigerians educated either
within or outside Nigeria. Among them were also Nigerians who had returned to the
homeland after their studies who seized upon the slightest opportunity to emigrate
back to the U.S., as the political and economic situation worsened.4
Instruments of the Nigerian Immigrant Community
Within the African American Context
Certainly the build-up of Nigerian population in the U.S. from the 1970s
marked the beginning of a new chapter within an earlier strand of Afro-Atlantic
exchange. 5 For, this particular build-up of largely voluntary waves of ethnic Nigeria
in America—like the one during forced migration—was dominated by ethnic groups
from the Niger Delta valleys, which embraced the Bights of Bonny and Benin.6 This
same region is where the transatlantic slave trade had one of its largest shares of the
'Udofia, Research Report , p. 17.
2
Ibid. Also see Chapter 3.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.; Udofia, Research Report , p. 19
5
See, for example, the reference on shared socio-cultural experiences between descendants
of slaves and voluntary Nigerian immigration in the U.S. in Chapters 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7. On
the other hand, newer strands have been introduced by the Nigerian/African offspring.
6See Chapter 2: Background/Ethno-regional Typology of the Niger Delta Basins. Also, see
Figures 3.1 and 3.2, in particular, for their related demographic composition.
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human cargoes exported to the Americas. It is also where evidences of the residual
effects of that bitter cycle of the black experience still abound in the varying
socioeconomic and politico-cultural attitudes of the region and peoples. 1
And, since the 1970s, the demographic diffusion of the voluntary waves of
Nigerian settlers from the Niger Delta valley regions in America has been closely
aligned with the black base. Earlier evidences confirmed that the inter-generational
experiences of the descendants of forced migration were almost similar to those of
their counterparts under voluntary migration from Nigeria. Corresponding with this
background is also the fact that the contextual development of Nigerian immigrants
is closely linked to the historical cycle of black America. Thus, the most visible
feature of the Nigerian immigrant community that emerged from the early students'
waves of settlers was obvious enough in its susceptibility to the socio-cultural crises
of "the physical and permanent fact of color."
3
This Nigerian experience is unlike that of most America's immigrants from
Europe and Asia. Unlike Asian, Latino, and European immigrants who often settle
along their ancestral lines, and are somewhat more closely bonded, in the South or
elsewhere in the U.S., Nigerians are neither consciously organized under a
neighborhood-based structure among themselves nor side by side with African-
Americans, nor are they emboldened by the mainstream notion of an American
'ibid. This conclusion is also supported by evidences in Chapter 3. Also, see related notes
on the relationship between the ethno-regional make-up of involuntary migration from West
Africa/Niger Delta basins and voluntary post-colonial migration to America.
2
Udofia, "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans."
3
Alexis 'de Tocqueville, Democracy in America , Vol. I (New York: Vantage Books, 1990),
p. 358; Apraku, African Emigres in the United States , pp. 19, 106, 110; Udofia,
Research
Report
,
p. 25.
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amalgam—nor by its inherent racial indifference. If Nigerians are culturally and
demographically aligned with African-Americans, they sometimes exhibited
markedly dissimilar demographic characteristics toward the black base. Both
cultural and socio-economic forces have determined how the two kindred groups
perceived and indeed sought to relate with each other. 1 Such crises as violence in the
black neighborhoods and other related socio-cultural tensions, to a great extent, often
influenced how Nigerians made decisions regarding their residential distribution in
the U.S. This suggests that their pattern of neighborhood distribution requires
further information beyond such factors, for example, as class and ethnic differences,
as hinted in Chapter 3.
2
Whether for Nigerians, as a specific national group, or for black Africans
within a broader base of sub-Saharan African immigrants—it cannot be denied that
their more peculiar socio-cultural experience is more susceptible to racial
indifference. This uneasy experience has an equal effect on their collective unity.
Nor is the extent to which this experience has affected sustained relations with
African-Americans deniable.
3
Therefore, along with racism and discrimination, the
negative experiences of Nigerian immigrants are further exacerbated by the socio-
'ibid.; Authur, Invisible Sojourners , pp. 3-4, 72-9; Udofia, "Status of the Relationship with
African Americans," pp. 54-60, 254-63, 285-291. Based on the fieldwork undertaken on
Nigerians/Africans in America, the reactive nature of racial indifference toward the black
base also affected how Nigerians/Africans immigrants mirrored themselves in relation to the
available opportunities both individually as well as collectively. For further understanding,
see Chapter 3. We hope to show in Chapters 5 and 6 how the conflicting cultural
cycles of native-born black Americans have impacted on the choices
Nigerian/African settlers make in America—especially in their patterns of
neighborhood distribution.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
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cultural effects of American slavery. 1 Thus, the Nigerian immigrant community
currently occupies one of the most vulnerable and powerless bases of ethnic
America. To be sure, the earlier pluralist model by Riesman, Dahl, and Newman on
the conflict of incorporating ethnic groups into American mosaic2 is perhaps more
clearly linked to the context of the Nigerian or the black African immigrant
experience.
3 A similar pattern of intra-group stratification identified by Jennings for
black Americans4 appears to be closely linked to the racial experience of most
Western hemispheric blacks, including black Africans in urban America. 5
As a result of this tension, which we hope to return to again further down,
Nigerian immigrants exhibit patterns of an American incorporation that are markedly
dissimilar from those of non-African descent groups. Their striving for economic
survival, which is supported by excellent education, corresponds with increases in
'ibid. Additionally, Blackburn views the New World slavery as a "curse" on the descendants
of the Middle Passage. This background can be explained in relation to the socio-cultural
crises confronting Nigerian immigrants in such places as Dallas, Houston, and Atlanta. See:
Blackburn, The Making ofNew World Slavery
,
p. 4.
2
David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), pp. 213-
214, especially Chapter 10; Robert Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in American
City (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), pp. 3, 36; William E. Connolly, ed., The
Bias of Pluralist (New York: Atherton Press, 1969), p. 9; William M. Newman's American
Pluralism: A Study of Minority Groups and Social Theory (New York and London: Harper
& Row, Publishers, 1973), pp. 54-8.
3
Igboanugo, Nigerians in America, pp. 13-16; Ike Onyia, "The Making of a Scape-Goat:
Nigerians and the Image Problem," African Business Source Magazine (November 1992),
pp. 26, 40; Tom Kennedy, "Some Nigerians Specialize in Fraud," Houston Post (January 22,
1984).
4James Jennings, "Conclusion: Racial Hierarchy and Ethnic Conflict in the United States," in
Blacks, Latinos, and Asians in Urban America: Status and Prospects for Politics and
Activism
,
ed., J. Jennings (Westport, Connecticut, and London: Praeger, 1994), pp. 144-154.
5
Ibid.; Skinner, In Defense of Black Nationality , pp. 7-10; Portes and Rumbaut, Immigrant
America, especially, pp. 83-6, and Chapter 3; Blackburn, The Making of New World
Slavery , pp. 3-4; Authur, Invisible Sojourners , pp. 3-4, 72-7; Apraku, African Emigres in the
United States, pp. 19, 110; Sanford J. Ungar, Fresh Blood: The New American Immigrants
(New York and London: Simon &Schuster, 1995), pp. 258-9.
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their median-income status as well as cultural stress. Consequently, their hard-won
success, which is part of the all-time American myth of the triumph of the common
man, warrants greater pathos as it bears directly on how they have attempted to rise
above the social ostracism and denigration which confronted them to participate in
the free enterprise system.
1 We are likely to see further down that the swiftness with
which Nigerians adapted themselves into American society during the early decades
of their settlement was rather remarkable.
Given the preceding background, it was not surprising that during the early
decades of its American development, the Nigerian immigrant community could
only have been more clearly defined within the African American context. From the
late mid-1970s to early 1980s, the unmistaken fact of "slavery" and of the "Negro
color," as Alexis de Tocqueville once argued,2 determined how Nigerian immigrants
conceptualized relations with black America.
On the other hand, however, the peculiar socio-cultural experience associated
with the Nigerian-African background determined the extent to which these
Nigerians exploited the African American context for survival. Between the 1970s
'in reference to the socio-cultural crises as well as the educational and median income status
of Nigerians/Africans, see, for example, Portes and Rumbaut, Immigrant America, pp. 80-2,
90-2, 94-7; Apraku, African Emigres in the United States , pp. 3-9, 19, 24, 110; Udofia,
Research Report
, pp. 14-15, 25; Authur, Invisible Sojourners, pp. 3-4, 46-8. On the other
hand, however, some re-adoptive character of American success of some Nigerians, which is
inherent in the tradition of the homeland, follows almost a similar pattern of the struggle of
the common people identified among early Euro-Americans. See for example, Mazrui, "The
World Economy and the African/Afro-American Connection," p. 51; Udofia, Research
Report
, pp. 29-31; L. Jesse Lemisch, Benjamin Franklin: The Autobiography and other
Writings (New York: A Signet Classic, 1961), pp. vii-xiii; John William Ward, Andrew
Jackson: Symbol for an Age (New York: 1955), pp. 1-46; and Richard Hofstadter, The
American Political Tradition & The Men Who Made It (New York: Vintage Books, 1974),
pp. 18-32, 118-123.
2
Tocqueville, Democracy in America, pp. 357-8.
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and early 1980s, Nigerian immigrants understood and indeed appreciated the
historical benefits of their African-American context. This context was their
immediate source of cultural reliance and survival, when the going was tough. Also,
it was their most identifiable base. 1 The exploitation of the "African-American
context" implies an understanding of the landmarks constitutional achievements of
blacks in America, particularly after the 1960s, which the sojourning Nigerian
students adapted to advance their interests.2
Retrospectively, however, the preceding background might also explain the
extent of the accuracy of the claims made about the economic success of some
middlemen minorities in America. 3 For, admittedly, some of their ingenuity is
closely linked to the exploitation of historically marginalized ethnic minorities.4 So,
the exploitation of the "African-American context" is apparent in the manner that
most immigrants—including Africans—sometimes utilized their more pliable socio-
cultural backgrounds to exploit the indelible crisis of the American black base.
For example, just as the vulnerable status of Nigerians reinforces their
exploitation of the black base, its volatile racial crisis exposes them to exploitation
among the more fortunate hierarchies of American immigrants. During the mostly
'For example, the term "African-American context," as used here implies an understanding
by Nigerian immigrants of the landmarks civil rights achievements of African-Americans,
which are accessible to them. .
2
Ibid.
3
See Chapters 1 and 3 for earlier emphases on Sowell, Migrations and Cultures , especially
"Introduction" and Chapter entitled "Migration Patterns;" Sowell, Conquest and Cultures ,
1998), pp. lx-xi, 3-20, 153-173; D'Souza, The End of Racism , pp, 397,472-6, 526-8;
Rarone. The New Immigrants , 2001), pp. 9-11, 17-21.
4
For example, an article by Landry entitled "The Enduring Dilemma of Race in America,"
pp. 202-203,' could be an excellent rebuttal against some of the
emphases by Sowell,
D'Souza, and Michael Barone. Also, see Chapter 1, "Context of an Existing Problem," and
other related explanation of this background.
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non-settlement decades of the 1960s to early 1970s, Nigerians understood and indeed
appreciated the historical benefits of their African-American context. The black
American context and its related institutions were their immediate enclaves of
cultural reliance and urban survival. 1
Of course, the kind of the "exploitation" tying Nigerian/African immigrants
to the African-American context can also be explained by some inherent
commonalities and dissimilarities under undue alien influences. This fact in turn
explains the extent to which they two related groups could either collaborate as
ancestral partners, or elsewhere, tilt against their collective interest.2
Beyond the preceding explanations, the exploitation of "African American
context" also means that, while Nigerian immigrants often derived their contextual
stamina from the African-American context, they were likely to be seen exhibiting a
loose or detached settlement patterns along the African-American lines. That is, as
hinted earlier, while the politico-cultural gains of the black base were important
components of interaction within the mosaic, such did not necessarily result in a side
by side pattern of neighborhood bonding with black Americans.
3
Yet, this exploitation of the "African American context" had one of its
strongest bearings in the contextual transformation of Nigerian indices during the
1980s. Indeed from the mid- 1970 onward, with increased socioeconomic and
political crises back in the Nigerian homeland, Nigerian immigrants began to adapt
themselves, along with their cultural mechanisms, into the African-American
'
Trotter Review, p. 32. Also, see Chapter 3 of this dissertation, section entitled, "Regional
Distribution."
2
Cruse, The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual , p. 342.
3
Ibid.
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context.
1 The extent to which they were successful in this undertaking was closely
tied to the historical cycles of two American Presidencies: Jimmy Carter and Ronald
Reagan. Probably the development of a Nigerian immigrant community would have
been much slower but for the alternate socioeconomic and politico-cultural wheels of
black America under two American presidencies. 2
The first reactive build-up of Nigerians in the U.S. corresponded with the
somewhat more favorable domestic policies of the Carter presidency toward the
black base. These policies were further strengthened and indeed transformed by the
much earlier gains of the civil and the voting rights bills, as well as by the
corresponding passage of the 1965 U.S. Immigration legislation.3 As Ueda has
observed, "The liberalization of immigration policy was concomitant of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the federal pacemaking laws
designed to abolish racial discrimination, particularly against black Americans."
4
Despite some of the failings of President Carter, as Klinkner and Smith have
argued,
5
to a certain extent, his presidency was able to record some favorable points
toward racial minorities in America as well as toward non-European regions of the
world. Therefore, in retrospect, some of his policies were more favorable in
approaching black America and black Africa. Of this development, another observer
'Udofia, Research Report , pp. 29-3 1
.
2
Ibid., pp. 14, 26; Trotter Review , pp. 32; "The Status of the Relationship with African
Americans," pp. 106-9.
3
For example, see earlier discussion in Chapter 3, especially the related emphases by Hawk,
"Africans and the 1965 U.S. Immigration Law," pp. 266-9.
4
Ueda, Postwar Immigrant America, p. 44.
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noted that, "when Black America voted approvingly for Jimmy Carter in 1976, the
resultant policies of his presidency generated internal changes more favorable to
African Americans and African states." 1
Therefore, viewed against the preceding backdrop, "African build-up in the
American world reflected the kind of domestic and international policies which the
Carter Administration generated."2 Blackwell's research on the relationship between
African-Americans and President Carter supports the alternate shift of tide under
President Reagan. Blackwell observes that African-Americans gave their
overwhelming support to Carter during the 1976 and 1980 presidential elections by
voting approvingly for him. President Carter responded by appointing them to
highly visible and important positions:
President Carter appointed the first black male as U.S. Representative
to the United Nations, the first black to serve as Secretary of the
Army, and the first black woman to a cabinet position. Of the 1 192
appointments made by President Carter during his four-year term,
12.2 percent were black . . .
3
President Carter's appointments to judicial positions included 16.1 percent
black, and 15.1 women. His official policies supported popular issues among
American minorities, especially among blacks in such areas as Affirmative Action
and busing for school desegregation. Carter's personal commitment for minority
programs through the Office of Civil Rights, the Justice Department, and the
Attorney General made "blacks feel that once again, they had a friend in the White
'Udofia, Trotter Review , pp. 32.
2
Ibid.
3
See, for example, James E. Blackwell's examination of "The Reagan Administration and
Blacks" and the "Relationship Between Blacks and Presidents Carter and Reagan," in The
Black Community: Diversity and Unity , Second Edition (New York: Harper & Row,
Publishers 1985), pp. 77, 270.
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House."
1 The alternate social attitudes that accompanied the election of Ronald
Reagan as president in 1980, along with the subsequent policies of his
administration, brought changes for African-Americans as well as African states and
hence Nigerian (African) immigrants. "When President Carter lost the 1980 election
to Ronald Reagan," Blackwell further writes, "the black community was gripped
with trepidations about the future."2
President Reagan, Blackwell continues, failed to articulate views favorable to
racial harmony. Worse still, his policies opposed Affirmative Action, busing and job
opportunity programs
—
just as his relentless pursuit of budget cuts undermined civil
rights enforcement. Ultimately, as Blackwell concludes, the Reagan support for
tuition tax credits to private school and tax exemptions for schools, discriminated
against blacks and other minorities, as well as encouraged open bigotry. 3
Under the Reagan presidency, "minorities represented only 6.6 percent of the
287 appointments made in the 13 departments, compared to 16.7 made by President
Carter as of October 1980, near the end of his fourth year." The sharp contrast
between the policies of President Carter toward blacks and minorities and those of
President Reagan was compelling:
Only 2.5 percent of President Reagan's appointments have been black
(as of 1983), and 8.3 percent have been women. Over 12 percent of
President Carter's appointments to positions as U.S. attorneys and
marshals were minorities while only 4.3 percent of President Reagan's
appointments in this category have been minorities. In addition, both
'Ibid.
2
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minorities and women have a low representation in the foreign
service.
1
If the preceding emphases were true for African Americans, then, the effects
were translated into the broader socioeconomic and politico-cultural constraints for
Nigerian immigrants within mosaic. For, during the Carter administration, Nigerians
had a certain degree of economic and social comfort. Generally, African
immigrants, who were more operative within the African-American context also had
benefited from President Carter's goodwill. His defeat in the 1980 and the ultimate
election of Reagan as the new president was an important turning point for African-
Americans as well as Nigerian/African immigrants.2
"In 1980, when President Carter lost his bid for second-term to challenger
Ronald Reagan, Black America's historic civil rights began to crack, and
concomitantly, African immigrants also suffered, including those with advanced
education and high skills." Earlier, Apraku's observation of the new socio-cultural
turbulence of the Reagan era concluded that:
Recent racial incidents and U.S. domestic policy have only acted to
fuel the racial issue. For example, the eighth years of Reagan regime
saw attacks and attempts by the governments to roll back some of the
basic civil rights achievements of the 1 960s, an assault on Affirmative
Action and voting rights, and the cutting of social programs that have
traditionally supported blacks. The upsurge of racially motivated
crimes and racial intolerance in the absence of any moral leadership
from the Reagan administration heightened racial feelings in this
'ibid. Also, see, for example, Ronald Water's treatment of President Carter's and President
Reagan's relationships with black America in Black Presidential Politics in America: A
Strategic Approach (New York: State University of New York Press, 1988), pp. 68-84; and
The State of Black America 1990 (1990), pp. 25-50.
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country, and Africans in this country have not been spared or
sheltered from such feelings. 1
Thus, the swift changes in the direction of American presidential philosophy
under Reagan had some profound consequences on African descent groups,
especially those from south of the Sahara:
So when the 'all American' Ronald Reagan became president of the
United States of America in 1981 ... the agenda kicked in with a new
ball game. America began to negotiate from the so-called position of
strength. Things began to fall when the center ceased to hold for the
foreigners.
2
Further, Igboanugo's account shows that, Nigerians—as the most populous
base of African immigrants—were more directly affected by both the economic and
politico-cultural changes brought about by the Reagan era:
... by the early 1980s, the Nigerians who came to the United States
seeking the land of opportunity only met what could be considered
angry lions and lionesses, people who lost their jobs . . . their
unemployment benefits . . . their homes . . . and insurance coverage.
Many could only hear of the good old days, but not to live the good
time any more. 3
It was therefore the socioeconomic and politico-cultural underpinnings of the
Reagan presidency which compelled most Nigerian immigrants to begin taking the
necessary steps to control their destinies and to search for an alternative means of
surviving in "the land of opportunity."
4
So, at a time when the political and
economic convulsions back in the homeland were deteriorating, the Reagan polices
marked the direct reversals of the gains of the Carter era.
5 During the Reagan era,
'Ibid.
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moreover, the shadow of Nigerians as respectable immigrants from a rich oil-
producing country faded away.
Adjusting into the American Mosaic
Nevertheless, the Reagan tide had the effects of enabling Nigerian
immigrants to converge into a communal vocal point in America. This development,
as hinted earlier, had first taken a form of socioeconomic and cultural hardships.
For, not all Nigerians, who were mostly students at the time, had the skills needed to
adjust successfully into the American setting. As a result, the opening of the Reagan
era caused the bulk of them with college degrees to become more and more under
utilized. Those who were neither able to adjust readily nor to return to the homeland
after their studies, saw the Reagan policies as an unfriendly development. These
Nigerians argued that, while their nation was faithful in its oil relationship with the
United States, the Reagan policies were opposed to their well being. 1
Since the Reagan policies did not view Nigeria as a spokesman for black
Africa
—
quite apart from the blunders of Nigerian leadership at about the same
period—Nigerian immigrants began to seek independent means of self-sufficient
development. Most of them did whatever they had to do to survive. With neither the
precise job experience after their studies nor the financial base to function
independently in a capitalist society, this class of largely educated but handicapped
and under utilized Nigerians began a slow but painful retreat into self re-discovery.
'igboanugo, Nigerians in America, pp. 15, 28-9; and supported by fieldwork and interviews
undertaken for this dissertation. Also see Chapter 3, U.S. Congressional Report on Africa
(1982), pp. 50-1.
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Probably the negative image crises that affect most Nigerian immigrants
currently in America first began as a reflex action to the Reagan policies. On the
other hand, however, some of the negative characteristics of the Reagan years
corresponded with some of the deviant undertakings of a few Nigerian immigrants
involved in criminal activities. For, there were several forms of official scams and
ethical crises among the Reagan men in the 1980s that might have influenced the
breakdown of the moral fabric of the nation. This was equally a period of increasing
drug businesses, crimes, breakdown of the American families, rising trend of racial
indifference, including the development among foreign-born peoples of a more
identifiable form of negative tendencies in America. 1
Despite the preceding constraints, Nigerian immigrants held a strong
awareness that they belonged to the great American mosaic. They faced the
challenge of mastering their African-American context, the seedbed of their
American germination. With this success, they re-adapted their indigenous skills to
the American settings and developed newer survival skills to function within the
mosaic. Even the distressful socio-cultural milieu of the Reagan era had the alternate
effects of forcing them to refocus in order to survive independently and more
effectively. This meant that the longer-term impact of the Reagan policies was
rather more helpful to Nigerian immigrants as well as to the emergence of their
infrastructures in urban America. Nigerians were compelled to re-invent themselves
in light of the uncertainties that confronted them in a foreign land and back in the
'See, for example, "Probing the Mess, Fresh Money Trails; The CIA Role; An Interview
with Casey," in Time (December 22, 1986), pp. 14-20; Richard Ikiebe, "Reagan's
'Watergate Trial,' " Newswatch (Lagos, December 15, 1986), pp. 27-8.
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homeland. Norman Martin captures the Houston background of this development in
his explanation of the crises of Nigerian immigrants. He focuses on a whole range of
issues affecting them as newcomers in terms of their national settings, size of
immigrants, educational background, and the socioeconomic circumstances of their
American crises. 1
Going by Martin's emphases, it cannot be denied that the 1970s was a period
when an average Nigerian immigrant sought a degree for both economic and social
status back in his/her native homeland. This was when they had more faith in
university degrees.
2 From the mid-1970s to the early 1980s, the hope for educational
reward back in the homeland among the largely students' waves of Nigerian
sojourners began to wane.
For Nigerian immigrants, the preceding development marked the end of an
era and the beginning of another. During the 1970s, when the political ferment in
Nigeria was less turbulent and the oil wealth was the magnet for American courtship,
most American universities and colleges flooded the Nigerian regions with
applications for students, who responded by coming to the "New World." This was
a period when the relationships of most American universities with Federal
Government of Nigeria were happy ones. This was as well when the huge financial
gains resulting from the oil boom compelled some American institutions to open
their doors to Nigerians
—
particularly the students. Indeed, during this period, the
relationships between American colleges/universities and the Federal Government of
'Norman Martin, Nigerians Here Say Heroin Cases Wrongly Tarnish Image," Houston
Chronicle (May 1992). Also, see earlier notes by Igboanugo, Nigerians in America , pp. 27-9.
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Nigeria were a part of compromise linking Nigerian students to some well-known
America institutions. 1
Emmett George reported that during the late 1970s, about 1,000 Nigerian
students were supported in their studies by the Nigerian government while the U.S.
AID program helped them to function in the country. Students from Nigeria were
"taking mid-level technical and business courses at some 100 institutions in 35 states
over the next two years. This means about $17 million for the schools."2 Perhaps
this background explains in part—why, during the decade of 1970-1980—some
16,000 of the Nigerian students were spread across Ohio State University (Franklin
County), the University of Wisconsin (Dane County), Kansas State University (Riley
County), Alabama A&M (Madison County), Texas Southern University (Houston,
Texas), and Howard University (Washington, D.C.), Southeastern University, in
Washington, D.C.3
By the late 1970s, the transference of economic and political hardships back
in Nigeria, which we noted earlier, had begun to influence as well as to compound
the prospect of sustained settlement of Nigerian immigrants in America. The most
expedient angle of refocusing undertaken by Nigerians during this period was in
their occupational choices and re-education for economic survival. By the 1980s,
Nigerian immigrants—like other sub-Sahara African immigrants—had also begun to
"Emmett George, "Africans Among Us," Dawn Magazine , Vol. 6 No. 6 (July 1978), pp. 15-
16.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid. Also, see: Allen and Turner, "People of African Origin," in We The People : An Atlas
of America's Ethic Diversity , pp 150-1; "Nigerians Image." Houston Chronicle (February 9,
1992); Igboanugo, Nigerians in America, pp. 27-8, 76; "TSU - Nigerian Connection:
Africans give Granville Sawyer Princely Responsibility," The Houston Post (February 11,
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show greater interest in United States citizenship. The policy of the Nigerian
government, which at about a similar time made room for dual citizenship abroad,
made it much easier for Nigerian immigrants to apply themselves equitably to the
American setting. 1 Therefore, the fact that the Nigerian federal government did not
accept dual citizenship for its citizens prior to the 1980s had some bearing on the low
figures of Nigerians who had U.S. citizenship during the 1990s. 2
Undoubtedly, then, the Reagan era represented a crucial transitional period in
the contextual adjustment of Nigerians into the American mosaic. This
development, as already observed, embraced the entire bloc of the black African
immigrants. Significantly, in their striving for an American foothold, Nigerians
rediscovered patterns of survival mechanisms typical of 19th century "Black
America" when the ideology of Euro-American racism, at least in the view of
Booker T. Washington, implied that the "Negroes" must develop technical and
industrial skills for their economic and urban survival. 3 Pressed by the demand for
technical skills, some Nigerians went back to school to "retool" their bachelors,
masters and doctorate degrees for associate degrees in such economically high-
demand fields as electronics, auto mechanic, nursing and electrical works:
Some Nigerians used to prefer to continue their education into the
graduate level, and sometimes all the way to doctorate while
remaining unemployed or underemployed. However, that trend has
been reversing itself. There are many who obtained graduate degrees
but to their disappointment, have remained under utilized. Now, they
'"Nigeria Adopts Dual Citizenship," African Business Source Magazine (November, 1992),
p. 28; F. Nwankwo, "U.S. Citizenship Can Empower Africans," African Newsbreed (July,
1991), p. 34; C. Ihejireka, "The Exile Must Adapt," Nigerian News Digest (June 17, 1991).
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attempted to obtain a simple diploma (Associate Degree) in a heavily
paid profession, like nursing, electronics. 1
Igboanugo further laments that:
It is unfortunate for Nigerians to have spent four years or more getting
the college degree(s) before realizing . . . the job market requires ... a
smart move.
2
If job market strategies for Nigerians implied an adjustment through the
community colleges for survival skills, most of their relationships to university
education implied control over their occupational independence and status. So the
re-education of some Nigerians identified by Igboanugu for economic survival had a
broad contextual applicability between 1980s and 1990s. Most Nigerians during this
period saw themselves and their education in two terms: first—for the short-term
survival in America, they re-educated their skills in areas that would enable them to
survive as a viable community while in the diaspora; second—for the longer-term
survival, they strove toward the control of their destinies by re-developing their
professional training in order to master the racial character of American civilization.
Today in America, Nigerians who focus on technical education are
the beneficiaries of the opportunities of this land. . . . Those who
remain in the areas of academics are doing fairly well. However,
those with technical knowledge are even more enterprising .... The
technicians like plumbers and auto mechanics are investing their skill
in the challenge of America—the land of opportunity. Realizing that
there is no free lunch in America, they have taken out time to evaluate
the reality of living in America; what Nigerians ought to be doing.
3
The particular case of a Nigerian—Chef Abu Abukokha Amed—of
Philadelphia, is worthy of note. Chef Abu's background offers a more explicit
'igboanugo, Nigerians in America, p. 40.
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overview of the general course of the refocusing of Nigerian immigrants in the
1980s. As chef Abu himself observes:
Back in the 1980s, the first thing I noticed upon my arrival in the U.S.
was the near total lack of African restaurants, despite the fact that
America had a sizeable population of continental Africans. 1
So, after graduating with a Bachelor of Science degree in business
management, Abu, who was immediately absorbed by "Bloomingdale's department
store" as a sales person, began to explore "what venture was most promising in terms
of financial security and satisfaction." Assured that he could apply his background
in business studies to a restaurant based exploit, he began his "lunch-truck business"
on a "trial and error" basis. Abu started selling such American fast food as "hot
dogs, cheese, hot sausages and things like that." Then, after mastering the market
and determining his potential audience, he made a very personal but important
decision:
I therefore decided to sell what other traders did not provide—African
food; this was the only chance I saw open to me for economic
survival. And so I started selling the so-called ethnic food. 3
Kwame Okoampa-Ahoafe, Jr., the chronicler of "Chef Abu of Philadelphia,"
indicated that, when Abu began to count his triumphs, he never forgot those who
helped "to make me what I am today." Abu reveals the kind of social adjustment
undertaken by most Nigerians in the 1980s. As Abu finally observes,
You know, I never thought I was going to end up working in a food
truck ... my traditional African mentality taught me that a scholar
'Kwame Okoampa Jr., "Chef Abu of Philadelphia," Ni perian News Digest (Charlotte, North
Carolina, October 1 1, 1991), p. 20.
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should always work at a white-collar job. This attitude prevented me,
for a long time, from seeing myself the way I am today. 1
As suggested by the statement of "Chef Abu of Philadelphia, by the early
1980s Nigerians had completed the enormous task of re-adapting themselves along
with their communal features into the American mosaic. This success was
accompanied by efforts to organize themselves and their varying national images
into the mosaic. Further, it was followed by efforts to extrapolate the inherent
beauty of their cultural diversity into the mosaic. Unsurprisingly, along with their
inherent entrepreneurial spirit, these Nigerians began to stamp their marks
permanently on American society.
Table 16.1 shows the varying types of entertainment and cultural groups that
began to cater to the general direction of Nigerian immigrants following their
successful adjustment into the American mosaic. As shown, their organizational
representations have political wings, which are the bases for rallying Nigerian
immigrants collectively within and without. This is important for understanding how
they are beginning to employ the influences of American institutions to agitate for
some political changes back in the homeland.
By mid-1980s, therefore, Nigerians were already well ahead of the fact that
the decisive questions in America's civic and democratic future were those
concerning whether it would be truly possible to incorporate ideas of multi-cultural
inclusiveness on the basis of racial equality. By late- 1980s, they had envisioned the
context of their American interaction and their efforts in the realm of entertainment,
'Ibid.
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cultures and economics were beginning to rest on the certain but complicated
foothold that Julia Teresa Quiroz discussed in Together in Our Differences .'
Nigerians understood that changing and forging a social contract that was
imaginative and inclusive within the American confluence required much
assertiveness due to the racial crisis of American society. Also, they understood that
the varying concept of America's multi-cultural inclusiveness—or even its
exclusiveness—was not very difficult to fathom and to transform in their terms.
Table 16.1
Sample Profiles of Nigerian - U.S. Based
Entertainment and Cultural
Organizations, etc., 1990-2000
African Network TV, LA
Nigerian Club International, Seattle, WA
Fredimo Cross Cultural Production, Philadelphia,
PA
The Nigerian Foundation, Houston, TX
The Nigerian Club of Tampa, FL
Nigerian Eagle Soccer Club, Inc., Washington, DC
Organization of Nigerian Professionals, USA, Inc.
Council of Nigerian People and Organization
Organization of Nigerian Nationals
The Nigerian American Nationals
The Nigerian Association of the Research
Triangle Area, Inc.
The Nigerian Studies Association, Inc.
Organization for the Nigerian Women in Health
The Nigerian AIDS Foundation, Atlanta, GA
People Club of Nigeria, USA Branch, Houston, TX
People's Club of Nigeria, Houston, TX
Nigerian Power Club, Washington, DC
The Nigerian Democratic Alliance, Washington, DC
Global African Independent Cable TV Network
The Washington Soccer Club of Nigeria
Cultural Club, Houston
The Nigerian National Cultural Association
The American-Nigerian Foundation for Child
Health/C
Patriotic Youth Movement of Nigeria
Congress of Nigerians Abroad
Congress of Patriotic Nigerians, NJ
Club 30 of Abuja
Club 30 of Lagos
The New Nigerian Forum
Movement for Nigeria Unity
Organization for African Self-Determination
The Nigerian Political Forum
African Cultural Dance, Atlanta
Nigerian Chambers of Commerce, Atlanta
Nigerian Information Service Center, NY
Africa House, Atlanta
Council of Nigerian People and Organization
(CONPO)
Association of Nigerians in America, Philadelphia
Association of Nigerians Artists, New York, NY
Congress of Nigerian Abroad, New York, NY
Minnesota Institute for Nigerian Development,
Minneapolis, MN
Nigerian Community, Coalition of America
Nigerians for Nigeria, Washington, DC
Nigerian Ministers Council, Washington, DC
Nigerian Watch, New York, NY
Nigerian Women for Family Growth, Washington,
MD
Sacramento Association of Nigerians, Sacramento,
CA
The Nigerian Family, USA, Sicklerville, NJ
The Nigerian Friendship Association, Baltimore, M
Nigerian Physicians in the USA, Inc.
Congress of Patriotic Nigerians, NJ
Source: Exploratory Survey of Nigerian Communal Indices, 1990-2000.
'Teresa, Together in Our Differences , p. 1.
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Even those Nigerians, who did not understand the American settings during
the early decades of their American settlement, had found some ways of responding
to their circumstances. But those who understood immediately saw their proximity
to Black America as an important foothold to explore opportunities. 1 With the
emerging economic implications of Afrocentric renaissance during the 1980s, these
Nigerians were in a position to re-adapt themselves along with their enormous assets
within the African-American context. They were among the first to discover that
African-Americans were interested in African artifacts and Afrocentric wares and
could become important liaisons in the effort to market the African identity.
Between late 1980 and early 1990 the bulk of their cultural mechanisms were readily
identifiable within the black base, both as a natural impulse of their ancestral
relationship as well as an imperative of racial identity.
Definitely by mid-1990s there were grounds for optimism with regard to the
success of Nigerians in adjusting into the American mosaic. This success was
accompanied by their mastery of American free enterprise system. The extent then
to which the ethics of the American institutions had collaborated with the inherent
aggressiveness of Nigerian immigrants was crucial to their overall transformation.
This fact was supported by the visibility of many Nigerian-owned businesses and
private property holders in America. Between mid-and late 1990s, such thickly
populated cities like Atlanta, Dallas, Detroit, Chicago, Philadelphia, Los Angeles,
New York, and Houston had strong evidences of the emergent strengths of Nigerians
'
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within the American capitalist system. 1 Within these highly populated industrial
centers were unmistakable evidences of their professionals in computers, law,
academics, automobile dealerships, medicine, and the real estate businesses.2
Often seen among Nigerian settlers in urban America are the identifiable
displays of their hard won successes in such grandiose styles as the kinds of cars they
drive, the neighborhoods they live in, the clothes they wear, and accentuations to
their professional titles, and even up to the names of universities or colleges they
attended. These cities are as well where extensive myths of the success stories of
Nigerian immigrants are often displayed with a stare in their community repertoire
by both admirers as well as the detractors of this most recent of the newest settlers. 3
Part 2: Toward an American-world Unity of Ethnic Nigeria
The most identifiable feature of the Nigerian immigrant community which
emerged between the 1970 and early 1980 in America was its Judeo-Christian base.
This represents the strongest arm of an American world institution of Nigerians in
the diaspora. A majority of the early and later waves of Nigerian settlers, who
formed the core of the Judeo-Christian foundation, were mostly from Southern
Nigeria.
4
It all began during the early 1970s. However, from the mid-1970s, a few
make-shift/in-room clusters of Nigerian Christian assemblage had emerged. Such
metropolitan centers like Houston, Dallas, Los Angeles, New York, Washington,
'
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D.C, and Atlanta, are the most likely enclaves to see the visibility of the Nigerian
immigrant churches. However, it was not until the 1980s that the contextual
evidences of the Nigerian immigrant churches in these cities became more obvious.
By 1990s, therefore, an extensive Judeo-Christian assemblage of the Nigerian
immigrants had emerged as their most visible and strongest institutions in major
urban centers and all across America. 1 This development corresponded as well with
the visibility of the Judeo-Christian emblem of African settlers.2
As Table 16.2 shows, the names of the Nigerian churches have strong
Biblical associations within their Judeo-Christian fellowships. This may suggest the
extent to which syncretism has taken place between Nigerian religious traditions and
Judeo-Christian mores. Since Nigerians attach strong meanings to their names, it
cannot be denied that the fusion of indigenous religious beliefs with Judeo-Christian
ethos has either been transformed or Americanized within the mosaic.
By the early 2000, there were more than one thousand branches of the
Nigerian immigrant churches in America. What makes the churches the most
identifiable as well as visible feature of an American institution of Nigerians, is
perhaps best explained by how their pulpits often attempted to weld the varying
tribal and ethnic fractures of their adherents into a diligent collective national voice.
Thus, the Judeo-Christian assemblage of Nigerians reflects a more respectable
bonding among Nigerians in the diaspora.
'"The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 138-140. 141-142; Research
Report, pp. 22-4.
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expression of the larger Judeo-Christian aspiration of African immigrants.
3Gordon, Nigeria's Diverse Peoples , p. 238.
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As hinted earlier, however, some of these churches were being housed in the
homes of the faithful; others assembled with their zealots in clusters of urban setting,
and were susceptible to movements from place to place. 1 Despite such constraints,
their territorial integrity has served the noble role of uniting the fragile inter-ethnic
divergence of ethnic Nigeria in the diaspora. 2
Table 16.2
Selected Samples of Major Branches of Nigerian Immigrant
Churches in the United States, 1970-2000
The Brotherhood of the Cross and Star, Atlanta Christian Fellowship Center
The Universal Cherubim and Seraphim Church, Amazing Grace Church
New York First Square Gospel Church
Riches of Christ Fellowship Church, California Celestial Church
Universal Fellowship Church, Broadway, Los United Church of Christ
Angeles Christ Apostolic Church
Praise Chapel Church, Los Angeles Masters Vessels Church
All Souls Miracle Church, LA Believers Bible Church
Christ Apostolic, LA Jesus Women Prayer Band
All Nations for Christ Church, San Jose Living Faith Christian Ministries
Universal Holy Ghost Church, LA Word Alive Fellowship
Celestial Church, Atlanta Word of Hope Bible Church
The Sanctified Mt. Zion Church of Nigeria, Friendship Bible Church
Atlanta Later Reign Assembly
Akwa-Ibom Church, Houston Reunion Church
Chapel of Praise Church Foundation of Peace Miracle Church
Chapel of Restoration Church
Sources: Exploratory survey ofNigerian owned churches in the U.S. (1992-93) and
(2) "Social Calendar," African News Weekly (Nigerian News Digest), 1992-1996;
and Exploratory Survey of Nigerian/African Immigrants 1980-2000.
Generally, the socio-cultural features of the Nigerian immigrant churches in
America offer one of the strongest mechanisms for sustained linkages with African-
Americans. Beyond this fact, however, the socio-cultural context of its Judeo-
Christian origin flows from nearly a similar historical and racial despair that
'This explanation is based on my follow-up examination and exploratory survey of Nigerian
churches in the U.S. between late 1990 and the early 2000.
2See details of this background in Chapter 6.
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influenced the founding of first Black Church in America in 1794. 1 Due to this
inherent problem of racial indifference within the Judeo-Christian emblem in
America, the Nigerian immigrant churches have the noble functions of serving as
centers of hope over the deep-seated socio-cultural crises confronting their adherents.
Like the earlier experience of their ancestral kin, most Nigerian churches were
established as the necessary responses to the desire to defend their humanity within
the larger Judeo-Christian associations of American civilization.2
America's egalitarian paradox, which justified and still justifies the cultural
sanctity of independent native-born black institutions after freedom, 3 also offers
some faithful basis for Nigerian immigrants to develop their independent institutions.
The fact that the Judeo-Christian wing of Nigerians has the strongest wing of their
American institution is then a basic recreation of the historical cycle of descendants
of slaves.
4 Nor was it very surprising that the first elected Nigerian in America, Rev.
Emmanuel W. Onunwor, mayor of East Cleveland, Ohio, came out of the Christian
ministry.
5
Like the black churches in America, Nigerian churches are where their
adherents derive substantial community influences on economic and cultural matters.
However, unlike a majority of African-American churches, whose members have
'Horton and Horton, In Hope of Liberty , pp. 132-143; Gary Nash, Forging Freedom , pp.
125-129; Igboanugo, Nigerian Experience , pp. 15-16.
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active political interests in the larger civic cultures of the nation, a majority of the
adherents of the Nigerian immigrant churches are as yet to fully incorporate politics
into their evangelical mission. If this development is influenced by the late entry
into the American Judeo-Christian establishments, it could then mean that they are
still struggling to define their ideological confluence. The ideology of the Nigerian
immigrant churches in the diaspora will very likely be determined by how they seek
to adopt moral platforms to address the socio-cultural crisis that confront the faithful
adherents. Meanwhile, however, that consideration is as yet to be clearly defined.
Thus, given the preceding consideration, by the 1990s it did not seem that
Nigerian church ministries and their adherents were fully cognizant that the pulpit
was a viable political vehicle of an American power. 1 A majority of the early
decades of African settlers did not quite see the strong tide of racial indifference
confronting them as an issue calling for a united political front via their churches.
This absence of a united response has a lot to do with their overall contextual
instability. While this attitude has been changing, the future thrust of this dynamic
does seem to be a development that the American-born offspring of Nigerian
immigrants will very likely transform. Where Nigerians will later recognize the
political implications of their Judeo-Christian emblem, their church ministries might
become the avenues for molding more substantive influences in the diaspora. The
medium of the Nigerian churches is capable of uniting the faithful within the rising
tide of Judeo-Christian political ferment in post-modern America.
2
'Udofia, "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp 166-7.
2
Ibid. pp. 278-283.
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If the Nigerian immigrant churches are the medium for some economic and
cultural support, they are as yet to bend their enormous underlying powers into a
populist movement aimed at addressing the socio-cultural concerns of their
adherents. The Nigerian immigrant churches are well-known for their sermons on
moral diligence while the faithful adherents confront racial slurs and work place
discrimination almost on daily basis in society. 1
This slow response of the Nigerian immigrant churches to populist political
activism evolved not out of any peculiar cultural weakness, but rather perhaps more
directly from a carry-over of the crisis of colonial dispossession. Initially, in post-
colonial Africa, Christian churchgoers were more likely to be seen distancing
themselves from the relationship between religion and politics. To a certain degree,
it was this highly conditioned ideological mindset that justified both their piety as
well as interpretation of the holy script. Comparatively, however, the perspective of
pre-colonial Africa on the relationship between religion and politics was closely
linked. Mostly through the medium of divine fellowship, pre-colonial African
leaders administered and welded enormous power over their varying peoples.
Among pre-colonial African kingdoms and city-states, it would have been difficult to
deny the organic unity between politics and religion: for the elders who represented
their vast kingdoms were often viewed as divine leaders. The unity between
religious and political piety was the essence of responsible administration of justice,
taxation, and maintenance of social systems and institutions.
'Ibid.
2
For example, see Davidson, The Search for Africa: History. Culture, and Politics , pp. 21-4.
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With colonialism, however, and the resultant European missionary
evangelical missions, most Nigerian Christian adherents were compelled to disavow
the earlier unity between religion and political power. While colonialism provided
Judeo-Christian traditions a moral function to advance the interest of its political and
economic doctrine, the same principle served as a basis for the nullification of the
ideological unity between religion and politics among a majority of Africans. 1 With
a few modifications, the Judeo-Christian features of post-colonial Nigeria,
particularly in Southern Nigeria—are deeply rooted in colonial dispossession. It is
this background that influences the isolation of religion from politics just as it
collaborates with the official attitudes of the Nigerian Christian ministries in the
diaspora. On the other hand, however, the arduous history of the black experience is
closely linked to this trend. That is, the more peculiar racial otherness of the
Nigerian immigrant churches in America tends to suggest that their Judeo-Christian
status might be more secure at distance from political arena.
The above may explain why the Judeo-Christian ministries of Nigerians in
the diaspora are likely to be different both in terms of their orientation as well as in
terms of some aspects of their adaptation of the cultures of the homeland. Unlike a
majority of their African American kin, most Nigerian pastoral ministries are led by
preachers whose call rarely began at the theological seminaries. Apart from those
entering the Christian ministries through such well known denominations as the
Catholic Church, Anglican Church, Methodist Church, Presbyterian Church, and
'See, for example, Ayandele, The Educated Elite in the Nigerian Society, especially his
Chapter entitled "Deluded Hybrids and Collaborators," which mirrors the confusions, myth
of Judeo-Christian claims, self-aggrandizement, and denials of their indigenous cultures
among adherents of early Christian missions in Nigeria during the colonial era.
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Lutheran Church, for example, most Nigerian pastoral ministries are based on
spontaneous responses to the call by the Christian deity. This development tends to
defy some of the more familiar norms of early pastoral preparations characteristic of
African-Americans and Euro-Americans within the trademarks of Western
Christendom. Often the predominant training that justifies the claims of some
Nigerian preachers to the pulpit derives from association with practical Christianity,
mysticism, and the corresponding results of the syncretism between indigenous and
Christian religious values. 1
Perhaps the preceding explains why most Nigerian churches in the diaspora
are likely to be led by highly educated ministers. Usually, these pastors had first
been gainfully employed outside the Judeo-Christian setting. A majority of them
were academicians, physicians, engineers, and accountants before being re-claimed
to the Christian mission. The fact that this embraces highly trained Nigerians might
suggest that the alternative to the Christian ministries occurred either voluntarily
with a strong spiritual and religious leaning among a majority of the faithful, or even
involuntarily due to the expedient search for an internal mechanism to overcome and
transform their problems in the diaspora.
2
Luckily, for most Nigerian immigrants, the enduring socio-cultural
experiences acquired between late 1980s and early 1990s were the resources upon
which some careful choices were later made regarding their American agenda. By
itself, however, the general state of their powerlessness and skepticism about
'This is summary of the data derived from fieldwork in the course of examining the profiles
of Nigerian/African immigrant churches in the U.S. For elaboration, see the earlier
sequences in Chapter 1 of this dissertation entitled, "Methodology: An Interpretation."
2
Ibid.
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America's racial indifference did not necessarily mean that they were not active
participants within the mosaic. There are, of course, undeniable evidences of their
participation in the making of America' politics, as well as of its entertainment
businesses, scientific, intellectual, and cultural developments. While the racial
agony of American civilization has been real, most Nigerians have re-adopted its
powerful egalitarian principle to advance their diverse interests. Hence despite some
constraints, there have been favorable rewards. 1
There are indeed Nigerians who have been elected into important political
positions in America as mayors and city councilmen.2 Quite possibly, given the
electoral requirements of American politics, these newer phases of historic
developments are taking place in regions where native-born blacks and Africans are
densely concentrated.
3
Possibly these are also regions where Blacks, Latinos, and
Asians have developed more favorable intra-ethnic coalitions along with their liberal
White allies.4
Thus, based on the evidences we have shown up to this point, there cannot be
any doubt that the general socioeconomic and politico-cultural settings of Nigerians
in the diaspora are being shaped by the generational and historical cycles of black
America. Yet, the active application of their communal indices, are somewhat more
'Ogbaa, The Nigerian Americans , especially pp. 137-167.
2
Ibid., pp. 143-4.
3
See, for example, Chapter 3 "Regional Distribution" of Nigerian/Africans,
"ibid. Also, in some cases of electorate successes of Nigerians into mayoral and
councilmanic political seats, it is quite conceivable that such would have occurred through
active coalition networks involving African-Americans and Nigerians/Africans, Hispanics,
Asians, and liberal Whites. For details of this development, see James Jennings, "Changing
Urban Policy Paradigms: Impact of Black and Latino Coalition," in Blacks, Latinos, and
Asians in Urban America: Status and Prospects for Politics and Activism , ed., James
Jennings (Westport, Connecticut, and London: Praeger, 1994), pp. 3-15.
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identifiable with the adoptive and re-adoptive values of mainstream America. This
strongly suggests that Nigerian immigrants have accepted the criteria offered by
mainstream America that good education is an effective pathway toward sustained
and viable economic status.
By the early 1990s, Nigerian immigrants had acquired the material status
which in some cases, was well above that of average Americans. 1 Those who had
not done so well, fortunately, were still well off through a combination of several
jobs, which might result in more money although more fatigue. Many Nigerians in
the latter class were most successful as independent entrepreneurs. The bulk of them
owned and controlled the Afrocentric world businesses, indigenous African cultural
artifacts, African restaurants, and African grocery stores. By the mid-2000s,
Nigerian immigrants owned and controlled the bulk of the media outlets and related
informational sources catering to the varied needs of Africans in the U.S.
If the version of free enterprise and individualism to which Nigerian
immigrants have adapted is inherent in the American cultural psyche, it is also based
on that of their homeland. That is, they have re-adopted their traditional ethics to the
'For example, see "1991 30 most outstanding Africans in U.S.," African Business Source
Magazine (December-January, 1992) pp. 16, 24, 32, 35. Also, in Apraku's study, the income
status of African emigrants is impressive. Nigerians , as the largest base of sub-Saharan
Africans both during the 1960s and 1990s, were also likely to have had the largest median
income. By 2000, both the size and growth of Nigerian professionals in America
corresponded with their median income base. See Apraku, African Emigres in the United
States
, pp. 1-17, 41-6; Authur, Invisible Sojourners , pp. 46, 154-171; Ogbaa, The Nigerian
Americans
, pp. 138-167; Cordell and y Griego, Integration of Nigerian and Mexican
Immigrants in Dallas/Fort Worth, Texas .
2
Ibid. This fact was further confirmed through: (I) Exploratory survey of the Nigerian
immigrants (II) an examination of the Nigerian community record, and (III) Community
Media . On the basis of the general population of Nigerians, along with their socioeconomic
indices as well as cultural networks, have a vast lead and control over the rest of the African
blocks in the U.S. Moreover, they dominated as well as controlled the emerging African-
US. infrastructures, as well as the bulk of their informational sources.
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American circumstances and transformed them. As Mazrui writes, capitalism among
Nigerians "is relatively assured" because of their "vigorous level of Individualism,"
and because they have a "highly developed acquisitive culture." 1 Further, in Nigeria,
Mazrui continues, there is an "underlying attachment to liberal values, which
embodies structural pluralism in the society, diversity of power centers ethnically,
regionally, and in terms of religious differentiation."2
There is a basis here for explaining the extent to which there are cultural
similarities and differences between Nigerian immigrants and Americans. As found
in this study, their similarities and dissimilarities were linked to issues of national
identity
,
individualism, and ethnicity . On the American side, the Bellah et al. argues
that a typical American individualist is often isolated into a personal world. This
world, it is believed, is also often shaped by a deep sense of individualism. 3
Dahl, however, goes much further in his Democracy and Its Critics in
reconstructing some of the weaknesses of the Bella thesis, which was exclusive of
multiculturalism—a fundamental feature of American republicanism. Dahl
emphasizes a continuous upward development of the individualist for a more
fulfilling services and benefits to both the personal selfhood as well as to the larger
collective selfhood of the nation-state.
4
Dahl's strength, it seems, lies more in his grasp of the organic relationship
between "just distribution of freedom and fair opportunities for self development," as
'Mazrui, Dynamics of the African/Afro-American Connection , p. 5 1
.
2
Ibid.
3
Robert N. Bellah et al., Habit of Heart: Individualism an Commitment in American Life
(New Your: Harper Row, 1985), pp. 3-26.
4
Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven and London: Yale University Press,
1989), pp. 217-218, 280-2, 322, 332.
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well as for the common good of all citizens within the democracy. Dahl stresses the
importance of enlightened citizenship, control of agenda and racial inclusiveness as a
basis for collective development of individuals' self-interests in a multi-racial
democracy. To Dahl, moreover, the "common good" of all Americans within the
democracy is plausible when citizens seek to develop strong sense of selfhood at the
highest level as the basis of national service. 1 The Dahl position on racial
inclusiveness is one the Bellah scholars tend to misunderstand. 2
So, where then does Nigeria stand with regard to the American paradigm?
First, the concept of selfhood along with its relationship to national identity among
Nigerian immigrants contrasts sharply with that of Americans. Second, among
Nigerians the notion of individualism within the nation-state is informed by greater
isolation into one's tribal and ethno-regional setting. This background is perhaps due
mostly to their inter-ethnic fracture during colonialism.
Thus, in retrospect, the general difference between Nigerian and American
definition of the idea of national identity lies more in their historical background.
Due mostly to the centrifugal contradictions imposed by colonial dispossession, the
Nigerian citizenry after independence exhibits one of the highest forms of what one
late English historian termed "tribal clientilism" in the day-to-day orientation of their
civic and institutional functions.
4
'Ibid.
2
For example, see earlier notes on Bellah et al. (pp. 3-26), in which multi-culturalism or
elements related to racial inclusiveness, received no substantive explanation. Only the Euro-
American experience informed the Bellah thesis (Ibid.).
2Udofia, Research Report, pp. 32-5; Wright, Nigeria: Struggle for Stability, pp. 30-40;
4
Davidson, The Blackman's Burden , pp. 11-12.
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The system of tribal or ethnic clientilism—whether in Nigeria or elsewhere in
sub-Saharan Africa—in turn reflects the pathological characteristics of the
contemporary post-colonial or neocolonial nation-states, which resulted from
decolonization.
1
Consequently, in the civic cultures of modern Nigeria, the concept
of individualism is more likely to be shaped by family patronage, tribal, and ethno-
regional loyalty and support. This suggests that attachment to the tribal and ethno-
regional political cultures is stronger than what takes place within the larger nation-
state. Comparatively, then, while an American individualist operates more on the
level of selfhood and very often recognizes the essence of the national umbrella, the
Nigerian operates within his tribal and ethno-regional point of national selfhood, and
often tends to compromise the essence of the nation.2
But by and large, the ethic of hard work is an important similarity for both
Americans and Nigerian immigrants. Americans and Nigerians have enormous
adaptive and re-adaptive skills as hard working peoples. On the other hand,
however, even the strong sense of tribal or ethnic consciousness of Nigerians does
not mean that the idea of their national identity has been lost. Rather, it means that
the impulses of their varied dialects, which have lacked focused leadership, are often
in conflict with the direction of the Nigerian nation. This background of Nigerian
'Ibid.
2
Ibid. Regardless of some emphases by Bellah et al., Americans are generally very patriotic
in spite of their self-serving individualism. On the Nigeria side, however, such articles, for
example, by Bedford Umez, "My Case with a Typical Nigerian," The Good Hope News
(Dallas Texas: Good Hope Enterprise, September, 1991), pp. 12, 14; Beford Umez, "State
Creation in Nigeria is Bum Kum," The Good Hope News (Dallas Texas: Good Hope
enterprise, February, 1992), pp. 12-14; and Jack E. White, "Shamed by Their Nation," Time
(September, 1993), p. 36—appear to have directly confirmed the extent to which most
Nigerians affirmed their tribal/ethnic aspirations over their national unity.
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crisis will very likely become clearer in our explanation of the major leadership
models of Nigerian immigrants in America.
Part 3; The Nigerian Immigrant Community Leadership;
Context and Interpretation
The basis for understanding the leadership models of the Nigerian immigrant
community in America began more than ten years ago. The initial effort was
influenced in part by the evidences available to the author of this dissertation
between mid-1980s and early 1990s. 1 Based on the fieldwork and available
evidences, it was possible then to develop and explain the criteria for understanding
the three models of the Nigerian immigrant community leadership under: The Ethnic
Conscious-Type Leadership, Elected-Type Leadership, and the Attorney-Type or
Representative-Type Professional Leadership.
Those three models of Nigerian leadership were explained in the context of
the carry-overs of the cultural traditions of the Nigerian homeland, as well as of the
influences of American institutions. I argued then that the Ethnic Conscious-Type
Leadership of Nigerians reflected the strong ethno-regional set-up of Nigerian
immigrants. While the Elected Type Leadership was an elected body of Nigerian
leadership—with a strong ethnic consciousness—
t
he Attorney or Representative
Professional-Type Leadership reflected the extent to which professional
classification enjoined some Nigerians with leadership responsibilities while the
diaspora.
3
'"The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 16-20.
2
Ibid.;pp. 125-137.
3
Ibid.
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What determined the direction of the professional leadership , in particular,
was the extent to which the American institutions influenced both the roles and
attitudes of its representation of Nigerians in the diaspora. 1 However, with the
recurrent changes over the past ten years, the Representative Professional-Type
Leadership (Attorney-Type Leadership) has been amended and appended to
accommodate the emergent role of Nigerian Physicians-Type Leadership
. Because
the physician leadership is one of the most established bases of Nigerians in
America, a more extensive explanation as well as evaluation of its historiography
and leadership role has to be noted in this dissertation.
There are of course varying forms of representative-type professional
leaderships of Nigerian immigrants. Such professional categories as academics,
industrial engineers, and accountants, for example, have several representative
bodies serving the interests of Nigerians in the diaspora. However, on the basis of
the research undertaken in the course of this dissertation, some of the professional
wings noted here did not meet the criteria employed in evaluating the Nigerian
immigrant community leadership. The extent therefore of their influences over their
less established wings was not as strong.
3
Generally speaking, even the more established bases of the representative
professional-type leaderships of Nigerian immigrants were not as stable as might
often seem. That they represented a measure of socioeconomic success within the
'ibid.
2Shoroye and Emeruwa, Directory of Nigerian Physicians. 1994 ; Sunmolu Beckley, et al.,
Directory of Nigerian Physicians in United States and Canada (1996), pp. 7-8, 142-3, 145-6,
152-169; Who's Who of Nigerian Doctors in United States and Canada 2000: Special
Millennium Edition,(2000), pp. xi-xx, 372-469.
3
Udofia, Research Report , pp. 39-40.
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American capitalist system was an unquestionable fact. But their status was often a
source of social and cultural stress among the less fortunate community brethren.
Then, the racial resentment operative within the Euro-American professional set-up
reinforced their instability. The fact that this class of Nigerians is in the high median
income bracket may not always guarantee strong influence over their less established
brethren.
1
By the late 1990s, however, the preceding evidences led to the decision to
re-examine the earlier models of the Nigerian immigrant community leadership. By
the early 2000s, for example, the Nigerian-American Youth organizations had
emerged as an important component of the Nigerian immigrant community, worth
understanding and examining as well as appending to the earlier models.
Accordingly, in responding to these newer settings, it was possible to re-
construct the leadership models of Nigerian immigrants as the unfolding of an
organic process in which the roles of women and the Nigerian youth were
increasingly becoming the dominant features of direction in the diaspora. The result
was two additional models of leadership: (1) Women-Type Leadership, and (2)
Nigerian-American Youth-Type Leadership. Despite some modification, there is
'For example, emphases made here are based on the fieldwork and examination of the
Nigerian-U.S.-based media, community records, and interviews, including some
understanding of Apraku's African Emigres , pp. 1-16. As shown earlier, since Nigerians
comprised the bulk of Apraku's major respondents (pp. 13-14, 41-6), it is conceivable that,
on the basis of their size, they also controlled the largest share of the median income
tabulated on African skilled professional class (pp. 1-9). The notes on "1991 30 Most
Outstanding Africans in U.S.," African Business Source (Dec/Jan., 1992); and Ogbaa, The
Nigerian Americans , pp. 137-167, and Authur, pp. 154-171, were also used as bases for
conceptualizing some portions of the conclusion reached in this section of the dissertation.
Yet, as I observed in 1996 (Research Report, pp. 39-40), for Nigerians—as for the larger
Black African skilled migrants in America—impressive economic status rarely resulted in
their strong attachment and cohesion within the brethrens' communities.
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basic persistent unity between the earlier and newer models. 1 Therefore, in
retrospect, the extent to which Nigerian immigrants succeeded in adjusting into the
American mosaic as newcomers was accelerated by how their varied leadership
models had served them within a specific as well as the general context.
Definitely, between the mid- 1980 and early 2000, five phases of leadership
models were visible within the Nigerian immigrant community, and still continue to
exist in their organizational features. They are: the Ethnic Conscious-type
Leadership, the Elected-type Leadership, the Nigerian Women-type Leadership,
Nigerian-American Youth-type Leadership, and the Representative or Professional-
type Leadership.
Ethnic Conscious-Type Leadership
The ethnic conscious-type leadership of Nigerians reflects a strong
consciousness of ethnic affiliations. It is made of community brethren who are the
senior members of the community. Usually charismatic, knowledgeable, and wise
about the traditional values of their people, ethnic conscious leaders are not always
democratically-elected in the familiar manner found among the larger ethno-regional
'This author has borrowed extensively from his earlier research in reconstructing the current
models of Nigerian leadership in America. See Udofia, "The Status of the Relationship with
African Americans," pp. 125-131.
2
Ibid., pp. 125-136; Research Report, pp. 22-38. For the leadership of Nigerian physicians,
see: Yinka Shoroye and Acho Emeruwa, eds., Directory of Nigerian Physicians in the United
States, 1994 (Riverside, California: The Nigerian Medical directory, 1994); Sunmolu
Beckley, Acho Emeruwa, and Yinka Shoroye, eds., Directory of Nigerian Physicians in
United States and Canada (Riverside, California: Association of Nigerian Physicians in the
Americas, 1996), pp. 7-8, 142-3, 145-6, 152-169: Who's Who of Nigerian Doctors in United
States and Canada 2000: Special Millennium Edition (Riverside, California: The Association
ofNigerian Physicians in the America, 2000), pp. xi-xx, 372-469.
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context of Nigerian immigrants. Within their much smaller enclaves, ethnic
conscious leaders are more operative on the basis of ethnic solidarity. Leadership
among Nigerians in this category is directly linked to a consciousness of the tribal
clansmen, or related ethno-regional affiliations. Yet, in the final analysis, leadership
in this class must at least reflect the interests of the clan members within the U.S. and
sometimes back in the homeland, depending on the scope of established power. But
where one looks at ethnic leadership from the standpoint of the broader consensual
agreement reached and accepted between related and unrelated ethnic memberships,
the form of traditional sets involved in the election or nomination of its
representation, would be mostly democratic. 1
Unsurprisingly, therefore, the process of choosing ethnic-conscious leaders
from a broader ethno-regional base is different from one involving a much smaller
tribal/ethnic base. Within the much smaller ethnic bases, the consent of the
community brethren is often in unison as well as in recognition of the mantle of
"elder" clansmen leadership. This background in turn explains why the ethnic-
conscious leaders from smaller bases are mostly to be the senior or elder members of
the community. Within the crossroad of their American sojourn, the idea of
democratic representation of Nigerians is as American as it is Nigerian in the socio-
cultural and organizational context of their collective well being and development.
'For example, ethnic-conscious leadership whose demographic composition incorporates
groups with tribal/ethno-regional variants, are most likely to be democratically elected. The
example ofAkwa-Ibom State Association, U.SA, Inc. shows how a specific ethnic-conscious
leadership—representing a vast ethno-regional zone with related but somewhat differing
dialects and tribal visions—can also hold its adherents together under democratic principles.
2
Ibid.
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The most important feature of ethnic-conseious leadership within a small
tribal enclave is that its nomination often takes place with the full "consent of the
clansmen." 1 The kind of democratic consultation which operates within this enclave
is often one in which the clansmen and their elder leaders are mostly in agreement on
matters concerning their collective well being within the U.S. or back in the Nigerian
homeland. The extent to which leadership in this class is elected is often determined
by how an ethnic base consults its existing structures. 2
But, as we hinted earlier, in circumstances, where there are broader lanes of
ethnic fusion with related native tongues, the traditional method of nominating
ethnic-conscious leadership is almost similar in its orientation to the same pattern
found in most modern institutions. Where such is the case, then, community
brethren who are supporters of ethnic leadership often adopt a written constitution,
with its articles of faith and by-laws, as the basis for electing leaders.
To a certain extent, the ideological circumference of ethnic-conscious
leadership of Nigerian immigrants is a consequence of sustained post-colonial
balkanization along ethnic lanes during the bulk of the military era.
4
Fortunately, in
the U.S., this crisis offers the opportunity for reconstructing the ethnic-conscious
'ibid.
2
Udofia, "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 127-8.
3
This is based on an examination of Akwa-Ibom State Association Profiles in the U.S. 1990-
2000. For example, in the "Minutes of the First National Council/Board of Directors
Meeting Held at La-Guardia Airport Marriott Hotel, Queens, New York, November 1
st
,
published in Akwa-Ibom State Association of Nigeria (USA). Inc.. National Secretariat
(New York, 1997), pp. 3-4, are explanations which are supportive of this reference. Also,
another article by Engineer Sonny D. Abia entitled, "A Case for constitutional Amendment,"
in Mbuk Akwa-Ibom State: National News Letter of Akwa-Ibom State Association of
Nigeria. U.S.A.. Inc. (New York: New York, Summer 1998), p. 9, calls on member-brethren
to amend a standing constitution of an ethnic-conscious leadership embracing diverse but
historically and politically related ethnic tongues.
4
See, for example, Chapter 3, especially Figure 6.2 and Table 9.
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leadership under democratically elected platforms, serving broader ethno-regional
constituents. Nigerians from such regions as Oyo State, Kwara State, Akwa Ibom
State, Abia State, Ogun State, Plateau state, Niger State, and Bauchi State, Anambara
State Association, Ogun State Association, Cross River State, and the Bendel State,
can only uphold their collective national interests in the diaspora through
democratically elected body of ethnic leadership. 1
Admittedly, within the American setting, the Akwa Ibom State Association
of Nigeria has been able to exhibit one of the best evidences of democratic
representation of diverse ethnic groups under an ethnic-conscious type leadership of
Nigerian immigrants. The ethnic leadership wing of the Akwa-Ibom indigenes may
be said to have evolved the most advanced features of democratic rotation of power
of any ethnic leadership groups of Nigerians currently in the diaspora. Despite
varying odds, this leadership body has managed to rotate its national seat among
member states over the many decades of sojourn across the American landscapes.
To the Akwa-Ibom national leadership belongs the credit for instituting
yearly democratic colloquium aimed at unifying and seeking new directions among
its varied member-affiliates in mainland North America. This medium not only
assembles member-affiliates of Akwa-Ibom Association, USA, Inc., side by side
with the traditional features of their ethnic communities from all dialects of the
region, but often serves as a bridge in facilitating collective deliberations on their
cultural, educational, economic, and political well being. Through this forum Akwa-
Ibomites in chosen urban centers of the U.S. have been able to reveal the extent to
"Ibid.
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which their inter-ethnic based democracy is inextricable linked to the influences of
American institutions. For, although ironically, their organizational umbrella has all
the major features of ethnic-conscious leadership, the functional and institutional
mechanisms of Akwa-Ibomites in America are deeply rooted in democratic
traditions. Their institutional transformation can be traced to the effort to both blend
their diverse ethno-regional lanes in the diaspora as well as to the effects of
American institutions. 1
Despite some occasional crises,
2
the annual colloquium of the Akwa-
Ibomites testifies to the systemic evolution of democratic consciousness among their
varied ethnic clusters in urban America. Besides, providing the basis for gauging
how American cultures are impacting on the values of a specific ethnic base of
Nigerian immigrants, its colloquium reveals the larger development of the Akwa-
Ibomites, their internal struggles for power, their corresponding crises in the
diaspora, and their larger relationships while in the diaspora with the Nigerian
nation.
The preceding then means that the larger the ethnic base of an ethnic-
conscious leadership of Nigerian immigrants, the greater the imperative for
democratically established framework. The example of Akwa-Ibom State
'"Akwa Ibom State Extravaganza-National Presidency Goes to California," Nigerian News
Digest (September 6, 1991) p. 14. In 1993, their national seat was at Oregon; in 1994 it was
at Philadelphia—having already been in Houston, Atlanta, and Washington, DC, for
example. Also see "Mbuk Akwa Ibom," Newsletter of Akwa Ibom State Association of
Nigeria U.S.A.. Inc. (Philadelphia, Fall 1993), pp. 1-6.
2
Ibid. There have been some worrisome attitudes of power conflict and ethnic rivalries
within the leadership and the membership of the Akwa-Ibom, U.S. A., Inc. However, these
squabbles rarely affected effective the transfers of power from one state to another, nor the
understanding to organize in the general interest of its adherents in the diaspora, etc.
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Association, USA, 1 shows that it is not unusual for ethnic-based leaders to embody
the real gem of democratic leadership. This is especially the case, when the
institutional functionaries of ethnic leadership have to combine both the aspirations
of the smaller as well as of the larger ethnic branches into their administrative
functions. Also, other related functionaries include striving to protect the national
status of its ethnic affiliates in the diaspora, supporting missions of developing the
homeland, and representing the Akwa-Ibomites among the varied branches of
Nigerian immigrants. 2
But whether democratically elected, or chosen in accordance with existing
traditional norms, ethnic-conscious leaders are very effective within their specific
group as well as the larger ethno-regional sectors. If there is no rightful ethnic figure
within the much smaller base to rally his clansmen together, or a qualified choice is
not readily available, the role can be assumed through consultations with clan folks. 3
It would be very risky to assume the role of ethnic leadership without the
consent of the clansmen. Group solidarity among Nigerians is much stronger at their
much smaller and broader ethno-regional levels than in the much wider context of
their national relationships. Examples of smaller ethnic-conscious leaders are those
headed by such associations of Nigerian immigrants as the Ikwauno/Umuahia
'Cited from "National Convention Update August 7-9, 1998," and its Editorial entitled
"Honoring Statesmanship," in Mbuk Akwa-lbom State: National News Letter of Akwa-Ibom
State Association of Nigeria, U.S.A., Inc. (New York: New York, Summer 1998), pp. 1-2;
"Dr. Augustine B. Usoro, National Executive President, Akwa-Ibom State Assoc. of Nigeria
(USA) Inc. [and the] 13th Annual National Convention and Cultural Extravaganza," in
Akwa-Ibom State Association of Nigeria (Houston, Texas, August 2000).
2
Research Report , p. 34.
3
Udofia, "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 126-7.
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Association of Dallas, Mbaise Family Association, Ubiom Social Group, and the
Oron Development Union, Oduduwa Club. 1
So, unsurprisingly, within the larger ethno-regional context
—
particularly
where the varied interests of the related ethnic groups converge—both the much
limited and broader lanes of an ethnic-type leadership of Nigerian immigrants often
assemble through democratic processes in examining relevant issues. Thus, efforts
to direct ethnic clansmen on the larger issues of traditional values, regional well-
being, and the larger national well being are the very imperatives which make the
ethnic-based leaders circumspect to a composite democratic assemblage, markedly
dissimilar from the much limited community-clansmen-type. It seems to be this
strong ethnical cleavage along petty "Multi-Statal" lines, as Kwame Ahoofa, Jr.,
argues,
2
which justifies both the balkanization as well as the elective contest of
ethnic-based leadership of Nigerian immigrants in urban America.
Seen against the aforementioned context, ethnic-conscious leadership often
has the task of fashioning its roles in as a democratic a manner as will include all the
inter-related groups within a region(s). Whether through the much smaller
nomination forums by ethnic clansmen, or larger ethno-regional elective
representation, ethnic conscious-type leadership has proven effective in directing its
affiliates within both the specific clansmen's enclaves as well as wider geographical
lanes.
3
'ibid. Also, see explanation in the "Regional Distribution" of Nigerians in Chapter 3 of this
dissertation, especially Table 15; and Table 16.1, Chapter 4.
2Kwame Ahoofa, Jr., Nigerian News Digest Vol. 2, No. 45 (Charlotte, North Carolina,
December 20, 1991), pp. 20 and 22
3
Udofia, Research Report , p. 34.
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The official duties of the ethnic conscious leaders include being able to direct
their tribal or larger ethno-regional folks on the requirements of their tradition while
in a foreign land. As pivotal traditional links to the needs of their ethnic community,
these leaders serve as immediate rallying centers and support transfers in times of
crisis. Among Nigerians in this class are those who are highly educated and who are
in good standing within their clansmen communities; some of whom are addressed
by the official title of "chief." 1 Depending on the traditional set-up of a given
community, ethnic-based leadership often reflects the brunt of a carry-over of
tradition from the homeland. Among leaders in this class are those who would have
been made "chiefs" even if they were not in the U.S. Leaving their native
communities for further studies in America does not abrogate being recalled home to
assume traditional responsibilities. If they are in the U.S., their presence becomes an
asset to those who recognize and rely on them. Some Nigerians in this class have
had to step down from academia to take their rightful titles as traditional rulers back
home.2
At this point, however, an explanation may suffice as to why the ethnic-
conscious leadership is a powerful mechanism of Nigerian immigrants. First, as
indicated in the preceding pages, Nigerians are strongly aligned along their ethno-
regional lanes. This means that their approximation to one another, that is—as to
language, cultures and traditional customs, compounds a much-needed sense of trust
'See, for example, The Good Hope News The African Perspective (Dallas Texas: Good
Hope Publishers, July, 1991), p. 1; and "Events and Banquet," African Business Source
(Houston Texas, 1990), p. 21.
2
"Nigerian Professor Turned King," Nigerian News Digest (Ashville, North Carolina,
January 31, 1991), pp 1-14.
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not readily evident in their spurious national center. Second, by itself, the essence of
ethnic-conscious leadership reflects the real brunt of the historical crisis of sub-
nationalism back in Nigeria and among American-based Nigerians. The
consciousness of the ethnic kinfolks as well as the hegemonization of regional power
at the center is the major carrier of the ethnic-conscious leadership. Because ethnic
leadership has a strong attachment to a consciousness of the clansmen, tribe or
ethnicity, in the final analysis, its role must, at least, reflect the consent of the clan
members within the U.S. and sometimes back in the homeland—depending on the
scope of established national power. 1 One sees also from this complex setting that
without any concise line of national community, the soul of the country is bound to
become exhausted through the gruesome journey from specific ethnic enclaves to the
larger ethnic regions and to the national center.
Fortunately, some of the specificities of how the ethnic conscious-type
leadership of Nigerian immigrants is nominated have the merit of defeating the
inherent ambiguities of the "tyranny of the majority."
3
Alexis de Tocqueville, the
discerning French social scientist, found more than a hundred and sixty years ago
that the often irreconcilable "tyranny" of the dominant majority were identifiable
features of crisis in American democracy. According to Tocqueville, the power of
ultimate common good among Americans rested on the attitude of the majority, and
out of their foibles the democratic process was most likely to be constrained.
4
'The ethnic-conscious leaders are more often seen operating on the basis of their tribal and
ethnic solidarity in the U.S.
2
Research Report , p. 33.
3
Tocqueville, Democracy in America, p. 263.
4
Ibid.; pp. 264-86,271.
Nonetheless, how the Tocquevillean thesis might explain itself within an
ethnic conscious-type setting of Nigerian immigrants can be far more dangerous for
its adherents. First, ethnic conscious-type leadership of Nigerian immigrants
operates within a divisive national setting. Second, not every Nigerian understands
that the problem of ethno-regionalism has a subtle effect on how they perceive
matters of national governance. The function of inter-ethnic loyalties within the
larger national well being continues to serve as the basis of crisis among Nigerians in
America and back in the homeland. Third, while the wisdom of ethnic-conscious
leaders is commendable, their enclaves are where Nigerians become entrenched in a
worrisome pattern of national behavior. Their ethnic enclaves are where they are
likely to be drawn into national bickering, which in turn affect their collective unity. 1
Elected-Type Leadership
In contrast to the ethnic-type leadership, the elected-type leadership of
Nigerian immigrants is operationally an elected body of Nigerian immigrants with
some Nigerian national outlook at the core. Unlike the ethnic-conscious leadership,
elected-type leadership
—
just as its name suggests—is more likely to rely on a
working constitution in articulating the aspirations of its members. Like the ethnic-
conscious leadership, however, the very fact of cultural and regional diversity of
Nigerians creates a composite climate for inter-group and intra-group conflict and
coalition for the alternately aspiring democratic tenet of leadership. Examples of the
elected-type leadership are heads of the Nigerian organizations such as: the Nigerian
'
Research Report
,
p. 33.
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Foundation, Association of Nigerian Professionals, the organization of Nigerian
Professionals, etc.
1
At the very least, however, the elected-type leadership of Nigerian
immigrants is more definitive. This is particularly the case in terms of the duration
of time required for service. The National President of a given chapter is expected to
serve for two years or so before contesting for re-election.2
Sometimes, moreover, the presidential seats of the national chapters are in
rotation, depending on the democratic machinery. Governing officers who are not
trustworthy in the eyes of their electorates either voluntarily resign at the end of their
tenure, or are expected to face rigorous re-election contests by presumably more
trustworthy class of freshmen brethren. As often is the case during these changes,
particularly where the leadership machineries of the national chapters are not well
structured, the peripheral or marginalized ethnic groups/units often respond by
breaking apart to form independent associations. This might very well explain why
there are varying ramifications of national chapters claiming to serve the interests of
Nigerian immigrants. This is also the central dilemma confronting Nigerian
organizations with elected-type leadership in the U.S. Despite this problem some
elected bodies of Nigerians have records of effective democratic leadership based on
smooth rotation of power.
3
'Udofia, "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," p. 128. Significantly,
because of the absence of precise lanes of national unity among Nigerians, Elected Type
Leadership of Nigerians also exudes with vivid ethnic consciousness in its broader basis of
collective leadership. Also, see Tables 9 and 15.
2
Ibid.
3
Udofia, "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," p. 129; and Research
Report, p. 35.
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The elected-type leadership of Nigerians might be said to operative in two
contexts. First, its regional affiliates have a body of elected representation, who
uphold the varying regional duties of its memberships. Second, the ultimate
accountability of the powers of functional authorities is embedded in the national
headquarters, and with an elected President. Depending on how the center is
structured, the national chapters oversee the other regional bodies and keep records
of events. Aside from the complex coordination of activities under the elected-type
leadership, both the local and—indeed, all its regional affiliates and auxiliaries—are
to actively support the national chapters.
Within the U.S., elected-type leadership of Nigerian immigrants is a most
likely class with an institutional umbrella that strives to oversee as well as to serve
the functional role of spokesman of Nigerians. This is also the class of leadership
charged with the responsibility of catering to the varied interests of Nigerian
immigrants locally, regionally, nationally, and internationally. Almost similar to the
"attorney or representative-type leadership," elected-type leadership is a most likely
body of Nigerian immigrants re-directing the concerns of Nigerians to the Nigerian
Consulates and American Government, and reporting back to the masses via the
Nigerian community forums and media. In this way, the elected-type leadership
embodies the diverse interests of the electorates it represents, etc
1
.
Qualification for state and national levels of elected-type leadership requires
an ability to connect with the wider spectrum of differing ethnic structures,
especially those of the peripheral minorities. The elected-type leadership blends
'ibid., p. 130; Research Report , p. 36.
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with a deep consciousness of class; sometimes this consciousness is a source of
conflict for those who are not well connected. 1 This does not mean, however, that an
elected type-leadership cannot involve ordinary branches of Nigerian immigrants.
The emphasis is that success requires a substantial degree of organizational activism
and grassroots mobilization of community brethren during elections.2 Ultimately,
stronger inter-ethnic solidarity among Nigerians at their immediate and larger ethno-
regional settings and conflict at their intra-ethno-regional and national levels, are
important for understanding their patterns of continuing national crisis in America. 3
Women-Type Leadership
By mid-1980s, such cities as Atlanta, Houston, New York, Los Angeles, and
Washington, D.C., for example, were the major enclaves where a much smaller
representation of the Nigerian women organizations once under the male-based
leadership, particularly during the 1970s, were being transformed. This development
marked as well the beginning of more identifiable forms of women-type leadership
within the Nigerian immigrant community. First begun as forums for shared
collaboration among married and unmarried female spouses, it became a forum to
'in examining the attitude of Nigerian immigrants in their community media, class
conflict—if not ethnic/tribal differences—were often the likely sources of misunderstanding.
See Richard O. Nwachukwu, "The JD Question?" The Good Hope News: The African
Perspective (November, 1990), p. 13; Lai Adelagun, "Crisis Rocks the Nigerian Foundation .
. Aftermath of Akeem Roast and Toast," African Business Source Magazine (March,
1991), PP. 26-7.
2
Ibid. My attendances at the Nigerian meetings and examination of their election
machineries are supportive of this view. For instance, during these attendances, I often
noticed that, in a situation in which a Nigerian from the common folks was elected head of
his state or national body, he must have had traits of vast talents and related successes to
warrant acceptance by those from the dominant ethnic bases. Or elsewhere, he would have
been able to mobilize sufficient support, especially among related or unrelated ethnic
minorities to upset the buffer of the autonomous ethnies during election campaigns.
3
Ibid.
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weld and reconcile their differences and interests. Later, however, with increased
palaver within the community, the women role began to take the form of weekly and
monthly gatherings, ultimately becoming the basis for sustained deliberation.
The result was the emergence of organized forums with concerns over issues
that affected Nigerian women within a specific as well as a broader context. Thus
was born a distinct independent organization of Nigerian women leadership. This
birth—in every sense—released the Nigerian women in the diaspora from the
domination of the male-based leadership. Besides, it set them onto a course of
liberation that was somewhat oppositional to their male counterparts. This also
marked the beginning of a strong deviation from the experiences of the much earlier
decades of their American sojourn. For example, the 1960s and 1970s were decades
of much loyalty between the Nigerian female and their male spouses in America. 1
Authur, who examines the general background of the black African women
migrants,
2
also supports the strong socio-cultural context of the Nigerian women-
type leadership. Nevertheless, Authur does not explain any clearly why the socio-
'For example, the emphases by Ndubuike, The Struggles. Challenges, and Triumphs , pp. 79-
80, 93-4, are equally suggestive of the conflict resulting in the founding of independent
women associations. However, this trend was more typical of the 1980s and 1990s than
during the 1960s and 1970s. Authur's Invisible Sojourners , pp. 110-113, also mirrors this
same background within the general context of the black African women migrants. While
his emphases are supportive of the context of the Nigerian women-type leadership discussed
thus far, my concern is that some of the emphases should have been more clearly linked. We
need to understand why the socio-cultural features of the black African female migrants
seem to be more effective than those of their male counterparts. We should also be made to
appreciate why the socio-cultural bonding between the black African female migrants and
black American women was stronger than that of their men (Authur, pp. 120-121). These are
important issues worth clearer explanation than Author's exposition allows (Ibid.).
However, in the particular reference to the "Nigerian Women leadership," it is my
understanding that the differences in their transformation are due more to the changes from
one historical era to the other. I shall return again to this point in Chapter 5.
2
Ibid., Authur.
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cultural features of the black African women migrants seem more effective than
those of their male counterparts. Nor, moreover, does he explain the underlying
socio-cultural context that lures the black African female migrants toward sustained
partnerships with their black American women counterparts than their male. 1
Unlike their male counterparts, the ideological basis of the women-type
leadership cannot be said to be clearly democratic. This is the case because its
orientation rarely reflects the vigorous inter-ethnic democratic contest operative
within the male leadership cycle. 2 Similar to ethnic-type leadership, the women-type
leadership is a carried over of the homeland traditions. For example, the women
leadership is in a position to initiate for women entering child-bearing ages and
adulthood the expectation of proactive roles in their familial, as well as the larger
communal issues.
Like the ethnic-type leadership, moreover, the women-type leadership of
Nigerians—whether elected or nominated—is often based on a generally agreed
community norms capable of bonding its adherents together. This means that
election/nomination process is more likely to be based on what a majority of women
mutually agree to represent their collective interest. In their written constitutions,
moderation of function toward contested election protocols informs the ideological
basis of women leadership. The modalities governing how the varied women offices
are assigned can therefore adapt to democratic or undemocratic settings, depending
'Ibid.
2
For example, what we saw under the Ethnic Conscious-Type and Elected-Type Leadership
of Nigerian immigrants can be described as largely a contest involving their male-based
leaderships. The infusion of female leadership within the male-based leadership branches of
Nigerians does not necessarily mean that there is a strong-bonding and agreeable ideology of
collective direction between them.
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on how the internal structures of the pre-existing leadership envisions the realization
of its objectives/goals. Thus, of all the varying types of the Nigerian leadership
models in America, the women-type leadership is more goal-oriented and hence far
less inclined toward such a complex contest as often occurs in the leadership
functionaries of their male counterparts. 1
By downplaying the class status that affects male leadership, the women-type
leadership is more able to triumph over some impediments in getting some things
done. This background may very well explain—why, unlike the male dominated
ethnic-leadership—the women-type leadership of Nigerian immigrants reflects a
vibrant spirit of an intense and internally explicit collaboration. For, among its
membership, ethnic differences are not strong basis for collective unison in
achieving some sets of organizationally sanctioned objectives.
Indeed, the women leadership is quite versatile and capable of achieving sets
of collective objectives among its varied adherents without necessarily
overstretching hotly complex socio-cultural issues. This has allowed for internal
cohesion than differences.
Not only are the functions of the women-type leadership of Nigerian
immigrants multifaceted, in fact, they often yield remarkable results compared to
those of the male counterparts. Just as back in Nigeria, so in America married or
unmarried women or those previously married, have convened in the interest of both
their immediate families as well as the larger community to play multiple roles.
'The reference is based on examination of Nigerian/African women leadership profiles as
well as on interviews in Houston, Dallas, and Atlanta between 1992 and 2005.
2
This is based on my interview with Ufot of 49 F.M. Radio Free Georgia, July 2005.
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The daily routines of the Nigerian women-type leaders involve them as
workers in more than two jobs. In most instances, they are also house wives, child
bearers, and nurturers within their families; in other cases, even head of the family
households. 1 Thus, in coming together to build their identity in America, adherents
of the Nigerian women leadership seek to foster a safe-haven for child rearing issues,
marital ceremonies and sessions with marital problems, rites of passage for the
Nigerian-American youth, naming ceremonies, and collective support for its varying
memberships as well as the larger community. 2
The strongest feature of the women-type leadership is its influences on, as
well as, continuing assistance in the evolution of the Nigerian-American youth
leadership. This is likely to be its strongest legacy in America: in examining the
Nigerian youth profiles in America, the influences of the women leadership—as
mothers—were found to be very strong. This is not to deny the role of males
parents—but to admit of stronger influences where found. This success is more
remarkable in that, in the process of seeking to cater to its mission, especially to the
welfare of their offspring, its varying memberships have become transformed.
Besides, the role of the women leadership is strongest on issues of
programmatic development, which involves married and unmarried women who are
socially and economically handicapped. Also, its role involves funding scholarship
programs for financially handicapped persons back in the Nigerian homeland. Too,
'This is in reference to the multiple roles played by the Nigerian/African women. More
Nigerian women are working and are redefining their roles within the American cultures
(Authur, Invisible Sojourners , pp. 1 17-124).
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid. For example, in the "A'Ibom State Youth Assoc. Progress Report," in Mbuk Akwa-
Ibom (1998), p. 10, the influences of the women leadership are much stronger.
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its voices are increasingly being heard on other important areas of ventures of human
development in America and the homeland. 1
The general socio-cultural crises of black males in America have
corresponding effects on the status of African-male dominated leadership in
America. Probably the enormous crises of this experience have further exacerbated
the rift between the Nigerian women leadership and its male counterparts in
America. One such rift is that the pressing demand of daily life in the diaspora has
transformed the traditional feature of the Nigerian women leadership beyond the
level compatible with harmonious relationship under its male-led leadership. What
constitutes the Nigerian women-type leadership is the deflection of sustained conflict
of male chauvinism. If it is partly the result of American cultural influence, this is
not exceedingly different from its much earlier features back in the homeland.
For all of the preceding reasons, the women-type leadership contrasts sharply
with its male counterparts, both in its principles of democratic leadership as well as
in its approach toward functional priorities. Its adherents are more likely to be heard
saying, "we don't want long talk, we know what we're going to do and we're going
to do it . . . and this is how we're going to go about it."
3
But this emphasis does not
mean that sincerity toward achieving honest objectives within the community is the
same as adopting reasoned processes and approaches, as well as tested principles.
While this approach enables the women leaders to overcome the intense class
'"Because of You... We Made a Difference," Nigerian Women Association of Georgia
fNWAG): Beacon 100 Campaign 2004 (Atlanta, Georgia 30324, 2004).
2Mfon Ufot," Leadership in the African Immigrant Community: Conflict and Coalition,"
Trotter Review , p. 36.
interview with Ms Mfon Ufot of 49 F.M Radio Free Georgia, July 2005.
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struggle and bickering characteristic of their male counterparts, it is rarely the
medium for solid resolution of the complex questions of inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic
difference confronting most Nigerian institutions in the diaspora. 1
Ufot, who essayed the functions and conflict in the African leadership
structures, argues that African women were more effective as leaders than their men.
"Since African women sometimes marry outside of their native tribes, they do not
have such strong and unyielding loyalty to those tribes or ethnic groups as most men
do." According to Ufot, moreover, because some women are married outside their
tribes and the wider ethno-regional lanes, they tended "to be more open-minded in
discussing issues that affect the entire African immigrant community and not solely
their individual tribes."
So, as Ufot suggests, it is clear that the Nigerian women leadership contrasts
sharply with its male counterpart, largely due to incessant cases of ethnic squabbles.
Sometimes, for months or even years, the male-based forums were locales for
aimless debates and inactions in seeking to achieve common goals. Unlike its male
counterparts, therefore, the women leadership is informed mostly through the
gathering of opinions and implementations of agreements based on compromise
rather than complex debates. This, again, confirms that the women-type leadership
is more likely to avoid such issues as ethnic tensions and class pandering than the
male-type leadership of Nigerians.
'ibid. My interview with Ms. Ufot did not result in a clear insight as to how the particular
crises of ethnic differences of Nigerians in America could be resolved by the women-type
leadership. However, it did suggest that the women forums had some better grasp.
2Mfon Ufot," Leadership in the African Immigrant Community: Conflict and Coalition," in
Trotter Review, p. 36.
3
Ibid.
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Thus, the women leadership of Nigerian immigrants has achieved some
measure of positive results commensurate with their vision and style. But, as we
hinted earlier, it does seem that it is the socio-cultural imperatives of American
civilization that have placed them in a more effective leadership status over their
men. In such major cities as Philadelphia, Los Angeles, Washington, D.C., Dallas,
Houston, Atlanta, and New York, Nigerian women leaders are reportedly more
effective than their male counterparts in re-adapting themselves to the varied needs
of their young and unstable communities.
The Nigerian-American Youth-Type Leadership
Between the late- 1980s and early 1990s, the ideological basis of the
Nigerian-American youth-type leadership had already begun to identify itself within
the Nigerian immigrant community. 1 Again, this development was especially
stronger in such cities as Atlanta, Dallas, Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, New
York, and Houston. Unlike the other branches of the Nigerian immigrant leadership,
the Nigerian-American youth-type leadership—comprises mostly the offspring of
Nigerians, who are either American-born or Nigerian-born. This means that most of
its adherents were either born in America or in Nigeria. It also means that their grasp
on the cultures of the Nigerian homeland is pretty weak even for those born in
Nigeria. This is particularly evident where their parents had exposed them to a
greater degree of Western influences than those of the Nigerian background.
'This based on an exploratory interview with Mfon Ufot, August 28, 1999; and July 3, 2005.
2
Ibid.; also, see, for example, Ndubuike, The Struggle. Challenges, and Triumphs , p. 81;
Gordon, Nigeria's Diverse Peoples , pp. 237-241.
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There is no doubt that the youth-type leadership of Nigerians represents the
most distinctive model of the Nigerian immigrant community leadership in the
diaspora. This is because its consciousness of the Nigerian-African heritage is
markedly dissimilar from that of their core migrant-parents. Given the growing
deterioration of life in the Nigerian homeland, the connection between adherents of
the Nigerian youth leadership and the homeland is more favorable to America. Also,
in some instances their cultural connection is likely to be less orientated toward their
parents. Despite this fact, however, this wing of the Nigerian immigrant leadership
has the strongest bridge between America and Africa, and represents as well the
strongest arm of ancestral relationship with the descendants of slaves. 1
By agreeing to come together to re-orient their American experiences to those
of the traditions of the Nigerian homeland, adherents of the Nigerian youth
leadership are better able to adapt themselves and their "skills to negotiate the
treacherous waters of the two cultures."
2
Thus, the youth-type leadership of
Nigerians was created as a response to the conflicting socio-cultural milieu of
Nigerians in a foreign land. As such, it was an attempt to secure a more stable
cultural foothold for the descendants of voluntary post-colonial African settlers in
America. Behind this objective was also the aim of helping the Nigerian offspring in
the diaspora to blend their inter-generational experiences along with their varying
cultural backgrounds.
The foundation of the youth-type leadership of Nigerian immigrants owes a
greater part of its origin to the support of the women-type leadership. The emphasis
'
Trotter Review , p. 33.
2
Ibid.;Udofia, Trotter Review , p. 36.
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on "women leadership" in no part denies the role of its male counterpart in the
evolution of the youth leadership. The emphasis, however, takes into consideration
that, in a greater part of their maturity from puberty to adolescents, the women as
mothers, have had more direct contacts with the activities of the Nigerian youth in
the diaspora.
Indeed, the role of women who are mothers and child-bearers follows a
similar pattern as the inspirers of the youth movements in America. Together, with
the support of their males, the women leaders have been able to transform the youth
leadership into an arm of the Nigerian homeland development. 1
The age group required for the youth leadership varies from seven to thirty-
five. However, each age group adopts itself and its mission to reflect the required
variant in experience as well as membership. For example, those in the much
younger ages are made aware of who they are and where their parents came from;
moreover, they are made to learn about the traditions of the Nigerian homeland
among their social peers.
This form of internally generated attempt to sustain the consciousness of the
Nigerian youth about the homeland among the faithful adherents of the youth-type
leadership seems to have been helpful to the survival of Nigerian cultural values in
the diaspora. Adherents of the youth-type leadership not only act as the gatekeepers,
'For example, some portion of Authur's Invisible Sojourners , pp. 110-115, has been adopted
to explain the Nigerian settings albeit in modified form in areas supported by my fieldwork.
For instance, as already indicated, despite the important influences of the black African
women migrants—especially as mothers in shaping the direction of their offspring in the
diaspora—their success cannot be separated in some instances from the efforts of their male
counterparts,
interview with Ufot.
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but are also expected to re-orient themselves in accordance with the cultural values
of their parents and those of the African homelands. 1 At another layer of the youth-
type leadership is the age group striving to re-adapt itself to African songs, music,
dances, and proverbs. Others are involved in passing Africa's socio-cultural features
among themselves for shared keeping and memorization about the homelands. On
the other hand, however, others are being made to learn about important personages
in Nigerian cultures and history. 2
Through the medium of the youth leadership, Nigerian cultural revivals have
been assembled, recreated, and re-enacted and displayed for American audience.
Such places as Emory University, in Atlanta, King's Center, Atlanta, Houston,
Washington, D.C., and Los Angeles, have been homes to the varied forms of cultural
entertainments exhibited by the Nigerian youth.
Nigerian youth leaders whose adherents fall under the more concise age lines
of 25-35 years are among those currently in a position to voluntarily re-channel their
professional resources back to the Nigerian homeland. They are also among those
willing to re-position themselves as well as their professional training toward the
course of assisting human development back in the Nigerian homeland. This group
includes professionals who are concerned about the increased deterioration of the
image of their homeland as depicted by the American media, who are striving to
leave their legacy as helpers back in the homelands.
4
'ibid.
2
Ibid.; also, see Ndubuike, The Struggles. Challenges, and Triumphs , p. 58; Gordon,
Nigeria's Diverse Peoples , p. 238.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
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Representative Professional-Type Leadership:
Attorney-Type Leadership
As earlier stated, attorney-type representative-professional leadership of
Nigerian immigrants is not a democratically elected body. The idea is based more on
the professional representation as well as the functionaries of American institutional
mechanisms. These features in turn fit directly into the domain of a particular
training and a particular practice, which enable Nigerian attorneys to function as
representative class of leaders in the diaspora.
Thus, the attorney representative-type professional leadership of Nigerian
immigrants might be said to be both independent of elected branches of Nigerian
leadership as well as closely linked. While this wing of leadership is made of legal
professionals, yet, its functionaries are truly representative where it chooses to serve
in the interests of the brethren's communities. The legal wing of the Nigerian
leadership provides a clearer parameter for understanding the brand of professionals
who have substantial contextual leverage on Nigerian immigrants. While they may
not always be democratically elected, however, as attorneys and as representatives of
their brethren, their role as spokesmen is inevitable. But since most are active
members in other branches of Nigerian organizations with elected status, their
official status as professional representatives of their brethren is recognizable. What
therefore determines direction in the representative leadership of Nigerian attorneys
is their credibility within the Nigerian immigrant communities.
There are some fundamental reasons for the pre-eminence of attorney-type
professional leadership in the Nigerian immigrant communities in America. The
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characteristics of American institutional mechanisms strongly suggest that Nigerian
immigrants are more likely to be influenced by the legal wing of their native trained
professionals. The American racism that confronts Nigerians, along with their image
crisis,
1
often provides the battle lines for the Nigerian attorneys. Even before most
of them were able to pass the rigorous board examination, their involvement with
their brethrens' communities provided the necessary practical orientation and
experience for the profession.
Becoming certified and practicing professionals meant that Nigerian
attorneys were in a position to take up the fullest load of defending their young
communities from the negative image crises that often confronted them. They are
often the liaisons with Nigerian consulates in Washington, D.C., or in Atlanta on
how to explore an end to the crisis facing Nigerians in America. They are those who
speak more clearly to the American media about the socio-cultural experiences of
their brethren because they understand the American legal and the judiciary process.
By actively supporting their brethren-communities in court cases, these
Nigerian attorneys reap the reward in their socioeconomic status and hence are better
able to compete as well as to sustain their interests on a professional level.
3
If
Nigerian immigrants are to be effective participants in the American mosaic, and are
'"Prejudice at Comerica Bank," The Good Hope News: African Perspective (Dallas-Texas,
July, 1991), p.6. Also, see earlier notes on Nigerian image crises in this chapter.
2
"Nigerian Ambassador to Try to Ease Tensions in Visit Here," Houston Chronicle
(Houston, Texas, March 17, 1989), p. 19a; Onukegen Nwachukwu, "Preying on the Weak:
KXAS TV Zeroes in on Nigerians," The Good Hope News: The African Perspective
(Dallas-Texas, Nov./Dec, 1991), pp. 1-11; Norman Martin's, "Nigerian Image," Houston
Chronicle (February 9, 1992); "African Bar-Association Formed," African News Digest
(Charlotte, North Carolina, March 3, 1993), p. 1.
3
Research Report , p. 37.
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to develop the kinds of institutional mechanisms that other foreign-born ethnic
groups have developed, they need strong legal expertise and representation. Indeed,
Nigerian attorneys are foremost in the effort to carve out investment structures to
enhance economic growth and intra-cultural networking through such notable
organizations as the Nigerian Foundation and the Nigerian-African chambers of
Commerce. 1
Although the income status of Nigerian attorneys is not very easy to gauge,
some have won cases in the millions. Related evidences suggest that others have
done quite well. 2 There is reason to expect limited financial security among
Nigerian legal practitioners than among Whites, Asians, and African-Americans.
Certainly the color line crisis of the American world is one factor. Besides this, the
duration of professional stability in a stratified society, accounts for their
disadvantage as a foreign-born group. Though some Nigerian attorneys have
American clients, the market is polarized by an ambivalent cultural split, and by
competition.
3
This development, in turn, expresses itself in the contextual alienation
of the Nigerian attorneys, resulting in the attachment to their brethren's communities
for economic survival.
Unlike their American counterparts, some Nigerian attorneys are addressed
by the title of a "Doctor:" this is in accordance to the official insignia of "Doctor of
Jurisprudence" degree awarded them. Between the Nigerian "Juris doctors" and
'Chido Nwangwu, "Chamber of Commerce: Strategy for the 1990s," African Business
Source Magazine (Houston-Texas, April, 1991), pp. 30-1, 35.
2
"Dr. Oji speaks at the African Chamber of Commerce," The Good Hope News: African
Perspective (Dallas-Texas, August, 1991), p. 4; "Walter Oji: Connecting Law and Business,"
African Business Source Magazine (Houston-Texas, April, 1991), p. 34.
3
See, for example, my earlier notes on Nigerian attorneys.
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academic doctorates, there is a tilt of socio-cultural consciousness on the basis of
class differences. 1 This development may not be surprising to anyone who
understands the class cultures of Nigerians. Since most Nigerian attorneys had
doctorate degrees—even before undertaking legal study2—they see nothing wrong
for being called anything less that their academic worth. However, the irony is that,
Nigerians who subscribe to the more prestigious but less title-conscious name of
"attorney," are reportedly more able to woo their brethren as clients: that is, they can
connect at a level more acceptable to the professionally less-established community
brethren.
The Nigerian Physician-Type Leadership in America:
A Historical Review
Given the nature of its mission, the physician-type leadership of Nigerian
immigrants embodies some form of elected representation of leaders into key
functionaries both in the diaspora and back in the homeland. Nevertheless, the
extent to which this form of representation is adopted into organizational
functionaries is rarely seriously contested, compared to the scale found either in the
elected-type leadership or the elected wing of an ethnic conscious-type leadership of
Nigerian immigrants.
4 As one of the most economically established representative-
'ibid., including "The J.D. Question?" The Good Hope News , (November, 1990).
2
This based on examination of the Nigerian professional establishments who wrote or
advertised on the Nigerian community media.
3An interview with a Nigerian attorney in Houston, Texas (April 1993), led me to the
conclusion that their attorneys (like the gentleman interviewed), who were less title-
conscious, were also more able to connect successfully with their brethren as clients than
those who sought to emphasize their status as "Dr." But it must be noted here that even "this
attorney" did not see anything wrong among his colleagues who chose to address themselves
under the title of "Dr." According to him, "That is what the degree is."
4See earlier notes on models of Nigerian immigrant leadership.
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professional-type leaderships of Nigerian immigrants, our inquiry into the founding
of the Association of Nigerian Physicians in the Americas (ANPA) has to begin with
efforts to situate and explain its historical background as well as its current context in
the U.S. This is important because, as we saw in our previous background, its
official status in America came to the fore between 1990s and 2000. Besides, a
majority of them comprised of medical scientists educated mostly at indigenous
Nigerian/African universities. 1 Together, this calls for some knowledge of the
history of medical education in Nigeria before and after the 1960s. Further, it
requires some understanding of the national context of healthcare services and
medical education back in Nigeria.
For, although the British influences began in the region later to be named
modern Nigeria as early as the 1830s—reaching a formal colonial state in 1861, it
was not until the early decades of the twentieth century that a clear evidence of
Western-educated Nigerians became visible among its subjects. And it was not until
after the Second World War that the colonial mandate began to shift from a well-
known policy of discouraging the education of its subjects to some form of
encouragement.
2 Very few Nigerians, as was also the case for the whole of tropical
Africa, particularly during the pre-colonial and colonial eras—entered America for
general education, not to mention medical studies.
3
This is another evidence of the
constrained pattern of contacts between sub-Saharan Africans and America and the
'See Chapter 3, especially the statistical Tables on Nigerian physicians in the U.S.
2Norman R. Bennett, Africa and Europe: From Roman Times to National Independence ,
Second Edition (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1984), pp. 141-2; Coleman,
Nigeria: Background to Nationalism , pp. 113-115; Sunmolu A. Beckley, et al., Nigerian
Doctors in United States and Canada 2000: Special Millennium Edition , pp. xii.
3
Patton, Jr., Global Dimensions of the African Diaspora, pp. 143-5.
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related Western European world after the Atlantic slave trade. This development
corresponded with how most Africans were classified both during and after slavery
under the varying colonial fragments of Europe rather than by their ordered isolation
from the rest of the modern world. 1 This same background perhaps best explains
why the bulk of Nigerians entering America for medical training between the first
and second world wars concentrated at Howard and Meharry Medical schools.2
For, until the establishment of medical schools for the training of physicians
in Nigeria through the University College Hospital (UCH)
—
just before formal
independence—the access to medical education was fairly thin. Prior to the 1950s,
the system of health care delivery in Nigeria was under the control of the British
Army. 3
Between the 1900s and 1950s, the bulk of the indigenous Nigerian doctors
were trained abroad, and mostly in the United Kingdom, Scotland, France, followed
by the U.S.4 This exposure to modern medicine in Nigeria during the colonial era
was marked by strong ethno-regional disparities among Nigerians. For example,
when there were only 12 physicians in Nigeria in the early 1920s, 8 of them were
Yoruba and 4 were native foreigners; moreover, when there were 160 Nigerian
physicians in the 1950s, some 76 were Yoruba, 49 Ibo, one Hausa-Fulani, and 34
'ibid., pp. 146-8; Skinner, In Defense of Black Nationality , pp. 7-10; Hawk, "Africans and
the 1965 U.S. Immigration Law," pp. 159-4, 260-9; Immanuel Geiss, Pan-African
Movement
, pp. 169-170.
2
Ibid.
3Sunmolu A. Beckley, et al., Nigerian Doctors in the United States & Canada: Special
Millennium Edition , pp. xii-xiii.
4
Patton, Jr., Global Dimensions of the African Diaspora, pp.143, 149-155.
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were categorized as "others." 1 According to Table 17.1, until the mid-1950 Nigeria,
had no representation in the study of medicine at Howard and Meharry, the two most
established black American-owned medical schools. For the entire black Africa, the
training of medical personnel during the pre-colonial era [1868-1900], was more
favorable to Liberians, Sierra-Leoneans, and South Africans. 2
Given the diverse ethnographic distribution of Nigerians across West Africa,
it is probable that some medical students entering America, for example, via Liberia
and Sierra-Leone were from the Nigerian background. These were regions where
Nigerians were most likely to be found, especially among those freed from slavery
en-route to the New World by the British Naval Squadron.3 On the other hand,
Howard began to have clearer records on Nigerian medical students from the mid-
1950s onward, while Meharry had none.4
Not surprisingly, more Nigerians entering the U.S. during the colonial era
and early decades after the demise of colonialism [1900-1978], received their
medical training from Howard and Meharry. Between 1955 and 1958, Howard alone
graduated about seven Nigerian physicians. Again between 1961 and 1978, which
represented the post-independent era, another 14 Nigerian physicians graduated from
Howard compared to 8 from Meharry.
5
'Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism , p. 142; Sowell, Preferential Policies, p.71.
Also, see the general spheres of educational disparity between Southern and Northern
Nigerians in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.
2
Ibid.; Patton, Jr., Global Dimensions of the African Diaspora , pp. 143-5, 145-8.
3
Davi'dson, The Curse of the Nation State , pp. 23-30; Ayandele, The Educated Elite, pp. 10-
14.
4
Patton, Jr., Global Dimensions of the African Diaspora, pp. 149-1 5 1
.
5
Ibid., Patton, Jr., pp. 149-155
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Table 17.1
Nigerian Graduates of Howard University and Meharry
Medical Schools, by Pre-colonial, by Colonial and Postcolonial Eras, 1870s- 1970s*
Pre-colonial Era
Howard Medical School
Year
1872-1900
Number
Meharry Medical School
Year
1860-1900
Number
Colonial Era 1900-1960:
1955
1956
1958
1900-1960
Post-colonial 1960-1975
1961
1969
1970
1971
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1960-1978:
1961
1971
1977
1978
Overall Total: 29 Total: 21 Total: 8
Source: Adell Patton, Jr., "Howard University and Meharry Medical Schools in the
Training of African Physicians 1868-1978," in Global Dimensions of the African
Diaspora
, pp. 149-155. *The population of African medical graduates trained at
Howard and Meharry during the period indicated above is not shown here except
for the specific region of modern Nigeria. However, in order to understand the
general trend it seems useful to begin from the above period.
The preceding background also suggests when the visibility of indigenous
medical personnel really began in Nigeria. As we have hinted earlier, this began
following the establishment of Nigerian medical schools in the 1960s. With the
establishment of the first Local Teaching Hospital (LUTH) in the late 1950s,
followed closely with birth of the Nigerian nation in 1960, more Nigerians began to
receive medical training in their local medical colleges/universities.
1
Others still
traveled as far as Russia and Asia for medical education, while a majority went to
'ibid., pp. 143-151; ANPA (2000), pp. xii-xiii.; Patton, Jr.
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Europe and the Americas. 1 Following the aftermath of the Nigerian Civil war,
thanks to the early positive effects of the oil boom, efforts to train physicians in the
local universities also increased. These efforts resulted in increases in the numbers
trained indigenous physicians between the 1970s and early 1980s. Thus, during the
1960s and 1970s, the prospects of medical education enjoyed an exceptional growth
within both the local Nigerian universities as well as in the number of those
graduating to become practicing physicians. 2
By the 1970s, Nigeria—with 33 percent in its ranking status—had one of the
highest per capital incomes in the world. This development corresponded with
increased awareness of the quality of Nigeria's education as Africa's center of
academic excellence in journals and in the opinion of experts around the world.
During the period, Nigeria's medical education—similar to other forms of
professional education—compared favorably with recognizable world class
standards.
3 According to one opinion, this was when the "University of Ibadan
School of Medicine was listed among the top ten Medical Schools in the World,
producing many great scientists and world-class clinicians."
4
This was also when
Nigerian physicians had a certain degree of stability and support within the nation in
their profession.
By the early 1980s, when political instability along with the general
ineptitude among the ruling national elites began to set in, the organization of the
Nigerian healthcare system entered into an era of serious deterioration. This was
'ibid.; Patton, Jr., pp. 149-155.
2ANPA (2000), pp. xii-xiii.
3
Ibid.
4ANPA(1996), p. 143.
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also when the image of Nigeria as the giant of Africa began to wane, along with the
status of its "highly educated people." Reflecting on the era when most Africans saw
Nigeria as the beacon light of the continent, "the South African icon Archbishop
Desmond Tutu in 1995," reminded his readers in an interview by Africa Today how
people like him felt about the current crisis of Nigeria, which once occupied an
admirable status in the education of Africans.
I became aware of this when I was studying at King's College,
London in the sixties. I had Nigerian friends, fellow students, who
were working for their Ph.Ds in subjects like electrical engineering.
They were quite extraordinarily impressive. A good number of South
Africans went to study medicine at the University of Ibadan, which
became the best medical school in Africa. When I asked the dean how
they had achieved this, he explained how they had appointed whites
to all the important positions in the school and sent Nigerians to
Britain and other places; encouraged them to get all the qualifications
they could; to come back to Nigeria and understudy the white people.
This they did, and these highly qualified people, who had fellowships
from places like the Royal College of Physicians or Surgeons, soon
took over.
1
By the mid-1980s, most Nigerians became "agonized on the shattered hopes
and dreams, and the squandered opportunities." Hunted by the dreams that were so
destroyed, these "brains and talents" began to disperse around the world, where some
of them became practically of "no use to their own country."
2
This rather painful
development can be traced to the ill-informed military fiscal policies of the early and
mid-1970s, as well as to the ensuing depression of the era. Collectively, this
development had the chief effects of exacerbating the socioeconomic despair of
Nigerians. This then was the ultimate result of the gross mismanagement of the
enormous resources of the oil boom, which resulted from the aftermath of the
'"Nigeria at 40: time for the new generation," Africa Today (U.K., October 2000), p. 5.
2
Ibid.
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Nigerian Civil War. These cycles of national hardships had worked hand and hand
with the general state of economic crises in Nigeria: unemployment, socio-cultural
crises, and political instability. 1
As ANPA documents in its editorial in 2000, the above period was also when
much of the expanded program of immunization programs and medical supplies in
Nigeria began to be provided by the World Health Organization (WHO). This was
as well when the renowned achievements of Nigeria's medical professionals in
Africa and the world over became a ghost of its former self.2
Between the mid-1980s and early 1990s, Nigeria ranked among the 13
poorest nations in the world.
3
Similarly, between 1984 and 1994, the Federal
Government of Nigeria spent from 1.1 percent to 2.8 percent of its overall budget on
the healthcare system—below the minimum of 5 percent recommended by WHO.
The result was increased in the healthcare problem of diarrhea, malaria, malnutrition,
and pneumonia.
4
Again, during the above period, the number of AIDS cases rose in Nigeria.
For example, between 1986 and 1995 the AIDS cases rose in greater numbers in
Nigeria compared to the early 1990s. The population of the victims of the virus in
1997 was greater in such states as Bornu, Plateau, and the Cross River.
5 With
enormous healthcare hardships in a country as populous as Nigeria, there were
12,806 hospitals by the 1990s: 182 Federal Government owned; 2,228, State
'Wright, Nigeria: Struggle for Stability , pp. 73-81.
2ANPA (2000), pp. xii-xiii.
3
Ibid., pp. xvi, 1-341: Research Report , p. 47.
4
Ibid., ANPA , pp. 348,351-2.
5
Ibid., pp. 354-5; Victor Umuabor, "AIDS Through Obazees' Lens: Could AIDS be as
Simple as Dr. Obazee sees it?" African Concord (Ikeja-Lagos, September, 1987), p. 8.
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Governments owned; 9,840 Primary Health Care Centers owned; 553 Missions
owned; one Orthopedic; and three Trauma centers. 1
The preceding of course mirrors some of the internal crisis leading to the
exodus of Nigerian physicians to the U.S. Thus, ironically, at the time a majority of
Nigerian physicians were fleeing to America in greater numbers during the mid-
1980s and 1990s, the AIDS virus, "wild-type polio," and the general healthcare
system in black Africa was the most handicapped in the world. ANPA argues that, at
about the same time, the healthcare problem in "Nigeria and parts of West Africa,"
along with the additional epidemic of "wild-type polio," combined to make the
• • • 2
region the worst hit area in the world.
Given this background, it was not surprising that in 1993, the United Nations
Human Development Report estimated more than 21,000 practicing Nigerian
physicians were in the United States.
3
For, as we saw in Chapter 3, there were some
likely demographic nuances in the estimation of the population of Nigerian
physicians. This made more sense where an officially certified data of Nigerian
physicians by ANPA, for example, was perhaps a more reliable basis for estimating
the number of their population in the U.S.
Also, chances were even that the number of trained Nigerian physicians from
Nigeria/Africa, or elsewhere, could be much higher than indicated by the United
Nations Report if it included those not necessarily certified as practitioners but
'ANPA (2000), p. 345.
2
Ibid., p. xvii; Oluwambo Balagun, "One Step Aright: Enter a new health care system at the
village level," African Concord (Ikeja-Lagos, September 1987), p. 10.
3
Sako, "Brain Drain and Africa's Development: A Reflection," p. 26; Gordon, Nigeria's
Diverse Peoples, p. 236.
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actually working within or outside the medical profession in the U.S. 1 There is a
basis then for an educated guess, and that is: there is a strong probability that the
number of Nigerian physicians entering the U.S. from Nigeria and other parts of the
world—either certified, or uncertified—far exceeded 21,000 between mid-1980s and
mid-2000s. This would mean that some of these physicians, especially those trained
at indigenous Nigerian/African universities, for example, were not necessarily being
employed as practicing physicians in the U.S, and hence were not registered in the
ANPA directories. 2
The United Nations Human Development Report can then be accurate on a
more generic basis. This might mean that the number of Nigerians in the U.S. both
certified and uncertified, who were trained or still under training as physicians, could
very well have grown beyond 27,000 by 2000.
And physicians trained at indigenous Nigerian/African medical schools
comprised the bulk of the brain drain of skilled scientists currently practicing in
America. By 1994, about 60 percent of them—representing a majority—were
trained at indigenous African medical schools: about 34 percent trained in the
Americas, with the U.S having the largest share, followed by Europe and Russia.
3
By 1996, when about some 3079 certified Nigerian physicians were examined in the
'This position is based on exploratory survey and examination of Nigerian Medical
Directories from 1990s to the mid-2000s. Also see earlier notes in Chapter 4, along with
Yinka Shoroye and Ancho Emereruwa, (1994), pp. 1-103; Sunmolu Beckley, Acho
Emeruwa, Yinka Shoroye, ANPA , 1996, pp. 12-140.; and ANPA (2000), pp. 1-320;
Research report
,
p. 47.
2
Ibid., Research Report . This development was supported by the result of the exploratory
survey undertaken in the course of my research from the mid-1990s and mid-2000s.
3
Ibid., especially Research Report, p. 13.
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U.S., a majority of them were trained in Nigeria. 1 Between the 1980s and 1990s, the
ratio of Nigerian physicians trained in the Western Hemisphere was greater in the
U.S. By 2000, when the population of certified Nigerian physicians published in
the ANPA and African Business Directories and exploratory surveys were computed,
the number rose to about four thousand. Their demographic composition still
showed that a majority were educated in Nigeria/Africa, followed by the U.S. and
other countries in the Americas.
Nigerian physicians trained at indigenous Nigerian medical colleges were
mostly from the more established Nigerian medical schools. Some of them were
certified as far back as late as the late- 1940s; others as early as the 1950s, followed
by the 1970s and 1980s—with bulk of them emigrating to the U.S. during the 1980s
and 1990s. Thus, their American-build up includes physicians trained when the first
colonial medical infrastructures were established as well as before the first Local
University Teaching Hospital (LUTH) was established back in Nigeria in the late
1950s. Besides, it includes the core physicians trained at the newest medical
schools in Nigeria.
4
'This reference is based on examination of ANPA Directory, Nigerian-African Business
Directories, etc., including Exploratory Survey of Nigerian Professional establishments in
the U.S. See, for example, Tables 12.1-12.2; Figures 8.1-8.2.
2Yinka Shoroye and Ancho Emereruwa, Directory of Nigerian Physicians in the United
States 1994 , pp. 1-103; Beckley, Emeruwa, Shoroye, ANPA , 1996, pp. 12-140; ANPA
(2000), pp. 1-320.
3
Ibid., ANPA (2000), pp. 1-341; Saravic Directory of African Business in America &
American Companies that do Business in Africa (Newark, NJ, 1999-2000); African Yellow
Pages/Business Directory in the United States, 1999-2005; and Exploratory Survey of
Nigerian-African Community Profiles in the United States, 2000-2005.
4ANPA (2000), p. xvi. Also, see Figures 8.1-8.2 and Tables 12.1-12.2, and 17.2
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The Nigerian Physician-Type Leadership:
Rationale and Objectives
According to one view, the founding of ANPA in America can be traced to
the late 1980s and early 1990s. This was when some physicians gathered in a
quorum to discuss the medical intricacies confronting them in the U.S. and back in
the Nigerian homeland. Other indications, however, point to the fact that some of
the ideological strands of ANPA can be traced further back to the mid-1970s and
early 1980s.
1
Thus, within the U.S. context, the Nigerian physician-type leadership first
had its beginning as a collaborative forum for exchanging ideas among a few
certified physicians. This early and much limited beginning among member
physicians changed in the early 1990s when other occurrences emerged, which
united their varying aspirations in the diaspora (Table 17.2). This development, as
already indicated, was influenced and indeed later transformed by the deteriorating
state of the healthcare system back in the Nigerian homeland.
By mid-1990s, however, the official establishment of the Nigerian physician
leadership as a forum for collective deliberation in the Americas owed its origin to
two-related developments. The first of this was the historic publication in 1994 of
the Nigerian medical establishment in the first premier Directory of Nigerian
Physicians in the United States ; the second was the first inaugural convention of the
'This is based on exploratory survey of Nigerians as well as interviews undertaken in the
course of my fieldwork in this study. Possibly some Nigerian physicians in America had
some prior consultations on collaborative development both within the American and
Nigerian context before 1994. The likelihood then is that the vision which became
transformed in from 1995 to 2000 onwards could perhaps be traced to a much earlier period.
See ANPA Directory 1994 and 1996.
2
For example, see earlier notes on the poor state of the Nigerian healthcare system.
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Association of Nigerian Physicians in the Americas and Canada on August 11, 1995,
at Disneyland Anaheim, California. 1 Together, these two related events united and
indeed defined the ideological vision of the Nigerian physician-type leadership.
Table 17.2
Nigerian Physicians in the U.S. Trained at Indigenous
Nigerian Medical Schools, by Decade,
by Names of Medical Schools, by Number, 1950s- 1990s
Universities 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s
Univ. of Ibadan 2 39 215 427 24
Univ. of Lagos 12 87 293 19
Univ. of Calabar 14 2
A.B.University 12 29 2
Univ. of Ife 12 95 12
Univ. of Ilorin 62 6
Univ. Maiduguri 12
Univ. of Jos 75 4
Univ. Nsukka 46 234 17
Univ. Benin 17 110 14
Ogun State Univ 5 4
Univ. Sokoto 6
Univ.
Portharcourt
5
Total 2 51 389 1,367 104
Source: Sunmolu Beckley, Acho Emeruwa, and Yinka Shoroye,
eds., Directory of Nigerian Physicians in the United States, 1996
(Riverside, California: ANPA, 1996), pp. 9-141.
Table 17.2 also shows a representative sample of the ANPA network which
resulted from the historic background of 1994. As a matter of fact, "The Directory
which was initially started by the two founding Editors now becomes a corporate
property of ANPA."
2
This marked a first step in the pioneering effort of the ANPA
adherents to tackle and correct the healthcare lag back in the Nigerian homeland.
From the preceding backgrounds emerged the vision of the ANPA mission of
'Shoroye and Emeruwa, ANPA (1994), pp. 1-103; Beckley, ANPA (2000), p. 391.
2
Ibid., Shoroye and Emeruwa; ANPA (1996), pp. 7, 148; ANPA (2000), p. 391.
3
Ibid.
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redemption to the homelands. This formed the core of the physician-type leadership
of Nigerians in the diaspora. Unlike the attorney-type representative leadership of
Nigerian immigrants, which is more effective within the American mosaic, the
physician-type leadership is both operative within the mosaic as well as in relation to
its medical missions to the homeland. This development does not mean that the
physician-type leadership is not very active within its brethrens' communities in
America. For, there are evidences that Nigerian physicians have been assisting
handicapped members of the Nigerian communities in such cities as Atlanta,
Houston, Los Angeles, and New York. Despite this effort, however, their strengths
and effectiveness are home-bound via medical missions. 1 Both socio-cultural and
scientific factors of the Nigerian homeland and America may adequately explain the
similarities and dissimilarities of the attorney-type and physician-type representative-
professional leaderships of Nigerian immigrants in the diaspora.
There is one crucial feature of ANPA leadership that is markedly dissimilar
from all the leadership models of Nigerian immigrants: it is perhaps the one
association of Nigerian professionals in America where tribal and ethnic differences
may be said to be at their lowest point. This socio-cultural feature is also shared by
both the women and Nigerian youth-type leaderships in the diaspora. This is because
they are less tribally and ethnically fragile and hence more cohesive in their
representative role within the brethren communities. However, ANPA owes much of
its leadership unison to the ethical orientation of its profession rather than to any
particular features of Nigerians.
'This is based on a summary ofANPA profiles along with interviews.
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ANPA therefore represents one of the strongest arms of Nigerians'
professional leadership in America. Unlike other leadership mechanisms of Nigerian
immigrants, the physician-type leadership has its strongest emphasis toward the
development of the homeland. Its leadership role is made more realizable by the fact
that a majority of Nigerian physicians are in a strategic position to negotiate with the
mega giant companies in the U.S. in advancing the course of human development
back in Nigeria and across sub-Saharan Africa. This homebound thrust, as we noted
earlier, is influenced by the professional orientation of Nigerian medical
establishment in the diaspora, as well as by the corresponding deterioration of the
healthcare system in back in Nigeria.
First, ANPA and its adherents—unlike other professional wings of Nigerians
in the diaspora—are cognizant that they have the acquired scientific and
technological acumen that can help to redeem the medical lag back in the homeland. 1
Second, similar to the nursing profession, the ANPA membership comprises of
professionals who are in an economically high demand fields in American society.
This background is supported by the general degree of favorable socioeconomic
stability among its varied memberships, compared to its counterparts in non-medical
professions. Together, therefore, this stability is supportive of their influence as
agents and medium of regeneration of the homeland. And, again, because the ANPA
adherents are an economically more established base, they are in a more solid
position to project the emerging new image of the Nigeria or Africa in their public
outreach. Even if a majority of them are not paid as respectably as their
'ANPA (2000), pp. xvi-xvii.
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counterparts, their overall income status and services are still better. With this asset,
moreover, comes an assuring public and national representation.
The emergence of ANPA marked one of the most established bases of the
Nigerian diaspora of colonialism in the U.S. During ANPA's "first Inaugural
Convention at Anaheim, in California, in 1995," Dr. Iheanacho Emeruwa observed
that, the organization's main purpose "is to begin to address collectively the problems
of our homeland and the issues that we all confront as Nigerian physicians living
abroad." 1
Dr. Emeruwa further observed that the founding mission of ANPA in
America was designed to ameliorate the deteriorating healthcare services and
facilities back in Nigeria. This deterioration, as he argued, included poor healthcare
system in the country's hospital, poor medical school facilities, poor medical
training, absences of necessary drugs and the lack of medical equipments. 2
Dr. Yinka Shoroye, almost similar to Dr. Emeruwa, later took the position
that the Nigerian physicians should "try to reflect in a humble beginning possible
ways to improve the healthcare of our nation from the diaspora." Shoroye argued
that medical missions from the diaspora to the Nigerian homeland should have
behind them "a moral cause of building a transatlantic bridge between North
America and the Bight of Benin and beyond."
3
Additionally, Shoroye observed that
the official mission of ANPA should strive to develop within the North American
continent an organized collective effort "to give back to the homeland and more
'ANPA , (2000), p. 391.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.; ANPA (1996), p. 7.
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specifically, assist the healthcare delivery of Nigeria by building a transatlantic
bridge" between the America and Africa. 1
The ANPA objectives also included providing the required infrastructures for
a functioning medical and industrial regeneration of Nigeria, and the whole of
Africa; the reversal of the anticipated WHO's projection of Nigeria or Africa's
healthcare problem in the twenty-first century in such areas as the AIDS virus and
the related healthcare services.
2 The overall objectives of ANPA leadership toward
Nigeria/Africa can be summarized as embracing the effort to address, correct, and
put back to place an effective healthcare system catering to the needs of all from top
to bottom. The ANPA objectives desires as well to correct the poor healthcare
management policies, workplace indiscipline, shortage of competent staff; absence
of reliable health statistics; assistance in reversing the low public morale and neglect
of research on health education; and restoring the crumbling physical facilities which
affected both the patients, and providing support for improved and better healthcare
services in the decades ahead.
Conceptually, however, the Nigerian physician-type leadership envisions
from the diaspora, a Nigeria where government and the governed, as well as the
varying healthcare systems, would benefit all and sundry. ANPA, accordingly,
seems convinced that it can work within the nation and its institutions to move
human development to a new phase of collective development.
4 To be sure, the
ANPA leadership as well as its membership along with admirers, shares in the belief
'lbid.,(1996), p. 8.
2ANPA (2000), p. 432.
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that, "Nigerian professionals" in the diaspora must work "together in finding
solutions to the many problems facing healthcare in Nigeria and indeed Africa." 1
This background might explain why ANPA shows interest in correcting the
breeding of "incompetent generation" of Nigerians for the future. ANPA is even
interested in improved standard of the quality of national life in the economic,
technological, and industrial spheres. For, in its view, this is one way in which to
enhance respectability for Nigeria and Nigerians in the eyes of the world. 2
ANPA even sees itself as a philanthropic agent, or as a representative of the
multinational corporations, in bringing Nigeria and the entire black Africa into an
industrial age. Not only are its adherents willing to help the homeland, but are also
willing to share in the understanding that, "it might do good and help the standard of
medical education in Nigerian medical schools or hospitals by volunteering some
free time to teach and see patients for longer than the short duration of the current
medical missions." ANPA thus shares in the noble fact that: "To whom much has
been given much is expected." Enshrined at the core of the ANPA mission is the
motto of "social responsibilities to others," and this is further elaborated in its
official statement that: "As we work hard to raise funds by ourselves for ourselves,
we might gradually be succeeding in breaking the old cycle of dependency with its
psychological baggage and invariably promote a culture of self reliance, self-
sufficiency and self determination."
4
'Ibid., (1996), p. 162.
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ANPA recognizes that the ability to make long-term social projections is
necessary to sustained development. It also recognizes that success in its objective
ought to include getting Nigerians/Africans to understand the long stretches required
in moving from one point to the other. A viable future back in the homelands, as
ANPA argues, will only come if people are willing to undertake programmatic steps.
The ANPA leadership understands and indeed also appreciates that where Nigeria
and Nigerians want to be ten to twenty years from its current status requires laying
the foundation as well as taking the necessary steps required in getting there. 1
By 1998, when ANPA held its Fourth Annual Convention in Orlando,
Florida, entitled "African Mother and Child: Prospects for Better Health in the 21st
Century," the physician-type leadership of Nigerians had achieved a name
recognition for its mission both in America and back in the homeland. That most of
its conventions and medical exhibitions have been screened across the world by such
popular communication network as the CNN further attest to its international status.
ANPA convention of 1998—like earlier ones—was designed to evaluate and
develop programmatic medical strategies for healthcare and medical issues
commensurate with the needed services back in Nigeria. This convention focused on
how to arrest the problem of healthcare confronting the "African mother" and
childcare system, as well as examined strategies aimed at catering toward sustained
healthcare system for pregnant women in Nigeria.
2
During its Fifth Annual
Convention in Las Vegas, Nevada, in 1999, the ANPA delegates dealt with "Public
Health," and examined ways in which to develop quality health facilities from the
'ibid., p. xviii.
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diaspora for the Nigerian homeland, along with the related regions of sub-Saharan
Africa.
Through these conventions, "the ANPA leadership" came out self-assured
that its efforts "proved that dedication to a cause and the persistent pursuit of a goal
can yield outstanding results." This background perhaps explains why the ANPA
leadership felt that, "The successes of our conventions should be a tribute to these
selfless leaders of our association."2 Through its 1999 convention, in particular, a
foundation was laid for investing in medical supplies, storage, and improved
infrastructures for the future healthcare system in Nigeria in the years ahead.3
ANPA therefore represents a crucial first step toward greater interaction of
Nigerian skilled scientists within the capitalist world system. Despite intense racial
climate and discrimination confronting its adherents, its leadership seems poised to
lead the way toward lasting development in Nigeria. While ANPA represents the
clearest evidence of Nigeria's loss of much-needed skilled class manpower to the
Western Hemisphere, the objectives of its leadership illuminate this loss as equally
an avenue of both human and national regeneration. The ANPA mission represents
an important leap toward sustained integration and corresponding transformation of
the Nigerian indices within the capitalist world system in the twenty-first century.
ANPA; Health Care Challenges and Redemption Missions to Nigeria
The ANPA leadership is further strengthened by its advantage as a non-profit
organization. This status places both the ANPA leadership as well as its mission in a
'ibid., p. 432.
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position to collaborate with other scientific and philanthropic bodies in providing
needed healthcare services to Nigeria and the related handicapped regions in Africa.
With its official status, ANPA is thus in a position to provide facilities with adequate
storage for vaccine products, facility for medical storage for patients and doctors,
low-cost vaccine refrigerator, and volunteering to assist in administering
immunization of patients back in the homeland.
ANPA has an exceptional record in collaborating with the local and federal
medical governments back in Nigeria in undertaking medical missions to help restore
faith in the breakdown of the profession (Table 17.3). This attitude represents its
finest and indeed noblest feat. 1 ANPA has indeed introduced the practice of
telemedicine into Nigeria. This represents another creative response from the
diaspora linking its professional talents to areas of needed healthcare services back in
the homeland.
The notion of telemedicine takes into consideration "the practical inability of
specialist to regularly travel to Nigeria for time constraints." Thus before a direct
physical contact with the Nigerian homeland is undertaken, an on-line professional
consultation with the Nigerian medical experts can be sought as needed through the
"ANPA Clinic." ANPA anticipates that online consultations "may alleviate some of
the sufferings and expenses of many sick Nigerians who travel overseas at greater
cost and the very many who cannot afford to travel abroad."
2
In addition, success
through the medium of telemedicine may encourage support for its mission as well
'Ibid., p. xvii; ANPA (1996), p. 146.
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exposure to the professional resources of the Nigerian medical scientists in the
diaspora.
Table 17.3
ANPA Redemptive Missions to the Nigerian Homeland,
by Year, by Region, by Medical Procedure,
by Number of Patients Treated, 1997-1999
uate Year Location Medical Procedure Number Treated
April, 7-14 1997 Kwalla Plateau State 1 1 8 Operative Procedures,
70 Dental Extractions, 25
Cataract Surgeries
Over 2 000 Patients
Treated
July, 4-11 1997 Akwa-Ibom State Iota
Abia
OB-GYN / Surgery
Onerations
102 Treated
August, 4-11 1997 Gwagwalada Fed.
r^anital TprritorvV'tlL/ILClt 1 vl 1 ILWI V
87 OB-GYN Surgeries Over 200 Dental
TculCllla 1 icdLgU
March, 1-8 1998 Ifon, Ondo State 80 Surgeries Done Over 3,000 Patients
Treated
July, 13-20 1998 Issele-Uku Delta State 89 Surgeries Done Over 300 Dental
Cases Treated
Sept, 4-11 1998 Ovim, Abia State 1 20 Surgeries Done Over 4,000 Patients
Treated
March, 14-20 1999 Fuger, Edo State
April, 11-12 1999 Calabar, Cross River
State
May, 3-8 1999 Epe, Lagos State 80 Surgeries Done Over 3,000 Patients
August, 16-20 1999 Enugu-Ukwu,
Abaeana State
October, 10-16 1999 Ilawe-Ekiti, Ekiti State
November 1999 Yola, Rdamawa State
Source: ANPA (Riverside, California, 2000), pp. 377-386.
Not to be forgotten is the fact that, in 1995, the ANPA leadership began a
program entitled, "Information Technology," aimed at integrating isolated regions of
Nigeria into the capitalist world economy. By 1999, ANPA not only had led the way
in establishing "The first local e-mail in Nigeria," but also in extending its on-line
services to about twenty-two universities including major hospitals, health facilities
and other institutions."
1
Moreover, in 1999, its leadership successfully tested how to
'ANPA (2000), pp. xi, 367-373.
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re-adopt "video-broadcast live to computer screen on Nigeria medical needs around
the world." The result of this project proved the maturing as well as the arrival of
the new status of one of black Africa's most skilled scientific class on the world
scene.
1
ANPA has already accumulated the impressive records of medical missions
to the Nigerian homeland to provide help to the disadvantaged sections of the
populace (Table 17.3). Besides, its steadfast response in linking Nigeria and
Nigerians to modern scientific innovations is further indicative of its emerging
leadership role in the diapora. By linking its American-based resources to the
program of empowering Nigeria's healthcare system, its mission has served as an
important foundation toward the larger goal of providing needed healthcare services
to the whole continent of Africa. Between April 1997 and November 1999, the
numbers of ANPA's medical missions to Nigeria were fully representative of the
areas of need within the current healthcare system of Nigeria. The number of
patients examined and treated within short notice correlated with areas of dire
medical need and services in Nigeria (See Table 17.3).
With its excellent status in seeking to move the Nigerian healthcare system
forward, ANPA has been able to solicit assistance from, as well as collaborated with,
such well known institutions as the Federal Ministry of Health in Abuja, World
Health Organization (WHO), U.S. Center for disease and Control and Prevention
(USCP), UNICEF, Rotary International, and ASAID.
2 ANPA has also shown a
willingness to work in liaison with the state/regional governmental bodies back in
'Ibid.
2
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Nigeria, as well as with African governments to bring about the needed changes in
the healthcare services. This is perhaps one reason why, in 1999, it praised the
Federal Government for ending the year with promises toward sustained prospects in
providing affordable national healthcare system in the years ahead. 1
ANPA, of course, recognizes that the huge volumes of long distant telephone
calls made by its members from the diaspora vis-a-vis AT&T to the homeland are
reasons enough why some of the mega-giant corporations should reciprocate in
humanitarian-philanthropic projects aimed at boosting development in Nigeria.
Further, its leadership is cognizant of the viability of communications to modern
marketing interaction. Besides, it views philanthropic support from such mega
corporations as AT&T, for example, as worthwhile and as rewarding because it
receives its huge benefit of wiring the Nigerian regions and industrial sites with
internet connections. The ANPA editorial in 2000 states its desire to "encourage for
instance, the telephone long-distance carrier as the mega-giant AT&T to give
something back to us as corporate donation given the large volume of humanitarian
projects in Nigeria and some immediate problems like provision of bore-hole for
some teaching hospitals where water shortage remains perennial."
ANPA and SANPA: Toward Sustained Linkages with the Homelands
ANPA has its greatest potential at the inter-generational base of the Nigerian
medical association in the Americas. This fact is supported by its influence in
founding the Student Association of the Nigerian Physicians in the Americas
'Ibid.
2ANPA (2000), p. xv.
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(SANPA) in 1998. 1 This organization comprises of medical students who are mostly
American-born offspring of Nigerian immigrants and of those born in Nigeria.
Membership of SANPA therefore comprises of a much younger generation of mostly
American-born or perhaps more accurately, western-influenced Nigerians. As a
result, their socio-cultural orbit tends more to favor greater orientation with America
than necessarily the case with the Nigerian homeland. This seems to be a major
intersection of difference between the earlier decades of Nigerian immigrants
(1960s- 1970s) and the much later waves between mid-1980s and 1990s. Nigerian
offspring both of the American and the Nigerian homeland origins represent an
important wing of the Nigerian physician-type leadership in the diaspora.2
As a representative scientific body of Nigerian medical professionals, it is
credit to the ANPA leadership for inspiring a younger generation of Nigerian
medical students toward an early attachment of their training to the cultures of the
homeland. SANPA is therefore being poised at the youth level as a back-up toward
a more sustainable scientific and industrial exchange linking them in the diaspora to
the Nigerian homeland. As a youth umbrella organization of Nigerian ancestry,
SANPA is expected to help its members while in the diaspora to learn ways of dual
co-existence with the professional cultures of the Nigerian homeland at its core.
3
Members of ANPA who have American-born offspring recognize the complex
'Ibid., pp. xii, xv, 362-365; ANPA (1996), p. 146.
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systems. Their missions were also influenced by the incessant negative media portrayal of
Africa's healthcare problems.
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socio-cultural influences likely to impinge on their intergenerational basement of
their American offspring.
Unlike a majority of the generation of forced migration who were unable to
trace their points of separation from the homeland, most American-born offspring of
Nigerian physicians can identify their precise lanes of separation as well as renewal
between the diaspora and their ancestral homelands. 1 ANPA's legacy in helping to
found SANPA lies more in its vision. This has made it much easier for the latter to
begin an early process of intra-Atlantic cultural bridge exchanges aimed at molding
the needed scientific skills for the future.2
There emerged therefore two closely knit professional and cultural visions
between the ANPA and SANPA leaderships seemingly revealing of the likely pattern
of the future: Their search for a solid collective foundation of sustainable interactions
with the homeland appears to be genuine. The strength then in founding SANPA lies
more in the aim to begin an early head start linking needed scientific skills of
Nigerians in the diaspora to the homeland.
3 ANPA and SANPA therefore appear to
be the two most likely bodies of Nigerians capable of serving as faithful medium of
transfers between Nigeria and the Western Hemisphere in a greater part of the
twenty-first century. This likelihood was apparent in an examination of the SANPA
in 1990s.
4
For example, an interesting article in the students' forum entitled
"Childhood Reflection: Raising a Nigerian Child Abroad," sums up the prospect of
an evolving cultural consciousness between the offspring of Nigerian immigrants in
'ANPA (2000), p. 391; ANPA (1996), p. 146.
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the medical school in America and their relationships with the homeland. For
example, in 1996, the attitude of one Moji Arowosegbe, a young Nigerian-American
medical student at the Albert Einstein's College of Medicine, New York, accounted
for the inevitable transformation of the SANPA dynamic toward the Nigerian
homeland. 1
Additionally, Arowosegbe' s article shows that she not only cherished the
cultural values of her Nigerian ancestry but praised the wisdom of her parents for
sending her back to live in Nigeria in order to learn the cultures of the homeland.
Further, as her narrative shows, it was her stay in Nigeria which helped to reinforce
the knowledge of the homeland cultures. The experience enabled her to update her
cultural void as American-born of Nigerian ancestry living now in the diaspora. 2
Arowosegbe, as a future physician, counsels that raising the offspring of
Nigerian immigrants in a country like America depended more on personal
convictions. These convictions, she argued, are based on the willingness to identify
where one's own interests in love and in strength of daily survival are to be found in
life. To Arowosegbe the essence of any little lasting development and contribution
in life can be traced and linked to one's cultural traditions.
3 They are, in her noble
views, the core of any true development and any contribution in life.
As first generation Nigerian-Americans living in New York city, my parents
thought it was very important for my siblings and I to know where we came
from and much so learn through experience the Nigerian culture including
language. My parents were very particular about language... They only had
'ANPA(1996), pp. 166-9
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one solution to the problem that children had to live in Nigeria and learn
everything first hand. 1
Neither were the roads for Arowosegbe back to learning the Nigerian cultures
in the homeland any easier. Despite her positive feelings, Arowosegbe reveals
obvious pride in her American birth, acknowledging that personal experiences back
in the Nigerian homeland were not always pleasant. "To be honest, it wasn't the
greatest 8 years of my life because I had to deal with attacks of malaria every 3
months, heat waves year round, electric power failures and other little mishaps."2
Yet, she shows gratitude to her parents as well as to her inherent fortitude during the
experience in Nigeria Her understanding of the way of life of her people as well as
of their cultures became more mature mostly due to physical contact.
Besides those little inconveniences which I can now refer to as minor,
I must confess that I gained a lifetime of education that otherwise may
not have been possible. I truly benefited from the fact that I lived in a
town full of history, heritage and rich in culture which made me
decide that no matter where I live or who I become in the future, I
will proudly bequeath this fine legacy to my children the way my
parents passed it to me.
3
The interesting story of Arowosegbe reveals several contesting experience
confronting Nigerian parents and their offspring in America. The Arowosegbe
experience typifies how some Nigerian offspring understand themselves and the
cultures of their parents while in the diaspora. Beyond this point, her experience
reveals that, in most instances, the attitudes of the Nigerian offspring toward the
homeland are the reflex of those of their core parents. Arowosegbe seems right in
arguing that, if many of the Nigerian parents in the diaspora "have no intention of
'Ibid.
2
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ever going back to reside in Nigeria so why should they bother to teach their kids the
old culture and language since they won't be using it here." 1
Her success in returning to the Nigerian homeland was due mostly to the
attitudes of her parents. Also, it was the combined faith of her parents' beliefs and
her own noble beliefs in the soundness of the cultures of the homeland that
guaranteed the success of her mission. Those were the attitudes that reinforced and
supported her mission. Such inherent attitudes of parental beliefs, along with her
own positive maturity during the eight years back in the homeland, were what later
transformed her homebound experience. 2
Favorable parental support and favorable personal spontaneity which
Arowosegbe exhibited toward the cultures of the homeland can be very rare among
most American-born offspring of Nigerian immigrants. For, she appears to have
been thoroughly imbued both in her personal demeanor as well as the corresponding
values of her parents toward the cultures of the homeland. "I have to admit that I did
not originally feel strongly about going to Nigeria. As a teenager, I felt I missed out
on so many things by not attending high school in America."
3
Among the things Arowosegbe missed during her eight years in the Nigerian
homeland were cheerleading, gymnastics, science fairs, senior prom, and special
scholarship programs. Yet, as she observes: "I am glad that I missed out on peer
pressure-trying out drugs, guns and premature sex."
4
Consideration ought then to be
given to the extent in which the attitudes of Nigerian parents, either toward the
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cultural values of the homeland or toward the American cultures, are also either
positively or negatively affecting the inter-generational circuits of their American
offspring.
Taken together, however, the Arowosegbe experiences demonstrated how
some SANPA members were being prepared toward the task of re-adapting
themselves along with their professional training toward the cultures of the
homeland. Their desire to help secure a viable climate of future scientific links with
the homeland from the diaspora seems so far to be increasing with some
understanding of their differing worlds. Like any other Nigerian-American youth
leadership, it can be speculated that SANPA is likely to have a more sustainable
bridge between America and the Nigerian homeland. As its adherents become
increasingly dominated by American-born offspring, chances are that their future
professional success will also very likely alternate more favorably toward greater
attachment the varied communities of their brethren in the diaspora as well as on the
cultural values of their homeland.
Thus, by her experience and triumph, Arowosegbe counsels that the
American-born offspring of Nigerian immigrants in the diaspora would be well
served in the long run in knowing enough about themselves, about America, and
about the homeland of their parents and cultures. She also counsels against the
unknown nostalgia of the future. For, according to Arowosegbe, the Nigerian
offspring "May want to associate themselves with the culture in the future or just
want to visit the place, meet relatives and probably just want a place to identify
354
with."
1
And, if such scenario ever comes to pass, she argues persuasively that the
Nigerian offspring would be certain to have a place in the cultural values of the
homeland. "Whatever the reasons, I think we all especially as physicians, have an
obligation toward building the future of Nigeria. We can insure this by getting our
children interested in their roots because it is this and the generation to come that
will face the difficult task of bringing Nigeria back to be a pride to the entire world. 2
ANPA Missions to the Homeland: Jewish, Asian, or Pan-African?
However, in seeking to direct its scientific skills either toward the
development of Nigerian or the entire African homelands, ANPA draws aspiration
from the experience of both the Jewish and Asiatic diasporas. As a result, in its
vision of developing the homeland, ANPA appears to share in the beliefs that the
Jewish and Asiatic visions were similar to those of other branches of American
races. This is probably one reason why "ANPA admires the Jewish Diaspora," and
why it believes that "the American-Jewish success story... keeps transcending
generation after generation."
4
Shoroye, in an editorial entitled, "Giving back to the
Bight of Benin and beyond," draws the analogy between the ANPA achievements
and its ongoing re-transfers of the medical and industrial skills from the diaspora to
Nigeria. 5 Again, drawing from the experience of the Jewish diaspora, Shoroye states
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that "The State of Israel is arguably what it is today because of the Jewish in the
diaspora around the world." 1 Therefore, as Shoroye argues, in reference to Nigeria,
and particularly to the pace of its human development in the twenty-first century,
... we believe the intelligentsia in any country including ours have a
leadership stake and a social responsibility to their future generations. We
should draw counsel from the hindsight that the hard lesson of the past
teaches. Our children and indeed our nation will only do well in an
increasingly competitive global economy if we prepare them well. History is
full of sacrifices.
This kind of thinking perhaps further explains why, in 1998, ANPA enjoined
with the effort of other membership in founding a supplementary umbrella
organization known as SANPA.3 As is the case with the Jewish and Asian
associations, SANPA is reportedly expected to function as a back-up to its core
ANPA parent in the future.
That the ANPA effort in the evolution of SANPA leans more favorably
toward the Jewish and Asiatic models further testifies of its willingness to go to any
length necessary in developing the homelands.
4
In its imagination of how the first
generation of Nigerian-Americans of SANPA mission will help in developing the
homeland, ANPA looks up to, and indeed, admires the effort of Sara Lee Schupf. As
an American of Jewish ancestry, Schupf has good record of supporting her ancestral
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homeland from the diaspora. 1 As Shoroye, President of ANPA 2000, observed of
this background:
Imagine American Sara Lee Schupf who inherited from her father's
estate and started a family foundation with an endowment. She
wanted the foundation to encourage women in service. She
contributed some funds for a female service professor's chair at
Skidmore College in New York State. She further wanted to give
something back to her parents' original homeland and she funded also
a lecture series and prize for women at the Weitzman Institute of
Science (a mini-NIH) in Israel. The Institute later wanted to build a
woman's health center, and she also supported the cause.2
There is a similar admiration for the activities of the Jewish diaspora on the
philanthropic front by ANPA. This thrust has a lot in common with the ANPA
vision of leadership based on charitable networking. According to ANPA, shared
attitudes of charitable network have permitted the Jews under law to benefit from
donor grants while in the diaspora, as well as to access needed assistances in
developing their American communities and the homelands.3
ANPA also recognizes that—like their Jewish and Asiatic counterparts in the
diaspora—the provision in the U.S. tax code offers to its adherents the required
access to philanthropic support. Further, it provides them with stock sales that can
strengthen its missions and associations within and without. In addition to such
gains, charitable giving or offered endowment can enable ANPA to reduce tax
burden as well as enhance access to the U.S. legal status on tax-exempt shelters and
donor access to available fund. So, with the economic stability of its membership
along, with a more viable social accord, the ANPA leadership occupies a favorable
'ANPA (2000), p. xv.
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orbit in exploiting the noble insignia of the profession toward the realization of its
aim of industrial redemption of the homeland. 1
Hence, collectively, the lessons drawn from the benefits of American Jewish
Charitable Organizations and the by-laws of charitable tax-exempt statuses would
seem to have had enormous impact on the mission of ANPA leadership toward the
homeland. Viewed then within the inter-Nigerian professional context in the U.S.,
adherents of the SANDA and ANPA associations, appear to have accepted the fact
that they were eminently qualified and indeed well placed in the diaspora to lobby
American governmental agencies to support their medical missions to the Nigerian
homeland. Referring to the Jewish socio-political clout, ANPA argues that their
lobbying power while in the diaspora has won them admiration everywhere.
Corresponding with the preceding emphases, ANPA poses its philanthropic
gesture as neither "a political" nor "apolitical" organization. What does this mean?
What the ANPA ideology represents, therefore, can best be viewed as corresponding
with neither a clear political nor "apolitical" interests over the torn and degraded
images of the Nigerian or the entire African homelands. On the basis of its official
statement, ANPA is simply an organization seeking to bring out the varied strengths
of the Nigerian physicians, in the hope that, "our host communities and our
motherland will avail themselves of the resources that our organization represents."
4
Along the same course as the Jewish vision, ANPA exhorts the example of
"one departed colleague and compatriot, Dr. Daniel Nwankewo," who reportedly
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gave to the association a memorial trust fund that put its membership into investment
in the capital gains. The future of this "trust fund," particularly its "financial
capacity to do charitable work that would last generations after generations," not
only recognizes "such opportunity at the young age," but would enable its adherents
to set "up a long-term philanthropic goal." ANPA has identified this process as the
key to success in the future. 1
The preceding background, as we have already hinted, undoubtedly explains
the admiration of Nigerian physicians in philanthropic activities. Probably it also
explains the course of their persistence to embark on projects designed to usher in
Nigeria, along with the rest of Africa, into the fullest cycle of an industrial age. 2 But,
as we shall see slightly further down, it is also at the intersection between adapting
the Jewish and Asiatic vision toward the regeneration of the homelands that ANPA
reveals its weaknesses.
Despite, of course, what appears to be its commitment to the mission of
medical and industrial regeneration of the homeland, the ANPA thrust is also driven
by the crisis of the racial "otherness" that seriously begun to confront a majority of
this most skilled class of Nigerians in the diaspora from the 1980s onward.
3
But
ANPA appears to have been more optimistic throughout the remaining part of the
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1990s that it could find collaborative partners that would supports its initiative of
developing the homeland. By that time, ANPA believed that its success in this
venture would depend on its own commitment. Drawing from both the Jewish and
Asiatic experiences, ANPA envisioned giving of itself and of its tremendous skills
back to the future course of recovery of the homeland. To succeed in this endeavor
ANPA argued that Nigeria's national character required more substantive changes
from its current context of economic and political indiscipline.
ANPA thus shares in the wisdom that good healthcare services in the
Nigerian homeland would be conditioned by improved socioeconomic and politico-
cultural milieu within the larger nation-state. During its Third Annual Convention at
Chicago in 1997, Professor Chukwuedu Nwokolo, the guest speaker, observed that:
"In addition to the problems specific to health care, there are several very serious
national impediments which greatly inhibit and undermine development activities
everywhere."
1
Further, Nwokolo observed that the national impediments to sound
healthcare services included, the "failure of Nigeria to industrialize its handicaps in
modern communication, failure of financial institutions, destitution of the Nigerian
school system, and breakdown of the infrastructure of the health institutions
everywhere." But, according to Professor Nwokolo, these crises were heightened by
"societal indiscipline that reached a peak within the last ten years." These crises, as
he further observed, must be addressed and corrected to enhance the prospect of
sustained development in Nigeria. 2
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Nwokolo therefore seemed right in urging Nigerians to strive "to follow the
well defined footsteps of former third world nations of the Asian Pacific region who
have now moved on to the other worlds." 1 He called upon Nigeria to "tackle the
fundamental cankerworm of indiscipline and corruption while planning and
implementing all other programmes."2 To Nwokolo, the conditions that enabled
Korea and Malaysia to sell "motor vehicles and computers equipment to us," as well
as to send "experts to find out in the spirit of South-South cooperation what
happened to us along the way," have its root in "a failure of leadership."3
The preceding could very well explain—why, during the inauguration of
ANPA in 1995—the presiding leadership emphasized making the Nigerian-African
background more respectable in the eyes of the world. ANPA even argued in its
2000 editorial that the peculiar problem confronting Africans in the continent, or in
sub-Saharan Africa, where the evidences are about the most retarded, was neither
due to colonial dispossession nor one to be resolved nor corrected by blaming
outsiders. Japan, it argued, which was once handicapped was later able to prove that
it could surmount its obstacles, thus making its people respected in the world over.
Japan has since shown the world that the best providence can endow a nation is not
always material resources. With the respect earned in a little over thirty years after
raising themselves from the ashes of 1945, ANPA felt justified in arguing that, "the
entire world must now pronounce Japanese names."
4
This meant then that, "If the
'ibid., pp. xiii, 462.
2
Ibid., p. 463.
3
Ibid., p. 462. Also, see Chinua Achebe, The Trouble with Nigeria (London and Nairobi:
Heinemann, 1983), p. 1.
4ANPA (2000), p. xix.
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leaders of Nigeria create a milieu that truly encourages creativity, excellence, hard
work and ingenuity, it could be a nation someday that would be respected all over
the world."
1
ANPA Redemption Missions to the Homeland: A Brief Assessment
There is therefore no doubt that the ANPA leadership represents the birth of a
more pliable body of Nigerian-African professionals in the Americas. Within a short
time, its professional aptitude has offered the most reliable data for gauging the
direction of the class of high skilled Nigerian personnel likely to succeed within the
American capitalist system. Indeed, where both the ANPA leadership and its related
human membership stands in the historic effort of leading either Nigeria or the entire
of Africa into an industrial transformation must be seen as commendable necessary
first steps from the diaspora. Such also is its credit in helping to found SANPA—
a
supplementary back-up umbrella organization tied to its historic efforts. Besides, of
course, its willingness to borrow from the Jewish and Asiatic models represents a
meaningful response to the pressing crisis of underdevelopment in the Nigerian or
the African homelands. By envisioning the unity of its enormous talents with the
emerging generation of SANPA, these two closely knit branches of the Nigerian
physician-type leadership have indicated a willingness to "strengthen and established
trans-Atlantic bridge between North America and Nigeria."
ANPA, in fact, appears to be very conscious of its historic mission within the
renewed Afro-Atlantic triangle of exchanges in the twenty-first century. This fact is
'Ibid.
2ANPA (2000), p. xii.
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exactly what comes across in its editorial in 2000: "When the history of the twenty-
first century is written, we hope ANPA would be remembered maybe not for any
heroism but hopefully as a generation of patriotic Nigerians in the Diaspora who
made some modest contributions to the rebuilding of the father land. Or still, as a
group of Nigerians who attempted to lay a strong foundation for the future both here
in North America and also in their homeland-Nigeria." 1
But perhaps because ANPA is dominated by medical scientists, some of its
noble objectives toward the regeneration of the homeland reveal signs of serious
misunderstanding over deep-seated facts of its peculiar historical background. With
such misunderstanding, some of its emphases are at best, historically misconstrued,
or even false. For example, to a certain extent, the effectiveness of the Jewish and
Asiatic diaspora, in advancing the pace of human development in their respective
homelands, is probably due more to their favorable historical settings than any other
factor. One explanation is that they have been least susceptible to the enduring crisis
of socio-cultural "otherness" on the basis of their race since the opening of the
modern era than African descent people. To be sure, the ANPA dogma expresses
itself within a socio-cultural orbit which calls for a much closer look. The more
serious omission in its claims of redemptive missions to the Nigerian-African
homeland lies in its misunderstanding of the related role played by the descendants
of slaves.
2 We hope to show slightly below that this is an important basis for a
critical review of the ideological platform ofANPA.
'ibid., pp. xvii-xix.
2
See, for example, Chapter 1 of this dissertation on "mission of African Redemption" and
"Pan-Africanism."
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Since its early formative years, ANPA has seemed imbedded in the nature of
crises that were traceable to its inexperience in meddling with the complex
historiography of the Afro-Atlantic triangle of the black struggle. First, ANPA was
not very explicit as to whether the major concerns leading to its founding in 1995
were driven by the nature of the socio-cultural experiences operative in the racial
orbit of its American interaction. Second, it did not explain what its reference on
how the lot of Nigerian physicians had confronted the new changes within the U.S.
healthcare system meant. The emphasis here is that, this critical position should
have been explained before moving to emphasize its medical objectives for Nigeria,
as well as the related desire to combat its deteriorating healthcare system.
Yet, the failure to explain the above context still deflected some evidences
that suggested that the ANPA dogma co-existed with socio-cultural stress .'
Significantly, the high population of Nigerian physicians in the U.S. trained at
Nigerian/African medical schools pointed strongly toward a probability that both the
founding of ANPA as well as its current vision had their take off in unfavorable
workplace settings. 2 By early years of the 2000s, both the ANPA leadership as well
as its larger memberships comprised mostly of Nigerians trained at the Nigerian
medical schools; others were trained within Africa or outside Africa. These were
those whose re-adaptive cultural skills were readily pronounced, and who comprised
the most vulnerable wing of physicians currently practicing in America. The general
workplace apathy which has impinged on this body of skilled professionals can be
'ANPA , 2000, p. 391. This is based on examination of the ANPA profiles from 1994 to
2000, including interviews.
2
Ibid. Also, see Figures 7.1-7.4; Table 16.2.
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explained by complex intra-cultural adjustments, which might have been
unfavorable. There is a strong likelihood that the effect of sudden changes within the
medical establishment during the mid-1990s was particularly stronger for physicians
trained within Africa than elsewhere.
For example, as we indicated earlier, about 21,000 Nigerian physicians were
reportedly in the U.S. probably between 1993 and 1995. 1 But between 1994 and
1996, for example, the officially certified and published number of Nigerian
physicians in the U.S. was about 4,000. 2 This might suggest that a majority of them
were not practicing physicians for reasons that could very well be associated with
cultural constraints. Thus, as the largest base of African scientific establishment in
the diaspora, Nigerian physicians are undoubtedly among the most affected
professional groups within the ongoing economic integration of American
professionals. Both globalization and integration are occurring simultaneously with
socio-cultural indifference as well as hierarchic stratification of racial groups. The
enduring effects of the "skin color," which historian Lincoln examined about forty
years ago,
3
is even a more relevant for explaining the current socio-cultural context
of the skilled class of the black African labor migrants in America.
4
For, as Lincoln argued, "the fundamental problem of color and group identity
derives in large measure from the desire of the established white hegemony ... to
'See, for example, earlier notes especially in Chapters 1 and 3; Gordon, Nigeria's Diverse
Peoples
, p. 236.
2
See ANPA published data 1994-1996.
3
Eric Lincoln, "Color and Group Identity in the United States," in Color and Race, ed., John
Hope Franklin (Boston: Houghton Mufflin Company, 1968), p. 249.
"ibid.; Apraku, African Emigres in the United States , pp. 3-9, 19, 110; Authur, Invisible
Sojourners
, pp. 3-4.
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distinguish itself by all means available from the blacks." 1 While, on the other hand,
color is an unreliable basis for determining human qualities, it is with race that the
question of color is ultimately concerned. Lincoln further observed that: "In the
social relations in the United States, color is often read as a signal to denigrate, to
discriminate, to segregate."
2
Anthropologist Ogbu, on the other hand, argued that
the experience of historically marginalized racial minorities in American society
correlated with their state of underdevelopment.3 Based then on the Ogbu thesis,
there is a basis that African-Americans and hence Nigerian immigrants, are likely to
be among the most susceptible groups to racism and discrimination.4
Not surprisingly, Nigerian physicians in America fall into the racial category
of those with supposedly low "Ethnic Differences in Cognitive Ability." Their
socio-cultural features, moreover, are presumed to have unmistaken correlation with
low "psychometric properties of the standardized test" noted against blacks in Africa
and America. 5 These facts are perhaps rendered more correctly in corroboration with
the black experience than with class differences in the U.S.
6 The fact that the
'Lincoln, Color and Race , p. 25 1
.
2
Ibid.; Linda Vigilant, "Race and Biology," in Global Convulsions: Race. Ethnicity, and
Nationalism at the End of the Twentieth Century , ed., Winston A. Van Home (New York:
State University ofNew York Press, 1997), pp. 49-56; Martin Bernal, "Race and History," in
Global Convulsions , pp. 75-6.
3Ogbu, "The Consequences of American Caste System," pp. 19-56.
"ibid.; Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery , pp. 3-5; Apraku, African Emigres in
the United States , pp. 19, 110; Portes and Rumbaut, Immigrant America, pp. 58-81, 90-2,
94-7; Landry, America at Century's End , pp. 202-3; Alejanro Portes and Min Zhou, "The
New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and Its Variant," Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science 530 (November, 1993), p. 84.
5The Bell Curve , pp. 288-289.
6
Ibid. Also, see, Chapter 1; Cindy Rodriguez, "Study Shows Blacks Trailing Immigrants
from Africa, Caribbean," The Boston Globe (February 17, 2003); Lapham, 1990-3, "Census
Reports Among Immigrant Groups," Public Opinion Office , September 1993); Trotter
Review
, p. 3 1
.
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"predictive validity of tests for academic and job performance seems to be about the
same" for Africans and African-Americans further suggests that the experience of
the ANPA professionals will be arduous. Yet, a majority of its members,
particularly those trained in America and Europe, attended some of the finest
medical schools. 1
The preceding background perhaps best explains why Winston Home sees
the emphases by scholars in The Bell Curve as an attempt to insist upon the notion of
an inherent inequality of American races. This development, as he further argues,
was first evident in the degradation of African-Americans on the basis of their color
within the racialist traditions of colonial America, and later of the U.S.2 There is no
doubt that the racialist traditions which Lincoln and Home have emphasized for
African-Americans have now extended to the Nigerian or to the black African skilled
professionals in America.3
The shift therefore from managed healthcare system to computerize
medicine, as we saw earlier, marked the first fateful development leading to the call
on the Nigerian medical professionals to rally around a common interest. This call,
which was intended to "showcase the talents and expertise that exist within the
Nigerian community,"4 may have been a necessary response to an emergent socio-
cultural workplace changes. These occurrences can even be viewed in light of the
'For example, this is supported by information on the ANPA Directories, 1994-2000.
2 Winston A. Van Home, "A Cross-Century Tradition Concerning Race and Intellect," in
Global Convulsions: Race. Ethnicity, and Nationalism at the End of the Twentieth-Century ,
ed., W.A.V. Home (New York: State University ofNew York Press, 1997), pp. 63-73.
3
Ibid. Also, see earlier notes on historian Lincoln, and related emphases in Apraku, African
Emigres in the United States , pp. 3-9, 19, 1 10; and Authur, Invisible Sojourners, pp. 3-4.
"ANPA (2000), p. 391
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emerging compartmentalization of the medical profession by the medical
establishment. Probably some identifiable changes in computerized medicine began
to work against racial minorities during the 1980s. By around mid- 1 990s, especially
with the publication of The Bell Curve, some of the crises associated with the latter
emphases had begun to transform workplace relations and attitudes among varying
high-skilled professions in America. 1
If the above is correct, chances then are that the changes alluded to earlier by
Dr. Emeruwa, probably had much in common with events that were traceable to the
1980s. This development, which reached its heights during the Reagan era, had
strong impact on foreign-born settlers in America. Along with this background, the
renewed racial climate from the early to mid-1990s, for example, was least favorable
to Nigerian physicians or to their related counterparts elsewhere in this country. 2
Dr. Emeruwa' s insistence on raising the American-born offspring of Nigerian
physicians with due consideration to the values of the homeland was perhaps another
way of responding to an existing socio-cultural conflict: "how do we raise our
children in the best traditions of Nigeria? How do we transmit our culture and values
to these children?" Still, within this context, he observed that, "other issues we face
include professional ones such as the change in the health care environment in the
USA—from managed care to the issue of computers in medicine." This last
emphasis seems to depend on control over professional access within the medical
'ibid. Also see, Jennings' emphases in "Conclusion: Racial Hierarchy and Ethnic Conflict in
the United States," pp. 144-154. The Jennings emphases were probably transformed
between early 1980s and 1990s.
2
Ibid. Also, see Apraku, African Emigres in the United States , pp. 19, 110.
3ANPA (2000), p. 391.
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establishment, which most Nigerian physicians did not have.
1
This strongly suggests
that things were not going well with Nigerian physicians in America, as indeed such
evidences were common place in American electronic news media in the late 1990s.
Thus, given the preceding emphases, there is a strong likelihood that, the
adjustment made by Nigerian physicians in the U.S. to some changes in their
profession, especially during the mid-1990s, was either due to the new technologies
or growing manifestation of cultural stress. This seems to have influenced the
founding of ANPA in 1995. The development marked as well the genesis of its
mission of medical redemption to the homeland from the diaspora.
Viewed within this context, the birth of ANPA may very well have marked
an historic fist-step toward sustained consolidation of Nigerian medical scientists
within the Western Hemisphere.
3
Accordingly, in a situation where workplace
attitudes were least likely to favor Nigerian physicians, the ultimate
founding of
ANPA corresponded with the ways that historically marginalized groups have often
attempted to re-adapt themselves as well as their skills in eras
of crises. For
example, with freedom from slavery, African-Americans responded
to racial
resentment and discrimination by developing black-owned institutions.
This had the
effects of releasing most of them from direct forms of racial
oppression. The
founding of the first black Church in America corresponded
with the response to the
'Ibid On the other hand, this emphasis is supported by the ANPA data
and interviews.
2
"Foreign-born Doctors in America," 60 Minutes (November 6, 1999).
^Ibid. Ihis development followed a similar pattern
identified #er»y ev^onof
Nieerian/African transformation in America-particularly
from late 1970s to 1980s. Also
I my optoto the adjustment undertaken by the ANPA toward
the N.genan homeland was
is] no less different from the one which
influenced the "af*^*"*™
migrants during the Reagan era.... and thereafter; Udofia,
Re^rcLRe^ort, pp. 25-38.
racism and discrimination which confronted the descendants of slaves who attended
predominantly white congregation.
1
Coincidentally after about four centuries, a
similar attitude of socio-cultural constraints accounted for the founding of
Nigerian/African immigrant churches in America. Earlier, as well, this same
background had influenced the missions of African redemption from the diaspora to
the homeland among some the descendants of American slaves. The ANPA
missions of medical redemption from the diaspora to the Nigerian homeland during
the 1990s were no less different.
2
Aside then from the inherent problem of workplace stress, ANPA is as yet to
evolve a disciplined professional interaction among the varying establishments of
Nigerian immigrants or African immigrants in America. This negligence appears to
presage future crises in its mission from the diaspora. As a young organization, the
ANPA leadership, along with its membership, depends on philanthropic support to
contest its homebound programs. ANPA can, of course, claim to be a Nigerian
organization with a far lesser degree of tribal/ethnic pandering among its
membership. But such a fact is not an adequate basis for what appears to be a
calculated distancing from other American-based organizations of Nigerians while
claiming to represent Nigeria in the diaspora.
3 Only sustained interactions within the
Nigerian/African immigrant communities can fully legitimize its representation as
well as status as an effective medium of developing the homeland.
'Horton and Horton, Tn Hope of Liberty , pp. 137-8. Also, see Chapter 1 of this
dissertation.
These socio-cultural crises are almost similar to those identifiable among
ordinary Nigerian
immigrants during the Reagan era. See, for example, Chapters 4-6.
2
Ibid.
3
This position is based on fieldwork and interviews.
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Probably the most identifiable weakness of ANPA is in its uncritical
admiration of the Jewish and Asian models. This attitude appears to blur an effective
grasp of the varied complexities surrounding the current status of human
underdevelopment in Africa. This weakness is perhaps more revealing in ANPA's
overemphasis rather than in the soundness of the Jewish-Asiatic models. For
example, ANPA's admiration of the progress of post-Second World War Japan
showed no grasp of an earlier one among the descendants of slaves. But,
coincidentally, despite dissimilarities in historical eras, their admiration for Japan
was almost similar. As Marc Garllicchio has demonstrated, the admirable status of
Japan in the world scene was first exhorted by the black diaspora of enslavement.
Like ANPA, moreover, the descendants of slaves admired and even celebrated the
rise and triumph of the Japanese people.
1 They—like ANPA—saw in the Japanese
progress the necessary example in their struggle for a better future through self
determination. "The wonderful progress of Japan and their sudden rise to a position
of one of the great nations of the world," even Booker T. Washington once admitted
to a Japanese editor, "has nowhere been studied with greater interest or enthusiasm
than by the Negroes of America."
2
Nevertheless, while both the Jewish and Asiatic
footing is plausible, the ANPA tended to misunderstand where and how its inherent
historical setting contrasted with theirs. This is a serious weakness; for
it reveals a
loose grasp of its peculiar historical orbit.
If, as we pointed out, the ordeal of the black experience also
affected ANPA,
it does appear that a much clearer grasp of its often conflicting
Afro-Atlantic context,
'Gallicchio, Black Internationalism in Asia. 1895-1945, p. 14.
2
Ibid.
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is likely to enhance the success of its medical missions to the homeland. Certainly
the ANPA views about the Japanese experience, in particular, can be queried. The
comparison of the Japanese experience with the Nigerian-African experience under
colonialism is commendable but imprecisely linked. For example, there was a
marked difference between the internal fracture of Japanese and Nigerian societies
under colonialism, which was later mirrored in terms of the advantages of one nation
over the continuing handicap of the other. This is not, however, to accept some of
the shameful evidences of the political indiscipline in post-colonial Africa, along
with the related problem of corruption, misrule, and of undue human hardships.
Rather, it is to understand that the Japanese experience within the European
context, for example, was markedly dissimilar from that of black Africa. Historian
Davidson has argued that the political sociology of Africa" under colonial
dispossession was "peculiar to itself."
1
Japan, according to Davidson, had a
dissimilar experience with Europe compared to Africa. Davidson further argues that
the dissimilarity between Japan and black Africa lies in the peculiar fact that
Africans had suffered more deeply than did the Japanese under colonialism. As
Davidson concludes: "One may reasonably reply that in this case the modernizing
revolution of Japan could not have been carried through" had its peoples been "made
a target of . . . colonial dispossession in the second half of the nineteenth century."
3
Nor, moreover, could the Japanese revolution "have succeeded," had the Western
'Davidson, Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State , pp. 63.
2
Ibid., pp. 64-6.
3
Ibid., p. 65.
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enclosure and dispossession and its agencies "taken from the Japanese all scope for
their own initiative and enterprise." 1
Therefore, in a sense, the ANPA ideological exhortation toward the
homelands exhibits almost a similar weakness as that identified by Harold Cruse for
the Negro intellectual. This is a weakness of spurious extraction of ideas from
outsiders' views despite the more peculiar historical facts surrounding the black
experience both in America and Africa. 2 For, admittedly, where ANPA does not
understand the extent to which the peculiar history of the black experience contrasts
sharply with that of other races—while still suffering from its effects—its lanes of
collaborative exchanges with the homelands are likely to be susceptible to
incrimination. This seems to be the kind of oversight that is likely to blur its future
direction in an otherwise well-founded mission.
It is worth again emphasizing at this juncture that, what defines the
effectiveness of the Jewish and Asiatic models, which ANPA seems to
misunderstand, is traceable to their more sustainable context within the European
global network. The ANPA prospect of a lasting success may very well depend on
the extent to which the major cultural forces of advanced world capitalism determine
the varying collaborative contexts which influence its efforts to incorporate the
homeland into high skilled industrial sector. This may require an understanding of
'Ibid.
2
Ernest J. Wilson, 111, "Foreword," in Harold Cruse's Crisis of the Negro Intellectua l, pp. i-
vi, especially the Chapter VI entitled, "Role of the Negro Intellectual—Survey of the
Dialogue Deferred." One can sometimes see this pattern of the "Crisis of the Negro
intellectual" evolving among adherents of U.S.-based organizations of Nigerians/Africans.
This is particularly evident in their striving to bring their countries or the continent line with
the trend of development in the Western world. On the other hand, very few of Africans
have pondered over the complex horizon surrounding their craze for the outsiders' models.
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its competitive margins within existing unequal hierarchic classifications of
European and Asian dominated global networks. 1
ANPA's emphases regarding the philanthropic gains of the American by-
law2 also suggest some misunderstanding of some context and facts. For, while
these anticipations seem valid, they are likely to be constrained by the absence of a
viable institutional support within the American mosaic. The general overemphasis
regarding the gains of the American philanthropic by-law does suggest that the
ANPA leadership has as yet to understand the socio-cultural and political intricacies
surrounding organizations with its kind of public agenda. For, to be sure, the
historical context in which the Jews and Asians have succeeded in philanthropic
projects in America, and hence in the benefits of tax-exempt status, is somewhat
dissimilar with that of ANPA. While ANPA has every right to tap into the standing
benefits of the American by-laws to facilitate its medical mission to the Nigerian
homeland, its lasting success in the venture appears to require a more thorough grasp
of the process. Even with the best of intentions, an overwhelming reliance on
philanthropic platform via the tax-exempt claims seems to underestimate the
powerful groundswell of institutional forces likely to be touched off by some of its
unsolicited public overtures. Because the ANPA-American public overtures are not
as yet based on actively sustained institutional support, some of its aspirations
toward the homeland from the diaspora are mere presumptions.
3
Indeed, its
admiration for the ingenuity of the Jewish and Asiatic models ought then to be based
'
Research Report
, pp. 42-3.
2ANPA (2000), pp. xiv-xv.
3
In my opinion, some of the emphasis found in Ruben and Rumbaut's Immigrant America ,
p. 112, can also explain the ANPA context.
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on some understanding of the events that have shaped the descendants of forced
migration and post-colonial African migration in America.
Surprisingly, ANPA places the economic and industrial imperatives of its
vision too assuredly outside the Pan-Africanist framework. Yet, as we have shown
thus far, the redemptive missions of the black diaspora of enslavement were foremost
in heralding the notion of African regeneration. 1
By all the available criteria, the ANPA and SANPA visions of a Nigerian-
African world development are nothing more than a recreation of earlier redemptive
missions of the black diaspora. Shepperson and Uya and Geshoni have credited the
generation of the Middle Passage for heralding organized mission of African
redemption. This redemptive medium was among the earliest channels of
attempting to bridge the vast lag in human development deflected against sub-
Saharan Africa largely by the transatlantic slave trade. 3
Legum also observed that from the early 20th century to the Second World
War, the birth of formal Pan-Africanism served as a new bridge in the commerce of
ideas via the Atlantic triangle.
4 ANPA's redemptive medical missions to
Nigeria/Africa were also basic the re-creation of the Pan-Africanist summons to
African-descended peoples everywhere to work collectively toward the development
of the homeland. 5 For example, its official summons on cultural differences,
'For example, see chapter 3.
2
Shepperson, "Notes," pp. 301-312; Uya, The Black Brotherhood ; Uya, "Afro-
American/African Relations," in Global Dimensions of the Black Diaspora, pp. 70-4;
Gershoni, Africans on African Americans , especially Chapters 1-3.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.; Legum, Pan-Africanism , p. 14.
5
Esedebe, Pan-Africanism: The Idea and Movement , pp. 2-3.
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multiculturalism, integration and interaction of cultures are Pan-Africanist.
Similarly, its emphases on the pains and gains of assimilation are inherently Pan-
Africanist.
1
Essentially, while leaning on the Jewish-Asian models, the ANPA hopes of
Nigerian/African regeneration for its mission as well as for the succeeding
generations of American-born offspring of Nigerian immigrants are rooted in the
earlier conjectures of Negro-American Pan-Africanist aspiration. 2 This historical
coincidence is rather interesting, given its somewhat calculated isolation from an
open intra-Pan-Africanist partnerships.
Nor, moreover, did the philanthropic history of Nigerians or of Africans
abroad originate with ANPA. Although ANPA and SANPA are neither a political
nor apolitical organizations, nevertheless, their foundation and missions are basic
modifications of earlier patterns of African students' associations in the Americas
and Europe. 3
Both the West African Students Union (WASU) and African Students
Association in the Americas (ASAA) were founded in the early decades of the
twentieth century out of the noble desire to chart the course of self-determination and
development back in the homelands. 4 The founding in 1924 of WASU in London
was shaped by the aim of developing a generation of African leaders who were later
to lead Africans to liberation from colonial yoke. This later formed the basis of
"ANPA (1996), pp. 165-168.
2
For example, see earlier notes on chapter 3.
3ANPA (2000), pp. xi-xx.
4
Osedebe, Pan-Africanism: The Idea and Movement , pp. 95-100.
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African liberation movements from colonialism. 1 Like ANPA, those earlier
associations of African students abroad were founded by a few dedicated members
before becoming the medium of collective liberation for the many back in the
homelands. Similarly, they correctly shared in the soundness of the cultural as well
as moral and political responsibilities of helping to redeem the homeland from alien
exploitation, human degradation, and racism. Historian King tells us that these
Africans looked "forward to a day when representatives from various parts of Africa
can meet in a general convention to discuss the problems of common interest which
bear on African people." 3
Perhaps the missions of WASU/ASAA and ANPA/SANPA were only
dissimilar in terms of their historical eras . If so, an understanding of the historical
orientation of the black struggle in America as well as its African rampart is an
important intersection in explaining the varying eras of the black sojourn in the
Western Hemisphere. 4
To begin with, evidences are supportive that adherents of WASU/ASAA and
ANPA/SANPA5 were willing to sacrifice their time, their skills, and their
professional prospects in developing a network of inter-regional and continental
liberation and development. Similarly, the success of their missions also depended
'ibid.; pp. 215-17; ANPA (2000), pp. xi-xx.; Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism,
pp. 202-4..
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.; King, Pan-African Education , p. 218.
4
Landry, America at Century's End , pp. 202-3; Coleman, Nigeria: Background to
Nationalism , pp. 239-245; Osedebe, Pan-Africanism: The Idea and Movement, pp. 95-100.
5
Ibid., pp. 181-5, 192-3; Geiss, Pan-African Movement, pp. 295-304; Legum, Pajh
Africanism , pp. 26-36; Shepperson, "Notes," pp. 301-312; and ANPA (2000), pp. xii-xviii.
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on the support of both the white and black institutions of the Western world. 1
However, unlike ANPA/SANPA, members of WASU/ASAA were not a settler
community of Africans in the diaspora: they were mostly students. Until the late
1950s, a majority of Africans south of the Sahara were not under political freedom.
Consequently, their immigration to the U.S was not a product of the disruption of
post-colonial institutions—as was the case, for example, during a greater part of the
late 1980s and early 1990s—for a majority of the ANPA adherents. This strongly
suggests that the difference between earlier and current redemptive missions of
Nigerians [Africans] from the diaspora to the homelands lies more in generational
changes within varied historical eras rather than in ideologies.
Conclusively, nearly all the important aspects of ANPA's missions to the
homeland from America corroborated those earlier undertaken by the black diaspora
of enslavement. The ANPA/SANPA visions are therefore no new creations in the
Atlantic triangle of Euro-African and Afro-Atlantic connections. From the mid-
19408 onward, when Africans began to take formal frontline leadership from the
New World blacks, the generations of WASU/ASAA were mostly those at the helm
of the liberation movements.
By 1960s, moreover, when a majority of Africans were free from alien rule,
these men represented the dominant base of the new leaders of independent Africa.
The new status of Africa that began to emerge as from the late 1950s was the
'ibid. This is based on analyses of ANPA 's activities and goals as well as Pan-African
orientations in the Americas, Europe, and Africa. Particularly important are the obvious
reversed relationships within a continuum of the frameworks, that is, between the current
patterns and earlier ones. For example, see Osedebe, Pan-Africanism: The Idea and
Movement : Geiss, Pan-African Movement : and in Shepperson, "Notes."
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consummation of the union between the descendants of slaves and Western-educated
Africans abroad. 1
Given these antecedents, it is instructive to place the redemptive missions of
ANPA to the Nigerian homelands within the historiography of Pan-Africanism. That
its leadership leans more favorably toward the Jewish and Asian models should not
negate where the true historical essence emanated. Even where ANPA rarely refers
to earlier Pan-Africanist antecedents, its similarities are irrefutable. 2
Of far greater significance is that differences in historical cycles, as evident in
the renewed Euro-African contacts, strongly suggest that ANPA and other Nigerian
representative organizations in the diaspora—have finally entered into an era of
sustainable interaction within the Western world. This might even represent one of
the strongest bridges of controllable exchanges and development linking the diaspora
of colonialism and the homeland in the twenty-first century.
Summary
The Nigerian immigrant community in America began largely with students'
immigrants between the mid-1970s and early 1980s. This background later formed
the core of the Nigerian diaspora of colonialism. Between mid-1980s and 1990s,
Nigerians further consolidated their American build-up through successive waves of
chain immigrations. This represented the first sustained historic concentration of
voluntary waves of Nigerians since the demise of slavery and colonialism. This
development was influenced by the historical and political cycles of black America,
'ibid.; Legum, Pan-Africanism , pp. 24-32.
2
Ibid.
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as well as by the policies of two American presidencies: Jimmy Carter and Ronald
Reagan.
The Nigerian immigrant community is more operative within the African-
American context, both as a natural impulse of its ancestral relationship as well as an
imperative of racial identity
.
The African-American context provided the strongest
arm in the contextual development of Nigerian immigrant community as well as in
the general transformation of Nigerians. Within this context, the Nigerian churches
and American-born offspring of Nigerians are the most identifiable arms of ancestral
relationships with African-Americans. In adjusting into the American mosaic,
Nigerians almost unconsciously recreated patterns of socioeconomic and cultural
survival identifiable among African-Americans after freedom from slavery.
The five major leadership models widely in use among Nigerian immigrants
within the U.S. and toward the development of the homeland are: (1) Ethnic
Conscious-type Leadership (2) Elected-type Leadership (3) Women-type Leadership
(4) Nigerian-American Youth-type Leadership, and (5) Representative Professional-
Type Leadership. The strongest components of Representative Professional-Type
Leadership of Nigerian immigrants are the Attorney-Type Leadership and the
Physician-Type Leadership. The major ideological outlines of the Physician-Type
Leadership of Nigerian immigrants are basic recreations of earlier redemptive
platforms of black America toward ancestral Africa.
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CHAPTER 5
THE EXTENT OF INCORPORATION OfNIGERIANS:
A NEW SOCIO-CULTURAL MILIEU IN THE UNITED STATES
This chapter explains how Nigerian immigrants are being incorporated into
American society. It also contains some explanation of their socio-cultural context
and experience. The chapter emphasizes that the incorporation of Nigerian
immigrants into society is more favorable to their offspring; that their socio-cultural
experience is similar to that of the descendants of slaves; and that their impressive
educational status is more favorable to economic incorporation. Additionally, it
explains the effects of American institutions on indigenous Nigerian marriages,
along with the struggles between tradition and changes, the emerging inter-
generational crises of the Nigerian offspring—their relationships with black America
and the Nigerian homeland—as well as with mainstream America, etc.
Part 1 : Re-creative Patterns of Inter-Ethnic and
Intra-Racial Class Conflict
The enormous achievements and crises that resulted from the successful
adjustment of Nigerian immigrants into the American mosaic, which we saw in
Chapter 4, have then to be explained in relation to the changes that began to affect
both their African and American foundations. This implies understanding the extent
to which the continuing crisis of American slavery and colonialism either facilitated
or constrained the spirit of collective unison among the Nigerian settlers, as well as
of relations with African-Americans. On the other hand, it implies seeking some
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understanding of the basic commonalities and differences in the historical
relationships between African-Americans and the Nigerian settlers in America.
The preceding emphasis can be explained in terms of the differing but
somewhat closely related histories of America's immigrants since the birth of the
new republic. This requires as an understanding of the bittersweet experiences of
some branches of ethnic America. Every generation of its settlers has experienced as
well as shared in the bittersweet struggle of crossing the waters of the Atlantic to find
a new home. Mostly economic and political as well as religious compulsions have
combined to embolden the human or racial varieties associated with crossing the
Atlantic to this land of freedom and opportunity. Within this context lies the notion
of an American dream. The aspiration to be an American and to benefit from its
enormous bounties, historian Countryman tells us, has been as related as markedly
dissimilar for the White, Red, and Black races who were enjoined at the core of the
"Collision of Histories."
1
What then constitutes the concept of historical collision in A Country of
Strangers
2
has an added bearing on the character of post-emancipation settlers from
Europe, Asia, and Africa in America. Of course, in similar albeit varying degrees,
their strivings for the American dream have often varied both in historical periods as
well as in the available opportunities for those who came and continue to come. This
is the case because each definitive historical era of American immigration has
always been influenced by the attitude of its earlier and much newer generations of
'Countryman, Americans: A Collision of Histories , pp. xi-xii, 4-9, 83.
2David K. Shipler, A Country of Strangers (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997).
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settlers. The general politico-cultural milieu shaping their diverse characteristics has
also always played an important role in their strivings for success.
On the other hand, of course, what has continued to be an exceptional fact of
human prospects among the newer breed of foreign-born settlers in America since
the Civil War—even for descendants of slaves—is not that the possibility of the
American dream is not accessible, nor that the chances for its material opulence are
no more available. For example, given the current status of West Africa, where a
majority of the descendants of slaves came from, it would perhaps be wrong to argue
that they have not fared much better in America. For, indeed they have, despite the
continuing crisis. 1
So, the sometimes gruesome struggle among America's immigrants for its
"dream" is not only exceptional to the peculiar complexities surrounding the
experience of the descendants of slaves . But there is a difference: the latter were
forced into America against their will. The same emphasis, however the revolving
crisis of racial indifference in America, would seem inappropriate for the new
generation of mostly voluntary immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa. Yet,
accordingly, Americans of varying cultural backgrounds have confronted almost a
similar problem. With time and sustained support, as well as experience, they were
able to adopt or to re-adopt the values of the Old World to sooth themselves in the
new settings.
But, as historian Countryman points out, because the peculiar traits of the
black experience bore the deeper bruises resulting from the collision of histories,
'This position is fully supported by current status of Black America compared to West
Africa. It is also supported by the literature in Chapter 1 of this dissertation.
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some enduring negative effects have persisted against the descendants of slaves. 1
This development has strong bearing on the expressed lanes of some development
currently shaping the relationship between two historic generations of African
settlers in America. Due to the peculiar character of the black experience during and
after slavery, Nigerian immigrants are susceptible to almost the same pattern of crisis
within the mosaic that has historically affected their ancestral kin. This is the crisis
of "racial otherness" based on the effects of both the earlier and continuing conflict
of historical collision. This is a problem that might escape most other non-European
immigrants who are not African descended.
Consequently, raising the particular concern regarding the inordinate-
subordinate status of American blacks as political scientist Jennings has done, for
example, suggests that assimilating or incorporating Nigerians into American
society is likely to be problematic. The Nigerian context may offer insights that
could defy earlier theories of inter-group assimilation of ethnic America.
First, as noted earlier, the inter-generational attribute of American slavery
explains the socio-cultural context of Nigerian immigrants. Second, it also explains
the nature of the tenuous relationships that often find expression in some of the
attitudes of Nigerians and African-Americans. Third, and perhaps of far greater
significance, it offers a basis for explaining the extensions of historical crises
involving two generations of Africans in America, along with the attitudes
'See earlier notes on Countryman, Americans: A Collision of Histories . Also, see Blackburn,
The Making ofNew World Slavery , pp. 3-4.
2
Jennings, Blacks, Latinos, and Asians in Urban America, pp. 144-154. Also, see earlier
notes on the socio-cultural context ofANPA professionals in America.
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influencing their social crises.
1
That Nigerians succeeded in adjusting into the
American mosaic, must then be viewed as a remarkable historical feat. For, their
success, as we also saw earlier, was shaped by the generational experience of the
descendants of slaves. 2
By early 1990s, the Nigerian phenomenon had its most direct bearing by how
some Nigerian immigrants sought to employ the moral foundations of the American
republic to advance their collective interest. These Nigerians, seeking to identify and
redirect their diverse interests within the mosaic
—
just as their forebears had done
after slavery—enshrined their faith in the possibilities of American dreams. Their
faith offered some insight into the fact that, unless the moral foundation of America
was re-summoned, their collective stability would very likely be indeterminate.
To these Nigerians, moreover, the enormous gains of being a part of the
American dream were immeasurable. This is the understanding that gets across in a
book written by a Nigerian entitled, America the Beautiful in Our Life Time: A Step by
Step Program for the Radical Transformation of America .
3
In this book, Dr. Azuonye
goes as far as pointing out the virtues of America, calling for an understanding of the
underlying wisdom of its Founding Fathers . He argues that America must confront
and resolve some of its internal problems in order to secure the well-being of its
varied albeit beloved peoples within the existing republican principles.
'ibid. Also, see Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery, pp. 3-4; Authur, Invisible
Sojourners , pp. 3-4; Apraku, African Emigres in the United States , pp. 19, 110; Sanford J.
Ungar, Fresh Blood: The New American Immigrants (New York and London: Simon
&Schuster, 1995), pp. 258-9. Also, see Chapters 1-4 of this dissertation.
2
"The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. vii, 117-118; Udofia,
Research Report
, pp. 26, 40-1 . Also, see Chapter 4 and 6 of this dissertation.
3Ikechukwu O. Azuonye, America the Beautiful in Our Life Time: A Step by Step Program
for the Radical Transformation of America (New York: Vantage Press, 1992).
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Clearly, the process proposed by Azuonye seems designed to ease the
existing historical tensions among the American races, particularly for Nigerians. He
argues that America's truest greatness requires finding a realistic solution to the
ongoing cycles of racial crises, moral decadence, and involvements in foreign wars. 1
According to Azuonye, America must abandon the unhealthy program of
global intervention, thus retrieving itself from the role of a world policeman.
Overextensions, he argues, have drifted America from realizing its historic destiny of
being the truest evidence of human nobility and beauty. 2 So Azuonye documents
that,
I suspect that part of the answer we seek will come by way of another
shot at the melting pot. Whether this will result from the expansion of
cross-racial marriages or from some other factor operating in the
environment, I am unable to predict, but the overall effect of possible
future changes could be a new, unifying, and distinct American
identity—not European, African, "Native American," or Asian—but
an entirely new aspect ofconsciousness of a people.
3
As, for example, the legacy of the Founding Fathers of American nation,
Azuonye believes that,
If the people of the United States should at this time rededicate
themselves to the expression in everyday life of the full potential of
the Great Documents of their nation and apply themselves to the
exploration and development of their mental and physical
potentialities, society will certainly develop in wonderful directions
which we are at present unable to predict... We can certainly envision
a people whose character will be most exemplary, whose technology
will grow to exceed the wildest imaginings of science fiction writers,
whose government will be just and balanced, a people noble and
cultured beyond all others on earth, a society serving as a model for
the crest of the world to follow.
4
'Azuonye, America the Beautiful in Our Life Time , pp. vii-29.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid., p. 85.
4
Azuonye, America the Beautiful , p. 85.
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Even unconsciously, the Azuonye position, to be sure, is a basic recreation of
the ideological summons of the descendants of American slaves. At nearly all the
crucial intersections of their struggle for an equal place, they have called upon their
former enslavers and the larger nation-state to honor the noble credo of the
Declaration of Independence. In other words, the Azuonye parlance is another
expression of the existence of conflict at the core of sustained incorporation of
Nigerians into American society. For, admittedly, unless the conditions alluded to
by this Nigerian physician turned activist are removed, an equal place within the
American mosaic for such a handicapped immigrant group like Nigerians is, as we
hinted earlier, uncertain.
Answers to the concerns raised by Dr. Azuonye can then be explained by
understanding of how Nigerians are being incorporated into American society. Like
native-born blacks, Nigerians who succeeded in adjusting into American mosaic,
recognized that the "physical and permanent fact of color," was and is still a strong
barrier against favorable contextual incorporation.
So, in America, observes Igboanugo, discrimination is "generally
undercarpet, but mostly evident." Citing a typical dramatic example at Utah, he
points to how a "white woman got up and changed seats after realizing she was
sitting next to "a woman of color."
2
This further confirms the extent to which the
general socio-cultural context of Nigerians is being shaped by the generational
attributes of the descendants of American slaves.
'ibid.; Tocqueville, Democracy in America , pp. 357-9; Igboanugo, Nigerians in America, pp.
14-15; Apraku, African Emigres in the United States , pp. 19, 1 10.
2
Ibid., Igboanugo, p. 16.
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Sometimes, however, these attributes are more pronounced toward Nigerians
who have been able to acquire an American niche. At other times, however, even
their American success reinforces their instability within the brethren's communities.
Alternately, it is this same background that encourages some of the magnanimous
accounts of success stories among the few more fortunate Nigerians over the masses
of their less fortunate brethren. 1 Sometimes accounts of the success stories of
Nigerian immigrants against a growing tide of racial resentment follows almost a
similar pattern of make-beliefs identified among African-Americans by sociologist
Franklin Frazier in the decades after their emancipation from chattel slavery. 2
For, indeed, in nearly all aspects of their American evolution, one finds such
features as exaggerated sense of Nigerian success stories that bear strong
resemblance to the earlier experience of their ancestral kin, as well as to their general
state of powerlessness and contextual insecurity. Except however in one area, and
that is: Nigerian immigrants have more intimate certainty about their native and
national roots than their ancestral kin.
3
Otherwise their social context exudes with
exaggerated myth of success driven almost by the same socio-cultural denigration
and ostracism that once confronted the descendants of slaves.
4
There is a basis then for surmising that the socio-cultural attributes of most
Nigerians have merged with those of the descendants of slaves. These are capable of
'Udofia, Research Report
, pp. 38-40.
2
E. Franklin Frazier, Black Bourgeoisie (New York and London: Free Press Paperbacks,
1997), pp. 174-238; Portes and Rumbaut, Immigrant America: A Portrait, pp. 81, 90-2, 94-7;
Apraku, African Emigres in the United States , p. 19; Ogbaa, Nigerian Americans , pp. 138-
167.
3
Harold Cruse, The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual , pp. 433-5.
"Frazier, Black Bourgeoisie
, pp. 174-238.
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sustaining the bond between the two related and affected groups, depending, though,
on the attitudes of the mainstream agenda. On the other hand, these attitudes can
sometimes be helpful to further understanding of the peculiar similarities and
dissimilarities between the black experience in Africa and America. 1
Among Nigerian immigrants, as for their African-American kin, the problem
of make-beliefs—which we noted earlier, along with its exaggerated sense of
success—is further exacerbated by inter-ethnic class struggle. The extension of this
problem lies in the fact that, despite their good education and hence huge gains in
median income, as also in the general placement of the black African skilled
immigrants, they still occupy an unequal status among America's newcomers.2
Whether for Nigerian immigrants, as a specific group or for the entire black
African immigrants, the problem of inter-ethnic class struggle is closely tied to their
unequal racial status in the diaspora, and back in the homeland. This background,
which was first ordained during the historical cycle of racial slavery, has followed a
similar trend during and after colonial dispossession. Since then, it has continued to
retain its arduous effects on Nigerians/Africans and African-Americans despite the
'For example, in 1994, scholars in The Bell Curve took a position that confirmed the
existence of "Ethnic Difference in Cognitive Ability" as well as "How . . . African
Americans compare with Blacks in Africa on Cognitive Tests" (pp. 288-9). Portes and
Rumbaut, Immigrant America , pp. 90-7; Landry, America at Century's End, pp. 202-3;
Apraku, African Emigres in the United States , pp. 19, 110); Judy Pamphile, "Education in
America: African Americans vs.: African and Caribbean Immigrants," in Scholars of the
Twenty-first Century: End of Year Research Reports . Spring 2005 (Amherst: University of
Massachusetts, August 30, 2005), pp. 1-3; Authur, Invisible Sojourners , pp. 2-4.
2
Ibid. Author, Invisible Sojourners , 45-8; Nigerians in the Atlanta Region: Ethnic Regional
Community Profile (Atlanta, Georgia: The Atlanta Regional Commission, 1994), pp. 1-2;
Cindy Rodriquez, "Study Shows U.S. Blacks Trailing Immigrants from Africa, Caribbean,"
The Boston Globe (February 17, 2003).
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huge gains of freedom. 1 The stringent measure of identity crises as well as of
complex inter-and-intra-cultural adjustments identified by sociologist Ira Reid more
than fifty years ago among the early waves of Negro immigrants in America remains
unchanged. 2 For Nigerian immigrants, with the largest sub-Saharan African
population base, this problem of inter-class conflict has further exacerbated their
inherent fragile unity. With racial ambivalence, Nigerian immigrants—like their
related sub-Saharan counterparts—maintain one of the most detached associations
within the mosaic with American institutions.
Perhaps the above explains why most Nigerian immigrants often see
themselves as "outsiders" in America. Similarly, it explains why economic gains
remain the strongest emblem of their American sojourn. Authur tells us that, as
outsiders, Africans identify themselves as "foreigner." For, in their view, "even if
they achieve the highest social mobility in the United States, they will continue to
experience problems with integration.
. . because of their skin color."3
As Authur further argues, the educational advantages of the black African
migrants are not explicable to a favorable degree of assimilation. The inherent crisis
of their racial background, he points out, explains why most of them engage in the
host society selectively as well as confine "their activities to carefully constructed
zones, mainly educational and economic for survival in this country."
4
This
probably best explains why a majority of sub-Saharan immigrants sometimes defined
'For example, Robin Blackburn in his New World Slavery (pp. 3-5) has an excellent
observation on the negative impact of chattel slavery on African-descended races.
2
Reid, The Negro Immigrant p. Research Report , pp. 25, 29-30.
3
Authur, Invisible Sojourners, pp. 3-4, 73-4.
4
Ibid.
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their relations with black America either as separate or as approximate as both the
internal and external fractures of the black base allow. 1 The type of identification
indicated here strongly suggests that the enduring socio-cultural attributes of racial
slavery have some defining effects on how Nigerians—as the largest black African
base in America
—
perceived their contextual crisis and attempted to re-construct
their relationships with the descendants of slaves. 2
Woldemikael and Authur have both pointed out that the problem of
differentiated histories of the black experience corresponded with the cultural ironies
of their varied regions under alien influences. 3 For example, in reference to black
Africa, Authur argues that a majority of its immigrants in America came from
countries where they controlled almost all aspects of their social organizations.
While in America, however, their approach to the black-white racial divide has to be
extremely cautious.
4
This background perhaps best explains why they were more likely to censure
their relationship toward African-Americans. Also, it might explain why their
attachment to the American mosaic is mostly defined by the quest for economic
survival.
5 These emphases are important for understanding some of the claims about
'Authur, Invisible Sojourners , pp. 3-4; Apraku, African Emigres in the United States , pp. 19,
110; Jennings, Blacks. Latinos, and Asians in Urban America, pp. 144-154; Milton
Vickerman, "West Indian Adaptation: The Role of Cross Pressures," in Trotter Review:
Immigration. Ethnicity, and the Black Community in the United States , ed., James Jennings
(Boston: William Monroe Trotter Institute, University of Massachusetts Boston, Summer
1996), pp. 6-8.
2
Ibid.
3
Authur, Invisible Sojourners , pp. 3-4; Woldemikael, Becoming Black American, pp. 1-5,
38-42.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid.
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the effectiveness of some racial traits . 1 For, ultimately, the fact that most immigrants
do better in America than while in their country of birth may not always be based on
their solid educational status or effective racial and cultural traits. Sometimes there
seems to be a natural inclination among humans to re-adopt more effectively for
success in far removed regions; sometimes this happens more favorably among
distant cultural groups than necessarily the case within well-known environments.
This development is perhaps most likely to occur where the socio-cultural unities
among varying groups are as internally and externally volatile, as are evident in the
loose and obviously detached racial amalgam of the American races.
Perhaps we can safely conclude at this point that the rigid feature of intra-
racial tenacity surrounding the struggle of American races has also an equal effect on
the inter-class conflict of the black African immigrants. That the Nigerian or the
black African labor migrants have high expectations for economic survival via
education is, therefore, unsurprising—as Judy Pamphile argues. The dividend here
has some bearing to their Old background in Africa. Compared to native-born
blacks, where education is sometimes susceptible to the adversarial policies of
institutions, the resulting dividends are also likely to be less favorable.
The evidences then are supportive that Nigerians who benefited from good
education are susceptible to very little sustained incorporation into American society.
This might suggest some over-emphasis in the effectiveness of the middlemen
'For example, earlier notes on Sowell and D' Souza in Chapter 1
.
2
Judy Pamphile, "Education in America: African Americans vs. African and Caribbean
Immigrants," pp. 1-3.
3
Ibid.
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minorities,
1
where neither the high median income nor excellent educational status of
Nigerians, for example, guarantees acceptance or favorable degree of institutional
assistance.
2
Overall, however, the preceding might mean much for understanding the
effectiveness of the middlemen minorities. For example, it is quite likely that their
cross-cultural effectiveness over native-born black Americans or the black African
migrants was sometimes based on exploiting the inordinate-subordinate status of
both the former and latter racial groups. Thus, the success or failure of some groups
is neither always clearly inherent in their cultural vitality nor inaction but probably
due more to the dominant politico-cultural forces shaping the collision of the varied
histories of the American races. Surprisingly, the effectiveness of the middlemen
minorities—as explored in the context of race and culture—is rarely viewed as also
embedded in the bittersweet socio-cultural experiences of marginalized racial
minorities.
4 Authur and Woldemikael noted that the white-black historical tensions
'See for instance Authur, Invisible Sojourner, p. 3; Cordell and Griego, Integration of
Nigerian and Mexican Immigrants , pp. 4-5; Research Report, pp. 13-19; Apraku, African
Emigres in the United States , pp. 3-9; Portes and Rumbaut, Immigrant America, Chapter 3,
especially, pp. 83-6; Pamphile, "Education in America: African Americans vs. African and
Caribbean Immigrants," pp. 1-3; Cindy Rodriguez, "Study Shows U.S. Blacks Trailing
immigrants from Africa, Caribbean." For effectiveness of ethnic middlemen minorities'
racial/cultural traits, see Sowell, Race and Culture , Chapters 1-2, especially pp, 32-58;
D' Souza, The End of Racism , pp. 472-3
.
2
Ibid. Also, see for example, earlier notes on the median income status of African
immigrants, along with their educational classification, as well as related socio-cultural
crises.
3See earlier notes on Countryman, A Collision of Histories. Also, based on Jennings'
"Conclusion: Racial Hierarchy and Ethnic Conflict in the United States," pp. 144-154, it is
unlikely that some of the emphases, for example, in Race and Culture: A World View,
"Introduction" and Chapters l-2^specially, pp. 46-58, 141-144—are tenable in all phases.
4
Ibid.; Sowell, pp. 32-46; D' Souza, The End of Racism , pp. 410-421.
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were capable of tilting even similarly related and affected black migrants against
their collective interest and certainly against native-born blacks. 1
The above goes to say that, while the effectiveness of the middlemen
minorities and their cultural and racial traits are obvious enough in America, the
overwhelming emphases on their successes are sometimes over stretched. Jennings
has noted the extent to which the social experience of black Americans is influenced
by officially sanctioned acts of institutionalized racism and discrimination.2 This
seems to be the type of occurrence enhancing the effectiveness of ethnic minorities.
Part 2; The Extent of Incorporation of Nigerians in America
Admittedly, the crisis of America's incorporation of foreign-born groups can
also be explained by understanding the extent to which each historical era has either
positively or negatively shaped the pace in which its settlers were/are able to
transform their identities. This background, to say the least, is generally unfavorable
to the black migrants—especially those from Africa south of the Sahara. For, this
region is where the residual effects of the Atlantic slave trade and colonialism still
have the strongest opposition to modernization and human development. Except,
however, for the Ibos of Southeastern Nigeria,
3
most Nigerians are not accredited as
possessing the racial and cultural traits likely to result in a higher orbit of human
'Tekle Mariam Woldemikael, Becoming Black American: Haitians and American
Institutions in Evanston. Illinois (New York: AMS Press, Inc., 1989), pp. 1-5, 35-42;
Vickerman, "West Indian Adaptation: The Role of Cross Pressures," pp. 4-8; Gemima M.
Remy, "Haitian Immigrants and African American Relations," in Trotter Review, pp. 14-16;
;
Authur, Invisible Sojourners , pp. 3-4.
2
Ibid.; Sowell, Race and Culture , pp. 32-46; D'Souza, End of Racism, pp. 420-421;
Jennings, "Conclusion: Racial Hierarchy and Ethnic Conflict in the United States," pp.
144-
154.
3
Sowell, Race and Culture , p. 239; Sowell, Migrations and Cultures, pp. 27-8, 228,
368;
D'Souza, The End of Racism , p. 473
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development in their current status of American sojourn. Such have been the
obvious suggestions made in the massive examination of cultural and racial traits by
some scholars.
1
Sowell and D'Sousa have praised the effectiveness of the cultural traits of the
Ibos of Southeastern Nigeria
. Accordingly, they argued that, through hard work and
acceptance of the lures of Western education, the Ibos have been able to transform
themselves to higher status of human development.2 Substantially, however, there is
validity that the Ibos—once backward to the Yorubas of Southwestern Nigeria, for
instance, later embraced Western education more openly as to benefit from its
accumulative blessings—both economically and politically. It cannot therefore be
denied that, with colonial contact, the Ibos began to respond more positively to the
values of Western education.
One of the finest explanations of the status of Ibos and of their striving for
modern development during the colonial era is found in Professor Emmanuel
Ayandele's Educated Elite in the Nigerian Society . This book offers some useful
insight into the fact that Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, the first President of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria, and the first Ibo to have a university degree in the "thirties of
the twentieth century," studied in the United States.
Yet, to be sure, by the 1 870s, the Yorubas had already established evidences
of highly sophisticated class of Western-educated elites in medicine, law, literature,
'ibid., Migrations and Cultures , pp. 1-49.
2
Ibid.; Sowell, Race and Culture , p. 239; D'Souza, The End of Racism , p. 473; Chinua
Achebe, The Trouble with Nigeria, p. 46.
3
Ayandele, Educated Elite in the Nigerian Society , p. 14; John Iliffe, Honour in African
History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 316-31 7.
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linguistics, mathematics, poetry, musicology—including the first modern black
African Bishop—to mention but a few. 1 Elsewhere, however, this Ibo-Yoruba
strand in the making of modern Nigeria was sharpened by the contrast between
Western European education and American education. For example, the Yoruba
educated elites were mostly of the British and Western European backgrounds. To a
certain extent, it was the backwardness of Ibos at a certain historical juncture that
made their choice of American education more meaningful. Therefore the education
of "Azikiwe" in the U.S. represented a pioneering phase of post-Second World War,
and later still, even of the post- 1960s immigration of most Nigerians to this country. 2
Between 1930s and 1950s, the Ibos had successfully upset their regional handicaps,
emerging as challengers to the Yoruba, and even surpassing them in some instances.
This background corresponded with the successive waves of mostly Ibo-led
immigration from Nigeria to the U.S., both before and after decolonization.
4
And, again, both the colonial and post-colonial phases of Ibo-led immigration
to the U.S. reflected features of those of their pre-colonial era under the slave trade.
Their populations as forced migrants from the Niger Delta basins and the Cross river
to the New World were the largest during the eighteenth and early decades of the
nineteenth centuries. Nor, furthermore, should it be forgotten that Ibo slaves were
among the largest ethnic groups in the Chesapeake region of mainland North
America. At other times, however, they were among the most susceptible to slave
'Ibid. „
2Coleman, Nigeria Background to Nationalism , pp. 220-4, 264-7. See the demography of
Nigerian immigration to the U.S. in Chapter 3.
3
Ibid.; Achebe, The Trouble with Nigeria, p.46.
4
For example, see the explanations in Chapter 3 of this dissertation; Research Report, pp.
12-
29- "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 95-102.
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revolts. Later still, moreover, Olaudah Equiano, the West African slave—the earliest
embodiment of black abolitionist ferment—was an Ibo. 1
After about four centuries of American slavery, the Ibos again constituted the
core ethnic group among the largely voluntary post-colonial settlers in America from
Nigeria. From the First to the Second World War eras to the 1980s, for example, the
pattern of the Ibo admiration for Western education, along with their attraction to
American immigration, had not changed. Rather, since then, it has simply been
strengthened and further transformed. As we observed earlier and also saw in
Chapters 2 and 3, the general thrust of immigration from Southeastern region of
modern Nigeria to the U.S. followed the pattern established during the forced
migration. But during the colonial era, it was the pioneering influence of a
Southeastern Nigerian, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe—an Ibo, that opened American
immigration to Nigerians who sojourned for Western education. As far as post-
colonial (1960s-1990s) Nigerian immigration to the U.S. is concerned, the Ibo
regional and cultural traits were among the most dynamic in the making of the
• * 3
Nigerian diaspora of colonialism.
Where then do the admirable Ibo-cultural traits stand in the context of
American incorporation? Do their much praised cultural traits yield toward
favorable or unfavorable patterns of American incorporation? First, to begin with, as
'ibid. Chapter 3, especially the explanations of the demography of Nigerian-West African
background of mainland North American slaves. Holloway, Africanisms in American
Culture , pp. 6-10; Horton and Horton, Hard Road to Freedom, pp. 7, 12; Berlin, Many
Thousands Gone , p. 145.
2
Ibid. Also, see Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, pp. 220-4, 247).
3
This is supported by explanation of the waves of Nigerian immigration to the U.S. in
Chapter 3 of this dissertation. Also, see Chapter 2 of this dissertation for some details
on the
earlier phase of Ibos during the forced migration.
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we have shown so far, and, as we shall see again in related explanations in both
chapters 6 and 7, post-colonial build-up of the Ibos in America—despite their hard
work, adaptive and re-adaptive cultural skills—is still being affected by the inherent
crisis of their racial otherness
. Given the identifiable crisis of race in American
civilization, this further suggests that the basis for incorporating the enormous talents
of the Ibos into the American republic is problematic. For their good status on hard
work is rarely the highway to sustained incorporation. Second, and perhaps due
more to the peculiar crisis of racial indifference, the Ibos are likely to be foremost
among Nigerians noted by the host country and related institutions, whether truly or
falsely, among the major culprits in socially deviant behaviors. 1
From the foregoing, we can re-confirm our earlier conclusion: that is, for the
core base of Nigerian or the black African migrants in America, economic and
educational successes are more favorable to selective incorporation .
2
Aside from
their inclination toward the American black base, Nigerians exhibit a form of
segregated incorporation patterned after the experience of the descendants of slaves.
If the preceding emphases are correct, then, the fact that Nigerians are
seeking American citizenship in far greater numbers than previously does not
necessarily mean that their American foothold at this point is secure. Nigerian
immigrants have one of the most constrained accesses to institutional support. As
Portes and Rumbaut have observed, one of the key factors in effective development
'This is based on an examination of the national profiles of deviant social behaviors in which
Nigeria and Nigerians have become noted for in the U.S.
2
Nigerian immigrants—as a specific group—have the largest share of the black African labor
migrants mirrored, for example, by Apraku, African Emi gres in the United States, pp. 3-9;
Authur, Invisible Sojourners , pp. 3-5, 25, 46-8.
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of an immigrant group is the extent to which a seating government and its related
institutions are willing to support them. 1
The preceding position is reasonable largely because it is closely associated
with the success of the newcomers in America. However, the trouble is that such an
attitude is rarely associated with the official policies that most American institutions
have toward Nigerians as a specific group. Nor is it associated with their attitude
toward the broader base of the black African migrants' struggles for survival in
America. The result then is that Nigerians are cognizant in "their heart of hearts that
the odds are against them."2 Like African-Americans, these Nigerians not only fall
into the peculiar categories of the more "visible minorities," they are indeed among
the racially defined minorities whose share of self-definition and identities are
among the most affected. 3 Nigerians are therefore cognizant that the hurdles are
against them and that their more distinctive racial features would neither change over
night nor encourage favorable incorporation into the host society. Unlike other non-
European people of color, "their skin color, accent, natural orientation," are some of
the features that affect respectable participation in American society.
4
Consequently, in the absence institutional support, Nigerian immigrants
suffer from pluralistic and socio-cultural biases associated with their vulnerable and
'Portes and Rumbaut, Immigrant America, Chapter 3, especially, pp. 83-6.
2
Igboanugo, Nigerians in America , pp. 14-15; Authur, Invisible Sojourners , pp. 3-4, 73-5.
3
Probably, the general background employed by Mary Waters in her illuminating essay had
its strongest applicability to Nigerian/African immigrants. See, for example, her essay
entitled, "Optional Ethnicities: For Whites Only?" in Origins and Destinies: Immigration,
Race and Ethnicity in America, eds., Silvia Pedraza and Ruben G. Rumbaut (Belmont,
California: Wadsworth, 1996), p. 447.
4
Ibid.; also, Igboanugo, Ni gerians in America, pp. 14-15; Authur, Invisible Soiourners, pp.
3-4, 73-5.
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powerless racial status. Just as this vulnerable status reinforces their exploitation of
the black base its alternate effect exposes them to exploitation among the more
fortunate hierarchies of the American races. 1 This suggests again that deep-seated
socio-cultural stress could explain why Nigerians are least likely to have respectable
collaboration with American institutions, or even with the less fortunate branches of
the races of color. This does not even include the more fortunate races of color or
the more distinctive and subtle ramparts of mainstream America.
As we saw earlier, the same crisis as above influenced how Nigerians made
some key decisions on race matters. It also corresponded with their scare to fully
Americanize, or to openly embrace ancestral bond with African-Americans. Like
their counterparts from the Caribbean, while generally sympathetic toward native-
born black Americans, they are willing to exploit their vulnerability purely for
contextual survival. At other times, however, this could result in their willingness to
detach their distances from their ancestral kin. That they don't want to be like their
kin is not because they feel anything different; rather it is because of the desire to
insulate their consciousness from the stress of an unchanging inter-generational
experience.
2
This crisis has a lot to do with which model is viable for an effective
incorporation of ethnic America into the mosaic. For, none of the three models of
'Skinner, In Defense of Black Nationality , pp. 7-10; Portes and Rumbaut, Immigrant
America
,
especially Chapter 3, pp. 83-6; Apraku, African Emigres in the United States , p.
110; Jennings, "Racial Hierarchies;" Percy C. Hintzen and Jean M. Rahier, eds.,
Problematizing Blackness Self-Ethnographies bv Black Immigrants to the United States
(New York and London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 26-30.
2
Ibid. Remy, "Haitian Immigrants and African American Relations: Ethnic Dilemmas in
Racially Stratified Society," in Trotter Review, pp. 14-15. Also, see for example: Blackburn,
The Making of New World Slavery , pp. 3-4; Alejandro Portes and A. Stepick, City on the
Edge: The Transformation of Miami (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
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generic pluralist inter-group relations identified by James Davis, for example—as
cultural, structural, and political—is clearly favorable either to Nigerian or to the
larger base of the black Africans in America. 1
Therefore, the notion of American assimilation for some skilled class of
Nigerian immigrants—as identified by April Gordon is uncertain—if as he also tells
us, their relationship within the brethren's communities is marked by subtle forms of
detached relations or distancing. The prospect of an American assimilation is more
likely to be shaped by favorable historical settings, sustained and shared communal
institutions among related groups, and the support of mainstream institutions. These
factors, as we noted earlier, were/are least favorable to either the Nigerian or the
entire bloc of the black African migrants. Gordon's position appears then to have
misunderstood the vital requirement of the relationship between assimilation and
collective communal solidarity.
The incorporation of Nigerian indices into American society should then be
measured against the inter-generational constraints confronting the descendants of
slaves after freedom.
4 The status of black Americans, as once perceived by Haitian
immigrants, is almost similar to that of Nigerians.
5 As Igboanugo documents,
although "African Americans have been here for centuries," and have made
'ibid. F. James Davis, Minority-Dominant Relations: A Sociological Analysis (Arlington
Heights, Illinois: A H M Publishing, 1979), pp. 152-4.
2
Gordon, Nigeria's Diverse Peoples , p. 237.
3
Ibid.
"Woldemikael, Becoming Black American , pp. 1-5, 35-42; Landry, America at Century's
End
, pp. 202-3; Apraku, African Emigres in the United States , pp. 19, 110; Paul Kennedy,
Preparing for the Twenty-First Century (New York: Random House, 1993), pp. 39-43; 211-
219, 303-4. Vickerman, "West Indian Adaptation," p. 7; Remy, "Haitian Immigrants and
African American Relations," p. 15.
5
Ibid.
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enormous progress during their long period of inculcation into Western mores, "not
much difference" has occurred in the attitude of most whites toward them. 1
Among Nigerians in the diaspora, it is obvious that the experience of racial
otherness has further sharpened their unequal status as well as their built-in pattern of
socio-cultural stratification. Igboanugo argues that back in Nigeria, there is class
discrimination, ethnic preferential treatment, and religious fundamentalism, but the
consciousness of race is taboo.2 "Racial prejudice in the U.S. is in a class by itself."
This is where "one is loathed, hated, and put down, and sometimes killed for his or
her race." While "racial discrimination has been outlawed," racial prejudice has
not. So the volatile incorporation of Nigerian immigrants into the American
society is undeniable. As we pointed out earlier, this phenomenon corresponded
with rigorous class conflict, resulting as well, in their distorted displays of make-
beliefs about American successes. Ironically, while some have achieved an
American niche, such does not necessarily correspond with a desire to want to live
and die in America.4
On the other hand, however, the example of American support for Ethiopian
immigrants during the early stages of their American sojourn contrasted sharply with
similar effort toward other groups. This attitude appears to be more pronounced
toward African immigrants from regions where a majority of the forced migrants
were taken.
'igboanugo, Nigerians in America, p. 15.
2
Ibid., p. 14; Sowell, Preferential Policies , pp. 69-76.
3
Igboanugo, Nigerians in America, p. 15; Authur, Invisible Sojourners , pp. 73-5.
"This is based on summary of the field work undertaken in this dissertation.
5
Ungar, Fresh Blood: The New American Immigrants , p. 259.
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The preceding development seems to have some effects on the sometimes
tenuous relationships between Ethiopians and their West African counterparts. This
is also linked to some of the indifferences one finds between them and native-born
black Americans. Given the sustained hierarchical inequalities surrounding the black
base, Ethiopian immigrants have sometimes claimed that they were neither Africans
nor required to publicly identify with African-Americans. 1 Undoubtedly, the
Ethiopian attitude is further supportive of the volatile socio-cultural context of an
American world incorporation of the black African migrants.
Africans tend then to be incorporated into the American mosaic from a north
to east to south to west thrust of the races of continental Africa. This appears to
correspond with the reversed pattern from the south-north thrust to a north-south
downward contraction of ancient lanes of exchanges along Afro-Asian, which we
illuminated much earlier. 2
For example, in the U.S., Africans from Northern Africa, particularly those
favored by physical Mediterranean bloodline—are more likely to be accorded
favorable incorporation. The Ethiopians of East Africa appear to be next in line.
Generally, the greater the inclination toward Afro-Asiatic bloodstream and cultures
the more secure seems to be the American foothold of the black African migrants.
South African blacks are likely to trail their counterparts from both Northern
and Eastern Africa despite sustained contacts with Western Europeans. Black South
Africa's most favorable point of an American incorporation lies squarely in black
'ibid., pp. 263-6; Jennings, Blacks, Latinos, and Asians in Urban America , pp. 144-154;
Remy, "Haitian Immigrants," pp. 14-15.
2
For example, see earlier references in Chapters 2 and Chapter 3.
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America. The weakest lanes of Africa's incorporation into the American mosaic
comprised West and Central Africans. They are mostly from the cultural regions
where the transatlantic slave trade had its most devastating effects. But ironically,
these comprised the most educated base of the black African migrants, and certainly
one of the most educated of American foreign-born settlers.
The above thus imposes a certain difficulty in gauging what kind of
American assimilation the Nigerian offspring are likely to have in the succeeding
generation of their American transformation. Other evidences, however, suggest that
some positive prospects in the U.S.-Nigerian relations are currently being poised via
the Nigerian-African offspring. This is largely due to the fact that the chances of
their incorporation into American society are much better than that of their parents. 1
We hope to show again slightly down this chapter that, if properly harnessed,
the inter-generational molecules of the Nigerian offspring can be of enormous
benefits to both black America and black Africa, as well as to Euro-America. Their
socio-cultural features could very well serve as one of the most sustainable bridges
of interactive and intra-active exchanges and partnerships within the American as
well as the larger global context in the twenty-first century.
Part 3: A New Socio-cultural Milieu for
Nigerian Immigrants in America
Aside from the problem of incorporating Nigerians into American society,
there was also the related one of changing cycles of cultural impact during the 1980s
and 1990s. The underlying emphases all along suggest that success in assembling
'"Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 266-270.
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and transforming Nigerian indices within the American mosaic was either favorable
or unfavorable depending on how the new climate of intra-socio-cultural interactions
affected the newcomers from Nigeria. The problem then emanated from the extent
to which the cultural features of the American free institutions affected the
traditional beliefs of Nigerian immigrants, as the newest of America's newcomers.
From the mid-1980s onward, both in their marital and inter-generational circuits,
Nigerian immigrants confronted problems that were inherently American. 1
For, indeed, prior to the late 1970s, Nigerian female spouses did not have to
be long in America before realizing that they owed it both to themselves as well as to
the traditional values of the homeland to stand faithfully behind their husbands in the
struggle to acquire education. This was when both the female and male spouses
owed it to each other and to their collective future in America to work as a close unit
toward a meaningful future back in Nigeria after their studies. During this period, it
was not therefore unusual for most Nigerian students desiring to be well connected
back in the homeland to bring their wives to America for further education. This
option was even more rewarding both economically and socially in a status infested
climate of modern Nigeria. Even the few, who desired to settle down in America
after studies, also depended on the marital traditions of the homeland. However, for
those with children, the cultural values of the homeland were equally influential in
the orientation of their offspring.
2
'igboanugo, Nigerians in America, pp. 25-6.
2
This is based on interviews along with my examination of the patterns of Nigerian
immigration to America
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Probably the first two decades of settlement of Nigerians in America were
favorably linked to, as well as, supported by the marital values and traditions of the
homeland. During those early decades, the union of Nigerian female-spouses with
their male counterparts was often a sort of compromise: married female spouses
became the economic, cultural, and moral foundations upon which the success of
their student-husbands rested. Aside from other family pressures on the Nigerian
female spouses—especially those pertaining to the welfare of their offspring—the
traditions of the homeland required them to be fully supportive of their husbands. 1
Very few Nigerian students' marriages would have succeeded between the
1960s and 1970s without the strong marital traditions of the homeland tying both the
female and male spouses in their respective family households into a cohesive
union. Those who succeeded without the support of their female spouses were very
few. Just as the husbands had to work from dawn to dusk as full-time students to
bring their wives/fiances to America, these wives often reciprocated those efforts
while safely in America.
3
By mid-1980s, however, things had begun to change. First, with the
corresponding influences of American institutions, Nigerian marriages were
beginning to reveal vigorous signs of contextual stress. Second, with this problem
began the erosion of traditional loyalty between husbands and wives. The effects
'For example, John Authur, in his Invisible Sojourners , pp. 117-120, made some
observations which, in a very general sense, revealed the working attitude and re-adaptive
skills of the Nigerian homeland among some female spouses. I believe those features were
of enormous advantage to their male spouses during the early decades of their American
sojourn.
2
Ibid. "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 147-152.
3
Ibid. p. 151.
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were such that some Nigerians seeking longer-term economic survival began to look
away from their home-bred pairs as spouses.
By early 1990s some Nigerians had entered into marriages with Americans,
rather than accepting indigenous choices that were least likely to be of immediate
socioeconomic and cultural value in the hazardous strivings for an American footage
and its ultimate dreams. 1 In fact, since the mid-1980s, the Nigerians marital crises
reflected the extent to which the influences of the American free institutions had
impinged on the once dominant status of the male spouses. This development was to
hasten the liberation of their female spouses. Although during the later part of the
1980s, indigenous paired marriages were still the preference for a majority of
Nigerian immigrants, it could not be denied as well that most of them had begun to
come under intense revulsion almost along similar lines with American marriages. 2
Coincidentally, almost the same degree of unfavorable socioeconomic status
identifiable among native-born black American males3 was also reflected in the
bittersweet experience of most Nigerian male migrants. Similarly, the somewhat
more favorable socioeconomic status found among black American females
corroborated with that of most Nigerian females. Almost in a similar degree, African
women were in general noted for having stronger contextual partnership with
African-American women than their men vis-a-vis African-American males
4
'ibid., pp. 147-152; Igboanugo, Nigerians in America, pp. 55-65; Authur, Invisible
Sojourners
,
p. 46
2
Ibid.;Authur, pp. 119-123; Jermaine Nkrumah, "Is African Societal Influence Too Evident
in Today's Intra-African Relationships," African Business Source Magazine (Houston-
Texas, November, 1992), pp. 35-6.
3
Hacker, Two Nations: Black and White. Separate. Hostile. Unequal, pp. 94-7.
"ibid.; Authur, Invisible Sojourners , pp. 46, 120-121.
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The degree, therefore, to which the impact of the American free institutions
affected Nigerian traditional marriages in the early decades of settlement, was due
largely to their general state of socioeconomic and cultural instability. This then
meant that, as Nigerians settled within the American mosaic both socioeconomic and
cultural factors had far stronger effects on how their marriages and romantic
relationships were re-envisioned. It also meant that, coupled with some of the
exaggerated values of American material civilization, some of the traditional values
of the Nigerian homeland were being overthrown by the influences of American
cultures. Some of these problems were the deflection of the changes brought about
by the Reagan era. We noted earlier that the socioeconomic and politico-cultural
effects of his policies toward African-Americans corresponded with the beginning of
crisis for the black African immigrants.
1
Unsurprisingly, his era was also when the
earlier unities of African marriages began to fracture. This was equally the period
when the socio-cultural circuits of the American republic, was least unfavorable to
the black American and African males. This was especially the case with regard to
the male-spouse relations among Nigerian immigrants.
The crises surrounding most Nigerian marriages were such that, in taking
over the social circumstances of an independent survival, most Nigerian women
were generally more flexible than their male counterparts in re-adopting into the
economic settings of the host society. Due also to the inherent feminine attributes,
"Alejandro Portes and A. Stepick, Citv on the Edge: The Transformation of Miami
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Apraku, African Emigres in the United
States , pp. 19, 110; Udofia, "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans in
the
United States," pp. 107-120; Research Report , pp.; Udofia, Trotter Review, p. 32.
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they were sometimes more accessible to some support than their male counterparts. 1
Significantly enough, during this period, some of the inherent survival skills of the
homelands that these Nigerian female spouses re-adopted and exploited proved
advantageous to their American transformation. Such re-adoptive attributes of the
homelands such as active inter-women collective fellowship further complemented
their intra-American cultural pull and socioeconomic flexibility. For some reasons
as yet not clearly known, the White-Black racial divide, which indeed affected the
black African male immigrants more directly, sometimes appeared to have been
more flexible and even soft-handed toward their female counterparts.
Elsewhere, it so turned out that, in successfully adjusting into the American
mosaic, Nigerian females seemed to have had some advantages over their male
counterparts. During the arduous adjustment of the Reagan era, they tended to have
adapted both themselves and their skills more readily into some professions than
their males. When married women with college degrees adapted themselves to such
economically high demand work as nursing profession and nursing maids, their male
spouses had some difficulty seeing themselves and their interests along such lines.
Nigerian males who adapted their professional endeavors along similar lines
as nursing and nursing aids, for example, could make just as much money. But
within the social class structure of Nigerian immigrants, male nurses and male
nursing aids are least likely to be accorded high ovation within the community. Even
among Americans, some high-demand professional features have strong marital
relationships between female and male spouses: male lawyers and women nurses;
'Authur's Invisible Sojourners , pp. 1 18-120.
2
Ibid. This is based on evidences obtained during the fieldwork for this dissertation.
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female teachers and male professors; male scientists and female lawyers; male
engineers/business/accountants and nurse vis-a-vis. 1
Given the well known status of male dominance in most Nigerian traditional
marriages, the changes ushered in by the new socio-cultural milieu of American
society from the mid-1980s onward were to place the Nigerian male spouses in a
most unusual position in the diaspora. For, as a story entitled, "All in the Name of
Love," published in the African Newsbreed Magazine reveals, both the
contemporary American socioeconomic compulsion ushered in by the Reagan
dynamic, as well as its inherent socio-cultural constraints on Nigerians, ultimately
proved crucial to the making of their marital/romantic crises in the U.S.
Indeed, in the particular story of "All in the name of Love," a representative
Nigerian [African] named, "Musa" finds solace in exploiting the economic stamina
of his "sweetheart" to advance his progress as a medical student.2 Musa, as the story
goes, later abandons his sweet heart on completion of his medical studies. This story
reveals how Musa's ploy, through "mesmerizing kisses" and promises, ultimately
seduces the affection of a homeland's "sweetheart," who identifies with the tradition
'Ibid.
2
African Newbreed Magazine (Chicago, July, 1991), p. 22. This author employed two
fictional stories based on true occurrences during the early 1990s to explain the socio-
cultural context of the Nigerian marital/romantic relations in America. The first story
involved a deviant attitude of a male spouse toward the female partner; the second involved
a similar attitude by a female spouse toward the male counterpart. These stories, in sum,
although Active were based on true some Nigerian/African romances/marriages: "Marriage
by Arrangement" (MBA) and "Lay Away Marriages" (LAM). Dr. Bedford Umez, as will be
seen slightly down the pages, has employed the term "Marriage by Arrangement" (MBA);
similarly, Igboanugo and this author have employed the term "Lay Away Marriages" in
explaining the painful emotions involved in long-distant marriages among Nigerians both in
the diaspora and back in the homeland. See, Bedford N. Umez, "High Divorce Rate Among
Nigerians in Houston: A Rejoinder," http://www.umez.com/divorce.html (Accessed
10/25/2005 ); Udofia, "Status of the Relationship with African Immigrants," pp. 147-152;
Igboanugo, Nigerians in America, pp. 58-62.
410
of loyalty to her future husband as well as to her status as Nigerian/African i
foreign land.
Babe we need to plan our future. I can quit medical school and work,
or you can be the bread winner until I finish school ... I think the best
thing is for us to live together until we can afford the wedding you
desire. When I marry you, I want the whole world to know
.
.
Ultimately, Musa's astute mastery over his sweetheart yields expected
dividends. As Ndelia states, "Not too long after this incident Musa moved in with
me. I quit my own school and took a full-time job to pay the rent and the bills."
Moreover, as Musa "could not even keep a part-time job because of the demanding
medical studies" (he was on probation), and the sweetheart's (Ndelia) job "couldn't
cover school expenses," he again "suggested that we make a decision about the
future." To help in securing this future, Ndelia
took another full-time job so he could concentrate on school. I also
became Musa's housewife without a ring. I did all the cleaning,
laundry, cooking and attended to all of Musa's personal demands. . .
As a medical student, Musa's lifestyle was very demanding. He was
in school all day and spent most of the night studying . . . The
schedule was hectic, but I didn't mind, for as Musa said, "We need to
alter our lifestyles for a better future" . . . The household chores and
Musa's demands turned me into a robot, but I didn't mind. I chose to
make the sacrifice because I loved Musa, and he said, "we are
working for a better future . . . after . . . medical school."
Two months after Musa "got into the residency program," and after buying
himself a Corvette as a graduation gift, which only increased his sweetheart's
regularity at two jobs, a letter directed to "Dear Ndelia" comes stating:
Let me begin by inquiring about your health and jobs. I hope
everything is well at the end. Things are going well for me. I've
passed my course with flying colors, and I've also met somebody who
'
African Newbreed Magazine , p. 22.
2
Ibid.
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has changed my life forever. Ndelia, I hate to hurt you, but I am now
experiencing real love. I've fallen in love with one of the students
here. The two of you are alike in so many ways, yet different in many
aspects. I cannot explain it, but she's brought a totally different
dimension to my life. I'm sorry. For all it means, I will never forget
you.
1
Given the economic crunches of mid-1980s, the Musa-Ndelia scenario
further confirms that most unstable Nigerian or African marriages could not have
been faithful for too long in the remaining part of the decade and during the 1990s.
The Musa-Ndelia story thus confirms the passing of an historical era . This was when
the male chauvinism in some Nigerian marriages began to be resisted by female
spouses, who sought greater independence from the rigid tradition of the homeland.
This development also corresponded with a period when both the individual's and
collective demeanor of Nigerians had begun to question the extent to which the
marital traditions of the homeland were useful to their strivings for survival.2
As most married Nigerian women became effective economic partners with
their husbands, they sought financial and social independence. This perhaps
explains why one Nigerian woman in Washington, DC, observed that she "only
married that fool because I wanted to satisfy my parents."4 To another in Houston, it
was the compulsive pressures of the capitalist system that reinforced both her marital
grievances as well as the ultimate decision in seeking an alternative choice in an
American marital partnership:
'
African Newbreed Magazine , p. 22.
2
This reference is based on fieldwork, interviews, exploratory survey, and examination of the
community profiles of Nigerian marriages in America, 1990s-2005. Authur, Invisible
Sojourners
, pp. 117-119.
3
Ibid., Author, p. 120.
"igboanugo, Nieerians in America , pp. 60-2.
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I was so frustrated with my Nigerian fiance who controlled everything
including my bank account that I left him. I am now dating a fine
man. He is an American, and we will be married this summer. 1
Accordingly, Nigerian married females such as professional nurses, lawyers,
and independent entrepreneurs have become more self-aware of their needs. As this
happens, as we indicated earlier, their inherent feminine attributes have further
acceded to them some advantages over their men. Besides, their transformation by
America's egalitarian cultures far exceeded anything their male spouses would have
anticipated prior to the early 1980s. The result has so far been evident enough in the
number of divorces and voluntary separations occurring among Nigerian spouses,
especially in such cities as Houston, Chicago, Atlanta, and Los Angeles, and New
York. By mid-1990s, some Nigerian marriages entered an era of re-negotiations
between female and male spouses. Just as in the experience of most American
marriages, Nigerian marriages began to serve the dual functions of not allowing
marital differences to hurt the future of the children within the family households.
For those who could afford the exorbitant child care bills designed by law, found
acceptance of such an alternative more useful than leaving their children blank in the
diaspora.
The general result was that some Nigerians reconsidered their homeland
marriages. Others, however, regretted having left "a good American woman" in
preference for a Nigerian.
4
Nigerian males
—
just as their women—are therefore
'Ibid.
2
Ibid. Authur, Invisible Sojourners , pp. 112-113; Bedford Umez, "High Divorce Rate
Among Nigerians in Houston," pp. 1-2.
3
This is based data gathered from field work.
4
Igboanugu, Nigerians in America, pp. 60-2.
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more likely to accept American marriages, particularly with African-Americans.
Being more operative within the African-American context also meant that, where
marriages with their national and continental pairs were not readily negotiable, the
racial factor has made access to African-Americans the most likely alternative to fill
the void. Also, because Nigerians comprise the largest sub-Saharan African base in
the U.S., chances are that they are even more likely to consider cross-cultural
marriages for longer term survival with African-American than previously. 1
Marriages by Arrangements vs.
Lay Away Marriages of Nigerian Immigrants2
Going by a more specific statistics, by mid- 1990, "There were over 100 cases
of divorce involving Nigerians in Houston, Texas alone."3 As a city where Nigerian
immigrants have one of the strongest communal structures in America, the Houston
evidence reveals the scope of an ongoing marital conflict among Nigerian
immigrants since the 1990s. Political scientist Bedford Umez has described the high
divorce rate of Nigerian marriages in Houston as resulting from negative effects of
"marriage by arrangement" (MBA). By this development, Professor Umez argues
that MBA "may not work for every body because the person who is arranging the
marriage (between the two individuals separated by thousands of miles) is only
working on his or her perceptions of the two people."
4
"MBA," as Umez further explains, "is a blind date" because the individuals
involved "are mostly blind to each other's preferences." Nor is it any surprising that
'ibid.; Udofia, "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 147-152,
Authur, Invisible Sojourners , p. 46.
2
This is partly a reworking of post-colonial African context of its pre-colonial traditions.
3
See, for example, the Houston Punch (Houston, Texas, February 1995).
"Beford Umez, "High Divorce Rate Among Nigerians in Houston," pp. 1-2.
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"blind dates are often a disaster." Umez points to the three cardinal factors
associated with its crises as: distance, dishonesty, and the poor state of the Nigerian
economy. Umez then argues that these problems are compounded by the harsh
"Life" which confronts Nigerians in America. 1
But, in Umez's view, it so turns out that the cases of "dishonesty" by "our
men," are the most identifiable causes of the high rate of divorces among Nigerian
immigrants. For, according to him, most of the Nigerian males who visited home to
meet their MBA displayed ostentatious claims, which projected to their female
spouses evidences of an American success that were simply false. Lured either by
the well-known cycle of socioeconomic hardship of post-colonial Nigeria to
succumb to the expectations of greater security with an American sweet heart, or by
the sincere albeit uncertain nostalgia for the "American dream," some female
spouses had sometimes to go the extra mileage of abandoning a more faithful and
approximate home-groomed sweet-heart for an American MBA. The dilemma of
MBA therefore lies in the particular closet of an American experience unbeknownst
before. Umez mirrors the American phase ofMBA in the following manner:
upon arrival in the U.S., hypnotic reality sets in—truths start pouring
out, one by one. Worse still, these men start telling new lies to cover
the old ones. Now, the poor ladies find themselves in the horns of
dilemma—to stay or to leave? If they decide to stay, they spend the
rest of their lives in misery; if they decide to leave, we call it divorce.
But, who created the divorce? The men or the ladies? I say, don't
blame the ladies .
If, as indicated above, the Nigerian male spouses are more likely to blame for
the increased cases of divorces than their female counterparts, the flirtation among
'Ibid.
2
Ibid.
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the MBA adherents suggests that during the 2000s, some Nigerian males were still
being allured and fascinated by the traditions of marrying from the homeland.
Returning to the homeland to bring down a home-groomed sweet-heart that met the
expectations of the lost good-old days of the 1960s and 1970s, must then be seen as
part of an ongoing struggle between vanishing traditions and emerging changes
among Nigerians in the diaspora.
For, in retrospect, the decades when Nigerian female spouses were willing to
withstand the rigor of American life solidly behind their student-husbands were
gone. By mid-1990s, very few Nigerian wives were willing to accept the rigorous
alternatives of the earlier decades purely for the sake of being married. These crises
were not wholly American: some aspects, still traceable to the extent of the
American cultural influences back in the Nigerian homeland, included exposures to
such popular day-time soap programs as "General Hospital," "All My Children," and
"As the World Turns." These exposures, along with the Nigeria's-own phases of
socioeconomic crises, were likely to have some irretrievable effects on the traditional
ethics of marital relationships and romance among Nigerians.
If the proceedings were/are true—even on a partial basis—then, what Umez
attempted to explain was/is mostly the result of socio-cultural contacts between
Nigerian traditions and American free institutions. This is, similarly, the result of the
retrospective cross-cultural carry-overs to America of some of the crises of the
Nigerian homeland. That, according to Professor Umez, the Nigerian male-spouses
were more to blame than their female counterparts, therefore, suggests a poor grasp
of the marital crises of Nigerians in Houston, or elsewhere in America. Seemingly
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blaming all the cases of Nigerian marital problems in Houston on the negative
attitudes of the male spouses, strongly suggests that the problem of distance,
dishonesty, poor national economy, and the related hardship of "Life in America," 1
only affected Nigerian males.2
Again, if the preceding emphases were correct, Umez then would have
denied that some marital conflict of the MBA tradition was also identifiable among
some Nigerian females striving to use foul means in entering into America. Clearly,
this failure to have an overarching picture of the crises as reflecting the negative
attitudes of both gender appears to be a serious although an unusual oversight. 3 For
example, the fieldwork done in this dissertation confirmed that, in some instances,
Nigerian male-spouses were more likely to be leveled headed than their female
counterparts. This was especially in situations where their economic status enabled
them to function as the leaders within the family households.4 Therefore, the general
socioeconomic insecurity of Nigerian males, along with increased family demands,
which sometimes propelled their women to a more pro-active economic role—was
not always helpful to marital security. This is perhaps due more to inexperience as
well as the implicit socio-cultural advantages of feminine attributes.
'Ibid.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid. Umez's chronicle of Nigeria/African experience in America is one of the most
thorough and foresighted found by this author over more than fifteenth years of assembling
and analyzing the data on this field. His views are therefore accorded one of the highest
respects in examining Nigerians/Africans. The benefits of his insight into the weaknesses
Nigerians, in particular, have helped this author to fashion a clearer context of the crisis
surrounding the Nigerian/African development in the diaspora and back in the homelands.
4
This is based on the field work undertaken in the course of this study. Generally, my
examination of Nigerian/African indices over the past fifteenth years was rather conclusive
that some divorces among Nigerian immigrants were increasingly being determined by the
attitude of females, which, in some instances, were negative.
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With inexperience, coupled with the unchecked appeals of American
egalitarianism, sometimes the women—more than their male counterparts—were
those taking conflicting positions. As they become powerful family household
leaders on the basis of their economic status, these required shared responsibilities
with the husbands, and without a working moral and cultural bonding, the inevitable
result was increased divorce rates. 1
Also, some Nigerian female spouses in America have played foul under the
marital tradition of MBA. These were female spouses whose marital attitudes were
contemptuous and whose behaviors encouraged increased divorces.2 If Nigerian
female spouses are part of the American material cultures, there seems to be no
sound basis for exonerating them while blaming their males. No sooner after the
MBA male-spouses had labored to bring their female partners to America did the
latter abandon them for the much greener pastures of American dreams. Often such
conflicts were likely to occur where the female MBAs had some hidden motives for
coming. Like their male counterparts, such an attitude by MBA female-spouses, as
we hope to show a little further down the pages, sometimes revealed a willing to
exploit the "honesty" of the former, as a passage to America.
3
The Umez version of MBA, as thus examined, was first expressed in the
character of the "Lay Away Marriages" (LAM) of Nigerian immigrants. Later on,
however, the two traditions become closely related, albeit with a slight variant.
LAM means exactly what the name implies; its character amplifies perhaps a
"Ibid.
2
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stronger commitment to the lost traditions of Nigerian marriages during the early
decades of mostly students' immigrants. The LAM traditions had its strongest
context when Nigerians did not develop a firm communal foothold in urban
America. But while MBA also means what the name implies, it involves greater
networks of people: sometimes these are bound to act on inclinations which are not
necessarily defined by respectable marital traditions of the homeland.
The author of this dissertation argues that between 1960s and 1970s, a higher
proportion of the student marriages of Nigerian immigrants in America fell under
what might safely be regarded as the LAM traditions; that, accordingly, the MBA
traditions might have begun to have its strongest impact on Nigerians from the mid-
1980s to the 1990s. As in the case of MBA, its genesis had closer affinity with an
era when the old traditions of the homelands among Nigerians/Africans in the
diaspora had come under greater contextual stress. This was also an era when the
cross-cultural diffusion of Nigerians between America and the homeland was as
economically and culturally volatile as to have allowed for the mitigation of a
complex array of internal and external misconducts which Nigeria/Nigerians later
became noted for throughout the 1990s.
1
Thus, a slight variant in historical eras
explains the commonalities and distinctiveness between the MBA and LAM models.
Yet, both the strong commonalities between MBA and LAM are predicated
by their inherent uncertainties: emotional drain, internal and external fraud in the
attitudes of the beloved. For their features were, and are still the functional channels
the subscribers have accepted to honor the traditions of marrying from the land of
'See for example, Winer, Nigerian Crime: 1996 Congressional Subcommittee
Hearing.
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their birth while in the diaspora. So, admittedly, the pre-eminence of MBA could
only have led to the erosion of the earlier status of the LAM
—
particularly from the
mid-1980s onward.
At this point, however, the LAM model of Nigerian marriages requires
greater clarification. By "lay away marriages," some Nigerians were either married
before coming to the U.S. or likely to have gone back home to do so after
establishing themselves in "the land of opportunity." 1 Prior to the 1980s, when the
communal settlement of Nigerians or even of the larger African immigrant
community, was not deep-seated in America, most Nigerian students looked back to
the homeland for their marriages. The expectations then were high back in the
homeland or in America among "these lay away husbands and wives/fiances,"
seeking to bridge their long distant emotions. Those who succeeded in bringing their
"lay way spouses" to America were even more fortunate.2
But, as Nigerian immigrants became deep-seated settlers within the American
mosaic, the "lay away marriages" became an exercise in futility. This was because,
for both the male and female spouses involved in the venture, both its cultural and
socioeconomic burden was enormous. These adherents worked tirelessly to pay
immigration attorneys to process the necessary papers for their fiance, wives, or
husbands—sometimes with no results. 3 Back in the Nigerian homeland, of course,
these "lay away" spouses often demanded every bit of support, which drained the
'See, for example, Coral Ekeruche, "Nigerian Bachelors Who Go Home to Marry," Nigerian
News Digest (Ashville, North Carolina, January 3, 1992), pp. 14 and 21.
2
Udofia, "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," p. 151; Amie Joofs
Column "Heart-to-Heart: A Stranger in the Midst," in African Newbreed (Chicago, May
1991), p. 22.
3
Ibid., Joof, "Heart -to-Heart: Stranger in the Midst."
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financial stamina of the long distance "sweethearts." By mid-thirties, most Nigerians
became aware that both the stamina and zest which some successful marriages
required might be lost. This may explain why one Nigerian lady "will not stay here
waiting for all these square heads
. . .
who don't even know what is good for them." 1
Knowing "what is good for them" implies that the "layaway" victims had
rationalized their circumstances in light of the available options in a foreign land.
They were willing to substitute for their "layaway" husbands or wives back in
Nigeria a more approximate cultural "sweethearts" in America. Prior to the 1980s, it
would have been difficult to accept such choices. Besides, during this period, it
would have required serious devaluation of traditional values to make the swift
changes into a new direction of intra-cultural marital choices. 2
As we hinted earlier, there was a phase of the crisis of "lay away marriages"
of Nigerian immigrants which could further explain how even the attitudes of their
female-spouses were equally faulty. Again Amie Joof—the insightful chronicler of
Nigerian-African Heart-to-Heart column in the African Newsbreed—uses fictional
story-news flash based on true occurrences to illuminate the Nigerian
marital/romantic crises. The problem which Amie Joof captures in this phase
revolves around how the ethnic parochialism of Nigeria influences the choices of
marital spouses and hence raises the scepters of the confusion and crisis involving
'igboanugo, Nigerians in America, p. 61
.
2
Udofia, "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," p. 152. Cross-ethnic
marriages among Nigerians are not new; but the pattern, in my opinion, is not deeply rooted
among them. What seems really new is that the current pattern that shapes them in America
seems compelled by socio-cultural circumstances, and they are also making the necessary
adjustments. Also, see Authur, Invisible Sojourners , p. 46.
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female-male spouse relations in the diaspora. 1 Raising the particular crisis of
Nigerian marriages from the mid-1980s mirrors its continuing transformation during
the early 2000s. This touches on an earlier position by Umez. For, to begin with,
while Joof s story is built around an episodic intensity of "lay away marriages," the
premise of its crisis is similar to the cultural features of "marriage by arrangements."
Besides, it is one in which the female-spouse is the culprit. So, the underlying
experience supports an earlier dissent from the position emphasized by Umez. 2
Writing of the experience of a Nigerian from Iboland, named "Mba," Joof
narrates how he falls in love with "Yata." In retrospect, however, "Yata" who is not
Nigerian, confronts the problem of ethnic parochialism. Being from Cameroon, a
country which has an approximate regional human contact with Nigeria, yet her
honesty and love for Mba are not the traditional criteria for marital support. The
opposition is serious. 3 Joof, the chronicler, makes "Mba" to tell us that,
Yata was the woman of my dreams. She offered all the qualities I
wanted. She valued her African traditions, and she supported me at
every level of my struggle to survive in America. But my family
wouldn't accept her because she wasn't from Nigeria. After years of
dealing with my family and friends who always treated her like a
stranger in their midst, Yata began to feel like a stranger. At the same
time, I couldn't deal with the stress of having a fiancee that wasn't
accepted by my family. I eventually left Yata, losing my true love. 4
As Mba ultimately loses Yata, a faithful and loving sweetheart, in her place
enters a "lay away fiance" back in Iboland. Joof mirrors Mba's dissent in the
following manner:
'Amie Joof, African Newbreed , May 1991, p. 22.
2Umez, "High Divorce Rate Among Nigerians in Houston," p. 1
.
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Joof, African Newbreed , p. 22.
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Shortly after the breakup, I went home to Nigeria to meet the woman
my family had selected for me. I came back to America after taking
care of the necessary traditional arrangements that would lead to our
marriage. I paid over $10,000 in cash and material goods to win her
hand in marriage. I drained all my savings to pay for Ify's bridal
price and to give her the lavish wedding she wanted. London was her
choice for honey moon. One month in London cost me a lot of
money, granted we had much fun.... I incurred huge debts in legal
fees to fly "Ify" here.
1
The final phase of LAM for Mba and "Ify," just as in MBA, is in America.
Here, Joof concludes that:
Shortly after "Ify" came to this country, problems develop in our
marriage. She was very materialistic. She wanted to live up to her
fantasies of America—in her actions, manner of dressing and speech.
Our communication suffered. She eventually started an affair with
another man. She told her friend that she wouldn't file for a divorce
because she wanted alimony from me. She accused me of being too
possessive and provoked me into granting her divorce. . . . My ordeal
with "Ify" turned to be a very costly lesson in my life. In trying to
marry a woman from Nigeria, I ignored an important factor in
choosing a life-time partner
—
getting to know her well. All I knew
was that "Ify" was Nigerian and was an Ibo.... In retrospect, should
have prevented me from marrying Yata. She loved me for who I was,
and she cherished her traditional values. She was always content with
what we had.
The "Mba" and "Ify" scenario symbolized the beginning of changes in
traditional attitudes of Nigerian immigrants toward the soundness of the "lay away
marriages." The fading shadow of Nigerians' "lay away marriages" as well as of
their beginning to debunk that pattern of tradition in the 1980s was captured in film
featuring Eddie Murphy, entitled "Coming to America." The film is probably most
revealing for its focus on the crises of the "lay away marriages" of Nigerians than for
'Ibid.
2
Joof, African Newbreed , p. 22.
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the general stereotype of "Akeem," a representative of Nigerian/African student
immigrants in the U.S.
Thus, the importance of "Coming to America" lies more in the shifting socio-
cultural circuits in America that surrounded the Nigerian-African renewed contacts
with their ancestral kin during the 1980s. For, this was a period when African
immigrants began to settle down in urban America, and when their earlier traditions
of returning to the homeland after studies also began to be reversed. 1 This was as
well a period when African immigrants began to identify themselves with American
images, especially with marriages with their black American kin.
But it is not clear whether Eddie Murphy or the Nigerian, who allegedly
collaborated in the development of the script, had thought in terms of the explanation
offered by the author of this dissertation. Nonetheless, the film gives further
credence to a period when the "lay away marriages" began to lose their traditional
vigor in America amidst varying competing cultural influences. It reflects and
conforms to the whole trend of the disillusionment of Nigerians/Africans with some
aspects of their traditional marriages; besides, it symbolizes a time most of them
began to settle as a community in America and to make decisions regarding their
future in ways that were independent of the traditions of the homelands.
By itself, moreover, the film is equally important for depicting the reception
accorded the new waves of immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa in America.
"Akeem" shows how a Nigerian student from a wealthy family was perceived by
'For example, see the crisis surrounding the film "Coming to America," featuring Eddie
Murphy, in Safari Link Magazine, Vol. 1 No.3 (Los Angeles, California, 19991), p. 4. Also,
see Udofia, "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 111-1 12.
2
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most Americans, especially by their African-American kin and the extent to which
the American system exploited him: it confirms the cultural crisis which confronted
those who were less informed of the material gratification of American society. 1
"Akeem," on the other hand, depicts a period when African-Americans began
to wield substantial power, particularly in the entertainment industry. As they
became a force to reckon with, due consideration began to be given to events around
their ancestral setting.
2
Taken as a whole, the Akeem-American gestures were equally suggestive of
how some African-Americans exploited the Nigerian context during the early
decades of their American concentration. This can be taken as a reversed pattern of
the contextual exploitation of the black base by Nigerian immigrants. A majority of
the early waves of Nigerian students attended predominantly black institutions of
higher learning, where millions of dollars in Akeem-like collaborations took place. 3
Beyond this point, the film reveals how some black Americans perceived
and reacted to the early waves of Nigerian students in America. As shown thus far,
their response was equally revealing of the extent to which they sought to ameliorate
the image of modern Africa from the standpoint of their conflict of national identity.
While Akeem typifies the excesses of some Nigerians during the early waves of their
American concentration, its black diasporan-African context exhibits the extent of a
continuing cultural conflict about both the African-American and African identities.
4
'Ibid.
2
Ibid., "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans."
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Igboanugo, Nigerians in America, pp. 27-8.
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Nigerian Offspring: Emerging Inter-generational Crises
The cross-cultural erosion of the marital traditions of Nigerian immigrants
was perhaps not the greatest problem confronting them during a greater part of the
1980s and 1990s. As we saw in Table 2, with increases in their ancestry group
populations, by far the greatest crisis confronting the Nigerian migrant parents
during the immediate decades of adjusting into the mosaic revolved around the inter-
generational transformation of their offspring. Throughout the three decades
preceding 2000, the size of the Nigerian ancestry group—representing American-
born population of Nigerian ancestry—was the largest from sub-Saharan Africa.
For example, in 1980, the population of the Nigerian ancestry group in the
U.S. was 47,857. By 1990, it rose to 91,688; and to 137,002 in 2000. 1 Accordingly,
the growth of the population of the Nigerian offspring, coupled with increased
divorce rates among Nigerian marriages, corresponded with a period of increased
socio-cultural crises of the Nigerian offspring. In responding to this crisis, a majority
of Nigerian-parents began to seek new ways in which to re-educate their offspring
along more favorable lines of the homeland cultures.
By the early 2000, there were no clear evidences that Nigerian parents had
been able to upset the perceived societal problems confronting their offspring in the
diaspora. Based on the data examined in this study, Nigerian/African parents were
not winning the war against their American-born offspring, for they were losing their
'For example, this is supported by the data on Tables 1, 2, 13.1. Also see the
related
information in Chapters 1 and 3.
Houston Chronicle (Houston-Texas, February 9, 1992); Fidelis Nwazuzu, "Toward Another
Breed of Black Africans," The African Herald (Dallas-Texas, 1998), p. 25.
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umbilical cords.
1 The seriousness surrounding the emerging inter-generational crisis
of the Nigerian offspring was due more to the fact that, as these core parent-migrants
became deep-seated within the American mosaic, their offspring also increasingly
become more Americanized. 2 This development, as we observed earlier, was due
more to changes in historical eras. When Nigerian immigrants were not deep-seated
as settlers in America, their offspring had a far lesser degree of undue exposures to
its cultural influences. But with a stronger communal foothold within the American
mosaic, coupled with increased exposures to its cultural and institutional influences,
the Nigerian offspring became more susceptible to such deviant social behaviors as
crimes and drugs.3 Prior to the 1970s, the early return to the homelands after studies
had enabled these American-born offspring of Nigerian ancestry to re-adjust into the
native cultures of their parents' homelands.
The 1980s and 1990s therefore marked the heights of the concentration of
Nigerian populations in America. Also, it marked the beginning of their strong
orientations under the cultural influences of American free institutions. This meant
newer orbit of socio-cultural crises for the Nigerian offspring and their migrant
parents. It represented as well the beginning of a shift from the traditional values of
the homeland.
4
This crisis (See Chapters 3 and 4) was made further complicated by
the continuing political and economic instability back in the Nigerian homeland.
5
Apraku and Authur emphasized the socio-cultural crises of the African offspring in
i
2Gordon, Nigeria's Diverse Peoples
, pp. 240-1.
3
Apraku, African Emigres in the United States , pp. 24-5; Igboanugo, Nigerians in America,
pp. 25-6, 70-71.
Ibid., Authur, Invisible Sojourners , pp. 1 13-1 17.
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the diaspora. They argued that it was at least one explanation why the core base of
the black African parent-migrants desired to return to their respective countries in the
future.
1
Yet, due to the continuing political and economic instability back in the
homeland, most of these parent-migrants were unable to establish a firmer hold on
their American-born offspring. This further confirms the extent of their collective
vulnerability, even after successfully adjusting into the American mosaic.
Given the variant between the traditions of the Nigerian homeland and that
of the U.S., one of the fundamental crises confronting Nigerian parents since the
1990s was evident in their child-rearing traditions. 2 First, as more Nigerians began
to settle down as a community, situation where their American siblings began to
think along markedly differing lines became characteristic of their collective
experience in the diaspora. Second, and perhaps of far greater significance, and due
mostly to the more evident impact of American cultures, Nigerian parents lacked the
much-needed and familiar child-rearing orbits found back in the homeland.
Igboanugo presents an excellent insight to the variant between the child-rearing
traditions of the Nigerian homeland and one operative in the diaspora. According to
him, children born of Nigerian parents in America,
are mostly "baby-sitter bred." Because they were born when their
parents were either students and still going to school, or working and
could not afford to take along time off to cater to the children and
bond with them. There are numerous cases where a child is born and
'
African Emigres in the United States , pp. 13-16, 19-28.
2
Igbonaugo, Nigerians in America, pp. 25-6, 67-71. Apraku, African Emigres in the U.S. , p.
26, has captured this phase of African problem in his emphasis in the return decisions of
Africans to their respective countries. On the other hand, however, Authur's Invisible
Sojourners
, pp. 121-3, argues that African women have emerged as the transmitters of
African traditional values to their offspring. Authur sees this development as a carry-over of
traditional African women child-rearing values from Africa to America (Ibid).
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the mother goes right back to school and /or work the same week.
This may not sound strange to an American. It is a common place
here, but to a Nigerian, it is not. 1
As Igboanugo further documents:
Nigerians who have children in America know that their children are
experiencing a different type of freedom from what they (parents)
were used to in Nigeria. They worry about charges of child abuse,
neglect, and the like. In Nigeria, paddling of children, is an
instrument accepted for child rearing, but it could easily be turned
into a case of child abuse . . . Nigerians who have . . . kids in America
do not have the freedom their parents had in child rearing and
nurturing. Children have the liberty to call their parents by first
name—a no, no in Nigeria. They may even call the law on them for
any strict disciplinary measures deemed "abused." Certain
disciplinary measures are common place in Nigeria, but forbidden
here. Siblings could be left to take care of each other allowing the
parents the freedom to do other things necessary to benefit the family
. . . that is in Nigeria, not in America.2
As Igboanugo's emphases suggest, between the 1980s and early 1990s, the
problem confronting most Nigerian parents was influenced by the extent to which
the power of traditional discipline over their offspring had eroded. This was made
further complicated by the recognition that, with an American birth rights, their
offspring had the power of flexibility to participate in the larger society in ways that
far exceeded their expectations, selective preferences, and choices.
The phase of the above conflict appears to be greater as the Nigerian
offspring begin to enter into the rigorous transition from one generation of settlers to
the other. This might have been why Chinua Achebe urged his Ibo community
brethren, as well as other Nigerians earlier in New Jersey to "stick to their roots" and
'igboanugo, Nigerians in America, p. 25.
2
Ibid., pp. 25-6.
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to "learn about the customs and traditions of our people." 1 "Professor Achebe," as
Chuks Nwaka reported,
Lamented about the fact that children born in the U.S. are not taught
and do not know how to speak Igbo. He illustrated this unfortunate
irony by reminding his audience that most children listening to him
did not understand what he was saying. 2
Yet, the inter-generational conflict surrounding the American-born offspring
of Nigerian immigrants is not exceptional. For, indeed, this is the type of crisis that
all the racial branches of American civilization have almost an even share throughout
most of their varied transitional phases. However, the real conflict surrounding the
Nigerian-African parents in the diaspora appears to have been reinforced by their
more peculiar cultural fracture under alien influences. Too, their strong orientation
under colonialism, along with the continuing influence of American cultures,
weakens an effective parental control over their siblings. American cultural values,
on the other hand, compel an alternate pattern of child rearing development markedly
dissimilar and in most cases, directly oppositional.
3
Authur has emphasized some of the re-adoptive values of the African
homelands by African parents in the effort to re-orient their offspring. This
development, according to Authur, has perhaps influenced the role of the black
African female immigrants in the diaspora than that of their male.
4
But, it is this
'Bon Uzzi, "Chinua Achebe at a Nigerian Gala," The Good Hope News. The Nigerian
Perspective (Dallas-Texas, July, 1991), pp. 1, 17.
2Chuks Nwaka, "A Call for Cultural Rejuvenation," Nigerian News Digest (Charlotte, North
Carolina, July 26, 1991), p. 17.
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author's opinion that Authur's emphasis here may not be correct in every aspect,
although generally valid in some clearly definable socio-cultural context.
Elsewhere, however, Fidelis Nwaozuzu—almost similar to Igboanugo and
Achebe—argues that the dilemma surrounding the child-rearing traditions of the
Nigerian offspring in the diaspora depends on what type of efforts their parents have
made toward their acceptance of the cultures of their parents' homelands:
There are certain practices otherwise known as culture with which
people are known and unless one starts early in life to assimilate the
said culture, one will remain an alien to the culture. Most, if not all
children of Africans born beyond their continent do not speak their
African language, and since language is the vehicle for cultural
transmission, how then can those children understand the customs,
traditions, moves and values of their true origin. 1
To Nwazuzu, moreover, mere exposure of the Nigerian offspring to the
Nigerian cultures without a follow-up may not guarantee acceptance of the cultural
traditions of their African ancestry. Nwazuzu writes that parents should strive to
involve their offspring in early contacts with the cultures of the homelands.
This writer is of the opinion that children of native Africans residing
abroad should be sent home early in life so that they grow up at home,
identify with their age mates, understand where they belong, know
what belongs to their family and what does not, instead of losing
touch with their roots...We need our children to be nurtured by the
finest tradition of African culture and this cannot be achieved by
bringing them up in the American lifestyle. In the American society,
people are highly individualistic and do not help one another. What
happens to another man is no one's business.... But in Africa people
work for one another, retain family ties for a long time and it is their
cherished culture to do so.
Of course, it can be concluded at this point that none of the preceding
emphases clearly implied that Nigerian parents were clearly successful in keeping
'Nwazuzu, "Toward Another Breed of Black Americans," The African Herald, p. 25.
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their offspring away from some of the deviant influences of American cultures.
Rather, it is clear that they were more likely to seek the balance against some
conflicting cultural influences on them. The simple fact, as we indicated earlier, is
that, as the Nigerian parents and their offspring become entrenched within the
mosaic, their grip on each other loosens most naturally. This partly explains why
most Nigerian parents were unable to upset the pace in which their offspring were
being influenced by American cultures. They realized that the Nigerian-child-rearing
traditions were difficult to fit into the American experience. 1
There is evidence that effective rearing of the Nigerian offspring in the
diaspora is further complicated by the attitudes of their parents. For example, one
Nigerian parent (father) stated that his "daughter protested" because "she holds it
religiously that it is insulting to call people blacks."2 In the opinion of this "Nigerian
American," black "isn't a fancy color like pink or red or yellow." Beside, "it takes a
color blind person to think people are black."3
Thus, it is clear that the revealed weakness of the Nigerian offspring in
faulting the "black color" is mirrored in the shared attitudinal predisposition of the
father. Since the father did not explain the cultural orientation of his daughter before
employing her childish views to back up his viewpoint in a "Black History Month,"4
the reader can only ponder over the type of influences some African parents
'ibid. Authur's position in Invisible Sojourners
, pp. 113-117, is predictive of the experience
of Nigerian immigrants as the largest black African base in America. This was supported by
an exploratory interview July 23, 2005, with Mfon Ufot of Nigerian Women Association of
Georgia (NWAG) and Radio Talk-Show personnel at Radio Free Georgia.
2The Good Hope News; African Perspective (Dallas: Good Hope Publishers, Dallas-Texas,
February, 1991), pp. 12, 14.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
432
encourage in their American-born offspring. 1 Given this background, it was perhaps
unsurprising that during the greater part of the 1990s, the traditions of the Yoruba,
Ibo, Hausa-Fulani, Efik-Ibibio, Edo, Itsekiri, and Ijo—were values that the Nigerian
offspring either knew very little about—or seriously cherished in their cultural
strivings and professional aspirations as Americans.
At best, however, in order to succeed as citizens, these offspring needed
stronger attachments to American mores than to the cultures of their migrant-parents.
This shift in trend was even taking place with the overwhelming approval of their
parents: most of them sought and helped their offspring to identify with American
interests in order to secure their future birth rights as Americans. 2
We hinted earlier that some of the child-rearing re-orientation of Nigerians,
along with their emerging generational conflict, was first predicated by changes from
one historical era to another
. These changes had a lot in common with the survival
schemes adopted by Nigerian parents from one decade to the other. Altogether, this
requires an understanding of how each experientially derived effort of an era had
transformed Nigerians in the diaspora, as well as influenced their choices of the tools
of child-rearing development. For example, by the early 1990, some Nigerian
parents had begun to re-adopt their indigenous child-rearing mechanisms within the
mosaic in combating their problems. This attitude differed from earlier approach. 3
This trend of re-adopting indigenous child-rearing concept of the homeland
in the diaspora in rearing American-born offspring of Nigerian immigrants seems to
'Ibid.
2
This is based on interview with Mfon Ufot.
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have corroborated an earlier emphasis by Authur. 1 He depicted the stamina of some
African family households in re-adopting their indigenous skills, values, and acumen
in rearing their American offspring. This also strongly corroborates the trend
operative among Nigerian parents.2 However, Authur' s important emphasis did not
explain the nature of changes taking place from one historical era to the other. 3 If
this had been so, perhaps the revolving patterns of adjustments undertaken by
African immigrants from 1960s to 1990s would have been explained. This could
have made some of their inherent differences much clearer.4
The position, then, is that the recurrent cycles of chain-migrations from
Nigeria (Africa) to the U.S.
—
particularly during the 1990s—had brought along
some observable changes in their general attitude toward the tradition of child-
rearing in the diaspora. Despite the somewhat decade-by-decade relationships in the
pattern of child-rearing crises among the black African family households, some
changes separated earlier attitudes from the much later ones. For example, as we
saw earlier, the characteristics of Nigerian immigration to the U.S. were not all
uniform or similar. 5 Dissimilarities within a continuum thus meant that some re-
adoptive socio-cultural changes had taken place in the subsequent orientations of the
'Authur, Invisible Sojourners
, pp. 1 13-124.
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the U.S. from 1960s to 1990s. Each phase of this development revolved with some changes
from the earlier waves. Thus, it may be futile to explain the socio-cultural context of
Nigerian/African immigrants without also explaining the underlying changes and
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Nigerian settlers. So, accordingly, we can now return to an earlier position: that is,
going by historical eras, the student-parents' part of the problem of child-rearing
identified earlier by Igboanugo among Nigerians in the U.S 1 was perhaps stronger
during the 1970s and early 1980s than during the 1990s. These were eras when the
bulk of them, particularly those with the expectations of returning to the homeland
after their studies, did not bother as much about the hazardous drain involved in the
child-rearing stress. The expectation of returning to Nigeria immediately after
studies seems to have been an underlying factor in understanding the hazards that
Igboanugo's important reference has to be taken.2
Of far greater significance is also the fact that, during the 1970s and early
1980s, the crises surrounding the students' child-bearers of Nigerian immigrants
were becoming internally self-tolerant due to an expectation of future recovery back
in the homeland. For, admittedly, most of the early hazards were undertaken
faithfully and in keeping with the future welfare of their American-born offspring .
During this period, children born in America under any kind of socio-cultural
hazards still benefited when their parents finally returned to Nigeria to socialize them
in the traditions of the homeland. When these children subsequently re-entered the
U.S. as their parents had anticipated for further studies in the future, they often did so
with a somewhat more balanced and educated understanding of their Nigerian
background and cultural heritage. 3
'igboanugo, Nigerians in America , p. 25.
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Actually, the preceding observations can also be seen in light of the cycle of
changes that began to unfold among African immigrants from the 1960s to the 1970s
in the U.S., reaching its clearest historical peak particularly for Nigerians in early
1980s.
1 The result of this trend of changes was later re-adopted into the
improvement of the child-rearing pattern of some Nigerians from mid-1980s to
1990s. During this period, the demographic composition of Nigerian immigrants
was slightly different from the earlier one. Nigerians entering America directly as
students from mid-1980s were much smaller in number compared to the previous
decades. "During this period, the allotment accorded to African immigrants
compared, for example, to the Asians and Europeans also became smaller."2 Again
between the mid-1980s and early 1990s, Nigerians admitted to the U.S. were those in
high skilled professions as the medical and technical sciences, academia, and
administrative positions.
3
To be sure, while the crisis surrounding Nigerian students who were parents
was an accurate history, a greater part of the 1990s did not seem to have mirrored its
effects among Nigerians as evenly all across. Its strongest claim was closely
Ibid. The emphasis here is based on an understanding of the varied waves of African
immigration to the U.S. For example, in the case of Nigerian immigrants, there is no
clarification of the major phases of their post-colonial immigration to the U.S. (Kalu Ogbaa,
especially Chapter 1-2). However, as we saw earlier, by the early 1980s, an historic
development of a Nigerian immigrant community, which took place, was mostly of the early
students' waves of the 1970s. The clarification in Chapter 3 of this dissertation can serve as
faithful basis in which to explain the earlier as well as the subsequent changes in the pattern
of Nigerian/African immigration to the U.S. By itself, however, some of the explanation of
Nigerian immigrants, as mirrored in Ogbaa's Nigerian Americans , for example, does not
quite fit with this author's understanding of the Nigerian context. The approach adopted here
is receptive to a more definitive explanation of the Nigerian immigrants, or even of the
broader context of black African immigrants in America.
2
Research Report
,
p. 15.
3
Ibid.
436
associated with the era of largely student waves of immigrants. 1 From early to the
mid-1990s, when Nigerian immigrants had accomplished most of their adjustments
into the American mosaic, other patterns of inter-cultural re-adaptations had also
begun to evolve among them. With maturity during the remaining part of the 1990s,
Nigerian immigrants had to re-adopt their indigenous child-rearing features into the
American environment. They succeeded in transforming what in Igboanugo's terms
were some of the identifiable features of the child-rearing crises of Nigerians.2
Authur's important emphases on adopting the cultural values of the homeland
by African women to influence their offspring in the diaspora are more closely
linked to the preceding background as well as to events during and after the 1990s. 3
This further supports the variant in historical eras. During this period, most
Nigerians were able to re-adopt their indigenous cultures within their functioning
communal settings in ways that the much earlier waves could not have been able to
do. Especially for those Nigerian parents with American citizenship, this was done
by financing the entries of their parents or relatives back in the homeland into the
U.S. to assist with the rigorous requirements of child-rearing in the diaspora. This is
another reason for understanding the varied cycles of changes that shaped post-
colonial African immigration to the U.S., as well as the likely re-adoptive socio-
cultural context operative within the Nigerian/African immigrant communities.
Authur's position on the increased presence of aged parents among African-
born family-households in America due to economic hardships and medical care
'Ibid.
2See the earlier notes on Igboanugo, Nigerians in America .
3
Authur, The Invisible Sojourners , pp. 1 13-124.
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problem is a true fact. 1 It is also a fact that aged parents brought all the way from
Africa have added financial strains on their struggling sons and daughters in the
diaspora.
2
Yet, Authur's underlying emphases corresponded more correctly with an era
when Nigerian/African immigrants were bringing aged parents into the U.S. to assist
as domestic helpers within their family households. 3 If so, the emphasis here lies
more in what appears to have been a misunderstanding of the underlying role played
by those aged African parents while in America. For some of them were brought as
rear-guards of traditional values as well as maids for their daughters and sons.4
While some came for medical assistance, however, often the medical care received
and the expenses incurred in bringing them into America, occurred as part of the
negotiation to help the American-born offspring of their sons/daughters to secure a
more stable socio-cultural cohesion.
5
This form of parent-relative child-rearing negotiations undertaken by
Nigerians in the diaspora was quite capable of freeing most of them during a greater
part of the 1990s and early 2000s either to attend colleges/universities or to take on
other lines of career re-training. At other times, however, they served as the basis
upon which some Nigerians were able to re-orient their career schedules with as
many jobs as were needed to meet the financial expenses of their struggling family
'Authur, Invisible Sojourners , p. 119.
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households. While either attending classes or working, the parent-relative-maid
helpers became the most natural home-bred rearguards within the American family
households in charge of the offspring. 1
Some parent-relative-maid helpers of Nigerians in the diaspora were
sometimes on contractual arrangements
.
This is another indication of the negotiation
schemes for the claim of bringing aged African parents into the U.S. for medical
services. Essentially, the difference between "negotiation" and "contractual
arrangements" lies in the nature of the rewards reasonably agreed upon between
Nigerians and their parent-relative maid helpers before entering America. The idea
of "negotiation" often involved reward for domestic services as helpers for being
taken away from the hardships of the Nigerian/African hunger, problem of absence
of proper medical attention, and general instability. On the other hand, however, in
"contractual" arrangement there is often the direct agreement and an understanding
about the nature of benefits to be derived between the Nigerians in the diaspora in
the coming over the parent-relative-maid helpers.
Accordingly, therefore, what Authur sees mostly as burdensome financial
pressures on Africans who brought their aged parents to America has to be viewed as
the working out of contractual compromises. This is no less different from the
attitude of some white families who brought in Mexican maids, who sometimes
spoke very little or no English, but who were willing to learn and later able to answer
to the demanding role of domestic services under illegal contractual financial
arrangements. By such compromises, the Nigerian parent-migrants in the diaspora
'Authur, Invisible Sojourner, p. 119.
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agreed to reward the parent-relative-maid helpers either while in America or back in
the homeland with some form of financial support. Given the harsh economic and
political uncertainties in Nigeria, some parent-relative-maid helpers were willing to
remain in America for as long as their assistance was needed. Usually, they agreed
to remain until the American-born offspring of their sons/daughters were in a
position to assert their independence without undue cultural influences. 1
Interestingly enough, to a certain extent, the parent-relative-maid helpers of
Nigerians were also the carriers of the homeland traditions as well as deciphers of
ancient folklores to the offspring of their sons and daughters. They were as well
their story-tellers and singers of indigenous songs. In situations where the Nigerian
offspring are to be seen speaking fluently in the native tongues of their parents, as
sometimes found among some Yoruba and Ibo ethnic groups,2 for example, the skills
may very well have been influenced through the medium of the parent-relative-maid
helpers living within the American family households of their sons and daughters. 3
Therefore, as indicated above, the process of influencing the Nigerian
offspring to speak in the native tongues of their parents depended in the
domestication of the cultural values of the homeland within the American family
households. Otherwise, very few Nigerian parents have succeeded in influencing
their offspring to use their native tongues in the diaspora. This is due mostly to the
enormous underlying contradictions between workplace attitudes and the medium of
domestic interactions influencing of Nigerians in America. So, however loosely in
'Ibid.
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"Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 275-6.
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degree, the medium of the parent-relative-maid within the Nigerian immigrant family
households appears to have appended an important outline of cultural void for their
sons and daughters in the diaspora.
The preceding then calls for a more specific understanding of how some
Nigerian parents especially mothers, have recorded their views regarding the
emerging inter-generational crisis confronting them and their offspring. This is
because, as mothers, they sometimes stand a better chance of understanding, and
indeed of carrying the deeper burden of child-rearing. This peculiar experience has
further transformed the role of the Nigerian/African women in the diaspora.
The extent then to which Nigerian female parents, who are mothers, are
coping with the emerging inter-American cultural transformation of their female
offspring is perhaps the most worrisome feature of their sojourn in the diaspora. The
question often asked is: "Can our female daughters who are American-born maintain
a balance with the traditional values of the Nigerian homeland?" This question is
often particular when it relates to choices of their future marital spouses: "Who will
they marry, anyway?" "Will they marry according to our tradition, and will they
ever return to Nigeria?"
1 Some of the questions posed here were based on
experience of a Nigerian mother of Ibo ethnic background "torn between teaching
my daughter to be an Ibo woman and giving her the independence she craves."
'These questions have been raised by Nigerian/African parents in the many community
forums I attended from 1990 to 2005. I noticed that most of these parents were fully
cognizant of their crisis but often had generally less agreeable formula to reconstruct their
dilemma.
2Dympna Ugwu-Oju, "should My Tribal Past Shape Delia's Future," Newsweek (December
4, 2000), p. 14. See further elaboration on "Dympna Ugwu-Oju" in Gordon, Nigeria's
Diverse Peoples
, pp. 240-1
.
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The above was the general dilemma of Ugwu-Oju, a Nigerian woman and
mother of a- 1 8-year old American-born offspring of Ibo ethnic background. For this
mother, the concern was mostly about the extent to which her Ibo tradition would be
relevant to her American-born and bred daughter. "I'm a member of the Ibo tribe of
Nigeria, and although I've lived in the United States most of my life, my
consciousness remains fixed on the time and place of my upbringing." 1 Ugwu-Oju's
experience reveals the nature of the double consciousness operative between two
contesting influences on her daughter. If, as a parent, she could separate herself from
American influences into her Ibo tradition, in her reasoned viewpoint, such an
exercise would be difficult for her daughter. "I see these American and Ibo aspect of
my life as distinct; I separate them perfectly, and these are no blurring."
Ugwu-Oju who entered America in 1974, argues that she knew and still
knows the rules governing the traditional values of her people and of the Ibo tribal
bond. She also admits that, in entering America, she brought along with her the
expectations of her parents. Her education, as a woman fell within the accepted
tradition of faithfulness to her husband. All she knew and was taught to cherish most
by her parents was loyalty to the marital traditions of her people, and crave for male
children to please the husband.
3
But, at age 18, her daughter—Delia, a future
Princeton University graduate—knew very little or nothing about the traditions of
Iboland. What Ugwu fears most is the extent to which her "tribal past" should
influence her expectation of her daughter's future. Like most Nigerian parents, she
'Ibid.
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is "torn between teaching my daughter to be an Ibo woman and giving her the
independence she craves." 1
Particularly for the Nigerian female offspring, the Ugwu-Oju crisis thus
confirms the general dilemma confronting Nigerian parents with regard to the
shifting crisis of inter-generational transformation of their American-born offspring.
For these offspring will "most likely not consider" their feelings and their values in
choosing their American spouses. They are not as selfishly loyal as the parents were
back in the homeland. "Should we limit their opportunities to keep them loyal to our
beliefs and our past, or should we encourage our daughters to avail themselves of all
experiences, even at the risk of rejecting who and what we are?"2 The answer to this
question requires an understanding of the prospects of their American incorporation.
American-born Offspring of Nigerian Immigrants:
Their Relationships with Black America
and the Nigerian-African Homelands, etc.
Admittedly, the worrisome concerns raised above by Ugwu-Oju had to be
sought and explained within the context of an American world incorporation of the
Nigerian offspring. And, as we have hinted earlier, this explanation lies in the fact
that, the longer Nigerian immigrants remain in the diaspora, the greater the chances
that their offspring will look more favorably toward sustained interactions with
American cultures than those of their ancestral homelands. Perhaps, due also to the
racial circumference of American cultures, both their relations as well as the
corresponding values of effective socioeconomic mobility will also gravitate more
'Ibid.
2Ugwu-Oju, "Should My Tribal Past Shape Delia's Future," p. 14.
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favorably toward black America, and in varying degrees, toward those of mainstream
America.
Most revealing, though, for the Nigerian offspring, has been the fact that their
sense of cultural identity—perhaps depending more on the degree of parental
influences—also corresponds with a double consciousness either toward ancestral
Africa and black America or toward Euro-America. While there are Nigerians who
have lured their offspring toward the cultural values of mainstream America,
however, the emphasis here is that the general trend is more favorably skewed
toward black America. Either way, however, African parents are neither able to
control the rising tide of the generational transformation of their American offspring
nor of the opposing lures of American cultures against those of their homelands. 1
Thus, the historico-cultural orbit of the Nigerian offspring requires a more
careful explanation. This is because their more distinctive generational orbit from
both the experiences of the forced and voluntary migrants places them in a certain
level of advantage. This tends to make them one of the most adjustable human
features from black Africa currently in America since the demise of chattel slavery
and colonialism. Yet, sometimes, their socio-cultural identification mirrors the
earlier and continuing attitudes of "passing" identifiable among the descendants of
forced migration with mixed white-black ancestries.
'This is based on summaries drawn from several children day care interaction conferences
(including African-Nigerian, African-American and White) I have attended.
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For example, for some historical context of "passing," see Jean Toomer, Cane (New York:
Liveright, 1993), especially the "Introduction" by Darwin T. Turner, pp. ix-xxv; Nella
Larsen, Quicksand and Passing (New Jersey and London: Rutgers University Press, 1986),
pp. ix-xxxii; and Houston A. Baker, Jr., Afro-American Poetics: Revisions of Harlem and
the Black Aesthetic (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), pp. 33-44.
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Nigerian offspring who "pass" outwardly as American rather than as
Americans of Nigerian ancestry are also able to "pass" back as the offspring of
"Nigerian ancestry." Generally, this development is dictated by the racial character
of American civilization. Ironically, however, it offers the Nigerian offspring the
dual choices of the consciousness of urban survival. It is either favorable or
unfavorable depending on the institutional features influencing their strivings for, as
well as, access to the goal of American dreams. 1 Overall, however, the inner
tensions leading some Nigerian offspring to "pass out" as African-Americans with
no links to Africa are rare. In the research and fieldwork done in this dissertation, it
was found that the Nigerian offspring only attempted to "pass out" as the "other
American" where they perceived their ancestry at a disadvantage. The attitude was
mostly in response to a drive to achieve the desired goals.2
Thus, there are currently in America certain institutional features that
influence some choices at the inter-generational circuit of the Nigerian or the African
offspring of sub-Saharan settlers. These are either advantageous or disadvantageous
to their American and Nigerian-African relations depending on the medium chosen
in their search for survival. Generally, within a specific context, it would appear that
Nigerian offspring enjoy a huge advantage in accessing some institutional support
with their ancestral origins fairly intact, rather than losing them.
As we see from the preceding development, the socio-cultural plateau of the
Nigerian offspring offers a much clearer basis than that of their core parents for
understanding their incorporation into American society. The social feature of
'ibid. This is also supported by the fieldwork and interviews undertaken in this study.
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"passing" adopted by some Nigerian offspring as a mechanism of urban survival is
therefore less obvious compared to the highly constrained patterns of incorporation
associated with their parents. The Nigerian offspring thus represent the most favored
basis for incorporating or integrating Nigerian indices into American society.
Similarly, both the historical and cultural orbit of the Nigerian offspring, are
more natural to sustained intra-racial incorporation than those of their parents. Their
future possibilities are assuring enough. One of the strongest demographic
achievements of their core migrant parents, which also hold for these offspring, has
been their excellent educational status. 1 The relationship of this advantageous
background seems poised to enhance greater chances of incorporating the Nigerian
offspring into the American mosaic. A majority of them are already achieving the
American niche in far greater numbers than their parents were able to do. Their
strong visibility within the major Ivy League universities and colleges is impressive.
The Nigerian offspring do also have a smoother access to the American
dream as well as greater commitment to its ideals. Thus, they are more likely than
their core parents to stake their rights as Americans and hence to achieve a greater
degree of incorporation. Besides, as our evidences have demonstrated, they seem
well placed to be able to re-adopt their American gains toward the Nigerian/African
world development than were their parents and the descendants of slaves.
Yet, it is also worth noting here that, the extent to which the current thrust of
the Nigerian offspring represents an effort toward sustained incorporation into
American society may not be based solely on their effective education . Nor are the
'Apraku, African Emigres in the United States, pp. 3-9; Research Report , pp. 14-19; Author,
Invisible Sojourners , pp. 3-4.
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strong efforts by their parents to identify them with mainstream values very
convincing future predictors of favorable incorporation. Perhaps, arguably, due to
the continuing crisis of racial indifference, good education is also likely to be more
predictive of a higher level of economic stability than of sustained incorporation.
As we saw earlier, the extent of an inter-American success in incorporating
ethnic groups into society had much in common with the support extended to them
by the host society and American institutions. This support in turn is closely linked
to the strengths of co-existing ethnic communities of these groups in America. 1
Given the evidences illuminated so far, this important emphasis is undoubtedly least
favorable to Nigerians or to the larger base of the black African migrants. As Portes
and Zhou found, incorporation of the children of Mexican immigrants and the
Caribbean immigrants was at the least favorable orbit of either assimilation or
integration, largely due to some social constraints. This strongly suggests that a
similar pattern for Nigerians/Africans is likely to be much weaker and harder in
America. For example, when considering that the Latinos and Asians in America
often view their conflict in terms of cultural rather than racial terms, it would likely
be seen that sustained incorporation of the Nigerian offspring falls into the dissenting
pattern of the historical crisis characteristic of African-descended groups.
There is even a basis that, despite their poor status in education, the inter-
generational features of Mexican-American offspring have more favorable
'Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou, "The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation
and Its Variants," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science #530
(November 1993), p. 84.
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that affect Mexican-American and African-American communities.
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demographic orbit than those of the offspring of Caribbean immigrants. While
conflict in assimilating the children of Caribbean immigrants, is due more to race,
that of the Mexicans is due to low level of education. 1
Therefore, unlike Nigerian and Caribbean immigrants, Mexican immigrants
can admit of discrimination but probably with little or no strong emphasis on race.
The inherent strength deflected by the broader assimilation of the Hispanic cultures
has the power of favorable reception by the mainstream races than for
Nigerian/Caribbean immigrants. 2 Moreover, the socio-cultural context of the
Nigerian offspring is much closer to the experience of the black Caribbean
immigrants as well as to that of the native-born black Americans.
The extent then to which Nigerian offspring will be able to overcome a full
cycle of the socio-cultural crises that have historically confronted the descendants of
slaves is as yet uncertain. Their options, to a certain extent, are likely to be
influenced by the contesting political and cultural forces that will shape the
American republican agenda. Almost most of them are cognizant that their racial
attributes both in America as well as back in Africa, are concealed in the background
of the black experience. 3 A majority of them have a strong consciousness about the
effects of race on their American strivings. They have witnessed through some
experiences and sometimes learnt from their parents, as well as from the bittersweet
relationships between White America and Black America, that race is a determinant
feature of American civilization. When they "pass" as pure Americans with no
'ibid.; Cordell and y Griego, Integration of Nigerian and Mexican Americans in Dallas/Fort
Worth, Texas, especially pp. 3-11, 19-20.
2
Ibid.
3
Authur, Invisible Sojourners
, pp. 3-4.
448
attachment to a Nigerian-African ancestry, this is mostly in recognition of the
inherent conflict of race in their consciousness.
But, as we noted earlier, the degree in which the above problem is
characteristic of America's newest migrants and offspring varies significantly from
one historical era to the other. Nevertheless, while the succeeding generations of the
Nigerian-African offspring are likely to fare better, perhaps their ultimate success
would depend more on the modification of the indelible attitude of racial
indifference toward their ancestral background. 1
For the Nigerian offspring, a point can then be made: that is, they are more
susceptible to favorable incorporation into American society than their parents. Yet,
as we have argued, such a fact or historical fortune need not conceal their unknown
footholds as Americans in the future.
The author of this dissertation argues that, unless there are concerted efforts
to modify the racial ambivalence of American civilization, the Nigerian offspring are
likely to achieve only a more favorable degree of an American incorporation than did
their migrant parents. One can speculate that such crises as racism and
discrimination, where they will continue to impinge on them—whether in a similar
or a near-similar degree as those of the descendants of forced migration—might lead
to the refocusing of their future direction as Americans. Such refocusing, as can be
further speculated, might enhance their choices of self-redirection either toward
greater partnerships within the American black base or toward the Nigerian/African
homelands. Clearly, the basis of an overall shift in historical dynamics is inevitable.
'Ibid.
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Should the preceding scenario take place, it would certainly represent another
phase of re-creative patterns of inter-generational similarities which involves the
descendants of slaves and voluntary migrations in America. 1 This inevitable
dynamic might be determined by how Americans of Nigerian ancestry, for example,
seek to control both their political and cultural agenda. At this point, however, the
prospect of this development is a mere conjecture. Yet, current evidences point
strongly to the fact that the general thrust of this development appears to be headed
in the direction of offering newer patterns of Pan-African features in the greater part
of the twenty-first century. 2
We are likely to see again in Chapters 6 some evidences of how the Nigerian
offspring are being positioned to achieve the real gem of Pan-African solidarity with
the black diaspora of enslavement. Their relationships with Euro-Americans and
even beyond the larger concerts of the European and Asian world connections are
equally suggestive of emerging medium of changes in race relations. This is largely
because, as we noted earlier, they are more likely to overcome some of the cultural
and historical constraints that often affected relations between continental Africans
and African-Americans. A similar degree of favorable relations between the
Nigerian offspring and Euro-Americans is therefore inevitable.
Summary
The successful adjustment of Nigerians into the American mosaic was
accompanied by newer patterns of socio-cultural crises—which, in turn—affected
'For example, see the major socio-cultural emphases in Chapters 6 and 7.
2
"The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 265-270.
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their inherent values. Currently, the basis of an American incorporation of
Nigerians/Africans is largely economic, and this is supported mostly by good
educational status.
Nigerian marital traditions, which have come under the influences American
institutions, are currently being affected by divorces and separations. Nigerian
marriages are also beginning to live and to act like most American marriages.
Among some Nigerians, as with African-Americans, the pageant for individuals'
successes follows the same pattern of make-beliefs in the efforts to define their new
found identities.
The Nigerian offspring have the best socio-cultural orbit of favorable
incorporation into American society. They are currently more African-American
than Nigerian as well as more favorably predisposed toward American values than
those of the homeland of their core parents. They are in a position to have more
favorable contacts with the ancestral homelands than the descendants of slaves, and
in some instances, they represent the best medium of exchanges involving Black
America, Euro-America, and Nigeria/Black Africa.
451
CHAPTER 6
THE SOUTHERN BACKGROUND OF NIGERIAN IMMIGRANTS-
AN EXAMPLE OF THEIR SOUTHERN PULL ALONG
AFRICAN-AMERICAN LANES
This chapter explains the Southern identification of Nigerian immigrants in
the United States and the extent to which the presence of African-American
institutions influenced their build-up. It argues that geography, the high density of
African-American and Nigerian populations, socioeconomic and socio-cultural
issues, and the presence of predominantly black institutions of higher education
—
were some of the major factors influencing the strong Southern pull of Nigerian
immigrants. The chapter also shows some evidences of the strong Southern pull of
Nigerians in Atlanta and Dallas, focusing on Houston as a case study. Next, it
explains the Southern interactions of Nigerian-owned churches and the pattern of
ancestral relationships with African-Americans.
Part 1: A General Review of Southern Background
By mid- 1750, the build-up and regional distribution of African slaves within
the Southern slave societies had both a distinctive as well as sizeable lead over its
counterparts in Northern societies with slaves. This was because the Southern
colonies, later to become the United States, had a far denser concentration of both
the cultural and demographic varieties of the African slave populations than did their
Northern counterparts.
1
Consequently, even before the legal abolition of slavery by
the U.S. Congress in 1808, Southern states had emerged as the most natural locales
of African-American communities and institutions. That the freest Black-owned
'This is supported by evidences in Chapter 2. See especially the statistical data on the
Southern and Northern colonies.
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institutions began in the North, as historian Leon Litwack has observed, is a fact of
the black experience in America. 1 But it was in the Southern region that the main
action of the early free Northern black communities both converged and transformed
itself after the Civil War.
With the coming of Reconstruction, the South had numerous black
colleges/universities, more viable black institutions, and an active population base
that facilitated its advantages in seedling the forces that were later to transform the
state of white-black inequalities in America.2 This Southern heritage of black
America is perhaps best illustrated by its peculiar experience and history during the
era of freedom. For example, from 1877 to mid-twentieth century, the public
institutions in the South expressed themselves toward the descendants of slaves in
accordance with the old features of racial slavery. This took place through
segregation of public institutions by race, an unequal school system for blacks and
• * 3
whites, rigid state miscegenation law, and exclusion of blacks from the juries.
The South then is where African-descended Americans began their entry as
late citizens into the American republic despite being one of the earliest frontier
settlers in the nation. This is also, where, following Reconstruction, racial
'Leon F. Litwack. North of Slavery: The Negro in the Free States 1790-1860 (Chicago and
London: The University of Chicago Press, 1961), pp. 39-40; Horton and Horton, In Hope of
Liberty , pp. 130-47, 203-213.
2
Martin Luther King, Jr., Strive Toward Freedom: The Montgomery Story (New York:
Harper & Row, 1958), pp. 100-3; Martin Luther King, Jr., "Letter from Birmingham Jail,
1963," The Annals of America, Vol. 18 (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1961-
1968), p. 147.
, m
3Davidson B iracial Politics: Conflict and Coalition in Metropolitan South (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana 'state University Press, 1972), pp. 15-16; August Meier, Negro
Thought in
America 1880-1915: Racial Ideologies in the. Age of Booker T. Washington (Ann Arbor:
The University of Michigan Press, 1968), pp. 19-25.
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opposition and increased repugnance toward black equality resulted in organized
violence by white supremacist groups against established black institutions. Thus,
apart from being noted for increased black ghettos and urban black underclass, it is
where racism and discrimination has been on record high since the enactments of the
civil rights and voting rights laws in the 1960s. This region is as well where the
status of black freedom continues to confront the strongest opposition by the
advocates of states' rights legislations. 1
Southern Background of Houston, Texas
Unsurprisingly, the South is where the black struggle won its national and
international debut both in the ethical and political appeals for equal status. Yet,
although a pathway to the emergence of a New South under law began probably
between mid-1950s and mid 1960s, it still retains some of the indelible facts of the
Old South. Sociologist Chandler Davidson has observed that the cultural milieu of
the Southern mores is still influenced by the character of the peculiar institution.
2
These features of the Old South are still evolving in the large size of internal black
population movements and established cultural institutions.
3
Robert Bullard has argued that the "South is more than a statistical entity,"
and hence cannot be classified as "comprising sixteenth states and the District of
'For example, see: Gates, Jr., America Behind the Color Line , pp. 179-189; Sitoff, The
Struggle for Black Equality , pp. 3-36; Desmond King, Separate and Unequal: Black
Americans and the US Federal Government (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 3-30;
K PnnPth O'Reilly. "Racial Matters:" The FBI's Secret File on Black America, 1960-1972
(New York and London: The Free Press, 1989), pp. 1-77.
2
Davidson, B iracial Politics , pp. 10-17.
3
Daniel M. Johnson and Rex R. Campbell, Black Migration in America: A social
demographic history (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1981), pp. 5-6, 9-16, 32-56.
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Columbia." 1 The South, Bullard observes, has its own distinctive history, culture,
and development patterns, comprising the "twelve states" of the so-called New
South. Like Davidson, Bullard concludes that the so-called New South is not
completely dissimilar from the Old South.2
Figure 9 shows that the twelve states of the New South, comprising of
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee,
Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas—are all embedded in the
regional and cultural zones of former slave societies (See Tables 6.1-6.3). Despite
the persistence of the character Old South, these states are where
—
particularly
between 1970 and 2000—some important demographic changes have occurred in the
white-black relations. Some of these changes have been of significant political gains
as well as losses to the descendants of slaves. For example, some major gains have
been recorded in the size of black middle-class and in their political representation
despite continuing strong disparities compared to whites. 3
Therefore, in the so-called New South, the peculiar circumstances which
make for the Southern typology of African-Americans and of the new generation of
largely voluntary African immigrants are perhaps more favorable in the major urban
cities of the black belt. Within these cities, their potential for collective groupings
is maximized by the large size of urban population of African-Americans. This
strong black visibility in turn is formed around more favorable socio-cultural and
'Robert D. Bullard, "Lure of the New South," in Search of the New South: The Black Urban
Experience in the 1970s and 1980s , ed., R. D. Bullard (Tuscaloosa: The University of
Alabama Press, 1989), pp. 3-4; Davidson, Biracial Politics , p. 10.
2
Davidson, Biracial Politics , p. 10; Bullard, In Search of the New South , pp. 3-4.
3
Ibid., Bullard, pp. 5-15
455
politico-economic interactions, geographic spread, along with sheer size of pliable
black institutions. These factors are either advantageous or disadvantageous to
African immigrants depending on the varying evolutionary statuses of the
descendants of slaves.
Figure 9
Map Showing the Twelve States of the South
Source: Robert D. Bullard, In Search of the New South , The Black Urban
Experience in the 1970s and 1980s (Tuscaloosa and London:
The University of Alabama Press, 1989), p. 4.
Aside from Atlanta and Dallas, perhaps nowhere else in the major Southern
cities are the possibilities of larger political and economic transformation of the
collective strengths of African-Americans and of the black African immigrants as
obvious as in Houston, Texas. As Bullard writes, "Blacks in Heavenly Houston,"
particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, represented the macrocosm of some of the
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changes in the Old South. 1 This same trend, which continued favorably throughout
the 1990s toward African-Americans, also embraced African immigrants.
As Table 18 confirms, the patterns of growth of blacks in Houston have been
steady since 1900. Such factors as sheer size, general demographic growth, internal
and external migrations, along with the numerous effects of rapid urbanization, have
added to the rapid rise of the city of Houston and transformation. For example, in
1970, Houston, a city of 1.2 million people, was within the country's thirteenth
largest Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA).2 In 1980, when Houston's
census population was 1, 595,138, it ranked fifth among the nation's major SMSAs. 3
When in 1990 Houston's census population figure was 1,630,553, its national SMSA
status moved to the fourth position.4 As of 2000, the city had a total population of
1 .9 million people. By July 1
,
2004, more than 2 million people were recorded in its
population.
5
Demographically and culturally, part of the region where Houston is
currently located falls into the "peripheral South or the Rim South rather than to the
heart of Dixie."
6 Founded in 1836, Houston located in Harris County, was once
included in a region known as East Texas. A. R. Mangus once defined East Texas
and Houston including part of Arkansas and Louisiana, as falling within the region
known as "Western Old South."
7
'Bullard, In Search of the New South , pp. 16-34.
2
Davidson, Biracial Politics , p. 17.
3
Atlas Year Book , 1993, p. 801.
4
Ibid.
5See U.S. Bureau of the Census Report for 2000, and the supplementary Report, July 2004.
6
Ibid.; Davidson, Biracial Politics , pp. 1 1-12.
7
Ibid.; Frazier, The Negro in the United States , pp. 200-2.
457
Table 18
The Growth of African-American Populations
in Houston, Texas, 1900-2000
War Total JTClLclll ^ /O
^
Ponul ation Ponulation
-L-/1CIV^J\. f±l 1 1 1 ik. til 1
1900 44,633 14 608 3? 7
1910 78 800 23,929 30 4
1920 138 276 33 960 24 6
1930 292,352 63,337 21.7
1940 384,514 86,302 22.4
1950 596,163 125,400 21.0
1960 938,219 215,037 22.9
1970 1,232,802 316,992 25.7
1980 1,595,138 440,257 27.6
1990 1,630,553 457,990 28.1
2000 1,900,000 494,496 25.31
Sources: Chandler Davidson, Biracial Politics: Conflict and Coalition in the
Metropolitan South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1972), p. 18;
The World Almanac and Book of Facts, 1983 (New York: Newspaper Enterprise
Association, Inc., 1983), pp. 212-213; The Information Please Almanac, Atlas
Year Book 1993 , 46th Edition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1993), p.
801.
The Negro concentrations in the above areas were principally along the
Brazos, Trinity, Neches, Sabine, Colorado, and Red River bottom, where cotton was
first grown in large quantity, and where plantation agriculture was densely
concentrated.
1 These areas included counties stretching from Lamar County along
the Red River down the Texas-Louisiana boundary to Harris County (Houston),
Galveston, Refugio, and Fort-Bent. Stretching further up the Neches and Trinity
River bottoms, the region embraced Dallas and Ft. Worth, and from there Austin and
Waco. According to Frazier and Davidson, East Texas and Houston along with the
Eastern Old South and the Mississippi Delta once embraced the Cotton Belt.
'Ibid.
2
Ibid.; Davidson, pp. 1 1-13.
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Houston is thus steeped in the political and social mores of the Southern Black
Belt. From the pre-Civil War to the current era, it exhibited both the image of the
Old and the so-called New South. The image of the Old South in the city is still
being retained as a place where slavery flourished in large quantity once it was
introduced in the early nineteenth century, and "which till today bears witness to the
nature of the peculiar institution." 1 Frederick Law Olmsted, who visited the city in
1854, noted that: "There is a prominent slave mart in town, which held a large lot of
likely-looking Negroes, waiting purchasers."2 Olmsted's record reveals that the
social features of the "peculiar institution," as posted on the "windows of shops and
on the doors and columns of the hotel," included many advertisements for sales of
"A likely Negro girl," "Two Negroes" and "Twenty Negro boys."3
Although the image of the New South in Houston is to be seen in some of the
active involvement of blacks in city-politics, evidences of its conservative traditions
persist. The peculiar Southern identification of Houston during the previous century
was indicated by its name, "Magnolia City."4 David McComb observed that
Houston's modern civic and social history reflected a pervasive conservatism in
politics, public schools, and reactions to urban problems. The roots of this
conservatism, he argued, lie in the Southern heritage of the town, the expansive, the
opportunistic nature of the areas, and the strong business orientation of the
economy. 5
'ibid.
2
Ibid., pp. 13-14.
3
Ibid.Quoted in Davidson, pp. 13-14.
4
Ibid., p. 17.
5
David G. McComb, Houston: A History (Austin: University of Texas, 1981), p. 145.
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Indeed, until the abolition of the "White Primary" in 1944, African-
Americans—as the largest minority group in Houston—were not involved in city
politics. Prior to this date, they were excluded from voting in the democratic
primaries in the state. They began to participate in Houston politics by way of
forging alliances with the liberal factions. By 1953, however, they had formed an
organization with the dual aims of fostering a relationship with the National
Democratic Party and providing support for liberal candidates at the state and local
levels.
1
The entry of blacks in Houston into the electorate in a relatively short time
challenged the status quo. This trend has in recent times come to be evident by the
growing shift in the organization of City-Hall politics from conservative to racial
moderates to liberal political dominance.
2
Significantly, the Houston city politics
has been dominated by numerous run-off elections. The evolving demographic
patterns of black coalition-based political activism, along with other ethic minority
political interest groups, have often made Houston's well-known and intense
political campaigns to depend on the cooperation of black voters. This trend peaked
in 1981, and in 1983, following the elections of the city's first female Mayor,
Kathryn Whitmire.
3
Prior to 1981, however, Houston's politics was not well known for its civil
rights actions. With the election of Whitmire, the reliance on minorities' support to
run the City Hall (Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, women, Asian Americans
'Davidson, Biracial Politics , pp. 11, 84-5.
2
Paul Udofia, "Television Use by Two Mayoral Candidates: A Comparative Assessment"
(Unpublished Master's Thesis, Texas Southern University, 1985), pp. 41-2.
3
Ibid., pp. 1-2, 39, 41-46, 72-5, 94-5, 109-1 10.
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and gays) marked the beginning of a gradual shift toward liberal policies in city.
This trend was further transformed by the appointment of Lee Brown, an African-
American, as Houston's Police Chief by Whitmire. Together, her election as the first
city's female mayor represented the clearest historic shift in the organization of City
Hall's policies.
1
Since the 1980s, therefore, blacks have been recording some gains in
Houston politics. For example, in 1997, Houston elected Lee Brown, as its first
African-American mayor. The current Mayor of the city is Bill White. Crime has
been closely linked to Houston's Southern identification. Houston maintained a top-
ranking murder rate and a relatively small police force throughout the 1940s, 1950s,
and 1960s. While Houston ranked fourth in the nation in crime rates in 1967 and
1979, its crime statistics were comparable to New York and Los Angeles, although
not as bad as Dallas and Atlanta.2
Consequently, the mayoral election of 1983, for example, focused upon crime
as an important issue.
3
Earlier, Henry Allen Bullock, a Professor at Texas Southern
University, who studied Houston's crime problem in 1961, noted that there was a
close relationship between homicide and geography and stated: "generally, murder is
a southern problem and Houston's murder rate helps keep this southern tradition
alive." Bullock concluded that murder encouraged general lawlessness in the city,
'Ibid.
2McComb, Houston. A History, pp. 153-154.
3Houston Chronicle , (May 24, 1983), Section 4, p. 8.
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and affected a communal lack of control over the criminal behavior. 1 Houston's
troubling crime identification has recently been tempered by favorable policing,
which began in the 1980s. The efforts to reduce crime in Houston increased between
the 1990 and 2000, and the city appears to be experiencing lower crime rates and
homicide cases. With expanding infrastructures of its varying ethnic minorities, the
city has truly become a staging-center for Texans, Houstonians, Americans, and
foreigners.
This evolving demographic outlines of Houston, which we highlighted
earlier, is supported by an array of expansive social, intellectual, industrial, and
cultural facilities catering to its diverse public interests. In sports are the Houston
Rockets and the Houston Astros. In higher education for blacks and whites are the
University of Houston (predominately white), Texas Southern University
(predominately black), and Rice University (a predominately white private school),
St. Thomas University (Catholic), and Houston Baptist University). In informational
sources, Houston has many network-affiliated television stations: KTRK-TV,
KHOU-TV, and KXLN-TV; and other independent TV stations. The major
mainstream daily newspapers are the Houston Chronicle and Houston Post and a
variety of related Black-owned newspapers such as the Houston Defender .
Further strengthening Houston's economic and social entertainment listings
are: NASA's Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, Astrodome complex, Sam Houston
Coliseum and Music Hall, and The Texas Medical Center. Besides, being the nerve
'Henry Allen Bullock, Houston Murder Problem: Its Nature. Apparent Causes and Probably
Cures: Report of the Mayor's Negro Law Enforcement Committee (Houston, Texas, 1961),
pp. 7-8.
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center of the American oil businesses, its enormous medical center facilities and
NASA projects provide Houstonians—native and foreign—the necessary backdrop
for complex economic and social experiences. This background has far-reaching
implications for emerging biracial coalition activism and conflict among racial
minority groups in the city. 1
Undoubtedly, Houston's image as a "space city" has brought an additional
strength to the growth of local, national, and international industries within its
counties. Collectively, these factors perhaps best explain why Houston is an
economic powerhouse of the New South and home to diverse nationalities. Also,
with a major U.S. port-city and an international airport, the city attracts large
concentrations of immigrants from the Americas, Europe, Asia, and Africa. This
fact has further transformed its complex ethnic milieu, making the city a place where
all sorts of peoples are to be seen struggling to define their American identities.
Houston therefore compares more favorably than Atlanta and Dallas in Southern
United States as a city with dense populations of native-born black Americans and
new generation of largely voluntary settlers from black Africa.
Part 2: Nigerian Immigrants in Major U.S. Southern Cities
Accordingly, from the 1970s onward, Houston emerged as a major enclave of
demographic changes in the so-called New South. This trend, as we pointed out
earlier, was accompanied by corresponding proliferation of the populations of "the
new Americans." This development was later to place Houston in a position to offer
mixed outlines of inter-and-intra-racial distribution patterns which have sometimes
'Udofia, "Television Use by Two Mayoral Candidates," pp. 1,41-6.
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touched off sensitive socio-cultural nerves in areas previously dominated by either
mainstream Americans or African-Americans, or the Latinos.
The dynamics of the "new Americans" from Africa have their strongest
establishments in Houston. This is particularly the case in relation to cultural
exchanges and proximity to areas of dense concentrations of African-Americans.
This is where some visible evidences of post- 1960s black African immigrant
communities are mostly likely to be found in the metropolitan South. This context is
also where the Nigerian immigrant community, with perhaps its most developed
Southern base, is to be found. Because of their sheer size, Nigerians control the
largest share of the general population of the black African immigrants in Houston,
or elsewhere in the South. 1
Overall, however, the Southern concentrations of Nigerians are denser in
Texas and Georgia. Within these regions, Nigerians are almost evenly distributed in
their cross-cultural diffusion along African-American lines. From a Southern
perspective, therefore, the successful adjustment of Nigerians into the American
mosaic, which we discussed in chapters 4 and 5, was more clearly expressed by their
interactions within the two regions.
'This conclusion is based on exploratory survey of the black African immigrant communities
in Southern United States between early 1990 and early 2000, along with information
published on the Nigerian/African community media; U.S. Bureau of the Census data;
African Business Directories in the United States , 2000; African Business Directories for
Houston, Dallas, Atlanta; Saravic Directory of African Businesses in America & American
Companies that do Business in Africa (Newark, New Jersey, 1999 & 2000); Nigerians in the
Atlanta Region: Ethnic Regional community Profiles (Atlanta, Georgia: Atlanta Regional
Commission, 1994), pp. 1-4; Houston Chronicle (February 9, 1992); Igboanugo, Nigerians
in America
, p. 90.
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Such cities as Atlanta and Dallas and Houston have not only dense
concentrations of highly educated Africans, in fact they have been noted as the major
enclaves of Nigerian immigrants. Thus, it can be safely asserted that, in these cities,
Nigerians have one of their most established communal institutions in the
metropolitan South. 1 For Nigerian immigrants, as for the entire black African
immigrants, the crisis of racial otherness, determines the socio-cultural context of
their affiliation with African-Americans. Despite their advanced degrees, Nigerians
often work two or three jobs in order to make good living standards due to the
misunderstanding associated with their educational abilities and racial background.
The demographic diffusion of their professional establishments includes: "teachers,
college professors, doctors, doctors nurses, pharmacist, lawyers, psychologists,
counselors, and artists."2 Their Southern presence in the major Southern cities is
also revealed in the strong visibility of their emerging institutions, the most
prominent which are their churches and media.3
Regrettably, however, determining the actual population of the black African
settlers in the metropolitan South often shows some contradictory data. The
controversy surrounding the official count of Nigerians in Houston, a major Southern
city, during the early 2000, revealed the extent to which the incorporation of
Nigerians indices into American society was as yet to be accorded a respectable
'Ibid.
2
Ibid.; also, see Chapter I, especially the explanation of the methodology adopted in this
study; Eyobong Ita, "Dallas Boils Over Nigerian Mafia," Nigerian News Digest (Charlotte,
North Carolina, December 27, 1991), pp. 1, 21; Cyril D. Lurlay, African Business Directory
(Atlanta, Georgia, 1996); African Business Directories for Houston, Dallas, Atlanta ; Cordell
and y Griego, Nigerian and Mexican Immi grants in Dallas. Forth Worth, Texas, pp.
18-
19,20-4; Igboanugo, Nigerians in America, pp. 37-40, 100.
3
Ibid.
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examination. 1 The problem of undercounting Nigerians/Africans by the U.S. Census
appears not to be exceptional to Southern U.S. alone, although one reflecting a
general national trend. According to one report in 1991, Nigerians in Dallas were
estimated at 10,000. As, for example, in 2000, the U.S. Bureau of the Census
recorded 7,300 of Nigerians in the Dallas-Forth-Worth Metropolitan area. This
figure contrasted sharply with the estimates of the Nigerian embassies. 2
Again, with Atlanta estimated below 12,000 Nigerians in 2000, Houston
reportedly had about 100,000.3 Between mid- 1990 and 2000, Nigerian/African
embassies differed in the head counts of their nationals/immigrants in Southern cities
from those presented by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. This meant that Nigerian
populations as known by Nigerians in Southern cities or elsewhere, are much higher
in number than those reported via the U.S. Census Bureau. For instance, in Atlanta,
Georgia, with an estimated population of 200,000 Africans in 2003, the proportion of
only 3,500 Nigerians in 1994,
4
suggests a strong underestimation of their overall
potential population base.
This was found in my examination of demographic information of Nigerians in Houston.
2
See, for example, U.S. Bureau of the Census Population, 2000; Cordell and y Griego, "The
Integration of Nigerian and Mexican Immigrants in Dallas/Forth Worth, Texas," pp. 3, 13;
Wikipedia, The Free encyclopedia: "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Houston ;
http:usembassy.state.gov/nigeria/wwwhxjan03g.htm; Ita, "Dallas Boils Over Nigerian
Mafia," pp. 1, 21. Also, see estimated of the population of Nigerians in Houston by the
"Embassy of the United States of America in Nigeria [Crossroads], Reaching Out to the
African Diaspora: The Need for Vision: US. Embassy," Public Affairs Section. Information
Section (Abuja, Nigeria, November 26, 2002), p. 2.
3
Ibid. My exploratory survey of Nigerian indices in early 2000s in the some Southern cities
leaned more toward a higher population than estimated by the U.S. Census. For example, an
unofficial estimate said that there were between 9,000-10,000 Nigerians in Atlanta in 2004.
4
Richie Bodie, in an article entitled "Entrepreneurial Spirit Brings Africans Here: Growth
points to Bright Future," The Atlanta Journal Constitution (May 9, 2003); Nigerians in the
Atlanta Region: Ethnic Community Profiles , p. 2.
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So the rise of the Nigerian population in Houston from about 10,000 in 1990 1
to 100,000 in 2000 may be extraneous, where their overall total, as reported by the
U.S. Census, was 134,000.
2
This controversy suggests that most black Africans were
either not being counted by the U.S. Census Bureau or were being underestimated in
the count, or were on their own not cooperating with the effort. Perhaps the
controversy surrounding African census tabulation in some Southern cities, as is
elsewhere in the U.S., lies in both the approach as well as in the attitude toward a
cultural region that has historically been the least respected by American
institutions.
3
Nonetheless, the controversy seems to have had no effects on the well-
known patterns of dense concentration of Nigerians/Africans in Southern cities.4
This Southern build-up of Nigerians, first begun with the largely students'
waves of immigrants during the 1970s and 1980s, formed the nucleus of the Nigerian
community. 5 We saw earlier in Chapters 3 and 4 that the educational inclinations of
Nigerians—coupled with favorable socioeconomic, geographic settings and the
presence of viable black institutions—were the major considerations in their vast
concentration in the region. Such cities like Atlanta, Dallas and Houston were the
major urban centers of economic, cultural, and educational diffusions of Nigerians
across African-American lanes during the 1970s and 1980s. These were as well,
'"The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," p. 165.
2
Cordell and y Griego, "The Integration of Nigerians and Mexican Immigrants," p.4; Census
of the Population of the United States, 2000.
3Hawk, "Africans and the 1965 U.S. Immigration Law," pp. 261-2, 271; Skinner, In Defense
of Black Nationality, p. 7-9. Holt, "Africans," in Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic
Groups
,
p. 5. Also, see some emphases in Chapter 1 of this dissertation.
4
For example, this is supported by the demographic composition of Nigerian immigrants in
Chapter 3. See especially the Tables on regional distribution.
5
Ibid. For example, see discussions in Chapters 3 and 4.
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enclaves where Nigerians were densely concentrated during the 1990s and early
2000s.
This Southern concentration of Nigerians was due mostly to the historical as
well as cultural factors that had tied African descended peoples to the black belt. 1
Probably such factors as economic, geographic, and low cost of higher education,
which accounted for the strong concentration of Nigerians in Southern cities were
also more closely linked to socio-cultural considerations. This might suggest that
racial 'otherness" had a far stronger basis in their Southern distribution than any
other factor. If so, surprisingly, such an explicit fact rarely corresponded with their
pattern of favorable residential settlement side by side with African-Americans. 2
Why then are Nigerians in Southern cities, or elsewhere in the U.S., less
inclined toward closer pattern of residential cleavage with African-Americans? Are
there other reasons that can further explain their loose affinity with black America,
the seedbed of their Southern and indeed of their American germination? To begin
with, it is worth noting here that, although the extent to which the class factor of
Nigerian immigrants influences the pattern of their residential distribution is
undeniable, it clearly requires some explanation. For example, as we saw earlier in
our examination of the issue of class forces in the internal structure of Nigerian
'This is the general feature of the Southern Background of the black base, which we saw in
Chapters 2-3. For example, W E. B. Du Bois, The Souls of the Black Folk (Greenwich,
Connecticut: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1961), pp. 88-103; Davidson, Biracial Politics , pp.
3-8; Frazier, The Negro in the United States, pp. 200-2; and Bullard, In Search of the New
South, pp. 5-15, classified this region within the Black Belt. For Geographic and
demographic distribution of black ancestries populations, see: Black Allen and Turner, We
the People: An Atlas of America's Ethnic . Diversity , pp. 151; "Nigerians in the Atlanta
Region," in Ethnic Regional Community Profiles , p. 1; and Chapter 3 of this dissertation.
2
Ibid.
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immigrants, 1 it was apparent that this development had much in common with the
extent to which the unfavorable socio-cultural orbit of the descendants of slaves was
being impinged by the attitudes of the more fortunate racial hierarchies in the U.S.
This was further supported by the fact that, for Nigerians—in particular, the problem
of an unfavorable racial background—often engendered inter-ethnic divide and
hence rivalries. This in turn generated impulses that further transformed their
responses within the mosaic. The result was then evident in the kind of inter-ethnic
class conflict that was probably strongest among them in such Southern cities as
Atlanta, Dallas, and Houston. As Cordell and Griego found in their study, a majority
of Nigerians were unconcerned in their affiliations with Nigerian ethnic
organizations. This position points strongly toward ethnic/tribal conflict that borders
on class struggle, particularly in the regional settlement patterns of Nigerians. 3
First, it may be well to keep in mind that the socio-cultural crises of some
Southern cities are sometimes expressed within the larger historical confluence of the
black experience. It cannot be denied that this development influenced the pattern of
neighborhood distribution of Nigerian or the larger black African immigrants, and
hence accounted for the absence of a strong desire to settle side by side with their
ancestral kin. Second, this attitude, which we shall touch on again slightly below,
can be traced to the entrenched inordinate-subordinate socio-cultural milieu of the
black experience and its effects on sustained Pan-African solidarity.
4
'See, for example, Chapters 3-5.
2
Ibid. See Chapters 3, 4, and 5, and Cordell and y Griego in "Nigerian and Mexican
Immigrants in the Dallas/Forth Worth, Texas," pp. 3, 1 8.
3
Ibid.
"
Research Report
, p. 25; Trotter Review , p. 32. Also see Chapter 5.
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For, indeed, unlike the Latinos and Asians, for example, who have
identifiable pattern of residential distribution, Nigerians were the least likely groups
during the 1980s and some part of the 1990s to identify themselves with ethnic
enclaves in such cities as Atlanta, Dallas, and Houston, or elsewhere in the U.S. 1 A
majority of the 28,000 Africans recorded in the Dallas-Forth Worth area in 2000,
including the 7.300 for Nigerians, lived in four counties: Collin, Dallas, Denton, and
Tarrant. These are mostly mixed neighborhoods, with some demographic variant
into upper white and mixed white-black-Asian-Latino residential areas. 3
For example, in Atlanta, Nigerians were once believed to "have formed no
ethnic enclave" because of "intent on assimilation." Their distribution in this
enclave stretches throughout the Atlanta region: from Fulton to Dekalb, Clayton to
Cobb to Gwinnett, with the largest concentration spreading from Stone Mountain to
College Park, to south of 1-20 to Riverdale.4 Proud of their heritage and presumed to
be intent on assimilation, a majority of these Nigerians in Atlanta live in what might
safely be described as predominantly mixed neighborhoods, with a few spreading
into predominantly white neighborhoods. Only a few live in predominantly black
'The pattern of Nigerians' distribution in Atlanta, as mirrored in Atlanta Ethnic Regional
Community Profile s, p. 2, is almost similar to their diverse pattern of residential
concentration in Dallas and Houston depicted by Cordell and y Griego in "Nigerian and
Mexican Immigrants in the Dallas/Forth Worth, Texas," pp. 3, 18.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
4
For example, the 1994 background of Nigerians in the Atlanta Region: Ethnic Regional
Community Profiles , p.2, still serves as a basis for evaluating the pattern of their
neighborhood cleavage. My follow-up examination of Nigerian indices in Atlanta (2005)
confirmed that the enclaves cited here were still areas of dense concentrations of Nigerians.
Where there were some shifts into other areas, such did not invalidate their demographic
composition and the general pattern of neighborhood cleavage as reported by the Atlanta
Regional Community Profiles in 1994.
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neighborhoods. 1 In Houston, however, most well educated middleclass Nigerians
who are white-collar professionals live in West, Southwest and South Houston.2
These Nigerians have their largest residential diffusion in mixed neighborhoods.
Others lived in predominantly white and middle-class black neighborhoods, with a
few still scattered here and there across predominantly troubled black
neighborhoods.
One strong Southern attribute found among Nigerian immigrants is in the
manner that an earlier feature of historical crisis has converged in favor of their
current relationship within the black base. For example, a majority of Nigerians in
Southern cities are from the regions where the forced migration to mainland North
America took its greatest human toll. Such ethnic groups as Ibo, Yoruba,
Efik/Efik/Ibibio, Ijo, Hausa-Fulani, and Edo, who comprised the majority of slaves
from the Bights of Bonny and Benin, also comprised the dominant base of the
current post-colonial voluntary settlers from Nigeria in Southern cities of the U.S.
The only marked differences are perhaps clearly discernible around areas of ethno-
regional redistribution of these groups under new political identities during and after
the demise of colonialism in Nigeria.
Further significant are the related socio-cultural attributes between the Judeo-
Christian attitudes of the descendants of the forced migration and voluntary Nigerian
'Ibid.
2
Houston Chronicle (February 9, 1992).
3
This reference is supported by information in Chapters 2 and 3, which examined the
ethnographic settings of the races of the Niger Delta basins/Niger-Benue during the pre-
colonial and colonial eras. The Southern front of their build-up and socio-cultural
identification in America since the demise of colonialism has the boldest ethnographic
similarities between the generations of forced and voluntary migrations from the Bights of
Bonny and Benin and hence the current location of modern Nigeria.
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migration in Southern cities. This revolved around the extent of the Judeo-Christian
indoctrination of African slaves by their masters in Southern slave societies and the
almost similar experiences among Southern Nigerians under colonialism. Both in
the Southern U.S. and Southern Nigeria, it was this experience that accounted and
continues to account for the extensive proliferation of Christian churches before and
after freedom. Among Nigerians in the diaspora, this historic dynamic has become
the most identifiable feature of their relations with black America, and alternately
with Euro-America. Also, its tenet has served both as a cultural and spiritual bridge
in linking the Nigerian diaspora of colonialism to the black diaspora of enslavement. 1
So, within the Southern cities of the U.S., Nigerians from Southern Nigeria
are the most dominant post-colonial base of Judeo-Christian representation in the
current build-up of the black African labor migrants. They are mostly from
Southeastern and Southwestern regions of Nigeria. Coincidentally, the Ibos, a
dominant source of supply in the human cargoes shipped to Virginia during the era
of racial slavery are also the dominant Judeo-Christ base of the Nigerians in
Southern U.S. from Southeastern Nigeria—and across the American landscape.
Together, therefore, with some proportion of others from the Middle-Belt
enclaves of Northern Nigeria, the overall Judeo-Christian configuration of Southern
Nigerian immigrants in Southern U.S. cities represented the strongest arm of intra-
cultural contacts with the descendants of slaves: also, this Judeo-Christian thrust has
its strongest contextual diffusion with African-American settings. Where the
concentrations of both African-Americans and Africans are much stronger, such as
'
Research report
, pp. 22-4.
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found in Atlanta, Dallas, and Houston, this Judeo-Christian thrust of Nigerians
embraced non-African people of color as well as mainstream Americans. 1
Using the Dallas-Forth Worth evidences of the Judeo-Christian confluence of
Nigerians, Cordell and y Griego noted that:
Nigerians attend a vast array of churches of all denominations, reflecting the
great variety of missions that fostered Christianity in Nigeria itself. Some
attend services in mainstream Catholic and protestant churches whose
congregations are largely white, or are mixed—white and African American
and Hispanic. Other frequent mainstream services populated largely by
African Americans and other Africans. Still, others attend small, Nigerian-
dominated independent churches with Nigerian ministers. Church and
Mosques attendance exposes Nigerians to virtually all immigrant and native-
born communities in north Texas.2
Of course, to be sure, what Cordell and y Griego saw as amounting to "small
Nigerian-dominated independent churches," represented the unfolding of their most
dynamic institution in Southern U.S. Demographically and culturally, the Nigerian-
owned church in the American South represents the most visible emblem of a
Nigerian institution in the diaspora. Within the Southern black belt, or elsewhere in
America, its socio-cultural features appear to have the strongest potentials for
sustained transformation of Nigerian immigrants in the foreseeable decades.
Ultimately, at this point the explanation has to be that, apart from their strong
Judeo-Christian bridge within the black base, Nigerians in Southern cities generally
have loose patterns of neighborhood/residential attachment with African-Americans.
As hinted earlier, perhaps due mostly to the crisis of racial indifference, their patterns
'For this background, see Chapter 4; and "What are Nigerian Customs and Culture," in
Nigerians in the Atlanta Region: Ethnic Regional Community Profiles (1994), p. 3.
2
Cordell and y Griego, The Integration of Nigerian and Mexican Immigrants in Dallas/Forth
Worth
,
Texas, p. 18.
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of neighborhood distribution have corresponded with a strong curve toward their
ancestral kin than one found among other enclaves of America's new settlers.
There seems now to be a basis for some re-appraisal over the other known
reasons surrounding the detachment in the residential attitude of Nigerian/African
immigrants toward African-Americans. First, choices of some urban residential
settings such as New York, Dallas, Atlanta, and Houston, for example, were equally
noted for the violent deaths ofNigerians. 1 These were as well where black American
deaths, along with those of other Americans, were often record high. Second,
Nigerians take their safety and general contextual security seriously since a majority
of them operated without personal health insurances. Third, with increases in both
their population and corresponding tragic deaths during the early 1990s emerged
some newer patterns of neighborhood clusters among Nigerian settlers in Southern
cities.
The above development later corresponded with the desire to secure their
safety throughout the remaining part of the 1990s. This development was further
supported by the fact that most Nigerians—like their related African counterparts
—
have strong views about the tragic passage of loved ones in a foreign land. For those
with independent businesses, the risks involved were often too high when tragedies
that should have been checked were allowed to occur. Due to these factors, the
'"Missing Nigerian Lady Was Murdered," Nigerian News Digest ((Ashville, North Carolina,
June 26, 1992), pp. 1,16; Richard Nwachukwu, ""A Nigerian, Alphonsus Iwuagwu, laid to
rest," The Good Hope News: The African Perspective (Dallas, Texas, September, 1990), p.
1, 14; "The Tragic death of an Ethiopian," pp. 1, 17; Richard Nwachukwu, "Two
Nigerian Cab Divers Killed Two Weeks Apart in U.S.," The African Herald (Dallas Texas,
June 1997), pp. 1,29;
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general socio-cultural pattern of residential/neighborhood clusters of most Nigerians
was least likely to result in a favorable bonding with African-Americans. 1
Elsewhere, the detachment of Nigerians from African-Americans had the
added negative effects of transforming their internal class conflict among varied
ethno-regional clusters into greater contextual rift in America. 2 Nor is it to be denied
that the historical rift between some Nigerians and American-born blacks still
persists, and can be further transformed under an atmosphere such as shown here.
Indeed, the painful and continuing attributes of the Atlantic slave trade accounted for
the suspicions as well as undue influences on certain patterns of their residential
distribution.
3
Thus, as shown here, the distancing of most Nigerians from African-
Americans
—
particularly in their patterns of residential clusters—appears to be
shaped more by socio-cultural forces than other factors. This then raises the ultimate
question as to whether the more definable "racial otherness" currently affecting the
Nigerian or the black African immigrants in America is poised to reveal further
insights which can help in re-explaining the earlier models of inter-groups
incorporation into American society via assimilation, integration, amalgamation, and
cultural pluralism.
4
'ibid. This author has been an eye witness in some occurrences taking place in the
Nigerian/African communities in the diaspora. Drawing from these accounts, along with the
data on exploratory survey in Southern U.S., it was possible to conclude that the residential
diffusions of Nigerians/Africans were influenced by factors that transcended inter-ethnic
differences and class conflict. See major emphases on this background in Chapters 1, 3-7.
2
Ibid.; Research Report , pp. 25, 33-5, 38-40.
3
Ibid.
4Newman, American Pluralism , pp. 5 1-78.
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For, admittedly, none of the earlier models had any cogent explanation of the
extent to which either the dominant white assimilationist model, or the ethnic
minorities' amalgamation model, was pliable to the black share of an equal status,
not to mention equal access to available national resources. The sufferance of some
white ethnic minorities under these models, as found in the experience of the Irish
Catholics, for example, had noted implications for the more peculiar encounter
among African descended groups. 1 Whether in the Southern cities, or elsewhere in
America, there is the problem of which models can fully incorporate the black
African indices into society.2
Authur's contention that the economic successes of African labor migrants
corresponded with neither a desire to integrate nor to assimilate into American
society,
3
suggests that their patterns of neighborhood distribution are more likely to
be oppositional than closely linked to African-Americans. Further, it suggests that
the socio-cultural commonalities, which defined their contextual diffusion in
Southern cities or elsewhere in the U.S. during the 1980s and 1990s, were internally
less supportive of intra-neighborhood cluster with African-Americans, as often
found, for example, among the Latinos, Asians, and Europeans. Also, Authur's later
hints that African women were more likely to have stronger relationships with
African-American females than their men vis-a-vis African-Americans
4
is further
suggestive of an overall pattern of a loose residential cleavage between Nigerians
'ibid. For example, see some evidences relating to the black experience in chapters 1, 3-7 of
this dissertation.
2
For example, see Chapter 5 for our discussion on the crises of racial "otherness" of the
black experience and the effects on African immigrants in America.
3
Authur, Invisible Sojourners
, pp. 3-4.
"Ibid., p. 46.
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and African-Americans in the metropolitan South. In other words, as we saw earlier
in Chapters 4 and 5, it can be concluded that the implicit socio-cultural stress of the
black experience has reinforced contextual dissonance among racially related groups.
Generally, a far stronger revelation of this development can even be associate the
detached patterns of neighborhood clusters of Nigerian immigrants from African-
Americans with the residual effects of intra-racial indifferences. 1
Perhaps the detached neighborhood bonding between African immigrants and
African-Americans is also the deflection of the enduring effects of American
apartheid. Massey and Denton have argued that the accumulated socioeconomic
and politico-cultural effects of the policies of racial indifferences compounded the
rigid attitudes of white residential segregation from blacks. If so, it cannot be denied
that this same attitude has found expression in the pattern of neighborhood cluster of
the black African immigrants. For native-born black Americans, particularly since
the 1960s, the oppositional attitude of white residential segregation has been closely
linked to their underclass status in society.
3 As of the black African immigrant
experience, however, this same crisis imposes a reactive pattern of both inter-ethnic
and-intra racial conflicts, which are oppositional to sustained residential partnership.
A clearer basis then for explaining the pattern of class conflict among
Nigerians in their residential distribution in Southern cities, or elsewhere in the U.S.,
requires an understanding of the implication of the preceding emphases. For, while
class conflict cannot be denied, yet, it cannot be denied either that it emanates from
'"Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 190-2.
2Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and the
Making of the Underclass (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 1-9.
3
Ibid.
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the nature of sustained inequalities that are closely associated with socio-cultural
indifferences. This might be the juncture in which to clarify some nuances by some
scholars who seek to explain the current attributes of the black African immigrants.
For example, in rephrasing an earlier position by Kristin Butcher, Authur
observes that, "they [African migrants] are more likely than native-born blacks to be
employed and live in multiple income households even though they earn less than
native-born Americans overall." 1 This statement is neither fully wrong nor fully
correct, but certainly one requiring some further explanation. If Author and Butcher
were correct, however, it would appear that the greater aptitude for a safety net ,
which we discussed earlier, and which the black African immigrant sought to secure,
can also explain his/her choices of the sizes of family households. For, indeed, some
choices of the sizes of family household by the black African migrant can be viewed
against the conflicting socio-cultural milieu that defines his/her experiences as the
newest of the "new American." That, as noted earlier, this development does fit into
the existing class conflict of the black migrant is a fact worth upholding.
By all the available criteria, the analogy by Butcher, as referenced by
Authur,
3
seems to reveal a misunderstanding that we can now explain. This is
because the position, which Authur referenced somewhat approvingly, is perhaps not
an adequate explanation as to why some Africans have "multiple households."
4
'Kristin Butcher, "Black Immigrants in the United States: A Comparison With Native Blacks
and Other Immigrants," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 47 [2] (1994), pp. 264-284;
Author, Invisible Sojourners , p. 3.
2
Research Report, pp. 25, 33-5, 38-40.
3
Authur, Invisible Sojourners , p. 3. Also, for full elaboration on the text, see Butcher,
"Black Immigrants in the United States," pp. 264-284.
4
Authur, Invisible Sojourners , pp. 3-4.
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First, as the most recent of America's newcomers, the black labor migrant is more
susceptible to choices that reflect a strong desire to shape the future of an American
world heritage. The Nigerian or African is therefore least likely to begin the
foundation of an American heritage by being petty, if there are possibilities for
choosing some of the best. Until recently, he/she had the least accessible medium to
an American dream. Second, unlike native-born Americans, he is least likely to
succumb to the exorbitant social habits, which affect their income, and which often
results in blatant declaration of bankruptcies among the most wealthy of them.
Third, and perhaps the most important, one of the results of selective pattern of
contextual incorporation into the host society is that his/her choices often tends to
favor investment in acquiring good homes. As Authur tells us, both his racial
background and socio-cultural constraints have compelled a more selective pattern of
American orientation markedly dissimilar from those of other immigrants.
1
Of course, with good education and hence corresponding better income
status, one would expect the choices and sizes of the black African immigrant family
household to be much better and larger. Nor, moreover, should it be forgotten that,
even before immigrating to America, some black Africans—especially those from
Nigeria—had already been exposed to a relatively assured sense of individualism,
coupled with a "highly developed acquisitive culture."
Conclusively, therefore, in Houston, Texas, where the post-colonial build-up
of African immigrants has one of its strongest concentrations in the metropolitan
South, Nigerians occupy the center-stage in the cross-cultural re-distribution of
their
'Ibid.
„ C1
2 Mazrui "The World Economy and the African/Afro-Amencan Connection, p. 5 1
.
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indices to Atlanta and Dallas, as well as into other related enclaves. 1 Beyond
Houston, these Nigerians have their strongest consolidation in the Dallas-Forth
Worth metropolitan areas. Houston and Dallas are not only two related sister-cities,
indeed they are also two related and aggressively competing industrial enclaves in
the metropolitan South. Often the speed of economic and cultural exchanges flowing
from the two cities affected Nigerians in as fast a speed of inter-active exchanges as
to influence the patterns of their resettlements and movements between them.
As a sister city to Houston, Nigerian residents in Dallas-Forth Worth areas
may be said to be almost similar in their patterns of economic, cultural, and social
class structures. Recurrent influxes of Nigerian immigrants from smaller Texas
cities like Marshall, Longview, Texacana, Tyler, for example, are mostly likely to
converge either, in Houston or Dallas; and, depending on the socio-economic
1 2
circumstances and change, they fluctuate betwixt and between the two cities.
The strong Southern pull of Nigerians in Houston offers a specific basis for a
more concise case study. Houston then can serve as basis for further understanding
of the scope of their Southern pull. It can also help in explaining the often
worrisome cycles of white-black relations discussed thus far. Within this context,
we are likely to perhaps fully understand the nature of the socio-cultural exchanges
that have shaped the relationships between African-Americans and Nigerians.
Similarly, the Houston background offers a faithful background for re-evaluating the
'Based on analyses of African Business Directories in the United States, 2000; African
Business Directories in Houston, Dallas, and Atlanta; Saravic Directory of African
Businesses in America & American Companies that do Business in Africa; and Nigerians in
the Atlanta Region: Ethnic Regional community Profiles , pp. 1-4.
2
"Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 176-7.
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corresponding socio-cultural crises confronting the two related and historically
affected racial groups in a metropolitan Southern U.S. city. 1
Part 3; Houston-Texas: A Case Study of a
Nigerian Immigrant Community. 1970-1990
Certainly, Houston, Texas, with one of the largest population bases of
Nigerians in the United States, is also where their most established communal
features in the metropolitan South are to be found. Aside from the favorable tropical
climate, Nigerian immigrants were first attracted to Houston by its healthy
economy.
2 As immigrants from an oil-producing nation, the Houston oil-based
economy was seemingly favorable in kind toward Nigerians. 3 By the 1970s,
Nigerian Houstonians comprised the largest base of African immigrants. Definitely
by the early 1980s, the process of establishing an American identity of a Nigerian
immigrant community in Houston was fairly complete. Seeded in the heartland of
the "Space City," the success of Nigerians in adjusting into the Houston metropolis
was closely linked to the black base: their high concentration was mostly due to the
existence African-American institutions.
4
Ultimately, one of the strongest arms of the black institutions that influenced
the influxes of Nigerians into Houston was Texas Southern University (TSU). This
historical institution of higher education controlled hundreds of students from
Nigeria during the 1970s and 1980s. By 1985, the nearly 2000 Nigerian students
'Eyobong Ita, "Dallas Boils Over Nigerian Mafia," Nigerian News Digest (December 27,
1991), pp. 1, 21; Onyia's "The Making of the Scape-Goat," The
Good Hope News, pp. 26,
40.
2
Bullard, In Search of the New South , pp. 27-34
^Nig.Han Tmage." Houston Chronicle (February 9, 1993); KHOU TV Profile Let Me Tell
You About Africa (1993).
. r innn imm
4
Ibid This is also based on my examination of TSU-Nigerian relations from 1970 to 1980.
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who enrolled at TSU represented about one-fourth of the total enrollment. 1 A few
still attended the predominantly White University of Houston, Rice University, St.
Thomas University, with others commuting from Houston to Prairieview A& M and
Sam Houston University. The low tuition fees in the South at the time, which was
much lower in the Texas region, made Houston attractive for Nigerians.2
While a majority of Nigerians during the much earlier waves had returned to
the homeland after studies, this was not the case during a greater part of the late
1970s and 1980s. After the 1970s, of course, the relationships between Nigerian
students and TSU entered a new phase. Due mostly to its large size of Nigerian
students along with increased political and economic uncertainties back in the
homeland, chances of returning to face an uncertain future after studies formed an
important basis in the development of a Nigerian immigrant community in Houston. 3
TSU, which benefited enormously from the financial resources that came
with the Nigerian oil boom in the 1970s, was in most instances unwilling to abandon
its large flock of Nigerians when the going got tougher. By mid- 1980, when the
Reagan interlude affected Nigerians in Houston, the black base was involved in their
recovery. Ironically, the beginning of the Reagan era marked the demise of the
somewhat more favorable policies of accommodation operative during the Carter era
'"Nigerian Image," Houston Chronicle (February 9, 1993); Igboanugo, Nigerians in
America
, p. 27.
2
Ibid.; KHOU TV Profile, Let Me Tell You About Africa (1993).
3
For example, the Nigerian background in Houston perhaps captures the clearest evidence of
the pattern of their American evolution and transformation. As discussed earlier, TSU
served as a patron in the build-up of Nigerian immigrants during the early decades of their
immigration from Nigeria.
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toward black America and black Africa. 1 This Reagan era coincided with a period
when Nigerian Houstonians had developed their cultural and national outlook within
the city. By this period, the socio-cultural seedlings of the instruments of the
Nigerian immigrant communities within both the city and the African-American
context were irreversible.
2
Generally, it is doubtful whether the Nigerian immigrant community would
have evolved within such a short span of time in Houston without the political
turbulence and uncertainties back in the Nigerian homeland. It is also doubtful
whether the dynamics of the Nigerian immigrant community in Houston would have
taken such a speedy interaction without the American social crises of the 1980s.
Significantly, these occurrences were inextricably linked to the alternate shift
from President Carter to Reagan. For, they had the chief effect of luring some
Nigerians into negative choices.
3
By the late 1980s, it was obvious enough that population of Nigerians in
Houston, along with their socioeconomic status, as well as the role ofTSU within the
local and international contexts, was linked to the development of Nigerian
Houstonians.
4 The effort of Nigerian Houstonians therefore summed up the result of
the brainstorming and search for means of self-rediscovery adopted by most of them
1 Apraku. African Emigres in the United States , p 110
2Susan Warren, "Nigerian Ambassador to try to ease tensions in visit here," Houston
Chronicle (March 17, 1989), pp. 1A, 19A; "Let Me Tell You About Africa," KHOU TV
Documentary; "Africans Attracted to Houston's Environment," Houston
Chronicle
(September 1, 19821: Houston Chronicle (February 9, 1992).
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
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during the early years of upheaval in America. 1 This represented a critical
intersection in the transformation of Nigerian Houstonians, when Nigerians sought to
find their niche as the newest of the "new Americans" within the mosaic. 2 This
background undoubtedly explains why Houston has one of the most established
infrastructures of Nigerians in Southern United States. Nigerian Houstonians are as
visible as are their socioeconomic and cultural establishments. Evidences of their
presence in the city are seen in the sizes of established ethnic-minority owned
businesses throughout the entire Harris County. With about a population of 1 0,000
in 1992, and about 100,000 by 2000, Nigerians in Houston owned and controlled the
bulk of the African fashion ware as well as media.
3
The extensive population of Nigerians in Houston is largely Judeo-Christian
based. This further confirms why the growing numbers Nigerian-owned churches
constitute the strongest arm of the Nigerian community. For example, in 1992, the
Nigerian-owned churches in Houston rose to about a dozen.
4 By the time the data
for some part of this study were compiled in April 1993, the 1992 figure of the
Nigerian churches had doubled.
5 By the early 2000s, the 1990s figures had risen to
about one hundred churches.
6
Table 19.1 shows the sample profiles of the major branches of Nigerian-
owned churches in Houston. This evidence is important for estimating the Judeo-
'For example, see explanations on this background in Chapters 4 and 5.
2
Ibid.- "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," p. 165.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid., p. 167. . . , A „ . _.
6
This is based on Exploratory Survey as well as examination
of Nigerian/African Business
Directories ; International Guardian ; IheChristian Herald Newspaper;
The Christian Mirror
Newspaper; Saravic African Business Directory, 1996-2005.
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Christian configuration of Nigerians in a major Southern city in the U.S. These
churches are as well where new patterns of ancestral relationships with black
Americans are unfolding. Most impressive has been the way African-Americans
have participated and indeed interacted with the Judeo-Christian diffusion of their
ancestral kin across the city of Houston and its counties. The Houston pattern is
almost similar to one found in Dallas and Atlanta. 1
Table 19.1
Sample Profiles of Major Nigerian/African-Owned
Community Churches in Houston, Texas, 1990-2005
Chapel of Praise Church Chapel of Restoration Church
Christian Fellowship Center Amazing Grace Church
First Square Gospel Church Celestial Church
Brotherhood of the Cross and Star United Church of Christ
Christ Apostolic Church Masters Vessels Church
Believers Bible Church Jesus Women Prayer Band
Living Faith Christian Ministries Word Alive Fellowship
Word of Hope Bible Church Friendship Bible Church
Later Reign Assembly The House of Payer for All Nations
Reunion Church Height of Zion Assembly
Foundation of Peace Miracle Church
Akwa-Ibom Church Redeemed Chr. Church of God
Bethel Evan. Church Miracle Christian fellowship
Apostolic Word of Faith Church Int. Divine Empowerment Zion House
The Apostolic Church Int. Restoration Christian academy
Nigerian Business Directory
,
August 1995-December 2005.
Some African-Americans adherents of the Nigerian/African churches in
Houston are married to Nigerians. Most of these couples live either within or outside
the immediate vicinity of the city of Houston. Along with the related Africans as
well as their white membership, the faithful adherents of the Nigerian churches are in
a position to forge a union of mutual Christian fellowship as never before. This
'"The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," p. 168.
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emerging biracial/intra-cultural unison is much stronger via the medium of the
Nigerian/African offspring. Since most of them are American-born, the interactions
via the churches have further strengthened the pace of the intra communal bonding
between African-Americans and Nigerian immigrants.
Generally, through the medium of the churches, varying forms of interactions
involving the Nigerian offspring and the black communities as well as the larger
communities of color and the mainstream communities, have taken place within
Houston and its related vicinities. Together, these offspring have become important
interlocutors in the pubic outreach of Nigerian churches across the Houston counties
and beyond. Because they have more natural traits as well as favorable socio-
cultural orbits of interactions and assimilation into American society than their
parents, they are in a better position to facilitate success as agents of new direction
within the Nigerian churches in Houston.
1
The Nigerian immigrant churches in Houston are also where to gauge the
emerging trend of economic and cultural attitudes among the faithful adherents. For
example, in 1993, an examination of the interaction of a Nigerian congregation at the
Chapel of Praise Church, Houston, revealed that some Nigerians used its podium as
members to "thank God" and to announce to the congregation the progress achieved
in both their old and new business ventures as well as to request for continued
support from the community brethren.
'Research Report , pp. 22-4.
,
2
"The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 281-282. This
feature seems
to have become further strengthened during a greater part of the 1990s and early
200s, with
the growing numbers ofNigerian churches in Houston.
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Also, to be sure, the Nigerian immigrants examined at the Chapel of Praise
Church showed strong orientation toward the messages of the Christian God: their
Christian fellowship coexisted with a strong sense of economic and cultural
solidarity among community brethren. The churches then become where the faithful
adherents are admonished either daily or weekly to be good representatives of their
country while in the diaspora. 1
Nor do the preceding emphases imply that Nigerian churches in Houston
were or are free from the well-known crises of ethnic conflict characteristic of
Nigerians in the homeland and the diaspora. Far from it, for the very fact of
increasing proliferation of smaller "cell churches" in the homes of former and later
members of the major branches across Houston, strongly suggests that things have
not been too well. On the other hand, however, the fact of an existing racial
indifference which confront the faithful, also suggests that the proliferation of
Nigerian churches in Houston is in response to socio-cultural crises. Probably their
response to this problem so far is no less different from the much earlier one by their
ancestral kin.
3
'ibid. This conclusion is supported by findings in "The Status of the Relationship with
African Americans," pp. 167-170; Research Report , pp. 20-24; and the exploratory study of
Nigerian/African-American relationships and churches in the Metropolitan South, 1990-
2005.
2
For example, there is a growing problem of separation between older and newer Christian
memberships among the more established branches of the Judeo-Christian ministries of
Nigerians/Africans in Houston. This problem has been growing steadily since the mid-
1990s. By the early 2000s, some Nigerians who did not have the financial resources to build
a church or rent a building for services were willing to convert their apartments or homes
into church services. The proliferation of Nigerian churches in Houston, Texas, as is the
pattern elsewhere, was also being unraveled by organizational crises, intense rivalries, and
internal division among the faithful.
3
Horton and Horton, In Hope of Liberty, pp. 136-9.
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The Nigerian churches in Houston, as elsewhere in America, co-exist with
diverse visions and characteristics among their memberships, which are the signs of
future crises. These crises are perhaps not as closely linked to the ethnic differences
of the faithful adherents as are in their leadership and organizational structures. 1
Since the ethnic differences of Nigerians are well known, it may be well to give a
brief attention here to the nature of the problem emanating from their Judeo-
Christian leadership structures. For example, during the early 1990s, an evaluation
of some Nigerian churches in the South revealed occasional rift among the faithful
members due to the save-keeping of fund-raising accounts and appointments of
members by the pastors to the upper benches of the Christian ministries. However,
on closer examination, it was found that such an occurrence did not show that some
members had very good grasp of what was involved in establishing new Christian
ministries on a foreign land, where money and sustained patronage counted.
Most of the Judeo-Christian institutions serving as the functional bases of
Nigerian Houstonians are still struggling to achieve stability. Their pastors have the
enormous task of working from morning till dawn to raise the money needed to keep
their young foundations intact. Worse still, most Nigerian churchgoers were as yet
to understand that securing the foundation of their Christian ministries during their
formative years in the diaspora required sustained financial support. Nor do they
quite understand that support for programs at their churches had some bearing on
how some appointments were to be made to the higher benches in the House of God.
'This is based on evidences of internal conflict among some Nigerian churches in the
South.
See earlier notes.
2
Ibid.
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Misunderstanding at this intersection can only lead to break away: this is where
trouble often set in, and such factors have been decisive in some congregational
conflicts found among Nigerian churches in Houston, Dallas, and Atlanta. 1
To a far greater extent, of course, the degree to which the Judeo-Christian
outreach of Nigerian immigrants influenced its faithful adherents in Houston was
found to depend on the effective use of their informational network. Table 19.2
shows that Nigerians have varieties of community-owned media sources that cater to
their needs in Houston. These media outlets are often used to rally the support on the
vital issues that affected them in the diaspora.
Table 19.2
Sample Profiles of Major Nigerian-African Community
Media in Houston, Texas, 1990-2005
Name
Africa Today Newspaper
African Business Source
African News Digest
Root Newspaper
Houston Punch
U.S. Africa Digital Network
Int. Guardian: A Journal of Africa
& America
The Christian Herald
Eno Style
Source: Exploratory Survey of Nigerians in Houston, 1996-2005;
African Business Directory in Houston , 1996-2005, Saravic
Directory of African business in America and American
Companies that do Businesses in Africa (P. O. Box 8386,
Newark, New Jersey, 07108, 1999-2000), p. 6.
Such Nigerian-owned newspaper as U.S. Africa Digital Network , for
example, has vast influences within and outside the Houston metropoles, and as far
'ibid. "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 168-9.
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as the Nigerian homeland. Thus, while the mainstream media may often exclude the
viewpoints of highly educated and mediocre Nigerian, the same option is much
different when it comes to publishing their concerns in their community-owned
media.
Access to informational sources by Nigerian Houstonians suggests that some
form of the inter-city cross-cultural exchanges have been taking place between them
and other Houstonians particularly since the 1980s. Further, it suggests the nature of
an emerging socioeconomic power of Nigerians as well as the pattern of their
incorporation into the affairs of the City-Hall. Indeed, as Nigerian Houstonians
become deep-seated settlers, their economic and cultural contributions to the life of
the city have received recognition. This fact was acknowledged by Mayor Kathy
Whitmire during a dinner organized by the Nigerian Foundation in 1991: "The city
of Houston commends the members of the Nigerian Foundation and Akeem
Olawujon for their contribution to the economic and cultural life of the city." 1 After
some nine years, Mayor Lee P. Brown acknowledged the enriching contribution of
Nigerians, the Akwa-Ibom State Association of Nigeria, USA, Inc., both for hosting
its Annual Convention in Houston, Texas, as well as for positive contribution toward
the cultural, economic, and spiritual life of Houston. "The City of Houston is
pleased to congratulate and commend the Akwa Ibom State Association of Nigeria,
'See "Akeem's Day of Glory," African Business Source Magazine (Houston,
Texas,
December 15-February 15, 1990), pp. 26-7.
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USA, Inc., on this auspicious occasion, and extends best wishes to all for a
successful and rewarding event." 1
Accordingly, in recognition of the fact that "Houston is a rich city of rich
cultural diversity, and the many ethnic groups that share their heritage with
Houstonians enhance the quality of our lives, "I, Lee Brown, Mayor of the City of
Houston, hereby proclaim Saturday, August 5, 2000, as Akwa Ibom State Day." 2
During a greater part of the 1980s and 1990s, Houstonians accepted the Nigerian
community as encompassing the strongest representation of the "new Americans"
from Africa in their "Space City."3
Throughout the evolving phases of the 1980s and 1990s, Nigerian
Houstonians walked side by side with the emerging economic power of racial
minorities in the "Space City." According to one 1992 official report, profits from
African/Nigerian owned restaurants, grocery stores, arts and crafts businesses, and
import and export trading, yielded a net gain of $100 million. 4 Another official
report in 1992, estimated major Nigerian-owned businesses in Houston to be 750. 5
When their economic indices were re-examined in 1993, the 1992 figure had risen to
'"Proclamation of Akwa Ibom State Association, USA, Inc., in Houston, Texas, by Lee P.
Brown, Mayor of Houston," in Akwa Ibom State association of Nigeria (USA). Inc.: 13
th
Annual National Convention &Cultural Extravaganza (Houston, Texas: 8686 Kirby Drive,
August 5, 2000), p. 8.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid. For example, Nigerian-owned businesses and personages have received public
recognition within the City-Hall. Since the mid-1980s onward, the larger metropolitan
enclaves of Houston have also recognized the economic power along with the rising cultural
visibilities of Nigerians.
"Peter Undue, "Prospects of African Business Looks Bright in 1991," African Business
Source Magazine (January 15, 1991), p. 10.
5
See "Nigerian Image," Houston Chronicle (February, 1992).
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1,054 (including the smaller businesses), thus recording a growth rate of 40.5
percent.
1 By 2000, the figures had all but doubled.2
Nigerians Houstonians not only have evolved an economic network aimed
controlling nearly all the major African businesses, they have also developed a
visible urban community features within the city. Measured in terms of cultural,
political and income indices, the Nigerian communal structures during both the
1980s and 1990s were far stronger than those of the other black African foreign-born
groups.
3
Houston is therefore a good example of a Southern city where Nigerians have
displayed their determination to control the direction of their traditional cultures.
Over the decades, Houstonians have witnessed the numerous phases of the cultural
celebrations of Nigerian immigrants within the city. This may be one of the cities
with the strongest organizational emblem of the Nigerian women association in the
South, or elsewhere in the entire U.S. During a greater part of the 1990s, Nigerian
Houstonians exhibited their cultural strengths through such associations as the Akwa
Ibom State Association of Nigeria, Akwa-Ibom Youth and Christian Fellow/Women
Fellowship Group, the Nigerian Women Fellowship, the Nigerian Foundation, Nimo
Brotherhood/Umuada, Enugu State Women Cultural Group, and the Ugor-Okpala
'This conclusion is based on an interview with Titus Oniya, owner and publisher, African
Business Source Magazine , in April, 1993.
2
This is supported by an Exploratory Survey and examination of the Nigerian Business
Directories and Media archives in Houston.
3
For example, to a certain extent, the size of the population of Nigerian immigrants in
Houston also determines their influence in controlling the bulk of African businesses. They
are the most identifiable Africans in nearly all important spheres of political, cultural, and
economic matters, etc. Also, see earlier notes on African Business Directories in Houston,
Dallas, and Atlanta, including Houston Chronicle (February 9, 1992), as well as the KHOU
documentary, "Let Me Tell You About Africa."
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Women Cultural Group. Through their annual celebrations and exhibitions, these
cultural extravaganzas have served as the medium for sustaining their consciousness
with the traditions of the homelands while in the diaspora. 1
Houston is also where Nigerians have taken steps in developing some
institutional structures that could enhance the prosperity of their young community.
This is evident, for instance, in the efforts undertaken by Nigerian/African Chambers
of Commerce and Nigerian Foundation since the 1990s to stabilize the cultural and
economic networks among varying business and cultural groups within the city and
across the state of Texas. There is a strong likelihood that, given the highly
developed infrastructures of Nigerian Houstonians, along with the large size of
highly educated Nigerian middle-class, the efforts to strengthen both the inter-ethnic
and intra-ethnic communal ties across all gender, class, and racial backgrounds
would probably enhance greater economic collaboration and investments within and
outside the city.
With the housing of The Nigerian Foundation in Houston, the role between
its Community House and the related communal centers of Nigerian Houstonians
might have greater visibility in facilitating creative arts and economic clientele. For
example, as of 1990, The Nigerian Foundation conducted a fund raising drive in
Houston aimed at building a Nigerian "Community House." This endeavor was
supported by its first dinner organized to raise $150,000 for the Nigerian
"Community House." In a follow-up examination of this background between 1995
'"The Status ofthe Relationship with African Americans," p. 167.
2Chido Nwangwu, "African Chambers of Commerce: Strategy for the
1990s, African
Rnsiness Source Magazine (Houston, Texas, April, 1991), pp. 30-1, 35.
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and 2004, it was disclosed that, despite some problems, The Nigerian Foundation
succeeded in putting into place some of the central goals of its mission: to establish a
collaborative cultural partnership for Nigerians as well as for the related Africans in
Houston city. Since then, The Nigerian Foundation has been serving as a forum for
promoting a variety of Nigerian/African commercial and cultural ventures. 1
Nigerian-Houstonians and the American Dream
So, accordingly, Nigerian Houstonians have come very close to being more
successful than one would perhaps say of their counterparts in other Southern cities.
Evidences of their success stories as recorded in their personal and collective
professional profiles form an important basis for evaluating their strengths within the
city and the capitalist system. Between the 1980s and 1990s, Houston had some of
the most visible evidences of successes in individuals' as well as in the collective
professional settings of Nigerians in Southern U.S. Such evidences were often to be
found among Nigerian working in the legal profession, drafting construction, sports,
academia, and cultural institutions. The reverse was unmistakable as well in the
character of socio-cultural crises confronting them.
2
If the success of these Nigerians
were examined as part of the "American myth of the common man,"
3
who according
to American traditions, succeeded against all odds, it might have some comparison
'For example, see "Akeem's Day of Glory," African Business Source Magazine (Houston,
Texas, December 15-February 15, 1990), pp. 26-7.
2
See Tom Kennedy, "Nigerians," Houston Post (June 22, 1985); Ogbaa, The Nigerian
Americans
, pp. 137-159.
3
For example, see Lemisch, Benjamin Franklin: The Autobiography and Other Writings, pp.
vii-xiii; arid, Andrew Jackson- Symbol for an Age , pp. 1-46; Hofstadter, "Abraham Lincoln
and the Self-Made Myth," American Political Tradition, pp. 18-32, 118-126; Stephen B.
Oates, With Malice Toward None: The Life of Abraham Lincoln. New York: A Mentor
Book, 1977.
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with that of early American heroes. The success of Nigerian Houstonians may even
warrant greater pathos in that it reveals how they have risen above social ostracism
and denigration to become effective participants in the American free enterprise
system.
It is no hidden fact that most Americans admitted that Nigerian Houstonians,
as elsewhere in the U.S., have mastered their system far better than they. This is
further confirmed by the fact that, nearly all the documentaries on Nigerian
immigrants from "60 Minutes" to local TV Talk-Shows to the "media write-ups,"
admitted that Nigerians had mastered the American system. Although such
inferences were often linked to a deviant trend, yet, they bore out the fact that, as
highly educated base of immigrants, Nigerians understood the American institutions
and their related structures.
Certainly, instances where Nigerians have done the extraordinary in sports,
academia, legal profession, and scientific inventions, for example, far outweighed
the deviant behaviors of the few.
1
For example, in 1994, a case study of one
Nigerian, Noble M. Uchendu , revealed that
2
most Nigerians succeeded during the
1980s despite the crises of the Reagan era.
3
This background, as we saw much
earlier, especially in Chapter 4, resulted in establishing the basis of an economic self-
sufficiency in America by most Nigerians. In Houston, evidences resulting from the
'"The Status of the relationship with African Americans," pp. 170-4.
Also, see Tom
Kennedy, "Nigerians," Houston Post (June 22, 1985); Ogbaa, The Nigerian Americans, pp.
137-159
2
"Dorik Noble Casting a Niche," African Business Source Magazine (December/January,
1992), pp. 6, 12, 24, 32.
3
Apraku, African Emigres in the United States , pp. 2-9; "The Status of the
Relat.onsh.p with
African Americans," p. 1 70.
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latter development were even more remarkable in that the Reagan dynamic was a
deciding factor in their contextual redirection throughout the Houston counties
during the 1980s. 1
The success story of Noble M. Uchendu, founder of Dorik Noble
Construction and Drafting Company, which can be traced to the backgrounds of mid-
and late 1980, came to the fore during the early years of 1990s. 2 This was a period
when the batches of Nigerians who first immigrated as students to Houston had
almost completed the arduous task of successfully adjusting into the American
society, and thus becoming active participants in the American dream. 3
Mr. Noble Uchendu' s success therefore fits into the spirit as well as the
criteria of an era that explains when Nigerian Houstonians began to add their niche
to the American dream. Although Mr. Uchendu was not selected in the "1991 30
Most Outstanding Africans in U.S.,"4 his recorded success at about a similar5 period
represented how some Nigerians succeeded within the American capitalist system. 6
The African Business Source Magazine , recorded in its "personality" profile
column that, "Smart Noble Construction and Drafting has blossomed from its initial
$5,000 capital outlay into a six figure annual turn-over . . ."
7
Dorik Construction, in
1991, reportedly landed
'ibid., Apraku, p. 110.
2
"Dorik Noble Casting a Niche."
3
For example, most of the emphases on Nigerians by the Atlanta Ethnic Regional
Community Profiles , pp. 1-2, are similar to those found among Nigerian Houstonians.
4
Udofia, "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," p. 171
.
5
"Dorik Noble Casting a Niche."
6
"Nigerians in the Atlanta Region," pp. 1-2.
7
"Dorik Noble Casting a Niche."
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Contracts worth over $250,000; these include among others the
$75,000 just completed Ceco building in Houston. Among its many
clientele are the Metropolitan Transit Authority, the Harris County
Housing Authority, the City of Houston and the Houston Independent
School District (HISD)....In addition to his construction firm, Dorik
Noble has other subsidiaries, these include: the Dorik Import and
Export and the Dorik Ink currently doing business with the Nigerian
Police and other
. . . manufacturing companies in Nigeria and . . .
Uganda. 1
Perhaps Hakeem Olajuwon, the dream, was Nigeria's greatest symbol in
Houston city during the above era. Born in Lagos, Nigeria, in January 21, 1963, his
memorable history in Houston sports entertainment during the early 1980s was
reminiscent of the beginning of a Nigerian immigrant community. And, it so
happens that, since the late 1970s, Houston was being poised by its favorable
location to attract a large size of Nigerians. By early 1980s Nigerian Houstonians
were certain that they would not be returning to Nigeria after their studies. Thus, it
was in Houston that the decision to settle down as a community after studies
received one of the strongest impulse among Nigerian immigrants in the South, and
perhaps across the whole U.S.
Hakeem's early history in Houston therefore fits into the period comprising
largely of the student waves of Nigerian settlers in the U.S. This was during the
early years of the Reagan era, which formed the clearest basis of the transformation
of a Nigerian immigrant community. Hakeem himself was introduced to President
Reagan as an ambassador of peace and new understanding between Nigeria and the
U.S. during a visit to the city in 1980. Flanked to the left and right by security
guards and American media gurus, Hakeem's introduction to President Reagan
'Ibid.
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almost symbolized a shift from the arduous cycle of negative media blitz that had
affected a majority of Nigerian Houstonians. Ironically, however, this historic
enactment in Houston after the replacement of President Carter 1 did not cast the
negative effects of the Reagan policies on both Nigeria and its immigrants in
America.
Among those Nigerian Houstonians seated in limbo, the sight of Hakeem's
handshake with President Reagan probably had some relieving effect on their
American dilemma. This was because some of their deviant attitudes had the boldest
manifestations in Houston. As a part of the deflection of the transition from Carter
to Reagan, the general thrust of the new era of Nigerians' visibility in urban America
was perhaps most pronounced in this particular drama within the Southern enclave.
Writing in the early 1990s as a Nigerian Houstonian, Igboanugo observes that
under Reagan things began to change for Nigerians. Most Nigerian, he further
observed, saw "The land of opportunity turned into what has been termed land of
opportunibust."
3 The Reagan policies, which were unfavorable to the Southern black
'This is based on analyses of Nigerian community profiles from 1980s to 1990s in Houston,
^oTtransition from President Jimmy Carter to Ronald Reagan, see earlier notes in Chapter 4
on James Blackwell in The Black Community: Diversity and Unity, pp. 76-7, 270. For
corresponding socio-cultural crises of Nigerian/African immigrants, see Apraku,
African
Emigres in the United States , pp. 19,1 10; Igboanugo, Nigerians in America, pp. 27-9, 40,
75-
6- Trotter Review , p. 32. On the other hand, Victor Umuabor, in an article entitled, "The
Americans Again! George Shultz's visit drama re-enacted,"African Concord (Ikeja, Lagos,
September 1987, p. 9), raised the suspicion of a likely conflicting responses
as well as
negative perceptions back in Nigeria toward the Nigerian-American relations.
3
Ibid.
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base, and which corresponded with the opposition toward African states, also
affected African immigrants. 1
The Hakeem-Reagan meeting also coincided with a period when the Nigerian
dynamic began to experience sustained contextual diffusion within the city of
Houston, and across the entire Texas landscape. 2 It represented as well a period
when the Nigerian image in Houston began to be popularized for things other than
incessant negative media portrayal.
Of course, as we saw earlier, the general irony was that Reagan's policies
were largely accountable for the socio-cultural crises that confronted most Nigerians
in America. Back in the Nigerian homeland, his dynamic was also blamed for the
hardships of the 1980s.
3
For example, one of the strongest effects of the Reagan era
was the devaluation of African international monetary system in scale unseen prior
to his era. This problem was closely tied to Nigeria's status as "an oil exporting
giant"
4
and later to its internal and external socioeconomic crisis.
Therefore, within the U.S., Houston mattered in the suffocation of this oil
glut that was also closely tied to the devaluation of the international monetary
system. Both its oil-driven industrial base as well as the Nigerian oil-based economy
presaged some of the reception accorded Nigerian students within the "space city"
during the early decades of their settlement. Nigeria—along with other OPEC
'ibid This explanation is a specific background of the development elaborated
in Chapter 4.
2
Ibid Also, this development was mostly based on the scope of the Nigerian
national crisis
and the dense build-up of its immigrants in Houston between the late 1970
and mid- 1980.
3Apraku African Emigres in the United States , p. 110; Eskor Toyo, "SAP can only Sap
Nigeria: 'it is simply a neo-classical drug store," African Concord (Ikeja,
Lagos, September
1987), p. 31.
4Ieboanugo, Nigerians in America , p. 28.
499
countries such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia—were respected just as "Other
considerations made them to be loathed." 1
Admittedly:
Oil money made students from OPEC countries get special treatment,
and feel important. But don't forget the indiscriminate hiking of oil
prices which hurt American economy so badly. The roller coaster oil
prices were also blamed for the failure of President Carter's
administration
. The land of opportunity was looking for a chance to
gather itself from economic disarray, political quagmire and fallouts
of the social turmoil of the late 1960's.
The preceding meant that, with the coming of "all American" Ronald Reagan
in 1981, some of the changes ushered in by his policies, had begun to affect Nigeria
and its immigrants in America. 3 We have already noted that these changes were
most radical in the devaluation of Nigeria's monetary value. For example, by late
"1984, one Naira was equivalent to $1.40 or more." As of 1992, one Naira was "said
to be equivalent to ten cents."
4 By February 2006, however, one American Dollar
was equivalent to $125.00 Naira or more—depending on the medium of exchanges.
By the beginning of the Reagan second term, Hakeem Olawujon who began
his transition in Houston as an ordinary Nigerian, had begun to dream of his
professional career in seven figures. His Basketball career was remarkable, starting
as a student with the Cougars at the University of Houston. There he was selected as
the Southwest Conference Player of the decade in 1980 by a panel of media and
'Ibid.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid., p. 29.
4
Ibid., p. 27.
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coaches.
1
At that same time, moreover, the magnificent promises of an American
career in Basketball and related status as a Nigerian Houstonian contrasted sharply
with nearly every aspect of life back in his Nigerian homeland. By the time he was
drafted by the Houston Rockets in 1984, his country had sung deeply into the
recession produced by the oil glut, as well as the changes proposed and supported by
Reagan policies.
Hakeem was one of the eight centers to lead his team to the NCAA Final four
in three straight consecutive seasons. As a result, Houston city not only honored him
but had a whole day declared by its Mayor, "Friday, 30th, 1990 as Hakeem
Olawujon's day."3 On the other hand, in another record dated "November 20, 1999,
Hakeem became the first player in NBA history to accumulate 20,000 blocked shots
in a career."
As the first overall pick by Rockets in the 1984 NBA draft, he led his team to
back-to-back titles between 1994 and 1995. During the 1994 and 1995, he was a
regular season MVP and a second-time Finals MVP, with seventeenth glorious
seasons with the Rockets before being traded in the waning years of his career to
Toronto.
5
Also, as a Muslim, Hakeem sought to reveal the ethical mantle of his
stardom. Throughout his time with the Rockets, his religious principles received the
'This is based on analyses of Hakeem-Nigerian community profiles during the
1980s in
Houston, Texas. . „
2
Apraku, African Emigres in the United States , p. 1 10; Toyo, "SAP can only Sap
Nigeria,
p. 31.
3
"Akeem's Day of Glory," African Business Source Magazine, pp.
26-7.
4
"Hakeem Olajuwon, Nigeria:" http//www.interbasket.net/players/olajuwon.htm>
5
Ibid.
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ovation of both his team and coaches: "the Rockets made special arrangements for
his meals, built him a prayer room at the summit Arena... and allowed him to take
time out of the practice schedule to attend mosque on Fridays." 1
At a time when most adherents of the Muslim faith were being faulted within
the mainstream, his religious attitude endeared him as an ambassador of peace to
representatives of all denominations. "Being in the limelight," according to one
observer, "has meant increased attention on his religion." Olajuwon believed that
one of the duties of his faith "is to express it so people in the non-Muslim population
can learn about it."
The Nigeria sports star did not hide his faith but fervently embraced the tenet
of live and let live for both Muslims and Christians—and all other religious bodies
alike. This marked a departure from the attitudes of some who preceded his claim.
But not all Nigerian Houstonians viewed Hakeem's religious faith as an important
emblem of cultural links within the Nigerian immigrant community in Houston. For
example, Chido Nwangwu, publisher of US Africa, the largest Nigerian newspaper
in the U.S., observed that while he was viewed as "a very good man and a credit to
our community, he was not a center for the African community." The Nigerian-born
Yoruba basketball star "could have used his star power to bring the Nigerian
community into the mainstream the way he did with Islam
."
4
'Kris Artman, "Houston Muslims lose a Leader, on and off the court," The Christian
Science
Monitor (Houston, Texas, September 6, 2001).
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
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Nevertheless, it may not be quite true that, as a Muslim, Mr. Olajuwon had
done nothing to advance the course of Nigerian communities in Houston, or
elsewhere in America. The fact that his contributions were more visible in areas of
dense Muslim populations may not negate his other public outreach. Perhaps he
neither saw nor understood the Judeo-Christian incorporation of Nigerian/African
immigrants "into the mainstream" in the same manner as did Mr. Nwangwu. His
retirement and ultimate return to Nigeria appears to support the findings in this
study: Some successful Nigerians were more likely to resist the contemporary notion
of American integration perhaps due to its racial ambivalence than any other factors. 1
Also, the success stories of Nigerian Houstonians comprised their attorneys.
According to the survey of African Business Directories, Houston alone had more
than one hundred practicing attorneys during the early 2000s. Their general
concentration appears to be stronger in the South and particularly in such cities as
Atlanta and Dallas, and Houston.
2 By early 1990s, Nigerian attorneys in Houston
comprised one of the most visible professional representatives of the Nigerian
immigrant community. They represented one of the most visible evidences of the
contextual adjustments made by some Nigerians, as discussed in Chapter 4. The pre-
eminence of Nigerian attorneys can be traced to an era when most Nigerians sought
to redefine themselves and their professional independence, mostly in response
to the
'Ibid Also see Chapters 4-5 of this dissertation; and Authur,
Invisible Soiourners
, pp. 3-4.
'Estimate of Nigerian Attorney at between 7,000 and 8,000
in the U S. is based on
Exploratory Survey and Examination ofNjgenan Businesses Director.es in America and The
Sarayic African Business Directory. 2000. Survey of these records
revea ed that Nigerian
attorneys were densely populated in Southern cities,
specifically in Dallas, Atlanta and
Houston. Some who emigrated to the U.S. from Nigeria as lawyers were
not registered and
hence not in professional practice.
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socioeconomic and racial constraints propelled by the Reagan agenda. Among them
were attorneys who won cases in the thousands and millions. Others have won legal
battles for their brethren within and outside the city in such areas as immigration law,
divorce cases, criminal cases, and auto accident cases. 1
However, the success stories of Nigerian attorneys may be explained in terms
other than their general state of income or professional security.2 The reason could
be that, especially between the 19990s and mid-2000, Houston was where Nigerian
attorneys had greater relevance in terms of their representative role within the
brethren's communities than necessarily the case in terms of their median income
status.
While their socioeconomic status was not in serious question, yet they might
not be as professionally secure as whites or even as African-Americans. Their strong
build-up in Houston had a socio-cultural angle, supported by a desire to secure
professional independence against workplace stress. 3 Therefore, in the particular
case of Houston, what determined the success and direction of Nigerians during the
1980s and 1990s was the extent to which they controlled their professional destinies.
The result then was the proliferation of applicants into some fields that
enhanced professional independence.
4
Generally, in the making of Nigerian
attorneys in Houston, it is this particular background that later came to have some
'Analyses of Nigerian community records and the professional records of Nigerian attorneys
confirmed this fact. See earlier citation on Nigerian attorneys under "Nigerian Community
Leaders" in Chapter 4 of this dissertation.
2
Ibid., including Udofia, "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 131-5
3
For example, see again, Apraku. African Emigres in the United States , p. 110; Igboanugo,
Nigerians in America, pp. 28, 33, 40, 75-6.
""The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," p. 1 1 8. Also, see Chapter 4.
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defining effects on their professional representation as leaders within the Nigerian
immigrant communities. It is also this background which later accorded to them the
image of public success both as a measure of the American dream as well as a
symbol of recognizable representation of their brethren. To a far greater extent,
therefore, the degree to which Nigerians fared in the Houston and beyond defended
on their role as the vanguard of the Nigerian immigrant communities. 1 Nigerian
Houstonians are widely praised and recognized in their academic feat. For example,
in the late-1980s, a Nigerian professor at Texas Southern University received wide
publicity and recognition for the discovery of a sickle cell treatment, which utilized
Yoruba roots from Western Nigeria to test and develop some medication for patients.
Other Nigerians were known to be involved in important research projects at the
Houston-based NASA. 2
Nigerian-Houstonians and Image Crisis
Probably, as noted earlier, the origin of the Nigerians image crisis in Dallas,
as in Houston, lies more at the intersection of changes in both the national and
international political guards from the 1980s onward. This development was closely
linked to the unstable political turbulence back in the Nigerian homeland, as well as
to the alternating policies of two American presidencies: Carter and Reagan.
'Ibid., pp. 132-5, 172-3. This background is based on the
growing numerical strengths of
Nigerian professionals in Houston, Texas.
2
This background relates to Professor Sunday Fadulu, the Nigerian microbiologist
at Texas
Southern University (Igboanugo, Nigerians in America, p. 83).
3
For general context of the Carter-Reagan transition, see Chapter 4,
including Apraku,
African Emigres in the United States , p. 1 10. For the Nigerian image crisis, see
earlier notes
in Chapter 3 on Winer, Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa, pp.
1-5, including the
emotions surrounding the Nigerian-American relations as mirrored by
Umuabor, The
Americans Again!," p. 9.
Given the above proceedings, how then does one evaluate the origin of the
Nigerian image crises in Houston and Dallas, or even across the United States?
Were their noted criminal records a development of an American environment or of
the Nigerian homeland? To begin with, it might be fair to see the background of this
conflict as closely associated with Nigerians who first entered this country mostly as
students. This calls then for some understanding of the extent to which their
American orientation had an earlier beginning in the attitude to acquire knowledge of
Western education. Prior to the 1970s, it would have been difficult to determine the
vastness of the criminal behaviors among the varied student-waves of Nigerian
immigrants in America.
Again, prior to the 1980s, it would have been difficult to count the number of
Nigerian immigrants shown via the electronic network and print media who were
involved in extensive fraudulent scams and narcotics in American society. As we
have shown all along, the magnitude in which this culture later became expressed in
both the national and international characteristics of Nigerians can be more clearly
linked to changes during the 1980s.
The above development, as we also alluded to earlier, had a lot in common
with the dynamic that came to the fore during the Reagan era.
1 Some of his policies
on the devaluation of the international monetary system, which did not favor the
Third World countries, had brought enormous socioeconomic changes and crises.
'Umuabor, "The Americans Again!," p. 9; Apraku, African Emigres in the United States , p.
110; Igboanugo, Nigerians in America , pp. 27-8, 40, 75-6; Winer, 1996 U.S. Congressional
Subcommittee Hearings on Africa , pp. 1-5.
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This later background probably explains why some of the responses to the Reagan
policies both in the U.S. and back in the Nigerian homeland, were oppositional. 1
Nor should it be forgotten that the inherent political misrule and instability in
Nigeria was also an equal factor in the making of the image crisis of Nigerian
immigrants in America. This background, by itself, had a lot to do with the official
attitudes of Nigerian leaders on both the national and international levels. Similar to
the effects of the Reagan officials on Americans, the negative impact of the varied
cycles of Nigerian leadership since the 1960s, especially during the 1980s and 1990s,
tended to encourage involvement of the citizenry in fraudulent scams and
international narcotics.
That some of official responses by the Nigerian governments may even have
been designed toward the Reagan policies, could very well explain the vulnerability
of Nigerian immigrants. Not surprisingly, the Reagan background which represented
an important transitional from the Carter doctrine, also formed a critical intersection
in the adjustment of Nigerians into the American mosaic.
3 The Nigerian problem as
mirrored during this period was probably more American.
If the fraudulent involvements of Nigerians during the 1980s, for example,
were compared to those of white Americans, Asian Americans, Latino Americans—
'ibid.; also see Chapter 4 for further understanding of this context.
2
See, for example, Chapter 3 for this background.
3
Ibid Also, see Chapter 4, along with "Nigeria: An African giant regains its strength,
Atnca
Today (October 2000), pp. 37-40; Matthew Hassan Kukah, "The beauty and the
beast,"
Africa Today, pp. 15-20; Adebayo Williams, "First closure, then the
new beginnings,"
Africa Today ,' pp. 16-23; Winer, Statement before the Subcommittee
on Africa, pp. 1-5;
Umuabor, "The Americans Again!," p. 9.
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including African-Americans—they would be one of the lowest. 1 Charles Harrison,
Houston's Chief of Customs, even argued that "many drug couriers traveling from
Lagos (Nigeria)," were white women.2 This further explains the extent to which the
Nigerian infestation during the 1980s and 1990s was indeed part of an American
syndrome. District Attorney John B. Homes, another Houstonian, argued that the
link between a particular crime and a particular nationality was unjust. "If you took
all the credit card cases and stacked them end on end, percentage wise . . . Nigerians
would be very small."3
Perhaps the extensive media coverage accorded the Nigerian scammers in
both Houston and Dallas during much of the mid-1990s and early 2000s, were part
of the deflections of the 1980s. Nigerians were not the only ethnic minorities
involved in the healthcare scam. Indeed, as the newest of the newcomers, they were
latecomers into the act.
4 Nor were some of the deviant attitudes of Nigerians without
the compulsions of the American material gratification. An understanding of the
American capitalist set-up, its exploitation, and intense materialistic inclinations
—
especially within its racially sensitive base—suggests that what the minority class of
Nigerians involved in fraudulent scams were doing fit within the psyche of the
American nation and social cultures. Sometimes such deviant attitudes were
'For example, see the criminal activities among Americans in the "Report to the Nation on
Crime and Justice," Bureau of Justice Statistics , U.S. Department of Justice, Washington,
DC (1988-2000).
2
"Nigerian Image," Houston Chronicle (February 9, 1992).
3Not all Americans identify a majority of Nigerian immigrants as criminals. See, for
example, earlier notes on Warren (1989), pp. 1A and 19A.
4
This is based on discussions with Nigerians in Dallas and Houston.
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attempts to reconstruct a basic line of socioeconomic survival in the midst of
conflicting socio-cultural milieu in which they found things. 1
The preceding might then suggest that, since the 1980s, an American and
Nigerian epidemic evolving out of the attitude of a few Nigerians
—
probably in
response to some of negative policies of the Reagan era—had the negative effects of
being attached to the general characterization of innocent Nigerians. 2 Between the
1990s and early 2000, the involvement of some Nigerians in the healthcare scams
further affected the image of Nigerian Houstonians. The negative publicity given a
few sometimes tended to undermine the overwhelming positive contributions of
most Nigerians to Houston's economic, cultural, and intellectual development. A
majority of Nigerians surveyed during the healthcare scam admitted that the
extensive media blitz accorded the deviant behavior of a few was an affront to those
striving very hard to succeed daily through honest means. As a community with
highly educated class, the perception that most Nigerians achieved their American
niche by foul means had devastating effects.3 Consequently, an overwhelming
majority of Nigerian Houstonians abhorred the shame of criminal indictment and
were absolved after intense investigations. Yet, they could not escape its negative
socio-cultural stigma.
4
For the few Nigerians involved in criminal scams, 5 their
notion of the "American Dream" sometimes differed operationally with one shared
'ibid. Also, see Chapter 4 for explanation on how the policies of the Reagan years influenced
the development of Nigerians in positive as well as in deviant ways.
2
Ibid.
3
This reference is summarized from an exploratory survey of Nigerians.
4
For instance, see Onyia, "The Making of Scape Goat: Nigerians and Image Problem," The
Good Hope News: African Perspective (Dallas, Texas, November, 1992), pp. 26, 40. This
report mirrors the successes and ironies of most Nigerians.
5
Ibid.
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by the majority striving through hard work to attain genuine success. But in recent
time, these few culprits were hunted as far back as Nigeria; and with the cooperation
of the Federal Government, were often required to refund their illegal wealth. The
damage, however, lies on the already blurred image of the Nigerian nation and of its
mostly innocent and struggling immigrants and peoples.
Innocent Nigerians affected by generalized negative media blitz on their
personal and national images blamed the American media for making very little or
no effort to contrast the danger against the overwhelming positive attributes that
were often unreported either in Houston or in Dallas. Apart from the publicity of
news worthy events about Nigerians in their community media, it is doubtful that the
mainstream media have very careful records on the positive contributions of
Nigerian Houstonians. Some occasional recognition of the achievements of Nigerian
Houstonians by City-Hall politicians often seems plausible. Such recognitions were
memorable and indeed historic. Yet, its basis also seems designed to facilitate
electorate support than sustained contextual incorporation of Nigerian indices.
1
Based on the exploratory Surveys—interviews and evaluation of the Nigerian
community in Houston from 1995 to 2004—most of the mayoral attributes noted for
Nigerian Houstonians, for example, were not clearly directed toward an acceptance
of their rising political and economic strengths. They were not viewed as quite
representative of sustained incorporation of either Nigerians or the larger base of the
black African labor migrants into the city. Some Nigerians believed that their
'For example, Mayor Whitmire declared August 30, 1991, as Hakeem Olajuwon's Day in
Houston. This was later followed by Mayor Lee Brown's declaration of August 5, 2005, as
Akwa Ibom State Association Day in Houston.
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economic strengths were much stronger, and hence warranted a far greater degree of
consultation than accorded them at the current level. 1
Consequently, in some sectors among Nigerian Houstonians, the notion of an
American "success stories" and the "American dream" implies understanding the
context of their image crisis within the city and across America. Since the mid-
1980s onwards, in particular, when some Houstonians began to associate Nigerians
with fraudulent scams, their general attitude toward a majority of Nigerians also
began to blur.
Because Nigerians in Houston comprise the city's "largest African immigrant
group," and because the city has both a major port of shipment as well as an
international airport, Nigerians who entered Houston particularly during the 1990s
from other countries were subjected to considerable scrutiny. Sometimes this
scrutiny bordered on outright racial slurs and death.
3
In 1992, such a noble
American basketball star as Hakeem Olawujon lamented the deplorable condition
confronting his brethren:
They [the public] know what I do ... but they still won't believe the
doctors, lawyers and other professionals [who are Nigerian
immigrants] when they introduce themselves, even if they have a
business card, and that's not fair. Most people think Africans are
uncivilized and that's a big mistake.
4
'ibid. This is a summarized portion of the data, exploratory research, and interviews
employed in this study. See Chapters 1 for the explanations of "Methodology" and Chapter 7
for content analyses of Nigerian-African community media.
2Tom Kennedy, "Nigerians Working to Improve Image," The Houston Post (Houston, June
24, 1985).
3
Warren, "Nigerian Ambassador to try to ease tensions in visit here," pp. 1A and 19A.
""Nigerian Image," (February 9, 1992).
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During the 1980s and 1990s, this image crisis of Nigerian Houstonians was
such that they were "unable to get jobs when potential employers find out they're
from Nigeria." The corresponding social consequence of this negative image was
such that the number of Nigerian immigrants admitted into the U.S. on student visas
during the period "appears to be reduced." 1 Perhaps it was this same background
that compelled Jeff Ohanaja, President of the Nigerian Foundation at the time to
lament that the 99.9 percent of the Nigerian immigrants who were not criminals had
been put in the same camp with the 0. 1 percent that were:
We're not proud of that 0.1% who are hurting our image, but the
99.9% of us are hard-working, productive and law abiding people
who are just trying to live our lives. 2
Sometimes, however, the outright racial slurs confronting the Nigerian
communities in Houston provided their leaders the basis in which to explore the
loopholes in America's libertarian ideal. In 1989, when KPRC-TV (Channel 2),
broadcast a series on Nigerian criminals (February 12-15), the Nigerian community
promptly summoned their Ambassador to Houston to meet with the city's "news
organizations" and its mayor, to exonerate themselves under the American Fairness
Doctrine. This response perhaps corresponded with the American Fairness Doctrine,
which allows an equal time for an opponent or accused person to defend or respond
to an attack in much the same time frame allowed the first party. 3 As a
representative spokesman, Emeka Ozurumba, attorney and head of the Nigerian
Foundation observed that:
'Ibid.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid. Also see Warren's article on Nigerians, Houston Chronicle (March, 17, 1989).
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The Nigerian community has decided enough is enough, and they
don't want to take it anymore. They just want to live peacefully. They
just want what is fair for them. 1
Nigerians in Dallas—a sister-city to Houston—shared almost a similar fate of
image crisis as that of their brethren in Houston. Nigerian immigrants, especially
those living in the Dallas-Forth Worth area, comprised a majority of those involved
in drug scandals from the 1980s to early 1990s. 2
During much of the 1990s and early 2000s, Dallas experienced almost a
similar level of healthcare scams involving Nigerians, and almost with an equal
degree of socio-cultural impact. Just as in Houston, while the crisis involved a few
Nigerians, the media coverage tended to blur the image of a majority of reputable
Nigerians. Locally, nationally, and internationally, the socio-cultural orientation of
the coverage depicted most Nigerians as criminals. To be sure, from the mid-1980s
to early 1 990s, most Nigerians in the Dallas-Forth Worth area were grounded by the
pre-conceived negative judgment of the white media. A majority of Nigerians
opposed fraudulent criminal activities, and felt that some of their negative depiction
in the media was due to racial indifference. The period between the mid-1990s and
early 2000 was remarkable for the often generalized fraudulent scams of "The
Nigerians" in the healthcare services in Houston and Dallas.
As in the case of Houston in 1989, when Nigerian rallied against the KPRC
TV documentary, Nigerians in the Dallas-Forth Worth reacted fiercely in 1991 to a
'Ibid.
2
"The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 176-8.
3
Richard Nwachukwu, The Good Hope News (Dallas, Texas, November-December, 1991),
pp. 1, 1 1. Also, this conclusion was supported by data derived from exploratory survey.
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KXAS Dallas-Fort Worth-TV documentary entitled "The Nigerian Mafia." 1
Responding to the documentary through the auspices of the African Chambers of
Commerce, the "Nigerian community" faxed a letter to that "recalcitrant" station,
cautioning that:
We want the station to be mindful of the equal protection clause of the
United States Constitution. It will be discriminatory of you and/or
your station to single out Nigerians on the issue of credit card fraud
and/or abuse. If you are fair and not witch-hunting or not trying to
damage the image of well meaning Nigerians in the Dallas/Fort
Worth metropolis, you should do a similar documentary on credit-
card fraud and/or abuse across the board, irrespective of color, creed,
and national origin.
2
On the other hand, the basis for this image crisis of Nigerians in Houston and
Dallas might have been linked to the changing demographic composition of urban
America. This might mean that the size of population, educated class, and of
emerging infrastructures, have serious implications for tilting the balance and
direction of urban policies. Therefore, with the reactive nature of multicultural
dynamics in metropolitan Southern cities, Nigerians were capable of adding further
inflammation to the sensitive climate of socio-cultural crises through the few
involved in deviant behaviors. This development is often attendant with crises
among varying groups. While the racial feature of the Nigerian background might
conceal this type of crisis, the experience is probably inherent in urban changes.
3
Yet, the racial indifference of the Southern enclaves appears to have correlated with
'ibid. Richard Nwachukwu, The Good Hope News (Dallas, Texas, November-December,
1991), pp. 1, 11.
2
Ibid.
3
Cordell and y Griego, "The integration of Nigerian and Mexican
Immigrants in Dallas/Forth
Worth, Texas," pp. 3-6; Apraku, African Emigres in the United States, pp. 3-9, Authur,
Invisible Sojourners
, pp. 3-5, 46-8.
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how Nigerians were depicted in the white media. Also, it compounded the general
attitude of the media against Nigerians, which really began in the 1980s. 1
That most of the policies of the Reagan presidency had attempted to heighten
racial indifference meant that those Nigerians entrapped either in Dallas or Houston
without much financial resources, were susceptible to some scandalous activities.
That some of their deviant attributes corresponded with those of some Reagan
officials, further confirmed the extent to which American influences were an
underlying factor of the crisis. These Nigerians knew that the Reagan policies were
unfriendly toward their country as well as toward their contextual stability. Like
Americans, some found it much easier to re-invent new means of socioeconomic
9 — -
survival, which were sometimes deviant. If, as Tom Kennedy observed in 1992,
"Many of the Nigerians who come here are well-educated and know the banking and
credit card systems better than American experts,"3 then the implication was that the
majority of them were more likely to be arrested, harassed, suspected of criminal
activities and searched without justification.
4
Thus, as shown thus far, the socioeconomic and politico-cultural orbits of
Nigerians in Houston and Dallas, or elsewhere in America, during the early decades
of settlement, were more clearly explained within the historical context of black
America. 5 This further confirms that within their Southern confluence, the crises of
'ibid. See, for example, Chapter 4; Apraku, African Emigres in the United States , pp. 19,
110; Onyia, "The Making of Scape Goat," pp. 26, 40.
2Kennedy, "Nigerians Working to Improve Image," The Houston Post (Houston, June 24,
1985).
3
Ibid.
4
Udofia, "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," p. 174.
5
Ibid., pp. vii, 117-118,285. Also, see Legum, Pan-Africanism, pp. 14-21.
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racial otherness, which affected Nigerians, were more similar than dissimilar to the
experience of the descendants of slaves. This same phenomenon probably also
explains why a majority of Nigerians with excellent education were susceptible to
underemployment or even unemployment. 1
The view then that African-Americans trailed African immigrants in median
income status is perhaps a plausible development2 but certainly one requiring a more
careful explanation. First, on the basis of an overall population of African-
Americans and African immigrants in the U.S., such an observation is misleading.
Second, where the overall population of Africans in America is much smaller
compared to that of native-born blacks—which is much larger—such comparison
only serves the longer-term purpose of influencing further contextual dissonance
between the two related and almost similarly affected racial groups. 3
Part 4: Nigerian Houstonians: The Extent of Ancestral Solidarity
with African-Americans, 1970-1990
We saw in Chapters 4 and 5 as well as in the previous pages of the extent to
which the strong visibility of African-American institutions influenced the
concentrations of Nigerian immigrants in Southern cities. We also saw that this was
particularly the case in Houston, Texas. In addition, we emphasized that, because
the early waves of Nigerians in Houston were mostly students, the presence of a
historically Black institution of higher learning accounted for their influx into the
'Apraku, African Emigres in the United States, pp. 3-9, 19, 110; Authur, Invisible
Sojourners
, pp. 3-4, 46-8.
2
Ibid.
3
Trotter Review
, p. 32.
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city. This fact was especially the case during the 1970s and 1980s . We undertake to
show in this section that, this intersection represented the most appropriate locale in
which to explain the early build-up of Nigerian Houstonians. This historic
relationship between Nigerian Houstonians and the "Space City," as we argued
earlier was closely tied to Texas Southern University (TSU), a historically black
institution of higher learning.
TSU, based in Houston, Texas, was an institution founded for the
descendants of slaves. Its criteria for instructional services were/are as similar to
those of predominantly white universities as they often differed due to the peculiar
crisis of the black experience. But over the long period of the black-white political
struggle in Texas, this latter background was influenced by the extent to which the
winning political and cultural leaders of the American republic had sought to define
the status of blacks in higher education. Therefore, within the framework of the
black struggle in the South, the origin of TSU can be traced to 1927 and to the
creation of Houston Colored Junior College under Houston's school board. This
later became a four-year Houston College for Negroes in 1934.
1
From 1934 to 1947, Houston College for Negroes became a state-supported
institution, taking on the new name of Texas State University for Negroes (TSUN).
The creation of TSUN was in reaction to the threat of lawsuit by the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) against an attempt to
keep Herman Sweat out of the University of Texas law school.
2 However, in 1951
'Bullard, In Search of the New South , p. 35.
2
Ibid.
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TSUN was changed to Texas Southern University. 1 By all the available criteria, the
link between Nigerian Houstonians and TSU lies in the renewed contacts of two
related albeit dissimilar historical eras involving the descendants of forced migration
and voluntary Nigerian migration. Viewed within this context, it seems well to keep
in mind, as already hinted, that the development of Nigerian Houstonians would
probably have been longest delayed or much more arduous a task—without TSU.
Admittedly, the large students' waves of Nigerians in the 1970s and 1980s, who
enrolled at TSU, formed the core of the Nigerian immigrant community.
Just as TSU had one of the strongest statistics on the development of black
professionals in the state of Texas during the said decades, this same trend was
equally representative of African immigrants, especially of the Nigerian background.
Prior to the 1 990s, probably no other historically black institution of higher learning
in the "peripheral South or the Rim South,"2 had educated more Nigerians than TSU.
It would not be an overstatement to surmise that a majority of Nigerian attorneys and
pharmacists currently practicing in Texas and beyond its borders were educated at
TSU. And TSU, particularly during the 1970s and 1980s, benefited immensely from
the financial power of its Nigerian students during the heydays of the oil boom.
3
The financial crunches that often sunk most predominantly state-funded black
institutions of higher learning were some of the developments that sometimes made
the relationship between Nigerians and TSU a faithful marriage. Even during times
of conflicting perceptions, it was at TSU that Nigerians or Africans who sought
"Ibid.
2
Davidson, Biracial Politics , p. 12.
3
"Let Me Tell You About Africa;" Houston Chronicle (September 1, 1982); Houston
Chronicle (February 9, 1992).
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employment in academia were most likely to be offered a job after certification from
the surrounding white universities. 1
Beyond the preceding emphases, however, TSU sometimes played the role of
an ancestral patron for Nigerians who attended there: its institutional premises were
the staging centers for the Nigerian voice in Houston. Most Nigerian cultural groups
used its playgrounds to host their annual festivities; others used its facilities for
hosting their monthly, quarterly, and annual deliberations. These venues also served
them in covering a variety of community issues like professional, national, and
ethnic organizational matters. Conferences between visiting dignitaries from the
Nigerian Consulate General in Washington, D.C., and the homeland and Nigerian
Houstonians often found receptions at TSU. During the 1980s, the KTSU on-
campus radio station provided Houstonians some informational outlet on the
traditional cultures of Nigerian/African immigrants. The KTSU forum enabled
Nigerians both individually and collectively to rally around matters of cultural and
i * 3
national commonalities.
The KTSU-Nigerian connection served as a bridge toward greater
cooperation and understanding in areas relating to the Nigerian (African) music.
Through its weekend programming, a variety of Nigerian homeland music, folklore,
'This is based on an examination of TSU profiles on Africans, faculty and administrative
structures, as well as overall system.
2
For example, most of the Nigerian/African conferences from the late 1970s to the early
1980s—and thereafter—were held at TSU. During this period, moreover, TSU was often
chosen as a host center for most of the Nigerian national/ethnic celebrations which took
place in Houston—particularly from early 1980s to mid-1980s. Additionally, during the mid
and late 1980s, several representative bodies of the Nigerian consular officers from
Washington, D.C., and Atlanta, and the Nigerian homeland met at TSU to see Nigerians as
well as to answer to their concerns before the public media.
3
"The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," p. 182.
519
and free counseling on how to prepare Nigerian traditional foodstuffs reached a
broad spectrum of Africans, African-Americans, and mainstream Houstonians. If the
KTSU made it possible for Nigerians to rally around the campus air-circuit on
Saturdays,
1
African-Americans who listened to the Nigerian/African musical
programs reportedly requested replays of some of the music of their ancestral
homeland. And throughout the first three decades of concentration in Houston, it
was at TSU that the numerical and cultural potentialities of Nigerians were more
effectively transformed than at any other institution of higher learning in the Texas.
Not surprisingly, therefore, the incessantly dented images of Nigerian
Houstonians were sometimes mirrored against TSU. During the 1980s, the Houston
media along with some Nigerians even referred to TSU in ways that threatened both
the public image of Nigerians as well as the institution. The fact that more Nigerians
attended TSU, as a predominantly black institution of higher learning than the UH,
then, served as a problematic contrast. At other times, however, they were simply
perceived as less academically connected compared to Nigerians who attended the
predominantly white University of Houston (UH). However, the irony is that,
between the 1970s and 1980s, in some important professional degrees, such as
pharmacy and law, for example, TSU fared ahead in educating more successful
Nigerians across Houston than UH. While the population of successful Africans
educated at TSU was far ahead of UH, yet the much smaller minority of those who
'An examination of the KTSU on-campus radio station and Nigerians/African immigrants in
Houston substantiated this fact. Also, interviews in Houston with some Nigerians who kept
a close watch over the KTSU weekend programs were supportive of the highlights indicated
here.
2
"The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 182-3.
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attended either UH or Rice believed they were better educated with acceptable status
of recognition by the mainstream. 1 Evidences taken from examination of Nigerian
data in Houston revealed that the small percentage ofNigerians who attended the UH
system during the 1970s and 1980s, for example, rarely seemed a justifiable basis for
determining attitudinal variances—either as more academically connected or socially
deviant—unless one applied a cultural variable. 2
But, ironically, the statistics of successful Nigerian professionals who
attended TSU during the period was impressive. More importantly, most of the
graduate research by Nigerians who attended TSU revealed an understanding of
events in the African-American social settings, African world, and the
Nigerian/African homelands.
The TSU relationship with Nigerian Houstonians can be placed on an
international setting. For example, a 1993 KHOU TV Documentary entitled, "Let
Me Tell You about Africa" revealed how some African-Americans were involved in
the write-up and production of a program that showed a more positive image of
modern Africa. It also showed the continuing relationship between former students
ofTSU from Nigeria and other African countries back in their respective homelands.
This program, in addition, showed the extent of an ongoing understanding between
former TSU students in Nigeria/Africa and African-Americans. According to the
'This would be the general view among Houstonians and even the Nigerians who attended
UH, as evident, for example, by the article entitled, "UH, TSU May Be Locked in
Accreditation Dispute," Houston Chronicle (April, 1983).
2
"The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," p. 183.
3
This conclusion is based on an examination of graduate research at TSU relating to black
America, the African continent and Nigeria. See, for example, TSU Graduate School,
Graduate Research Abstracts of Doctoral Degree Dissertations and Masters Degree Theses,
1983-2000 .
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TV Documentary, the TSU influences embraced other parts of Africa. 1 Beyond this
point, however, the TSU-Nigerian connection embraced other spheres of ancestral
relationship with Nigeria: in 1979, President Sawyer of TSU visited Nigeria and was
bestowed on him a "Yoruba chieftain's title."2
Despite this trend, however, it might be misleading to surmise that extensive
population of Nigerians educated at TSU during the 1970s and 1980s meant much in
terms of sustained pan-African relationships. The TSU-Nigerian connection, insofar
as training of Nigerians was concerned, was stronger in its economic orientation than
on other cultural or pan-African issues. This was perhaps because, being a state-
owned institution, TSU would perhaps have had some constraints in overstretching a
pan-Africanist outreach. Clearly, the image crisis that began to affect Nigerian
Houstonians more directly since mid-1980s, and which continued into the early
1990s, might suggest that the underlying pan-Africanist operatives which were the
premises for their overwhelming relationship with TSU, had not resulted in any
platform of ancestral cooperation.
Whether, and in what sense, the TSU influences on Nigerians during the said
period reflected sustained understanding and cooperation may not be determined on
the basis of the numerical statistics of the successful Nigerians who attended this
historic institution. The emphasis here is that, while the connection with Nigerian
Houstonians was plausible, such efforts did not necessarily lead to well-coordinated
mechanisms of ancestral relationship. The TSU case is most revealing because,
'"Let Me Tell You about Africa."
2
Ibid. "TSU - Nigerian Connection: Africans Give Granville Sawyer Princely
Responsibility." Houston Post (February 11, 1979).
during the early decades of settlement in Houston, its Nigerians' connection did not
have as strong a pan-Africanist network. 1
The underlying conflict of the preceding background appears to have
corresponded with some evidences coming out of the death of the late U.S.
Congressman, Mickey Leland of Texas. This tragic incident was marked by
distancing between the two kindred communities. If Africans in Houston were not
openly invited to the funeral service of the late Texan U.S. Congressman,2 who died
in a plane crash in East Africa, it was not clear what other efforts they had made
subsequent to that development or thereafter, to calm the emotions of that tragic
event. It could be that some conflicting signals had preceded the perception that
Africans would not be welcomed if they attended the funeral service.
3
The preceding background perhaps best explains why both the Houston and
Dallas wings of the Nigerian image crisis had a somewhat silencing effect on the
African-American operatives. During the 1980s, what was absent in the organization
of ancestral relationship in Houston or elsewhere in the South, were sustained
mechanisms linking African immigrants and Africa-Americans together as a unit
actively seeking to go beyond the euphoria of pan-Africanism.
Houston, however, could not have had such established pan-Africanist
mechanisms when African institutions were not as yet firmly seated into its soil. By
'Ibid.
2
For example, my interviews in Houston in March of 1993 revealed that, at most, a very
limited number or perhaps no African community members attended Congressman Mickey
Leland' s funeral service. It was difficult to ascertain what channels were used to invite the
people who attended the funeral. After examining the information and context, it became
clear that Africans did not attend largely because they felt uninvited.
3
Ibid.
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the 1990s, when the emergent Nigerian institutions such as the churches and media
began to have more active interactions within the black base, it became possible to
estimate what a united front of black solidarity could do, as once suggested by two
black American U.S. Congressmen: Mickey Leland and Craig Washington. 1
Continuing Stamina of Ancestral Relationship in Houston
Despite the above constraints, the Nigerian churches which we saw earlier in
Houston, represented the clearest medium of ancestral relationships with African-
Americans. Within this context, their Judeo-Christian feature has served as a new
bridge for fostering intra-cultural exchanges and other collaborations involving the
two groups in Houston, Texas. This emerging unison between the Nigerian
immigrant churches in Houston and African-Americans is being strengthened by the
Nigerian offspring .
2
For example, between 1998 and early 2005, an examination of
the major branches of Nigerian-owned churches in Southern United States revealed
that the Nigerian offspring were one of the most important lanes of inter-cultural
exchanges. Their Judeo-Christian outreach and cultural extravaganzas were known
to embrace Houstonians of all gender, class, and racial backgrounds.
'
African Business Source Magazine (December/January, 1990), p. 32; Igboanugo, Nigerians
in America, p. 105.
2
During Nigerian cultural festivals, such as those presented under the auspices of the
Nigerian Foundation , Cross River State Akwa Ibom State Associations, Ogor Okpala
Women Cultural Group , Nigerian Women Fellowship , etc., African-Americans and African
offspring often formed a sizeable block of the invitees. In Houston, as elsewhere, the bulk of
the Nigerian churches and Youth Associations, economic clienteles, cultural associations,
and Afrocentric fashion designers, are more effective within the African-American context.
See "Akeem's Day of Glory," pp. 20, 26; Photo Files, African Business Source Magazine
(Houston, Texas, January, 1991), p. 20; "Black Expo USA," African Business Source
Magazine
,
(Houston, Texas, June/July, 1992), p. 23. Also, see the appendices of this
dissertation for samples of cultural profiles, etc.
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Further examination of the Judeo-Christian profiles of Nigerian offspring
revealed that their role as agents of cultural contacts would likely become one of the
strongest lanes of transforming the Nigerian immigrant churches in the diaspora.
This is due mostly to the fact that, on the basis of cultural expression and historical
grievances, their relationships to African-Americans and whites as well as to other
non-African descent peoples, are more solid and convincing. These offspring were
even emerging as the interpreters of the subtle habitat of American cultures to their
migrant-parents. Where they so chose to become the medium of exchanges for the
Judeo-Christian ministries, this would in turn explain why they were more likely to
be believed and accepted by both the descendants of slaves and others.
Generally, some African-Americans see the Nigerian offspring as
representing a more faithful alternative to sustained contacts with their ancestral
homelands than necessarily the case with their parents. Their connection with
ancestral Africa through these offspring is stronger than one occurring through their
Nigerian-parent migrants.
1
As of 1993, for example, when a case study of "Akwa Ibom Youth Christian
and Cultural Group" in Houston was undertaken, it was possible to conclude that the
emerging bond between a Nigerian church and the black church had greater chances
of being applauded by African-Americans. This further confirmed the emerging
relationships between Nigerian offspring and African-Americans in the South.
Besides, this development offered strong evidence that Nigerian-owned churches in
Houston were the most reliable outposts to gauge the ongoing course of intra-cultural
'ibid. Fieldwork.
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collaboration with African-Americans. There cannot be any doubt that these
collaborative partnerships were made more obvious and indeed stronger by the
Nigerian offspring. In Houston, as in Dallas and Atlanta, their roles as mediators in
bridging some intra-cultural rift between African-Americans and Nigerian/African
immigrants, were noted with admiration.
We can then safely return to the emphasis on the "Akwa Ibom Youth
Christian and Cultural Group." For, during the 1993 "Black History Month
Celebration" held at African-American Wheeler Avenue Baptist Church, the
Nigerian offspring of Akwa-Ibom State of Nigeria in Houston impressed their desire
for collective solidarity and sustained unity with the black communities in a song
upon the black congregation. Their song assured the black congregation that they
"are African-Americans" as well as "Nigerians from Akwa Ibom State." Moreover,
their song stressed the need for understanding the historical relationships between the
generations of forced migration and voluntary post-colonial Nigerian migration.
Additionally, it called for the renewal of ancestral solidarity between the descendants
of the two migrations:
Our people became captives in a foreign land and were tortured, burnt
and killed, but thank God for his love, strength and faith . . . they
survived.
1
Further, the song by the offspring of Nigerian immigrants from Akwa-Ibom
stressed that, "Blacks must not fail to remember how our fathers and mothers worked
'This reference was extracted from a "Song" by the Akwa Ibom Youth and Cultural Group
at Wheeler Avenue Black Church (Houston, Texas, February 1993) Also, see Appendix D;
Udofia "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans,' p. 189.
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the land." African descended peoples were also to remember how their predecessors
sacrificed "to bring us to where we are today."
We thank them for their love and strength, we thank them for their
sacrifices, we will never, never forget their struggle. Dr. Booker T.
Washington, Dr. Nkwame Nkurumah, Dr. Martin Luther King
Malcolm-X, Mickey Leland, we love you all. 1
To carry on the historical struggle of all the previous black leaders and regain
past glory, the song by the Nigerian offspring stressed that,
We must be well educated, we must have self confidence, we must
love one another, most of all, we must be God's children ... We must
stop selling and taking drugs. Drugs destroy the mind, the brain . . .
Our future is in our hands, our destiny as a people is ours to shape.
God has sustained us through the difficult years, He must have a
purpose for us on earth ... So let us stay together, work together, love
one another . . }
African-American Response: "Let Me Tell You about Africa"3
Aside from the Nigerian churches, which began to collaborate with African-
Americans perhaps more openly from the late- 1980s,4 the idea of sustained pan-
African exchanges, as we observed earlier, had no deeper roots in Houston during
most of the 1980s. This seems to have been the background mirrored by the
Nigerian offspring of Akwa-Ibom State Association in Houston in their song to the
black Congregation at the Wheeler Baptist Church.
5 And African-Americans had
'Ibid.
2
Ibid.
3
This is based on the KHOU TV Documentary, "Let Me Tell You about Africa." Written,
directed, and produced largely by African-Americans, this documentary had about one week
run in Houston, Texas, during the 1993 Black History Month.
4
This evidence is based on examination of the Nigerian profiles, as evident by the
Brotherhood of the Cross and Star Church-profiles with African-Americans from the mid-
1970s onward. See, for example, the excerpts on Bishop Ellerbe obtained during my initial
fieldwork in the Appendix.
5
This is based on earlier notes as well as excerpts of the Akwa-Ibom State of Association of
Nigeria, USA, Inc.
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sometimes responded in public defense of the image of their ancestral homelands in
Africa, particularly when the issues involved tended to cut across racial boundaries
to affect African-descended people. This then would mean that TSU could have
defended the sagging images of Nigerians in Houston in the 1980s not because it had
a pan-Africanist orientation, but because the integrity of its local, regional, and
international image warranted such a public posture. 1
If, therefore, African-Americans had some working relationships with
Nigerians/Africans in Houston between the early and mid-1980s, such an occurrence
derived more from their implicit grasp of the socio-cultural consequences of
extensive negative media portrayal of their ancestral kin. Certainly by mid-1980s, it
was undeniable that the new generations of African Houstonians were being
identified as one of the great arms of urban clusters among the city's newcomers.
African-Americans were familiar with the cycles of such crises on the basis of their
experience. The extent to which the Nigerian-African image crises affected or
attracted their attention cannot be doubted. Houston thus had good evidence
perhaps more than in Dallas at about the same time of the extent to which African-
Americans attempted to employ their presence in mainstream media to reconstruct
the negative image of their ancestral kin.
'This based on my early fieldwork in Houston Texas, in 1993. Also, in numerous instances,
TSU played the role of an ancestral patron due to the large size of Nigerian students in its
midst. Some Nigerian students were sometimes involved in activities that were not in
keeping with the educational objectives of the host institution. These were issues that the
institutions took seriously and had sometimes developed some quiet strategies to contain, as
well as to correct such recurrent problems. In such situations, consultations with the
Nigerian authorities either in Washington or the nearby regions were often recommended via
former TSU-Nigerian attorneys in Houston.
2
These accounts were noted in my evaluation of the context of the Black experience in
Houston, and across the Southland. See earlier notes, especially in Chapter 1
.
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That is, some African-Americans were in a position to reciprocate the
impressive display of solidarity by Nigerian offspring of Akwa-Ibom State at the
Wheeler Baptist Church during a Black History Month. The KHOU-TV
Documentary entitled, "Let Me Tell You about Africa," 1 almost coincided with the
plea by the offspring of Akwa-Ibom State that the descendants of slaves and
voluntary Nigerian/African migration should "stay together, work together, [and]
love one another."
2
First, the KHOU-TV Documentary represented a most direct
attempt by African-American operatives to reconstruct the negative public image
attached to African immigrants, especially Nigerians in Houston and beyond its
enclaves. For, the documentary not only mirrored a more favorable side of the
"African world image," it provided a marked departure from the incessant negative
media blitz directed at Nigerians. Second, since the documentary was aired during
the "Black History Month," it was probably designed as part of a cultural solidarity
• • • • 3
between African immigrants and African-American constituents in Houston.
Accordingly, the contents of "Let Me Tell You about Africa" showed as well
as credited the successes of the former students of Nigerian/African Houstonians
who attended TSU from early 1970s to 1980s. Also, it depicted the centrality of
TSU to the African-world development of African immigrants. Additionally, it
showed former Nigerian/African Houstonians in important professional positions
within the emerging modern infrastructures of black Africa. These were things that
mainstream Houstonians were not used to seeing other than the incessant hungers of
'See earlier note on "Let Me Tell You about Africa."
2
This is based on "The Song by Akwa-Ibom Youth and Cultural Group" before a Black
Congregation at the Wheeler Avenue Baptist Church, Houston.
3
This is based on "Let Me Tell You about Africa."
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Africa, human destitution, institutional and environmental crisis. But "Let Me Tell
You about Africa" captured and projected the other more positive evidences of an
African world development to Houstonians and beyond. In this undertaking, the
descendants of slaves were consciously doing for their kin what their much earlier
generations had done to bring Africans and their ancestral homelands to the status of
cultural and political respectability.
The socio-cultural blend which Nigerians or the larger black African block
falls into in Houston is closely linked to black America. This meant that the
recurring social crises which confronted them from the 1970s to 1990s, were those
American blacks had long experienced, known much about, and probably mastered.
Whether, and in what clear manner, this background had given some insight and
strength to the title "Let Me Tell You about Africa," is still a conjecture. But neither
African-Americans nor Nigerians could show unconcern over the image deformation
of the other kindred folk without being severely affected by the larger socio-cultural
effects. When Nigerians deployed their "racial otherness" in Houston, arguing that
African-Americans have been unable to escape its negative claws since freedom
from slavery, they were affirming their commonality with them even within some
existing historico-cultural distinctions.
2
African-Americans involved in the KHOU-TV production were aware of the
image crisis of modern Africa and perhaps also of its relationships with the socio-
cultural crises confronting the black African immigrants in Southern U.S. cities,
'For example, the general emphasis on the ideology of the mission of African redemption led
by the Black diaspora of enslavement is supportive. See Chapter 1.
2
For example, Igboanugo, The Nigerians in America, pp. 15-16, has made reference to this
crisis.
530
especially in Houston. Indeed while "Let Me Tell You about Africa" was funded by
KHOU-TV, this author was informed during an earlier fieldwork that TSU and some
African-Americans were also insightful behind its production. Some blacks involved
in its production occupied important positions within the KHOU TV structure; others
had affiliations either as former students or in working relationships with TSU. 1
"Let Me Tell You about Africa," which took a week of the public airtime
reportedly contributed to a more positive understanding of Nigerian/Africans by
some Houstonians. On the other hand, however, this documentary almost coincided
with the emergence of the spirit of the "New South."3 As Bullard has argued, the
ethos of the "New South" began in a period when the South "desperately attempted
to rid itself of the image of a socially and economically backward region."
Accordingly, this meant correcting the enduring developmental and racial problems
of the Old South.4 Viewed then in relation to the emergent black political power, the
KHOU-TV documentary represented the spirit of "New South," in its efforts to
identify, broaden, and poise the socio-cultural context of the black African
immigrants in a major Southern metropolitan Southern city. This phenomenon
cannot now be fully explained without appreciating the particular image of the
"Space City" as well as of the alternate shift in the direction of historical dynamics—
the rise of African-American political influences in Southern cities.
'"The Status of the Relationship with African-Americans," pp. 190-1.
2
This was based on interviews in Houston during the initial fieldwork in this study in 1993.
It was confirmed that the KHOU Documentary, running on the air for sometime, had
somewhat ushered in some shift among Houstonians from the incessant negative media blitz
on Nigerian/African immigrants in local and national networks.
3
Bullard, In Search of the New South , p. 2.
4
Ibid.
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The Nigerian Church in the South: The Extent of Community Influence
and Ancestral Relationship with African-Americans, 1970-1990
Therefore, to a great extent, the Houston evidences of the Nigerian immigrant
churches can explain their general Southern characteristics. This, again, is especially
evident in their peculiar linkages within the African-American context. However,
the difference between the Nigerian churches in Houston and their broader Southern
thrust lies more in their demographic variant. That is, within the broader Southern
base, the complicated characteristics of some of the "cell churches" of Nigerians may
not be too easy to gauge because, as we saw earlier, a majority of them were housed
in the homes of the faithful. Others, with orientations in segmented pockets of
make-shift Christian ministries, and comprising the shared values of the beloved,
also assembled wherever and whenever the financial and collective interest of the
faithful converged.
Although the Southern pattern of the Nigerian immigrant churches is
somewhat peculiar, it is not exceptional. It is peculiar because it seems propelled by
a certain homeland-bred moral frenzy, which is not as yet driven by a clear vision of
collective unity. This pattern of religious assemblage or corresponding moral
services is neither exceptional to the experience of Nigerian Christian adherents nor
to the larger context of the black African churches in Southern cities—nor elsewhere
in America. There were as well instances when White/African-American
congregations assembled in the homes of the faithful for religious services, or in
hotels or high schools facilities.
1
This is a most likely scenario during the early
'This author has personally been a part of a mixed White/Black Christian congregation
that
met for months in Worcester, Mass., first in school building and later in
Hotel facilities.
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phases of struggling to establish a religious congregation for adherents who were/are
financially handicapped to build or rent large-sized buildings for their Christian
fellowships.
Yet, interestingly enough, the peculiar Southern feature of Nigerian churches
from the 1980 to mid-2000, for example, was that human attitude as well as the
implicit response to the zeal to serve the divine was often shared with smiles and
hardships among the faithful adherents. This feature of the Nigerian Christians is
more visible during their early years of responding to the call to serve the faithful in
the diaspora. While the financial resources of the Nigerian ministries are often
insufficient, yet they are committed to the interest of the brethren and the lost sheep
in America.
But, whether these churches are held in individuals' homes, or under a make-
shift rotation, or under well-established Christian settings, Nigerian-owned churches
in the South are the most dynamic feature of the Nigerian immigrant communities
currently operative within the African-American context. If the total number of
African churches in the U.S. were tabulated, the Nigerian owned churches would
certainly be the largest. Going by the roughest estimates, Houston alone had about
100 Nigerian-owned churches in 2005, Dallas and Atlanta about twenty each.
1
That the Nigerian owned churches represented the strongest arm of the
Nigerian immigrant communities in Southern United States is due mostly to the
Often during the early years of community outreach, when the ministries did not have a
place, we rotated from one school/community building to another until we were strong
enough to rent or finance or to refurbish old buildings into a new church, etc.
"This is based on my Southern survey of Nigerian newspapers, community archives, and
Business Directories.
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enormous influences of their emerging institutions. Historically, the Judeo-Christian
rampart of American civilization has exercised one of the strongest influences on the
character of its republic. This same feature appears to be similar for Nigerian
immigrants. Again, as we saw earlier, this fact also corresponded with the
experiences of African-Americans and Nigerians during both the eras of the slave
trade and colonialism. After freedom, this same phenomenon has reconvened in the
U.S. as the strongest medium of cultural solidarity and self-expression between the
two related groups.
Given the inherent crises of ethno-regional tensions among Nigerians in the
Southern U.S., there cannot be any doubt that the moral imperatives within their
Judeo-Christian wing are possible bases both stronger and broader unity in the
diaspora. It can thus be speculated that substantial powers of collective unity and
ultimately of sustained development, are more apparent within their American-based
churches than their influential media outlets. 1 More significantly, the Nigerian
churches in Southern U.S. have already developed a commendable territorial power
within the mosaic. This seems to be something that most Nigerians are as yet to
fully grasp and exploit.
Unlike Nigerian community media, the Nigerian-owned churches are
operative as non-profit organizations. This suggests that the orientations toward
their faithful adherents are somewhat different: these churches are geared toward the
collective moral well being of their adherents; moreover, their focus appears to be
geared toward the economic welfare of the faithful. The Christian messages of a
'"The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 273-264.
2
Ibid. Also, see the background of this development in Chapter 4.
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loving God, even if more operative on the psychological recesses of some church
followers, are capable of bonding a communal body when tailored against their
social crises. While in the diaspora, these churches represent Nigerian territories.
These are where Nigerians act in their own terms, are freer to one another as a unit.
This is as well where they often responded in accordance with the revealed will of
the Christian God. 1 Thus, the Nigerian churches in the South are more able to
console the pains and sorrows of the community brethren in the cross-road of their
American sojourn. The preachers' messages, which thrive on the ever-merciful love
of God, and in the possibility of the future redemption, cannot be underestimated for
directing the faithful and the repentant sinners who yearn for hope and recovery.
Since moral diligence and discipline are characteristic of church teaching,
the Nigerian zealots not only are expected to be good representatives of their country
but also are enjoined from the pulpit to stay clear from negative behaviors. This
moral diligence perhaps determines why some Nigerians are more likely to see their
churches as the likely locations in which to identify with their marital "sweethearts."
2
The Judeo-Christian feature of Nigerians in the diaspora can even be
explained in relation to the phenomenon of the African background as a culture
rooted in religious traditions.
3
This fact is revealed by the names given to their
churches. These names bear direct relevance to their deep beliefs in God, as well as
to their associations with the Christian ministries. On the other hand, however,
'"The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," p. 279.
2
"The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," p. 280.
3
Holloway, Africanisms in American Culture , pp. 69-91, 83-1 13, 1 19-142; Herskovits, Myth
of the Negro Past ; Bolaji Idowu, African Traditional Religion: A Definition (New York:
Orbis Book, 1973), pp. 175-8; G.G. Parrinder, African Traditional Religion (London:
Sheldon Press, 1958), pp. 17-28, 31-65.
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within their African-American context, Nigerian churches appear to be replaying
both the mid-and late-nineteenth century patterns of the Negro Christian missionary
crusade to convert so-called heathen Africans to Christianity. This trend found some
expression during the 1980s between African and African-American churches across
international waters.
1
Some African American adherents of Nigerian-owned churches have
collaborated with their kin in visiting Nigeria for missionary activities. Within the
Southern U.S., this resultant collaboration has been known to strengthen their
collective solidarity. African Americans, through the medium of the Nigerian
offspring—which we saw earlier—have played frontline roles in the Nigerian owned
churches in the South in a manner that reflected increased understanding and
solidarity with their ancestral kin.
There is thus a clear basis that within the Southern confluence, Nigerian-
owned churches are one the most effective nerves of ancestral rejuvenation with
African-Americans. 3 Unsurprisingly, it has been observed that the
Nigerian churches have approximated the African-American base
with a certain degree of success, and may even become the nerve
center for the spiritual rejuvenation of Afrocentricism linking African
Americans and Nigerians as the larger carrier of Pan African
renewal.
4
African Americans who attend these Nigerian-owned churches see some of
'For example, the link by Dr. Frederick K.C. Price's large and mostly African-American
middle-class church in Los Angeles, USA, to a Nigerian church, "All Nation for Christ:
Redemption Faith Magazine (Benin City, Nigeria, 1992), pp. 9-13, testifies to the pattern of
this emerging trend.
2
"The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," p. 274; Research Report, p. 22
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid • "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 139-141, 282.
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them as emanating from Africa, and as representing some recovery from centuries of
their lost cohesion with the homelands. There are other reasons for the latter
development, however. First, and by far the most important, Nigerian churches, as
we explained earlier, operated more under the auspices of the larger Judeo-Christian
setting of American republic. In the second place, these churches use English as the
official language of worship, so African Americans who attend the services have an
easier time assimilating. Third, some African-Americans who attend these churches
are married to Nigerians; hence, along with their American-born offspring, they
represent an effective medium of re-direction. This is a two-way flow of ancestral
exchange because some Nigerians are also regular supporters of the black church.
1
African Americans who attend Nigerian-owned churches are harnessed into a
simple but instructive instrument of ancestral solidarity. In this particular
development, Nigerian church owners may have been fortunate. As confidence in
traditional American-patterned churches erodes, due perhaps to excessive displays
of
materialism, African Americans who lean toward sustained collaboration with their
ancestral kin are more spontaneous in their response to, and relationship
with, the
churches of their ancestral kin.
2
Given the swift pattern of intra-cultural efficacy of the Nigerian
immigrant
churches within the black base, another criterion was
employed in evaluating some
emerging relationships with African-Americans. This
was a case study undertaken
during the early 1990s in Southern U.S. This study
revealed some interesting facts
about Nigerian churches that claimed "Messianic
Mission" to convert American
'Ibid.
2
Ibid.
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blacks. This study looked at two churches because of their peculiar socio-cultural
features within the Southern base: they were Universal Cherubim and Seraphim
Church and The Brotherhood of the Cross and Star Church. 1
Finally, The Brotherhood Church was selected and examined because, with
about "2 million members worldwide," its underlying ideology depicted an ongoing
trend of relationship between a Nigerian-owned church in America and African-
Americans. Moreover, its messianic imperatives, which identified African-
Americans with messages of regeneration, provided a more solid basis to compute
the course of ancestral relationship for the remaining part of this chapter.
2
Table 20 shows the major enclaves of the Brotherhood Church within and
outside the Southern states in the U.S. If their newer Bethels in other smaller
Southern cities and elsewhere in America were included, the number of The
Brotherhood and Star churches would be much higher.
Unlike other Nigerian churches, the "Messianic" imperatives of the
Brotherhood Church appear to be a basic reconstruction of the notion of Christian
deification of Jesus Christ. Within its Christian rituals, an African essence of the
origin of its "Holy Father Olumba Olumba Obu" and a Nigerian incarnation of the
"Word" sometimes overtakes the established canons of the Judeo-Christian notion
of
'For example, see Gordon, Nigeria's Diverse Peoples, p. 238,
for another variant of our
earlier conclusion as well as "The Status of the Relationship with
African Americans, p.,
which supports choice of the two churches.
2Based on the official newspaper of the Brotherhood of the
Cross and Star, The Herald of
th. New Kingdom U.S. Special Edition (May, 1988). Follow-up interviews on the
activities
of the Brotherhood of the Cross and Star Church during
the 1990s were supportive of its
continuing activities within the Southern black base.
Also, see Appendix of th.s dissertat.on
and "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp.
142-3.
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"Christ."
1
But both in Nigeria and in the U.S., despite the fact that the Brotherhood
attracts people from all racial and class backgrounds, and has a worldwide
representation, Nigerians are likely to view its aspirations with mixed feelings. 2
Table 20
Selected Samples of Major Stations of the
Brotherhood of the Cross and Star Churches
in the United States, 1970-2006.
Brotherhood of Cross and Star, Atlanta
Brotherhood of Cross and Star, San Francisco
Brotherhood of Cross and Star, Dallas
Brotherhood of Cross and Star, Bay Area (L.A.)
Brotherhood of Cross and Star, Wichita, KS
Brotherhood of Cross and Star, New Jersey
Brotherhood of Cross and Star, Maryland
Brotherhood of Cross and Star, Houston
Brotherhood of Cross and Star, Chicago
Brotherhood of Cross and Star, Washington, DC
Source: Exploratory Survey of the Major Enclaves of the
Brotherhood and Star Churches via African Community
Media; African Business Directories in Southern Cities and
across the United States, 1993-2005.
Founded by Leader Olumba Olumba Obu, and headquartered in Calabar,
Nigeria, this church has been in the United States since 1971. 3 The particular
dynamic of the ancestral relationship between some African-Americans and Nigerian
members of Brotherhood was vividly revealing in some of the public gestures made
'Bishop James C. Ellerbe, The Stone the Builders Rejected:" Being lecture delivered by
Bishop C. Ellerbe at the Morehouse College, Atlanta University Center in April in the U.S.
Special Edition, Herald of the New Kingdom, Brotherhood of the Cross and Star (Calabar,
Nigeria, May 1988), 3-4; "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," p. 143;
Research Report
,
p. 23
2
Ibid.; Sir Eddie CO. Osuagwu, "Brotherhood of the Cross and Star Holds Anniversary,"
The Good Hope News: The African Perspective (Dallas, Texas, November-December,
1991), p. 4.
3
Bishop Ellerbe, The Herald of the Kingdom , p. 16.
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in the Southern base in the late 1980s. As the "Official U.S. Edition" of the
Brotherhood in The Herald of the New Kingdom noted:
Members of Brother of the Cross and Star, United States branch and
Association Of Students and citizens of Akwa Ibom State of Nigeria
in the America Inc. recently organized what they called 'reception into
Africa' in honor of Bishop James C. Ellerbe, an African-American
who has declared his intention to become an indigent of Africa. 1
So, in retrospect, Bishop Ellerbe, both as an African-American as well as
"our international and Field Bishop," became a big factor in helping to organize the
"Pan-African Christian Conference" in Atlanta, Georgia, between July 17 and 23,
1988. He also helped to lay the foundation for rallying the faithful, through practical
Christian ethics, and the "studying and strengthening of unity, and liberation through
the spirit of Christ."
2
Ellerbe himself felt justified in presenting the missionary
aspect of the church to some Christian congregation of blacks in Atlanta, and even
reportedly sought and had an audience with Mrs. Coretta Scott King. His lecture on
the essence of the Brotherhood church at Morehouse College and Atlanta University
Center, sought to convince the student audience that the peculiar crisis of blacks in
the world was an unfolding event from which a great hope had finally arrived. His
messages to blacks in Atlanta and all across the U.S. rested on the prospect for
recovery and hope.
The Messianic rhetoric of The Brotherhood Church, as reflected in The
Herald of the New Kingdom , has been compared to that of Dr. Martin Luther King
'Ibid., p. 6.
2
Ibid., pp. 3,4,16.
3
Ellerbe, The Herald of the Kingdom , pp. 3,4,16.
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who vigorously protested racist and discriminatory practices in the U.S. towards
minority groups. Yet, more than three decades after the Civil Rights Movement,
.... the world still looks hamstrung; and the living can bear true
testimony to Luther King that peaceful co-existence has eluded man
after all. Thus, man appears powerless when faced with oddities: life
now seems useless to him. Global economic recession, political
instability and social inequality now experienced by man, is borne out
of his desire to acquire for himself all the rich bounties of nature. The
results ... are violence [and] hunger.
. .
.'
As Olumba further declared:
Do not preach division and segregation. Do not say that some people
are not brethren or that some are not children of God, but rather
preach that all human beings are brethren whether they are Moslems
or Christians, Buddhist, or Hinduism, or Bahal, or Necromancer. . . .
Do not base your assignment on the color of your body or on name, or
place but know that we are all one through the spirit, and brethren,
who should love one another.2
Since the historical crisis of the black diaspora of enslavement is often
explained within a Biblical context,
3
the notion of "The Stone the Builders
Rejected," formed the core of the rejuvenation of blacks, and implied an
understanding of the fulfillment time of "history" and the coming of "God to the
rescue." Bishop Ellerbe argued that this trend bore directly on the emergent strong
consciousness among African-Americans about their ancestral homeland in Africa as
evidenced, for example, by changes of their names.
4
It was, then, the historical crisis of blacks which compelled the "Messianic"
mission of leader Olumba Olumba Obu. Whether realistically, or even
fanatically,
'Ibid.
3
In ChLlr'l for example, additional emphases to this background are
found in the orations
of AteSl Jones, (1808); Williams (1808); Sipkins (1809); Russell Parrott (1812 and
1814); John Gloucester (1830).
4
EUerbe, Herald of the New Kingdom , pp. 3-4.
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some black Americans have been led back to Africa, while others have been elected
as carriers of the prophetic horn. The development of "Black America" which began
from the church was reinforced by Bishop Ellerbe's messages to his audience that the
Holy Spirit had descended to earth in person:
The Holy Spirit has now descended on this earthly plane in human
form, bearing the resemblance of one whose hairs are like wool, eyes
like flames of fire and feet like brass. Leader Olumba Olumba Obu
having fulfilled that entity is now telling the world to embrace the
Brotherhood of the Cross and Star which is the new Kingdom of God;
now on earth. The Holy Father also fulfills the text of Isaiah 63 : 1 -2. 1
'
When the Brotherhood Church reached African-American students at the
Atlanta University Center, one admirer stated:
Prior to mid-April, this year (1988), neither I nor anyone I know in
Atlanta University Center had heard of Olumba Olumba Obu,
Biahapan, Nigeria, 'Kingdom of God on Earth,' Brotherhood of the
Cross and Star. Then, on a rainy afternoon, many students of my
faculty heard about the Afrocentric Christianity that contains ideas,
aspirations, and traditions that are strange and wonderful to our ears
as well as give solace to our hearts. . . . Now, those numerous
students, the department's friends, parents, faculty, student's friends, .
. . other teachers have heard about Olumba Olumba Obu and I know
that virtually everyone wants to hear more!
2
By early 2000s, the status of the Brotherhood Church within the American
black base had not changed significantly from what it was in the 1980s. This was
also the case with its African-American adherents. Admittedly, we can speculate
that, as the Judeo-Christian features of the messianic churches of Nigerians become
deep-seated within the Southern confluence, African-Americans will likely re-
'ibid., p. 3..
2
Ibid., p. 12. At the time the case study of the Brotherhood Church was undertaken between
1990 and 1993, Bishop Ellerbe was reportedly residing in the motherland, in the historic city
of Calabar. This is where the Headquarter of the church, in Cross River State, Southeastern
Nigeria, is located.
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negotiate the recurrent values of whatever best complement their attachment to the
churches of their ancestral kin. There seems here—along with the succeeding
complementation of inter-cultural exchanges by the Nigerian offspring to be a
bigger quest toward a more resolute definition of the bonding between the
descendants of slaves and voluntary passage across the Southland. The Southern
trend thus points toward a renewed pattern of an emerging trend in Afro-Atlantic
relations and an inevitable transformation through two historic migrations from
Africa south of the Sahara to the U.S.
Summary
Nigerians in Southern cities are densely concentrated along African-
American lines—with their most developed professional establishments found in
such cities as Atlanta, Dallas, and Houston. Texas, where Houston is located, has
one of the most established infrastructures of the Nigerian diaspora of colonialism in
the U.S. Ironically, their pattern of neighborhood distribution along African-
American lanes is oppositional. This development seems to be influenced by socio-
cultural crisis.
The Nigerian-owned church in the South represents the strongest arm of an
American world institution of Nigerians. It also represents the strongest medium for
sustained development of Nigerian indices, as well as ancestral relationship with the
descendants of slaves. Within the same Judeo-Christian medium, American-born
offspring of Nigerian immigrants represent the strongest arm of cross-cultural
partnerships. Similarly, their inter-cultural features are more conciliatory toward
African-Americans and Euro-Americans than those of their core parents.
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CHAPTER 7
NIGERIAN COMMUNITY MEDIA AND AFRICAN-AMERICANS IN
SOUTHERN CITIES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1990-2000
This Chapter contains the content analyses of the published opinions of
African-Americans and Nigerians/Africans in the Nigerian community media in
Southern United States and the extent of their understanding or misunderstanding of
each other. Part 1 of the content analyses (1990-1992), involving three Nigerian
media, and based mostly on Nigerian/African published views, examines attitude and
perception toward African-Americans. Phase 2 (1993-2000), involving two Nigerian
newspapers, based mostly on the published viewpoints of Nigerians and African-
Americans , examines how the two related and historically affected groups
understand or misunderstand each other. This section also explains the extent to
which Nigerian/African immigrants and African-Americans have shared similarities
or dissimilarities with regard to socio-cultural/race matters in Southern U.S.
Part 1: Content Analyses of Media Opinions About
African-Americans Published in the
Nigerian Community Media in Major Southern Cities, 1990-1992
Unlike interaction with African Americans via the churches, which we saw
within a specific context in Houston, as well as across the broader Southern front in
Chapter 6, interaction via published views via Nigerian-owned community media
involving the two groups provided another basis for assessing the course of ancestral
relationship. The difference between the Judeo-Christian features of the
Nigerians/African-Americans and the Nigerian community media lies more in
understanding the effectiveness of each medium of exchange , and how this in turn
544
relates with the issues involving the two kindred groups. To begin with, as we saw
earlier, the major differences/similarities between the two groups were closely linked
to the black experience in America and the Nigerian homeland. 1
As Table 21 shows, over a three-year period, a total of 68 articles (sixty-
eight) were recorded on African-Americans by the three Nigerian community media.
The heaviest media weight coverage on African-Americans was in 1991: the 36
articles recorded represented some 53 percent, compared to 1992 with 19 articles (28
percent), and 13 articles for 1990 (19 percent).
Table 21
Total Number of Articles on African-Americans
by Three Nigerian-African Community
Media in Southern United States, 1990-1992
Period The Good Nigerian News African Business Total Percentage
Hope News Digest Source Magazine
1990 10 3 13 19
1991 18 7 11 36 53
1992 9 5 5 19 28
Total 37 12 19 68
Tables 22.1, 22.2, and 22.3 are the breakdown of articles on news kinds
recorded on African-Americans, along with their distribution over a three-year
period. As shown, variations in their coverage were most identifiable in the editorial
news . For example, the Good Hope News (Table 22.1) had five editorials on
African-Americans, representing some 83 percent; Nigerian News Digest (Table
22.2)—zero percent; and African Business Source Magazine—17 percent (Table
22.3) .
'See our earlier explanation on the Judeo-Christian features of the Nigerian/African
immigrant churches and community media. Also, see the "Introduction" and Chapter 8 for
the summation of the extent of their similarities and differences.
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Table 22.1
Distribution of Kinds of Stories, by Percentage,
by The Good Hope News: African Perspective
.
1990-1992
1990 1991 1992 Total Percentage
News 10 11 4 25 63
Feature 5 2 7 32
Editorial 1 3 1 5 83
Picture 2 9 3 14 20
Total 13 28 10 51
Also, there were some variations in the coverage of African-Americans in
news stories: The Good Hope News (Table 22.1), with the highest score (twenty-five
news stories), represented 63 percent of its coverage on news stories over the three-
year period compared to Nigerian News Digest—10 percent (Table 22.2), and
African-Business Source 28 percent (Table 22.3). Very little variation occurred in
the coverage of African-Americans in the feature news , where Nigerian News Digest
was slightly ahead—eight feature news stories representing 36 percent compared to
The Good Hope News—32 percent, and African Business Source—32 percent.
Table 22.2
Distribution of Kinds of Stories, by Percentage,
by Nigerian News Digest , 1990-1992
1990 1991 1992 Total Percentage
News 2 2 4 10
Feature 5 3 8 36
Editorial
Picture 10 6 16 23
Total 17 11 28
In the picture news (photo file depiction of African-Americans), African
Business Source Magazine (Table 22.3), with 57 percent was the highest compared
to The Good Hope News (20 percent) and Nigerian News Digest (23 percent).
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Overall, however, the coverage of African-Americans was more consistent in
The Good Hope News
.
Besides, the frequency of its coverage and distribution of
issues on African-Americans cut across all categories of news stories over the three-
year period compared to its counterparts. 1
Table 22.3
Distribution of Kinds of Stories, by Percentage, by
African Business Source Magazine
,
1990-1992
Total Percentage
News 2 9 11 28
Feature 1 2 4 7 32
Editorial 1 1 17
Picture 4 18 3 39 57
Total 7 29 8 58
As regards the coverage of African-Americans under the five major issue-
categories (Table 23.1), The Good Hope News recorded 92 percent of its combined
total over the entire three-year period on Race Relations/Racism (RRR), compared to
Nigerian News Digest (zero percent, Table 23.2); and African Business Source—
8
percent (Table 23.3). Apart from the 38 percent recorded on Opinion and Attitude
About American Blacks (OAAAB) and 25 percent on Racial Solidarity/Pan-
Africanism (RSP) in the Nigerian News Digest , and 55 percent on RSP in African
Business Source , the coverage of African-Americans in The Good Hoper News was
once again stronger and more evenly distributed: 30 percent on RSP; 75 percent
SEBAP; 100 percent CRRP; and 33 percent OAAA (Table 23.1).
'Udofia, "The Status of the Relationship with African-Americans," pp. 222-3.
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Table 23.1
Major Categories of Issues on African-Americans
Covered by The Good Hope News, by Years, 1990-1992
1990 1991 1992 Total Percent
Race Relations/Racism (RRR) 4 5 2 11 92
Racial Solidarity /
Pan-Africanism (RSP)
2 4 6 30
Special Events/Black American
Personages (SEBAP) 2 2 2 6 75
Civil Rights/Race Politics
(CRRP)
2 2 3 7 100
Opinion/Attitude About
American Blacks (OAAAB)
5 2 7 33
Table 23.2
Major Categories of Issues on African-Americans
Covered by The Nigerian News Digest, bv Years. 1990- 1992
1990 1991 1992 Total Percent
Race Relations/Racism (RRR)
Racial Solidarity /
Pan-Africanism (RSP)
2 1 3 25
Special Events/Black American
Personages (SEBAP) 1 1 5
Civil Rights/Race Politics
(CRRP)
Opinion/Attitude About
American Blacks (OAAAB)
5 3 8 38
Table 23.3
Major Categories of Issues on African-Americans Covered
by the African Business Source Magazine, by Year, 1990-1992
1990 1991 1992 Total Percent
Race Relations/Racism (RRR) 1 1 8
Racial Solidarity /
Pan-Africanism (RSP)
2 9 11 55
Special Events/Black
American Personages
(SEBAP)
1 1 13
Civil Rights/Race Politics
(CRRP)
Opinion/Attitude About
American Blacks (OAAAB)
1 2 3 6 29
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Table 24.1 shows how the major issue-categories under SEBAP were
distributed in the media over a three-year period. The coronation of Debby Turner in
1990 as "Miss America" was seen and reported as an event that most Africans and
African-Americans ought to have known more about and be very proud of: "Do you
know that the beauty crown of Miss America and Miss USA are worn by African-
Americans?" As the report added, "Miss Debby Turner is Miss America 1990 while
Miss Carole Gist is Miss USA, 1990."' Also, the tribute to the "Legacy" of Dr.
Martin Luther King Jr., received a positive ovation because his "Dream Lives On"2
(Table 24.1).
Table 24.1
Breakdown of Issues Covered Under the SEBAP
by the Nigerian/African Media, 1990-1992
Period Issues The Good
Hope News
Nigerian
News Digest
African Business
Source
Magazine
7/90 Miss America Debby Turner 1
Black Catholic Archbishop
Resigns 1
2/91 Black History Month 1
Local Channels Mark Black
History Month 1
1/92 Martin Luther King, Jr.
Holiday Celebration 1
3/92 Martin Luther King: His
Dream and the Legacy Left
Behind
1
Court Building Dedicated to
an African-American Judge 1
6(7)92 Magic Johnson: AIDS Book
Controversy 1
On the other hand, other articles like "Hambee Festival Celebrated African
Tradition," "African/African-American Ties Wax Stronger," "African Products
'The Good Hope News: The African Perspective (July, 1990), p. 15.
2
Nigerian News Digest (February 7, 1992), p. 14.
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Shine at Black Expos, USA," and the Abidjan Summit" were examples of the shared
optimism about African-Americans by opinion molders in the Nigerian community
media. Such news story as "Nigerian Businessman gives $100,000,000 to Atlanta
Institute," on the other hand, revealed the perception toward the active role being
played by a Nigerian personage in support of the black struggle in America. 1
The elections of L.D. Wilder as Governor of Virginia, and of David Dinkins,
as Mayor ofNew York (Table 24.2), were depicted as representing a turning point in
the maturing of America.2 Similar praise in an editorial in The Good Hope
newspaper was given to the passage of the "Civil Rights Bill of 1990:" this was
argued as representing fairness toward American minorities as well as a genuine
effort toward civil rights for all (Table 24.2). 3
Table 24.2
Breakdown of Issues Covered Under
CRRP by the Nigerian/African Media, 1990-1992
Period Issues The
Good
Hope
News
Nigerian
News
Digest
African
Business
Source
Magazine
l(2)/90 Election of L.D. Wilder and David
Dinkins History in the Making in
US
8/90 The Civil Rights Bill and Its
Importance
8/91 Clarence Thomas Says: Civil
Rights Movement Helped Me
Bush's Choice of Thomas Fills
Quota
1/92 New Minority Scholarship Policy
Expected
'For detailed discussion, see African Business Source Magazine (Houston, Texas, January.
15-Feb. 15, 1991), p. 9.
2The Good Hope News:African Perspective (January/ February, 1990), p.4.
3The Good Hope News (August - 1990), p. 13.
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Further Content Analyses of Nigerian-African Community Media:
Understanding and Misunderstanding African-Americans by
Nigerians/Africans, 1990-1992 1
Table 25.1 mirrors the nature of understanding or misunderstanding about
African-Americans based on the published opinions of Nigerian/African writers.
Included in their media opinion perception was the sporadic split of the black base in
the wake of the "Anita Hill/Judge Thomas" nomination. On the other hand, in "The
Problem Lies with Teachers," the expressed socio-cultural attitude of racism toward
African-Americans was viewed as responsible for the conflict in their education.2
"The King Verdict," in particular, represented the "Most Sensational Verdict of the
Year."
3
It was argued that, the verdict showed how the "U.S. stood up for human
rights abuses everywhere except when it concerned people of color"4 (Table 25.1).
As the breakdown of data confirms, from Tables 24 to 25.1, and throughout
the three-year period, the coverage of African-Americans by the Nigerian
community media was much stronger in the Good Hope News newspaper. The
frequency of overall coverage on particular issues was also much stronger in The
Good Hope News .
Table 25.1 illuminates the breadth of the articles showing either
understanding or misunderstanding of African-Americans by Nigerian/African
writers. This is revealed by distribution of news briefs and by the frequency of times
'This explanation is an expansion/breakdown of analyses on issues covered mostly under the
major category of RRR. However, as shown by the data on Table 25. 1 , this trend is mirrored
in terms of understanding/misunderstanding of African-Americans by Nigerian/African
immigrants.
2
Udofia, "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," p. 237.
3
"The King Verdict," African Business Source Magazine (Houston, Texas, June/July, 1992),
p.8.
4
Ibid.
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of coverage over a three-year period. Accordingly, the analyses revealed a broad
range of understanding than misunderstanding on issues such as economic, cultural,
and civil rights politics.
Table 25.1
Understanding/Misunderstanding African-Americans
in Nigerian/African community Media, 1990-1992
Media Issues Understanding Misunderstanding
Good Hope News The L.A. Shame
The Young Black Males
1
* Reverse Discrimination 1
Inmate's Cry from Jail
* The Plight of Black Males \
* Blacks, Hispanics Denied Home
Loans than Whites/Asians ,
African-Americans: A Journey
Through "Niger River" 1
Mike Tyson's Rape Case
1Back to the Past
* Buchanan's Bigotry
Confirm Clarence Thomas
1
1
Nigerian News
Digest
Race: America's Quagmire 1
Black America/Nigeria an
International Perspective
Clarence Thomas' Mainstream
Media Hype
The Problem Lies with Teachers
Clarence Thomas' Apple
Chomping Eves
Race America's Quagmire A
Rebuttal
African Business
Source Magazine
Employment Discrimination
* Magic Johnson: Is AIDS a
Biological Disease?
* Obstacles Facing Blacks
The King Verdict
Further, such issues as "An Inmate's Cry from Jail," "Racial Slur Backfires in
Houston," and "Employment Discrimination," for example, revealed how opinion
molders in the Nigerian media perceived and depicted the agony of American racism
that affected them and their ancestral kin. On issues like the "Young Black Males in
the 1990s" and "Ronnie Reagan's," the Nigerian media blamed the Reagan era and
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his policies for the general state of the economic and socio-cultural crises that
confronted African-American males (Table 25. 1). 1
Based on the data on Table 25.2, the general trend of understanding African-
Americans by Nigerian/African writers was stronger in The Good Hope News .
Some 43 percent of its media weight showing an understanding contrasts sharply
with 4 percent for misunderstanding. Nigerian News Digest recorded 22 percent
against 13 percent, while African Business Source Magazine scored 13 percent
against 4 percent.
Table 25.2
Levels of Understanding/Misunderstanding African-Americans,
by Percentages, 1990-1992
Media Understanding Misunderstanding
Good Hope News 43% 4%
Nigerian News Digest 22% 13%
African Business
Source Magazine
13% 4%
Further content analyses of news kinds revealed a stronger expression of an
understanding of the socio-cultural context of African-Americans in the editorial
opinions of The Good Hope News . This was evident, for example, in its edition of
March 1992. In this particular editorial , the opinion was that the same process of
racial judgment, which freed Patrick Kennedy Smith from his rape trial, was
markedly different in the trial of Mike Tyson .
'The Good Hope News: The African Perspective (April, 1991), p. 13.
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In Mr. Kennedy Smith's rape case trial, he was acquitted. On the one
that looked much less like rape . Mike Tyson was convicted. Perhaps,
the fact that Mr. Smith was a medical doctor and from a celebrity
family and, of course, a white , helped to exonerate him. Mike Tyson,
although a world boxing champion...was prejudged and convicted
before the case even came up for trial. 1
Again, in the article entitled, "The Problem Lies with Teachers," the opinion
was that success in American education should be determined by how the
educational curriculum was structured and "how fair and firm teachers are with
grading systems and other requirements." The columnist questioned the view that
African-Americans "exhibit disproportionately high rates of illiteracy." He argued
that they confronted an educational system that was ambivalent toward their identity.
Further, he argued that, historically, the success of black education in America was
compounded by racism and institutional opposition. 2
In another article published in Nigerian News Digest (January 24, 1 992), the
writer argued that the black dilemma in America emanated from the entrenched
racial structure of America. Entitled "Race: America's Quagmire-A Rebuttal,"
Bennet Akpa, Nigerian, pointed out that the socio-cultural crises of black America
were linked to the irreconcilable mindset of white America. He urged the first writer
of "Race: America's Quagmire" (Nigerian News Digest , December 27, 1991), and
African immigrants in general, to open up to African-Americans.
Akpa encouraged his Nigerian/African brethren to come to terms with the
fact that "being born and growing up Black in America is not something.... Africans
'
The Good Hope News: The African-Perspective (Dallas, Texas, March, 1992) p. 13.
2
Nigerian News Digest (February 14, 1992), p. 18.
3
Bennet Akpa, "Race: America's Quagmire-A Rebuttal," Nigerian News Digest (January 24,
1992), pp. 4 and 20.
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could understand." Since Africans came to America fortified "with high esteem"
and determination to return home "some day richer than before," they were very
likely to exhibit traits that were markedly dissimilar from those of African-
Americans. African-Americans, he further argued, were deemed failures by most
white people right from their birth and considered "incapable." Considered failures
and "incapable," African-Americans, according to Akpa, must
learn to live with the fact that whenever such cliches as welfare, inner
city, ghetto, murder, AIDS, credit card fraud, hunger and starvation
are uttered on TV, the accompanying photograph is more likely than
not to be that of a black person. 1
Additionally, Akpa observed that the racism that confronted African-
Americans was so deeply embedded in the American psyche that "most whites could
not differentiate between a black cat and Black person." So, accordingly, he rejected
the blame placed on some African-Americans by the first writer for reliance on
"affirmative action." Without "affirmative action," which his countryman
criticized,
3
"A Black Ph.D could earn less than a white high school graduate."4 Akpa
cautioned: "I don't know that any of us from Africa has the moral high ground to
pontificate about the probable solution to the problems facing Black Americans." 5
"Remember," Akpa reiterated, "that it was our ancestors who sold them
(African-Americans) into slavery in exchange for such simple things as a bottle of
gin or shiny pieces ofjewelry." Africans, he argued, "have a whole continent riddled
'Ibid.
2
"Race: America's Quagmire," Nigerian News Digest (December 27, 1991).
3
Ibid.
"Akpa, "Race: America's Quagmire-A Rebuttal," pp. 4 and 20.
5
Ibid.
555
with problems" which "many of us have not the vaguest idea how to solve," in spite
of "decades and centuries of self government." 1
Akpa, then, pondered whether a Nigerian could have been the one who
wanted to correct black Americans on grounds of inaction, as the first writer of
"Race: America's Quagmire" had done, when "there are many Nigerians in this
country who, despite two or three degrees, drive cabs or work menial tasks"2
So before talking about the "African-American problem,"
... let's make an attempt to understand the people, lets join some of
their associations and sit around the table with them and allow them
to open up to us. If we do this, we would be surprised to find out that
the majority of Black people work everyday, are not on welfare, do
not push drugs, have close families, have good things to say about
Africans . . . and contribute positively to the American society. 3
To Akpa, therefore, a more realistic assessment of African-Americans would
undoubtedly make Nigerians/Africans cognizant that their development after slavery
represented "the greatest comeback ever attempted by any people in history." Akpa
concluded that Nigerians/Africans must accept "an additional requirement" in
constructive collaboration with their ancestral kin.
We (Africans) must learn to count African-Americans as our allies,
not enemies. Who knows what the outcome would have been if Black
grassroots organizations had mobilized to support those Nigerians
who were fighting defamation in Dallas, Texas?4
And, there was Dr. Ema Etuk, whose response to the Nigerian and African-
American relations complemented some of the emphases we saw earlier in Akpa.
Although Dr. Etuk's article entitled, "Election Year Politics: Black Power in an
'Ibid.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
International Perspective," showed a slight variant from the former, it represented a
conscious call for coordinated relationships between Nigerians and African-
Americans. 1 As a student of world history, Etuk took a most familiar although
slightly newer line of Pan-Africanist worldview.
First, he sought to grabble with the possibilities of relating Nigeria and Black
America's numerical potentialities to the pace of their development within and
outside the U.S.
2
Second, he sought to explore the emergent tenet of political
changes involving the two related and almost similarly affected racial groups, urging
for collective unity. Seizing upon the election campaigns of two presidents—one in
the United States and the other in Nigeria—involving Nigerians and African-
Americans in the democratic process, Etuk posed the inevitable question of a new
cycle of relations. He felt the trend represented a pathway toward greater
empowerment and regeneration between the two black worlds.3
When, in 1992, it first seemed that Nigeria would have an orderly transfer of
political power from a military dictatorship to a democratically elected leader, Etuk
viewed the strength of Nigerians and African-Americans as a magnet for cooperative
relationship as well as corresponding development. As his article speculated,
Most likely, experts in the field of current history will remember 1992
as the year of the two presidential elections on both sides of the
Atlantic. Almost coincidentally, African-Americans, with a
population of 88,254,501 (according to the 1991 census) will go to the
'ibid. Dr. Emma S. Etuk, "Election Year Politics: Black Power in an International
Perspective," Nigerian News Digest (Charlotte, N. Carolina, November 13, 1992), p. 4.
2
Ibid. Dr. Emma Etuk's article seems to be a more specific reworking of a historically
popular Pan-African worldview. See some emphases in Chapter I.
3
Etuk, "Election Year Politics," p. 4.
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polls this fall. The American will elect a new president on November
3, and Nigerians, hopefully , on December 5. 1
Also, Etuk believed that success between Nigerians and African-Americans
required them to work as people with shared interests and objectives:
African-Americans and Nigerians combined constitute the ninth
largest population group in the world
. . . after China, India, the
United States, Indonesia, Brazil, Russia, Japan and Pakistan. This
combination produces a figure of 1 18,500,561. 2
If Nigerians and African-Americans "are bound ... by some historical and
cultural ties that go deeper than geopolitical differences," an election year in which
their combined human forces were involved in electing two presidents, was so
historic an event as to warrant the convening of "a national congress of Nigerian and
African-American leaders of thought.. .for a declaration of purpose and action."
There are many thousands of well-educated Nigerian professionals in
the United States with resources that can be tapped in order to lay the
foundation for this kind of congress. There are also many Nigerian
organizations to be harnessed for this purpose. All that is needed is a
commitment and dedication to work together.
3
Etuk's "what would have happened" suppositions indicated an understanding
of the mixed phases of post-modern Pan-African possibilities. Profoundly suspicious
of the tenuous relationship between Nigerians and African-Americans, he wondered
in the following manner:
What would have happened if African-American leaders of thought
and Nigerians worked faithfully together to lobby the United States
Congress and Senate, the mega-companies, and the military industrial
complexes to pay closer attention to their sheer numbers as market
consumers, and as an important demographic group of the Black race?
.... What would have happened if African-Americans and Nigerians
'Ibid.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
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provided a united voice to the United Nations on some matters
relating to their interests, such as war, pollution, health, immigration,
resource exploitation, racism, trade, and world prices of commodities?
(Including massive public demonstrations of mutual concern)... What
would have happened if African-Americans and Nigerians
collaborated and cooperated in the areas of oil exploration, space
technology, space engineering, automobile manufacturing....? 1
The need for Nigerians and African-Americans "to work together," implied a
grasp of new possibilities. Signs of mistrust and misunderstanding in the
relationship between the two groups represented a source of disempowerment:
.... among many African-Americans and Nigerians the age-old
stereotypes, fears, suspicions, and misapprehensions still exist. These
are the roots of our powerlessness. As long as these misapprehensions
exist, we shall never be able to get united and wield the kind of power
we should.
2
"There is still an oral code of conspiracy of distrust" in the relationship
between Nigerians and African-Americans. Accordingly, this "oral code of
conspiracy of distrust" among African-Americans implied that Nigerians were often
to blame as those who "sold our fathers." Nigerians were also known to exhibit a
similar attitude of unconcerned and arrogance toward African-Americans:
Some Nigerians . . . have been alleged to possess certain degrees of
arrogance and airs of superiority. No one seems to honestly and
frankly deal with these matters of distrust... There is a lot of
hypocrisy and pretense while we claim that we are "brothers" and
"sisters." There seems to be more talks than actions.
3 *
'Ibid.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid. *The faith that Dr. Etuk placed on the possibility of a smooth democratic transition in
the 1992 Nigerian Presidential election did not yield expected dividends due to the
annulment of the democratic process which elected Chief M. K. O. Abiola as President by
President Ibrahim Babangida. Dr. Etuk reconstructed his earlier emphases in Nigerian News
Digest of November 13, 1992, based on Patrick Henry's libertarian exhortation "Give me
liberty or give me death," urging Nigerians not to accept an imposed leadership. See Dr.
Emma S. Etuk, "Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death:" The Meaning and Significance of the
Nigerian Independence, African News Weekly (October 1-8, 1993), pp. 8, 35.
559
Another substantial understanding of the historical context of black America
by the Nigerian media was revealed in the coverage of the nomination of Clarence
Thomas for Supreme Court Justice. Overall five articles were devoted to the
Thomas nomination crises; this represented the highest coverage accorded a
particular issue over the three-year period.
1
Unlike most black Americans, the opinions expressed in the Nigerian
community media with regard to the nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas were
neutral although more accommodating. First, the editorial opinions revealed an
understanding of Judge Thomas' own weaknesses as a black American in a white-
dominated institution. But, unlike the NAACP, which would have preferred a white
liberal to Thomas, the editorial opinions argued that complete absence of a black
Justice on the Supreme Court after Thurgood Marshall would be dangerous for black
America in the long run. The Good Hope News cautioned African-Americans that,
"the devil you know is better than the one you don't know."3 As for Judge Thomas,
His past utterances were starkly contrary to the legacy left behind by
Justice Thurgood Marshall. But we have to hear what his mother said
recently . . . "Black people" don't have to think alike, they don't have
to look alike, they don't have to talk alike . . ..
4
Similarly, other related opinions in the Nigerian News Digest showed
an understanding of the historical context of the Clarence Thomas
'"The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 252-3.
2The NAACP and its related associates were almost unanimous in opposing the nomination
of Judge Clarence Thomas. Besides, its official stance before and during the Supreme Court
confirmation process tended to have been more favorable toward a white liberal than Judge
Thomas.
3The Good Hope News: The African Perspective (August, 1 99 1 ), p. 1 1
.
4
Ibid.
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nomination crisis. 1 Responding to the New York Times editorial entitled, "A
Justice until 2030," the "Fire Talk" columnist observed that: "The above
mentioned editorial smacks of sheer racism." After all, "The Times did not
demand a similar high-handedness when bonafide White conservative Justice
David Souter was nominated..."2
Overall, however, the content analyses revealed that articles reflecting a
misunderstanding of African-Americans in the Nigerian media were mostly linked to
historical differences. Generally, this development supported the assumptions of this
study.
3 The Thomas/Hill conflict revealed how some Nigerians/Africans
misunderstood the profound historical grievances of their ancestral kin. The fact that
Professor Anita Hill had a continuing relationship with Judge Thomas, her boss,
might not have implied that her opposition to his nomination was triggered by an
unrealized interest—even sarcastically—as the writer of one article attempted to
portray.
4
Moreover, the substance of the conflict with Judge Thomas may be found in
black America's ideological split within itself rather than in the unrealized interest of
Professor Hill. And Hill, who probably understood the philosophical orientation of
her former boss, had recognized that his nomination did not represent the fullest
interest of black people. This same crisis was not much different from that between
'See "Clarence Thomas" Nigerian News Digest (Ashville, NC, August 30, 1991), p.18;
"Clarence Thomas," Nigerian News Digest (Charlotte, N. Carolina, October 18, 1992), p.
20.
2
Ibid.
3
See, for example, the major assumptions employed in this dissertation (Chapter I.)
4
Udofia. "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 255-6.
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Booker T. Washington and W.E.B. Du Bois, nor from the type of misunderstanding
which occurred between Martin Luther King, Jr., and Malcolm X, etc. 1
The article "Perverting the Afrocentric" was viewed as representing a
misunderstanding of African-Americans by some Nigerians or Africans. The
misunderstanding was found in the process employed in questioning the attitude of
African-Americans who tried to adapt African marital wedding traditions in the U.S.
This confirmed the extent to which differences in the cultural orbits shaped their
misunderstanding of each other. That an African-American even tried to go through
the rigorous routine of adapting a traditional pattern of African marital wedding after
centuries of cultural exorcise might have been a pointed representation of ancestral
maturity and solidarity with the homelands. This attitude was taking place in
America when the bulk of African marriages were largely Judeo-Christian based.
Another article entitled, "African-Americans: A Journey through the Niger
River," revealed some misunderstanding. Here the problem was with the semantic
of the name "Niger," which, according to the writer, bore closely to "Nigeria," and
somewhat to "Negro." The writer, whose viewpoint was published in a "Black
History Month," argued that it required African-Americans to make a journey back
'ibid. See, for example, the pattern of the ideological conflict of black America, as mirrored
by Harold Cruse, in his The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual , pp. 1 15-181,305-357,347-420.
2
This observation is arguable, and perhaps there are Nigerians/Africans who will differ with
interpretation given here. Nevertheless, as emphasized here, what constituted "Perverting
the Afrocentric," a feature news write-up by an African, revealed how some Africans tend to
use their cultural lenses in evaluating their ancestral kin, and, as often the case, this attitude
resulted in misunderstanding of some of the genuine efforts to link up with the relationships
homeland. Remarkably, while some African-Americans are trying to return to African
cultural base, most Africans are still struggling to get into the heights of Westernization;
others, of course, are entrapped in the adventure. For details, see earlier citation in The
Nigerian News Digest (July 1991), p. 17; and The Good Hope News, The African
Perspective (July 1991), pp. 1 and 17.
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to the "Niger River," in Southern Nigeria, to learn about that. 1 Since black
Americans have had contacts with Africa beyond the level of understanding
indicated by the writer of "A Journey through the River Niger," this emphasis did not
show an understanding. If the writer of this article felt he knew more about Africans
who came to America from the coastal region of the Niger Delta basins—and was
also himself more informed about them while in the U.S.—the central thrust of his
argument did not support that view. Indeed, he did nothing to enhance proper
understanding of his thesis based on clear exposition of the two sides of the
relationships with the "River Niger."
Equally significant, the content analyses found that there were some
favorable and unfavorable opinions toward African-Americans in the Nigerian
community media. Nearly all the articles on this issue were in The Good Hope
News column, and pointedly more favorable (Table 26.1).
The preceding meant that there were some variations in how each newspaper
or magazine targeted its audiences. The Good Hope News
—
with strong orientation
toward socio-cultural issues—also showed some favorable disposition toward
African-Americans.
As further analyses revealed, the overall media weigh level on favorable
news coverage of African-Americans did not differ any significantly over a-three
year period (Table 26.2). For example, The Good Hope News recorded 89 percent
of its favorable coverage against 1 1 percent unfavorable ; the Nigerian News Digest
'The Good Hope News: The African Perspective (February, 1991), p.10.
2
Udofia, "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp.
257-:
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recorded 89 percent level of favorable against 1 1 percent unfavorable : and African
Business New Source 50 percent favorable against 50 percent unfavorable . 1
Table 26.1
Most Favorable News About African-Americans
by Issues Over a Three Year Period, 1990-1992
Issues Favorable Unfavorable
Good Hope News History in the Making in the U.S.
(Election of L.D. Wilder as
Governor of Virginia and Mayor
Dinkins ofNew York)
1
Civil Rights Bill 1
Debby Turner (Miss America) 1
Curtis King A Man of Vision 1
Man of Courage Ervin Magic
Johnson
1
Black History Month 1
Court Building Dedicated To
African-American Judge George
Allen
1
Nigerian Digest The Legacy of Martin Luther
King
1
African Business
Source Magazine
Africans Have High IQ 1
Jerry Sonny Ugokwe an Opposite
of Martin Luther King 1
Magic Johnson AIDS Book
Controversy
1
Table 26.2
Most Favorable News About African Americans, by Percentage
Over a Three-Year Period, 1990-1992
Favorable Unfavorable
Good Hope News 89% L 11%
Nigerian Digest 89% 11%
African Business Source Magazine 50% 50%
Such news stories as "Court Building Dedicated to an African-American
Judge," "The Black History Month," and "Curtis King a Man of Vision," for
'Ibid., pp. 259-60.
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example, were some of the highlights of favorable coverage about accomplishments
of blacks reflected by the Nigerian media. The elections of L.D. Wilder, as the first
African-American Governor of Virginia and of David Dinkins as the Mayor of New
York—which we noted earlier—also corresponded with favorable disposition toward
American blacks. To The Good Hope News , this development meant great changes
for both blacks and whites in America. Particularly for blacks, it meant that,
Some color barriers were knocked down in the United States of
America during the recent November 7, 1989, election of L. Douglas
Wilder, an African-American Lawyer, and the Lt. Governor of the
State.
1
On the other hand, an editorial in The Good Hope News took a public stance
supportive of the passage of the "Civil Right Bill" against existing trend of
"intentional discrimination." The passage of the bill, it argued, was especially
helpful in removing some constraints against the "people of African descent."
Favorable coverage by the Nigerian News Digest was accorded to "Dr. Martin
Luther King" and to the "Legacy He Left Behind."
Almost a quarter of a century after an infamous assassin's bullet
snuffed the life out of him, the voice of this Black charismatic leader
and champion of the human rights movement still echoes throughout
America and around the world probing the conscience of man and
calling for social justices, equality for all, and the right of man to be
judged not by his color but by the contents of his character.
Other opinions about African-Americans were unfavorable. For example, the
news flash on "Magic Johnson's" Aids Book Controversy was considered
unfavorable . Although its accounts did not reflect a Nigerian or African point of
'The Good Hope News: The African Perspective (Jan/Feb, 1990), p.4.
2The Good Hope News: The African Perspective (Dallas, Texas, August, 1990), p.13.
3Ni gerian News Digest (Feb.7, 1992), p. 14.
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view, nevertheless, its contents raised some unfavorable ethical questions about the
character of the Basketball star. 1
Another article entitled "Africans Have High IQ's" was considered
unfavorable in relation to African-Americans. Published in African Business
Magazine
,
the writer wanted to use the auspices of a white immigration attorney to
refute an earlier view by "Charles Murray" that African-Americans had lower
I.Q.'s. By bringing in the viewpoint of this attorney, the anonymous reporter very
nearly accomplished a great public relations feat. However, the viewpoint of the
attorney probably succeeded most in splitting the Murray thesis without clarifying its
relevance to the relationship between Africans and African-Americans:
Blacks who came to America 300 years ago did not remain pure
and. . .Africans may be better off seeking to maintain racial purity.
The anonymous writer seemed not to have understood the socio-cultural tenet
implied by the statement of the white attorney. Regrettably, in attempting to
interpret his thoughts for public readership, he got things further mixed up.
Mr. Yakaboski's reference to American Blacks is not correctly
applicable to real Africans, to people who have not been diluted
through intermarriage, and who have not shown any dip in their
collective I.Q.
Yet the unfavorable categorization of the Murray thesis on African-American
I.Q. was not based on the imprecision of historical data alone. One can, of course,
argue that blacks were more than 300 years in America from January 15, 1990, when
'"The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," p. 259.
2
African Business Source Magazine (Houston, Texas, December 15-January 15, 1990), p.
13.
3
Ibid.
4
African Business Source Magazine (Houston, Texas, December 15-January 15, 1990), p.
13.
566
the article was published to the first date of their public identification under servitude
in colonial Americas or the British mainland North America. 1
Also, whether "African Americans" were completely "diluted through
intermarriage," or reflected a "dip in their collective I.Q.," was not a basis for
considering the article unfavorable. The real decision was due mostly to
unsubstantiated clarification of facts. For, of significance was the fact that, neither
the opinion of the white immigration attorney nor that of the anonymous writer was
clearly explained. Besides, the Murray-I.Q. article was considered unfavorable
because the so-called anonymous writer lacked a personal voice in reporting the
views of the white attorney. As a story reported by a second party, its central theme
should have been more thoughtfully researched before being printed. The
anonymous context suggested an element of controversy which the writer should
have checked.
Part 2: Content Analyses of Published Views by Nigerians/Africans and
African-Americans in Nigerian Community Newspapers in Major Southern
Cities in the United States, 1993-2000
Unlike Part 1 of the content analyses of African-Americans in the Nigerian
community media, which evaluated opinions from a Nigerian/African point of view,
Phase II—1993 to 2000—included those of African-Americans. Moreover, unlike
Phase I, which evolved varied media—two Nigerian-owned community newspapers
and one magazine published in the Southern U.S., Phase II involved two Nigerian-
owned community newspapers. The decision to use two Nigerian newspapers was
'Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census , p. 268. Also, see Chapter 2.
2
Ibid • "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 261-3.
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due to the fact they had a broad demographic reach on vital issues that affected
Nigerians/Africans across both the Southern U.S. as well as across the entire U.S.
Table 27 shows that a total of 213 articles were recorded on African-
Americans by the two Nigerian-owned community newspapers. On a yearly period,
The African Herald (TAH) recorded a total of 172 articles on African-Americans;
this represented about 66 percent (1996), and 100 percent (1997-2000), compared to
African News Weekly (ANW)—with 41 articles—representing about 19 percent.
Some variant in the coverage of African-Americans over the seven-year
period was revealed during the early 1990s, and this was mostly in ANW (Table 27).
About 100% of its articles on African-Americans were used between 1993 and 1995.
During the later part of 1990, the coverage on African-Americans was heavier in
TAH .
On average, however, between 1993 and 2000, TAH accounted for more than
81 percent of the total number of articles on African-Americans compared to only 19
percent in ANW . Significantly, between 1993 and 2000 (Table 28), news stories and
feature news were the most widely used medium in both ANW and TAH : the 12
articles on African-Americans accounted for 29 percent in ANW compared to 79 in
TAH, representing 46 percent. On the other hand, however, the editorial news kind
was the least used medium in the coverage of African-Americans: this accounted for
only 8 percent in the ANW and 4 percent in TAH. On the particular issue of racism,
ANW accounted for 29 percent compared to 33 percent in TAH.
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Table 27
Total Number of Articles on African-Americans
Covered by African News Weekly and The African Herald
,
1993-2000
African
News
Weekly
Percentage of
African news
weekly by year
African
Herald
Percentage of
African Herald
by year
Total
1993 7 100 7
1994
1995 15 100 15
1996 19 34 37 66 56
1997 55 100 55
1998 34 100 34
1999 33 100 33
2000 13 100 13
Total 41 19 172 81 213
Percentage
(total from
1993 - 2000)
19 81 100
Table 29.1 and Table 29.2 show the overall distribution of story kinds
relating to African-Americans in ANW and TAH. Table 29.1, for example, confirms
some patterns of the coverage of African-Americans found earlier in Table 28—in
the news stories, feature news, and racism—in 1995 and 1996. During the entire
period, news accounted for the most widely used form of distributing story [1996] on
African-Americans: its highest score recording 58 percent in 1996, with racism
having a share of 42 percent in 1993 and 1996. Feature news dominated in 1995
with 57 percent and 43 percent in 1996, followed by editorial news 67 percent in
1995 and 33 percent in 1996.
A similar pattern in Table 29.1 goes for Table 29.2: that is, news was the
major vehicle for distributing story kinds on African-Americans in TAH. Between
1996 and 2000, the 79 news items recorded on African-Americans were
found to be
consistent, especially in a year-by-year basis. Furthermore,
the news medium was
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widely in used in 1996, a fact corresponding with 51 percent; in 1998 it recorded 59
percent; and in 2000, it scored 70 percent. Racism, on the other hand, enjoyed some
shares under the major news story kinds: with 36 percent in 1997 compared to 46
percent in 1 999.
Table 28
Kinds of Stories on African-Americans [including Racism]
by Newspaper, by Number of Articles, by Percentage, 1993-2000
African News
Weekly
Percentage of African
News Weekly by kinds
of stories covered
The
African
Herald
Percentage of
African Herald by
kinds of stories
covered
News 12 29 79 46
Feature 14 34 30 17
Editorial
*Racism 12 29 57 33
Total 41 100 172 100
*Note: "Racism" is not a category of news. However, due to the strong orientation of
African-Americans and Nigerians/Africans on racial matters found in the study, this author
decided to place "race" under a separate category in order to enhance further explanation of
issues in the major categories.
Table 29.1
Distribution of Kinds of Stories by African News Weekly ,
by Percentage, 1993-1996
1993 1993
%
1994 1994
%
1995 1995
%
1996 1996
%
Total
News 2 17 3 25 7 58 12
Feature 8 57 6 43 14
Editorial 2 67 1 33 3
Racism 5 42 2 17 5 42 12
Total 7 17 15 37 19 46 41
Table 29.2 further confirms that the overall pattern of distributing news kinds
on African-Americans was more consistent in TAH than ANW (See Table 29.1).
Also, it lends support to the fact that the overall media weight concentration of issues
on African-Americans was stronger in TAH than in ANW. One explanation for this
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variant lies in the dense concentrations of Nigerians/Africans and African-Americans
in the cities where the two newspapers were stationed. The next bears closely to
how they targeted issues designed to capture the broad concerns of varied audiences.
Table 29.2
Distribution of Kinds of Stories by The African Herald
,
by Percentage, 1996-2000
1996
1996
% 1997
1997
% 1998
1998
% 1999
1999
% 2000
2000
% Total
%of
total
News 19 51 17 31 20 59 14 43 9 70 79 46
Feature 5 14 16 29 5 15 4 12 30 17
Editorial 2 33 2 4 2 15 6 4
Racism 11 30 20 36 9 26 15 46 2 15 57 33
Total 37 100 55 100 34 100 33 100 13 100 172 100
Table 30.1 and Table 30.2 show the major issue-categories employed in
examining African-Americans and Nigerians/Africans in ANW and TAH . Overall,
the data on Table 30.1 and Table 30.2 confirm earlier patterns found in Table 29.1
and Table 29.2. According to Table 30.1, the 23 articles recorded by ANW on
African-Americans from 1993 to 1996 were not evenly distributed across all the
major issue-categories.
Further analyses revealed almost no action by ANW during a greater part of
early 1990s. The exception was in 1993, when Racial Solidarity and Pan-Africanism
(RSP) had five articles, representing 100 percent. From 1995 to 1996, RSP received
22 percent; Civil Rights Race Politics (CRRP), received 22 percent; and Opinion
attitude About American Black (OAAAB) received some 56 percent. The general
average of the coverage of African-Americans by ANW was stronger in RSP with 39
percent in 1993 and OAAAB—31 percent.
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Table 30.1
Major Categories of Issues on African-Americans,
by African News Weekly, by Year, 1993-1996
1993
1993
% 1994
1994
% 1995
1995
% 1996
1996
% Total %
Race Relations
Racism (RRR)
Racial Solidarity Pan
Africanism (RSP) 5 100 2 22 2 22 9 39
Opinion Feature
Race
Solidarity Pan
Africanism
*(OFRSP)
2 22 2 22* 4 17
Special Events/Black
American
Personages
(SEBAP)
1 11 1 4
Civil Rights Race
Politics (CRRP) 2 22 2 9
Opinion/Attitude
About
American Blacks
(OAAAB)
5 56 2 22 7 31
Total 5 9 9 23
*The indication means that, although the category of coverage was on Race Solidarity/Pan-
Africanism (RSP), it was derived from what this author terms, opinion feature news. That is,
while the articles counted did not specify "feature news," yet they were based on
individuals' opinions. They could have been placed under the RSP issue-category, but might
not have favored general analyses of conceivable patterns of relationships based on the
strengths of some issue-positions. The feature news, as we explained in our definition of
terms (see appendix), relates more to personal viewpoints of the writer(s). This distinction is
important in that it establishes a basis for a more concise evaluation of opinion on racial
solidarity across the board.
Table 30.2 confirms the frequency of issue-positions covered by either
African-Americans or Nigerians/Africans. As shown, TAH had the highest score
compared to ANW (Table 30.1). Moreover, its overall distribution of media weight
was more consistent over the entire period across the major issue-categories.
As Table 30.2 further shows, with a total of 78 articles on the major issue-
categories compared to 23 in ANW (Table 30.1), RRR averaged zero point in ANW ,
while TAH yielded a total of 18 articles, averaging some 23 percent from 1996 to
2000. African-Americans received their strongest coverage under CRRP in TAH,
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totaling 21 articles, and averaging more than 26 percent, and representing the most
consistent focus on a particular issue from 1996 to 2000.
Table 30.2
Major Categories of Issues on African-Americans,
by The African Herald, by Year, 1996-2000
1996
1996
% 1997
1 997
% 1998 1998% 1999
1999
% 2000
2000
% Total
%of
total
Race Relations
Racism (RRR) 3 21 8 26 3 23 4 22 18 23
Racial Solidarity
Pan Africanism
(RSP)
2 14 3 10 1 8 3 17 9 12
Opinion Feature
Race Solidarity
Pan Africanism
(OFRSP)
1 7 1 3 3 23 5 6
Special
Events/Black
American
Personages
(SEBAP)
2 14 2 6 2 15 2 11 1 50 9 12
Civil Rights Race
Politics (CRRP) 4 29 7 23 3 23 6 33 1 50 21 27
Opinion Attitude
About American
Blacks (OAAAB)
2 13 10 32 1 71 3 17 16 21
Total 14 31 13 18 2 78
Table 31.1 highlights the breakdown of issues covered under RRR, showing
some strong sensitivity to white-black relations as well as to the attitude of American
justice system toward African-Americans. This is supportive of the assumption in
this dissertation that commonalities in historical experience would serve as a likely
basis for understanding and of partnership between the descendants of forced
migration and voluntary Nigerian migration in America.
1
Other evidences of ancestral collaborations between African-Americans and
Nigerians/Africans were found in the content analyses of the Nigerian community
'See Chapter I for the major assumptions of this dissertation.
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newspaper (Table 31.2 and Table 31.3). 1 This embraced collaborative economic
development and political support, and an understanding of the role played by some
key black institutions in America. For example, in an article entitled "The Black
Church," it was clear that Nigerians/Africans were aware that the church "has made
the greatest impact on the Black community."2 With origin in the caste history of
American slavery, Dr. Leonard Madu, the writer argues that the Black Church
fulfilled the spiritual needs of its adherents. Since freedom, the Black Church has
served as a reservoir of struggle and survival. The Black Church remains the one
institution that continues to mold the direction of African-Americans. 3
The history-making appointment of an African-American in the state of
Pennsylvania, where
—
prior to the time, African-Americans had never occupied such
a status—received attention. "For the first time in its 100-year history, the
Pennsylvania Colleges and Universities (PACU) has elected an African-American
chair of the state-wide organization."
4
Similarly, with obvious pride, the Nigerian/African writer stated: "The lucky
winner is Lincoln University President Niara Sudarkasa, author of more than 60
published pieces on women, immigration, African American families, [and]
diversity."
5 John Hope Franklin was the other African-American to receive such a
'For example, there was a strong correlation on ancestral relationships during both the first
phase and second phase of the media coverage of African-Americans by Nigerians
(Africans) and African-Americans who wrote in Nigerian community media from 1990 to
2000.
2Leonard Madu, "The Black Church: A Core Institution in the black Community, The
African Herald (Dallas Texas, February 19-25, 1996), p. 18.
""Lincoln Prez Chair of PACU," African News Weekly , (November 11-17, 1996), p. 2.
5
Ibid.
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high degree of praise as a non-ostentatious and successful African-American scholar:
"what an illustrious life of 80 useful years of worthy emulation." 1
Table 31.1
Breakdown of Issues Covered Under RRR
by the Two Nigerian-African Newspapers, 1993-2000
Period Issues The African
Herald
African News
Weekly
8/96 NIMH wastes millions on Psychiatric Racism
NAACP says Racial Problems of 1960s endure 1
10/96 Black Employees sue Bell Atlantic 1
6/97 Grocery Chain settles Discrimination case for $4.3
million
1
Judge rules Beauty Shop Discrimination Suit can be
Class Action
1
Lone Black student graduates from Gonzaga Law
j
Black Businessmen sue over Municipal purchasing
and contracting
1
7/97 Alabama executes Ex-Klansman for lynching of
black teenager
j
Egyptian sues U.S. Govt, over his race classification
Lawsuit: Police Using Excessive Force Against
Ethnic Minorities
Former Principal murdered in Nigerian Seminary
12/98 Police Chief suspended, demoted
Slave's descendants feel vindicated
Attorney accuses judge of being racist
1/99 Pizza Hut settles Hate Crime Lawsuit
Denver Toughens its Affirmative Action Law
2/99 UNT guilty of Bias against Black Professor
3/99 A Lesson from Jasper, Texas
The article "Summit Brings Trade Pact, Goodwill" shows the extent of racial
solidarity in a meeting of "African-Nations-Southern States Accord, September 20-
23," hosted by former Virginia Governor L. Douglas Wilder. "Wilder urged
cooperation between American and African parties... not only is Africa relatively
'A. B. Assensoh, In Retrospect: Professor John Hope Franklin, What a Life!," African News
Weekly (Charlotte, North Carolina, May 12, 1995), pp. 16- 17.
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untapped... but also African sectors could benefit from the experience of the
American South." 1 Further content analyses revealed a consciousness over the
continuing trauma of the trans-Atlantic slave trade era. "Wilder the first elected
African-American governor in the United States and the grandson of slaves, has led
two trade missions to Africa and has announced plans to construct a museum in his
state to acknowledge the beginning of the American slave trade in Jamestown,
Virginia" (Table 31. 3).
2
The content analyses revealed how the opinion molders in the Nigerian
community media perceived the identity crisis that affected their ancestral kin. This
was found in the news flash on Tiger Woods, the African-American golfer. The
news flash depicted Mr. Woods as "the first African American" to accomplish such a
feat, pointing out that his achievement "came as a great relieve to many Black
people... stereotyped as having no acumen to play golf."
3 The news flash then raises
the concern as to whether Mr. Woods was black or not. "Even though Tiger Woods
looks black to the naked eye, he says he is not Black. He says he is one-quarter
Black, one-quarter Thai, one-quarter Chinese, one eight American Indian and one-
eight White."
4
If, as the news flash mimics, the law enforcement officials were to
look for him, they would be looking more for those mixed ancestries rather than his
black skin (Table 31. 5).
5
'
African News Weekly , (October 6-8, 1993), p. 3.
2
Ibid.
3
"Who Am I?" African News Weekly (Charlotte, North Carolina, June 2, 1995), p. 2.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid .
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On the other hand, however, in "A Rich African Culture" 1 (Table 31.3), the
fascinating highlight of the relationships between Southern University Law School,
Baton Rogue, Louisiana, and the Faculty of Law University of Lagos, in Nigeria,
revealed an ongoing dialogue between American blacks and Nigerians/Africans.
The result of the content analyses revealed that two successful African-American
professionals were crowned with honorary chieftaincy titles "by His Royal Highness
Oba Adetju Adeyey II, Ado Oko of Ida Oko Ijesha in Ogun State of Nigeria."2 The
recipients were Dr. Gloria J. Braxton, Director of International Programs at Southern
University, and Co-Director of the USIA-Sponsored Democracy in Africa-Project,
and Judge Freddie Pitcher, Jr., of Louisiana Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
In "Center Honors African/African-American Children," it was revealed that
"several African and African-American school children were honored by members
of the city's center for African/African American Arts & Culture" in San-Francisco,
California.
4 The program, which involved indigenous Africans and African-
Americans in the U.S., inspired Chief Akande to observe "that Africa will rise
again," especially "with your contributions" (Table 31.4).
3
Articles like "Jumping
the Broom,"
6
"Reconnection to the Motherland,"
7
and "Reflection on a Visit to
'Yvette Alex-Assensoh and A, B. Assensoh, "A Rich African Culture," African News
Weekly
,
(Charlotte, NC, June 2, 1995), p. 6.
3
Ibid '
4
"Center Honors African/African-American Children," African News Weekly, (July
15-21,
1996), p. 18.
6
Hariette Cole, "Jumping the Broom," African News Weekly, (Charlotte, NC,
August 6,
'"Rejection to the Motherland," African News Weekly, (Charlotte, NC, July 16, 1993),
p. 18.
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Ghana," 1 written mostly by African-Americans or in collaboration with
Nigerians/Africans, revealed an ongoing interactions with African cultures and
continuing contacts with the ancestral homelands (Table 31.3 and Table 31.4).
These articles demonstrated the extent to which both African-Americans and
Nigerians shared as well as believed in incorporating available pieces of their
ancestral heritage in remolding themselves while still in the diaspora.
But, interestingly enough, other articles like "Summit Brings Trade Pact,
Goodwill," "Nigerians support Randall Robinson," and "Farrakhan's world Tour:
The Issue of Nigeria," confirmed the existence of cooperative relationships between
Nigerians/Africans and African-Americans. The TransAfrica democratic foray into
Nigeria, along with the visits by Rev. Jessie Jackson to bring about constructive
changes, also received some attention in the Nigerian newspapers. 2
Madu's article argues that Farrakhan's understanding of Africa's problem
explains his ready welcome in the continent than in the U.S. 3 For, accordingly,
while in Nigeria, Farrakhan observed that
...it was time.... to understand African Americans have as much right to
Africa as indigenes, bearing in mind that they have been forcibly sold into
slavery. Moreover, he employed African leaders to get together and decide
which area of land should be made available to African Americans for
settlement so that their children should start returning to Africa to help
develop it. In addition, Farrakhan emphasized a need for economic, cultural,
educational and scientific cooperation between the two peoples.
4
'Ibid.
2
A1 -Zeta Khan, "TransAfrica vs. Abacha," African News Weekly (Charlotte, NC, May 12
1995), pp. Land 29; African News Weekly (Charlotte, NC, February 19-25, 1996), p. 24;
Leonard Madu, "Farrakhan's World Tour: The Issue of Nigeria," The African Herald
(Dallas, Texas, May 1996), p.23.
3
Ibid.
4The African Herald (Dallas, Texas, May 1996), p. 23; "Louis Farrakhan on African Tour,"
African News Weekly (Charlotte, NC, January 29-February 4, 1996), p. 1
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Table 31.2
Breakdown of Issues Covered Under CRRP by Two
Nigerian-African Newspapers, 1993-2000
Period Issues African Herald African News
Weekly
1/96 NAACP to honor Harvey Gantt
1
5/96 California initiative to bar Racial
Preferences qualifies
7/96 First African-American Female Deputy
Chief
Congresswoman Eddie Bernice
Johnson reacts to SC decision
1
Hope High for Mfume leadership at
NAACP
1
11/96 Lincoln Prez Chair of PACU
1
1/97 Nyon Carathers named Director of
Outreach and Health Education
1
7/97 Senator Ellis Praises Lt. Gov. Bob
Bullock for service to Texas
1
7/97 Administrator at Jail sues County for
Discrimination
1
7/97 Bernstine named as new PSU President
some Faculty says
1
Jackson elects first Black Mayor
Bar Disciplines Scheck, Douglas, not
Cochran
!
Florida's 'Little Haiti' honored for
restoring houses
,
5/98 Western Michigan University names
first Black President
1
12/98 Senator Royce West expresses concern
over states report
1
MU receives $2.4 M Grant to train
Minority Professors
1
1/99 Rep. Thompson to introduce legislation
on Independent Counsels
1
2/99 Calendar of the month
Dallas Urban League and UTD
President to salute Youth
i
Texas Publishers Association holds
seminar in Austin
3/99 Dallas Mayor Ron Kirk kicks off Re-
election campaign
Plans afoot for first N.C. Minority-
owned bank in over 20 years
2/00 Woman ordered to repay $534,159 for
stolen chips
1
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Table 31.3
Breakdown of Issues Covered Under RSP by the
Two Nigerian-African Newspapers, 1993-2000
Period Issues African Herald African News
Weekly
7/93 Pamusa Plans National Conference
Reconnection with the Motherland
j
Jesse Jackson on weekend visit 1
8/93 Jumping the Broom
J10/93 Summit brings Trade Pact, Goodwill
6/95 A Rich African Cultural Excursion
|Most Nigerians support Randall Robinson
1-2/96 Symposium on Entrepreneurship in
Chicago
1
5/96 Lawyer sentenced for Bank Robbery 1
Tyson Needs to Stay out of Trouble 1
8/96 Michael Jackson composes song for
Mandela
j
6/97 Apology
6/97 Nation's Largest Black History Museum
Opens in Detroit
7/97 African Community honors retiring
Human Rights Commissioner
12/98 Jackson ends Africa Trip Heaping Praise
on Ghana
2/99 Ethiopian Trade Consul visits Dallas
African Americans monitor Gabon
election
3/99 Book Review - Book: Here and Now
(Author -K.L. Roby)
1
Further Content Analyses of Nigerian-African Newspapers:
Understanding and Misunderstanding between Nigerians
and African-Americans, 1993-2000
Since the overall pattern of intra-Pan-African misunderstanding mirrored in the
two Southern newspapers associated more with cultural differences, this background
was further content analyzed for clarification.
1 Based on the data, the result
confirmed that the racial background of the black African migrants, especially of
Nigerians, had some correlation with their socio-cultural crises. While using human
'For example, see the earlier concussions in Chapters 4-6 for an elaboration
of the emphas.
in this chapter.
580
perception to gauge social direction can at times be problematic (See related Tables),
still some negative depiction of Nigerians and African-Americans derived almost
from a similar historical crisis. Also, their understanding and misunderstanding of
each other derived from shared socio-cultural commonalities and differences. 1
The above emphasis lies more in understanding how the inherent differences as
well as the shared experiences between African-Americans and Nigerian immigrants
under alien cultures have influenced how each party views the other. This attitude
found expression in the response by Melvin Foote, an African-American writer, who
published in the Nigerian community newspaper ((Table 3 1 .4). In an article entitled,
"Why Africa Matters: The Case for Continued U.S. Assistance to Africa," Mr. Foote
took a position against the attitude of Senator Mitch McConnel (R-NC) and Senator
Jesse Helms (R-NC) for proposing cuts in foreign aid packages to Africa. As Mr.
Foote argued, the cuts were designed to favor countries in the former Soviet Union
and the Camp David Countries (Israel and Egypt) while ignoring those in Africa
south of the Sahara. "Both Helms and McConnell are on record opposing existing
levels of foreign aid for Africa. Both have promised to scale back bilateral aid to
Africa considerably, perhaps as much as 20%."2 Foote further argued that, "Scaling
back American aid to Africa sends the wrong sign to African governments and
economies struggling to recover from the effects of colonialism and the Cold War."
'For example, see our explanations in A. B. Assensoh, "CNN: An Unfair Report on
Nigerians," African News Weekly , (February 19-25, 1996), p. 16; Ben Edokpayi, African
News Weekly (Charlotte, North Carolina, July 29- August 14, 1996), p. 1.
2Melvin Foote, "Why Africa Matters: The Case for Continued U.S. Assistance to Africa,"
African News Weekly (Charlotte, NC, May 12 1995), p. 6.
3
Ibid., p. 22.
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Table 31.4
Breakdown of Issues Covered Under OFRSP by the Two Nigerian-African
Newspapers, 1993-2000
Period Issues African Herald African News
Weekly
j/yj Why Africa Matters: The Case for
Continued U.S. Assistance to Africa
1
A/OS0/7J /\iricdn /\inericdri neniage Awaros i1
1/96 Reflections on a Visit to Ghana 1
//VO Center Honors African/African-
American Children
1
o/yo Immigration Issue as relates to Anti-
terrorism Law
7/Q7 tfc A Tt*t ^on r\v ** A tt i /* fin — A mpn nan qc q/All ICall t'l \ 1 1 1 L ill 1 \ i IK 1 IC til 1 do a
mere tag is not Enough
5/98 Toward Another Breed of Black
Americans
7/98 Afrocentricity Thrives Despite Vicious
Attacks Detractors
12/98 The Persistence of Economic
Inequality in Age of Globalization
In another response directed at a legislation viewed to be unfair toward
Africans, attorney Ollie Jefferson, African-American female lawyer in Dallas, Texas,
showed some understanding of Africans' status. She argued that the anti-terrorism
law, signed by President Clinton in 1994, to combat domestic and international
terrorism, was unfavorable to African immigrants, especially to those entering the
country as refugees.
1
This "hurried legislative effort" according to attorney
Jefferson, was mostly unfavorable to refugees from Africa "than any other part of the
world."
2
Jefferson further argued that, where the U.S. "already accepts a
disproportionately low number of African refugees," the anti-terrorism legislative
law would further impinge on African immigration into the U.S. than any other
region of the world (Table 3 1 .4).
3
'Ollie Jefferson, "Immigration Issue as relates to anti-terrorism,"
The African
(Dallas, Texas, March, 1996), p. 26.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
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Table 31.5
Breakdown of Issues Covered Under OAAAB,
by the Two Nigerian-African Newspapers, 1993-2000
Period Issues African Herald African News
Weekly
5/95 Fight of the Century: Mandela vs. Tyson 1
6/95 Who Am I? 1
Serving Two Masters 1
Winning in Africa Makes it Special for
New Miss Universe
1
10/95 Colin Powell: Nigerians are Scammers 1
5/96 Texas Publishers Association 10 lh
Annual Convention in Austin
j
7/96 African-American Leaders head to
Austin
j
9/96 Senator Sees Abacha 1
Fredericks challenged by Johnson; Big
Purse at Stake
1
6/97 Nation's 100 Biggest Black-owned
Companies
1
6/97 Golfs New Math: How many can Tiger
Win?
Senate Approves Proposal to Create
Juvenile Crime Center
1
State Rep. Coleman helps TSU to
Remain Independent
'
States with Fastest Growth of Black
Buying Power listed
1
Historic Black School Appears on Verge
of Shutdown
1
7/97 Students "Reap" the Summer with
Science and Technology
1
Haiti Seeks Loans for Electric Power,
Agriculture
1
Former Barbadian Cabinet Minister
Charged Destroying Property
1
Immigration Sends Illegal Immigrants to
Bahamas, Cuba
12/98 Mosley-Braun loses tough Re-election
Test
2/99 Southwestern Bell Offers Hope to South
Dallas Students
3/99 The Making of Legendary Deal maker
North Texas Residents Urged to Open
Their Eyes to the Risk of Diabetes.
Furthermore, the content analyses revealed that Nigerians/Africans
were
of the emerging changes in their American identities in the diaspora.
They
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were also increasingly becoming aware of the implications of such changes in their
particular relationships with the descendants of slaves. For example, such an article
and public speech as "Toward Another Breed of Black Americans" 1 and "Dr. Ali
Mazrui Speaks at UTA African Series," revealed how the opinion molders in the
Nigerian community newspapers sought to cast the changing phases of their
relationships between America and the homelands as well as with their ancestral kin.
Moreover, the viewpoint expressed by Nigerian/African writers revealed that
the relationship between the forced migration and largely voluntary postcolonial
Nigerian/African migration to the U.S. was rooted in both the commonalities and
differences of the black experience. The migration of Africans under compulsion
and bondage, according to Nwaozulu, were "mercilessly labored, brutalized,
dehumanized and tortured beyond human endurance."
3
As Nwaozulu further argues,
Today the descendants of those Africans think American and behave
American both in lifestyles and character and hence they are called
Black Americans...
4 A person's total mentality and attitude is largely
dictated or conditioned by environment or circumstances of his
upbringing. For some obvious reasons, it will be extremely difficult
if
not impossible for children brought up in American society
to
recognize another home outside the American society.
How about the language crisis of the Nigerian/African offspring?
Most if not all children of African born beyond their
continent do not
speak their African language, and language is the
vehicle for cultural
'Fidelis Nwaozulu, "Toward Another Breed of Black
Americans," TJ1e_AfiMcmJleiald
^IZ^^M^ Speaks at UTA African Series,"T^«
March 1999, pp. 1,-8. .
3Nwaozulu, "Toward Another Breed of Black Americans,
p.25.
4
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transmission, how can those children understand the customs,
traditions, morals and values of their true origin. 1
So, what is the solution?
This writer is of the opinion that children of native Africans residing
abroad should be sent home early in life so that they can grow up at
home, identify with their age mates, understand where they belong,
and know what belongs to their family and what does not; instead of
losing touch with their roots.2
To Professor Mazrui, however, the problem that Nwaozulu painted above so
vividly requires grasping the implications of the emergent inter/intra-Afro-atlantic
convergence of Africans side by side with the descendants of forced migration in
America. In a speech at "UTA African Series," Dr. Mazrui placed the emerging
African-build-up in America as representing the making of a new Afro-atlantic
paradigm. He called for an understanding of the relationship between the old and
new histories, which, as he further observed, were now to be explained in America
within the context of the relations between the Diaspora of enslavement and the
Diaspora of colonialism .
3
Marui also argued that the human endeavors of Africans had shaped the early
American frontiers as well as the evolution of American capitalism.
4 While Euro-
Americans, Mazrui continued, "like to think of themselves as heirs to Greece and
Rome," as well as to the sole spirit of taming the frontier, they often forget that
"what was uniquely American was also the Black presence along the Frontier."
5
'Ibid.
2
Ibid.
3Nwachukwu, "Dr. Ali Mazrui Speaks UTA African Series," pp 1 and 8.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid.
It was this Black presence, "Which nurtured American capitalism in its
maturation." 1
In its infancy, American capitalism needed Black labor. This is the
link between America and the imperative of labour. In its maturation
in the Twentieth century, American democracy needed the civil rights
movement and deracialization to realize its original concept that "all
men are created equal." It was Black who helped American
democracy account to its ultimate ideal. The echoes of ... the Afro-
Atlantic paradigm
... fed into the feminist movement... The African
presence in America has also deeply influenced music, literature,
food, culture, sports and the performing arts. 2
What then does the new Afro-atlantic paradigm mean to the descendants of
slaves against the recurrent build-up of Africans in America since the 1970s? As
Mazrui argued, the relationship between black America and Africa has entered into a
new phase. Despite some distinctive Western Hemispheric differences, these
complicated relationship survived, resulting now in the build-up side by side of the
African diaspora of colonialism with the black diaspora of enslavement.
The distinction between the Diaspora of slavery and Diaspora of
colonialism gets more complicated... The great majority of African
Americans are a product of the Diaspora of Enslavement . . . American
Africans (or Americo-Africans) on the other hand are product of the
Diaspora of colonialism. They are usually first or second generation
immigrants from Africa to the Americas. They may be citizens or
permanent residents of Western Hemisphere countries.
3
So, as Nwaozulu observed, Mazrui agreed: the real difference between the
diaspora of colonialism and diaspora of enslavement lies in the existence of more
definitive lane of cultural exchange with the homelands. According to Mazrui, in
reference to the diaspora of enslavement, their major cultural links as well as
'Ibid.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
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language lanes toward the ancestral homelands are American. But in the case of
"American Africans," contacts with the homeland as well as language lanes are still
more secure: "when American Africans become African Americans, it does not
mean other ties with Africa are cut. Relatives in Africa still abound. Concern for
Africa is often still intact."
1
Mazrui concluded that with the ultimate incorporation of the diaspora of
colonialism through the offspring "into an African American family," begins a
natural erosion of language ancestry where sustained acculturation does not exist
with the African homeland. 2 Because language holds the umbilical chord together,
the blurring of vital lanes of sustained cultural contacts with the homelands would
likely influence adoption of an American identity by the Nigerian/African offspring.
Others, however, would increasingly become African-Americans. 3
The umbilical chord is language. The children of Professor Nkiru
Nzegwu of Binghamton University are still American Africans
(hemispherically) because the children still speak fluent Igbo. On the
other hand, my children still speak African American-their linguistic
umbilical chord has been cut.4
The extent then to which differences in historical cycles affected the
descendants of forced migration and largely voluntary Nigerian/African migration
has some bearing with their often tenuous relationships in America. For example, an
'Ibid.
2
This is fully supportive of our conclusion in Chapter 5: that is, the longer the stay in the
diaspora by Nigerian immigrants, the greater the chances that their offspring would become
more Americanized than acculturated toward the homeland cultures of their core parents.
The lures of this Americanization by Nigerian offspring was found to be more favorable in
their relationship with African-Americans, and alternately with the American mainstream
than their migrant-parents.
3Nwachukwu, "Dr. Ali Mazrui Speaks UTA African Series," pp 1 and 8.
4
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article entitled "My Name is Cornelius Emeka Nnadi—an African Living in a Black
Community Gary, Indiana," supported the extent to which difference in historical
experience influenced the rift between Nigerians and African-Americans. 1 Mr.
Nnandi's article was influenced by a court decision involving many political interest
groups within the Black community, in which he was on the losing side. As he,
himself, wrote in The African Herald :
I moved to Gary Indiana in 1974, and worked for the city of Gary
under the first black mayor Richard Gordon Hatcher... Then I worked
under William A. Douglas during the Mayor Barnes Administration.
I was caught in the political battles of two boards fighting to take
control of the airport board. 2
Undoubtedly, Mr. Nnandi, who lost by a court decision had also to suffer its
corresponding socioeconomic and politico-cultural consequences. This is because
the court decision had greater chances of affecting his economic status within the
poverty-ridden Gary-Indiana black politics. "When I sued them to get my job back,
the two boards united politically, and in court, the court gave them a political
division, and they won; the first case that the city won in decades."
3
With the preceding backdrop, a series of instigated failure at the Gary
Housing Project followed, which amounted to what Mr. Nnandi termed "My
Ordeal." As he further reported: "Ten unit apartments, in which I have spent over
$250,000 to renovate.... did not....work anymore." Nnadi concluded that an
'"My Name is Cornelius Emeka Nnadi—an African Living in a Black Community Gary,
Indiana: My Ordeal," The African Herald (Dallas, Texas, May 1999), p. 23.
2
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"African [Nigerian] who wanted to live in a black community [was] practically run
out of the neighborhood." 1
More than three quarters (3/4) of a million dollars of investments in
real estate has been lost.... I cannot even feed my family.... This is
regrettable to those Americans who work hard to fulfill the American
dream... a shame to all those who call themselves an African
American, but an African is not allowed to live in their community.2
The preceding development received further impulse in another article
entitled "African or African African-American as a mere tag is not enough" (Table
3 1 .4).
3
Although this article has some dissimilar emphasis with the one noted above,
nevertheless, it was also rooted in the conflict of cultural misunderstanding. The
writer of this particular article, Dominick Iyorlu, cautioned some African-Americans
to resist the temptation of misunderstanding their ancestral homelands. This position
was in response to the conflicting image of Africa, which, as Mr. Iyorlu recalled to
his readers: "very few us were prepared for the obscene anti-African diatribe that
appeared in the shape of a very strange book "out of Africa, written by one African
American Journalists, Keith B Richburg. 4 In responding to Keith Richburg, Iyorlu
argued that publishing a book that failed to show an understanding of the internal
crises of Africa was wrong. His position was similar to the position taken by
William Finnergan in The New York Times Book Review against Mr. Richburg.
5
"Ibid.
2
Ibid., p. 24
3Dominick Iyorlu, "African or African African-American as a mare tag is not enough," The
African Herald (Dallas, Texas, July 1997), p. 28.
4
Keith B. Richburg, Out of Africa: A Black Man Confronts Africa (New York: Basic Books,
1997), pp. xi-39.
5William Finnergan, "Black Like Me: An American journalist is posted to Africa and
struggles with what he finds there," The New York Times Book Review (March 30, 1997),
p. 30 [9].
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Mr. Richburg's problem, as Iyorlu argued, amounted to the continuing
of the Mis-education of the Negro :
Thus uncritically imbibed for so long the terrible images of Africa fed
them by the Western media, so many African Americans disdain
anything African. Some of us are already familiar with the anti-black
people reactionary activities of such notorious African Americans like
Walter Williams, Thomas Sowell, Allan Keyes, and Ward Connerly. 1
According to Iyorlu, Journalist Richburg's publication, along with the
misunderstanding associated with his statements,
Confirms a long-held thought among serious-minded scholars around
the globe that the extent to which aggressive oppression damages the
psyche of certain individuals, has, for a long time, been
underestimated and that serious study of this psychic problem might
reveal a disease which, in a physical sense, might be as deadly as
cancer or AIDS. 2
Another published indifference in the content analyses was found in response
to a statement made by General Colin Powell (Table 3 1 .5). General Powell's public
statement via the ANW (October, 1995), was quoted as saying: "Nigerians as a
group, frankly, are marvelous scammers. I mean, it is their national culture."3
Responding to this public indictment of the Nigerian national image, representatives
of the Nigerian immigrant communities argued that taking a public position, which
generalized and insulted the image of most law-abiding and honest Nigerians,
amounted to an "irresponsible tirade of a man who has abandoned his African
heritage."
4
'iyorlu, "African or African African-American as a mare tag is not enough," p. 28.
2
Ibid.
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"Colin Powell: Nigerians Are Scammers," African News Weekly (Charlotte, NC, October
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On the other hand, however, other Nigerians who responded to General
Powell's comments observed that: "There is a particular irony in this statement as it
comes from an African-American figure head." 1 Unsurprisingly, this background
picked up in an article entitled, "CNN: An Unfair Report on Nigerians," which
pointed to the negligent attitudes by American laws as well as the U.S. news
agencies in dealing with Nigerians. Dr. Assensoh, the writer of this article, raised
the query: "how can one stay completely out of trouble if one is made to be guilty by
merely belonging to a particular racial or ethnic group, or even because of one's
nationality: the guilt by association notion?"2
Other unfair public misrepresentation of the African background by agents of
American institutions found during the Olympics corresponded with the ongoing
socio-cultural crises confronting African-Americans and Nigerians. Responding to
the perceived negative attitudes ofNBC on African Olympians, one observer noted:
"If you are searching for detailed stories about African athletes at the Atlantic
Olympics, the wrong place to look would be NBC's daily coverage of the event."
3
Most Africans did not perceive the NBC channel as an appropriate medium
to watch for positive reports on the achievements of athletes from their continent,
if you are interested in details such as scores of Nigeria's two
goals in the Group D victory against Japan, or the punching power
displayed by Nigerian Light weight David Attah in his defeat of an
opponent from Papua New Guinea or, better still, the reaction of 21
year old swimmer Penny Heyns after she won South Africa's first
Olympic medal in 44 years.
4
'ibid.
2Assensoh, "CNN: An Unfair Report on Nigerians," p. 16; Edokpayi, African News Weekly,
p.l
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The scope of the preceding crises was further compounded by how the
opinion molders in the Nigerian/African immigrant community responded in 1995 to
an editorial entitled, "O.J. Puts America on Trial." 1 What was most revealing in this
editorial was that the published viewpoint did not suggest that the O.J. Simpson's
decision reflected his innocence. "This editorial will not engage in a futile attempt to
refute or confirm the guilt or innocence O.J. Simpson."2
The fact surrounding the O.J Simpson case lies in its historical context.
Consequently, the editorial was an open invitation to America to re-examine the
cancerous effects of white-black crisis, where the truth was to be found. "Long
before the trial, about 70% of Blacks believed O.J. was innocent while 70% of
Whites believed he killed Nicole Brown and Ronald Goldman."3 In other word, the
racial divide separating a majority of whites and blacks, "remained unchanged after
the jury had delivered its verdict."4
No wonder the editorial saw the O.J. case as representing the "Mother of all
trials," as well as "the undertow of racial prejudice that threatens to drown all of us if
not dealt with."
5
It moved backward to examine earlier antecedents in the trial cases
of African-Americans within American justice system. Racial indifference toward
African-Americans also explains why some judges were sometimes compelled to
break the rules "to the dismay of experienced lawyers and legal analyst."
6
'"O.J. Puts America on Trial." African News Weekly (Charlotte, NC, October 13, 1995), pp.
1 and 7.
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Theoretically, American law presumes a man innocent until proven
guilty. It demands proof beyond a reasonable doubt before taking a
man and stringing him by the neck. That is, if he is not a Black man
we go by precedent. Truly, as revealed from the O.J. trial, attitudes
have not changed since the days when it did not take much to hang
any Blackman. In fact, 14-year old Emmert Till was brutally
murdered in Mississippi in 1955 for allegedly whistling at a white
woman. He was found with one eye missing the other eye dangling
from its socket, nose bashed in, one ear missing and a bullet through
his head.
1
Yet, all white jury acquitted the culprit, J. W. Milam and Roy Bryant for their
brutal murder of Emmet Till. The same jurors later confessed that every single
member of the panel believed without a shadow of doubt that the men were guilty.
Pointing to the "Talk of rage at justice" in the O.J. case, the editorial observed that
answers were to be sought within the unequal distribution of white-black criminal
justice system in America. Seeking to address newer attitudes without understanding
the past, it pointed out, was premature.
Where was America when Myrlie Evers had to wait 30 years to get
justice for the June 1963 murder of her husband an NAACP activist
Medgar Evers? Twice, all-white juries failed to convict Byron de
Beck with, a white supremacist who even bragged to an acquaintance
about the killing. Beck, which later had the audacity to run for
lieutenant governor of Mississippi using the unofficial campaign
slogan "Elect Byron de Beckwith- He's a straight shooter.
3
And the editorial pointed to the Rodney King crisis. As it further noted, "the
Rodney King beating as recently as 1991 by Los Angeles police which fate
mercifully had recorded on video," and which was made of an all-white jury, found
the culprits innocent: "the evil that the community condones always comes
back to
haunt it... Prejudice, whether Black or White, hurts both the perpetrators
and the
'Ibid.
2
Ibid.
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victims. All America must recognize this snake and kill it before it swallows us
all."
1
Consequently, in associating the O.J. trial to the agonizing climate of blacks
under law, one writer argued that African-Americans were unfairly treated by the
judicial system. "Driving While Black" (DWB) was depicted as a coded dictum that
explained how "many African-American men are singled out by police for stops and
searches."
2 As this writer observed, "blacks are stopped more frequently than
Whites."
3
Even such well known African-American as Christopher Darden, one of the
prosecutors in the O.J. Simpson trial, admitted in his book, entitled The Contempt
that, the "police stops him about 5 times a year, although he rarely gets tickets"
because of being "suspicious of a black man driving a Mercedes."
4
This background
might explain why, according to one police report, about one-third of black males
between the ages of 20 and 29 are either in prison or under supervision, or are under
frequent police targets.
5
Based on our findings, Dr. Madu identified strong disparities in the racial
make up of blacks in American prisons, arguing that, "America's prison... is enough
evidence... that the law is not being fairly applied." Moreover, according to
Dr.
Madu, "The overwhelming allegations of police high handedness and judicial
burgling tend to support solid charges of institutional racism
and systematic
'Leonard Madu, "The Judicial System is Unfair Toward African-Americans,"
The African
Herald (Dallas, Texas, July 1996), p. 22.
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discrimination against African Americans." 1 The effects of this development were
obvious in the ambivalent attitude of African-Americans toward the system. As Dr.
Madu concluded,
There are very few African Americans who have faith in the U.S.
judicial system. To the average African-American, fairness in the
judicial system means for white people only. For all intents and
purposes, the U.S. judicial system has failed African Americans. The
confidence level among blacks is at its lowest since the emancipation
proclamation and the Rodney King police brutality case and the O.J.
Simpson double murder trial have obviously worsened matters. 2
The published viewpoint of Dr. Madu found further support in a 2004 report,
which stated that, nearly 1 million African-American men were in jail, with more
than 2 million under the criminal justice system. That about 625,000 African-
Americans were in college during a similar period might mean that more able young
black men were in jail for crimes sometimes dominated by whites.
4
Therefore, beyond the earlier emphases raised by Dr. Madu, 5 there is even the
evidence that the percentage of black women in American prisons rose by about 800
percent since 1986, compared to "a 400 percent increase in the number of all women
in American prisons."6 Hence the crisis of African-Americans in the criminal justice
system is an issue that cuts across all aspects of their current socioeconomic and
cultural features. For example, during the 1990s, when one in every seven
Americans lived in poverty, African-American figure was almost one in three.
'Ibid
2
Ibid
3
Jesse L. Jackson, "Restitution, Reinvestment," in America Behind the Color Line, p. 354.
4lbid
- is- A »TK
5See earlier note, Madu, "The Judicial System is Unfair Toward African-Americans, J_he
African Herald , p. 22.
6Dr R Lawton Higgs, Sr., "Word of God," in America Behind the Color Line, p. 185.
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While some 1 3 percent of white children lived below well-known poverty line, black
was 46 percent. Poverty and unemployment, coupled with alienation and despair,
"were major factors in an internal hemorrhaging of black America." 1
Indeed, when the number of black women in jail rose twice as fast as the
number of women prisoners from the population as a whole, a third of their male
counterparts were either in prison, or on parole, or probation.
2
This latter emphasis,
like the above and much earlier ones, corresponded with the findings in our content
analyses of the Nigerian media as well as with the explanation given by Attorney
Obi Duruji on the attitude of "Proposition 209." For, it also explains how the unfair
judicial system, along with centuries of related injustices, continues to perpetuate
"anti-black sentiment."
3
Further, Duruji argued that, "from colonial days to the Civil War" to post-
modern America, the negative attitude of the judicial system has continued to
influence the degradation of African-descended Americans. This made it rather
unsurprising that California overturned a civil rights position on Affirmative
Action
at a time when "President Clinton was preaching opportunity for all Americans."
4
As further revealed in the content analyses, differentiated
socio-cultural
experiences of Nigerian immigrants and African-Americans had strong
correlation in
their expressed public viewpoints on the media. This
perhaps makes it much easier to
understand why some opinion molders in the Nigerian/African community
media
'ibid. Also, see Segal, The Black Diaspora, pp.
260-1
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3OW Duruji, "Proposition 209 and Affirmative Action: Whiter
America?" The_Ajrican
Herald (Dallas, Texas, January 1997), p. 28
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were least surprised that President Clinton's admirable status "as a friend of African
Americans" was being reversed during his second term. 1
The uneven distribution of political gains among African-Americans and the
corresponding increases in the number of Hispanic/Latino appointments might have
been one reason why the loss of "U.S. Secretary of Commerce, Ron Brown," in the
plane crash in Dubrvrick, Croatia, raised some air of suspicion and concern in the
Nigerian/African community. The publication by TAH newspaper reflected the
general distress of most Africans following the news of the loss of "Ron Brown" in
the plane crash.
For example, as published in news flash via the Reuter Press release, Libya
allegedly reported that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was behind the plane
crash that resulted in the loss of "Ron Brown" in April 3, 1996. "News information
shows that the U.S. Secretary was the victim of a plot because he was black and
because of his well-known opposition to the economic measures which the U.S.
administration is taking."
The unsubstantiated allegation by Libya about the CIA in the loss of Ron
Brown confirmed that, Nigerians—like most black immigrants, and certainly
African-Americans—shared in the belief that their unequal status in American
society has historically been associated with tragic ends for those striving to reach
the pinnacle of American dream. The tragic death of "Ron Brown," similar to that of
'"Black and the Clinton Cabinet Appointment," The African Herald (Dallas, Texas, January
1997), p. 4.
2
"Libya Suggests CIA May have Killed Ron Brown," The African Herald (Dallas, Texas,
May 1996), pp. 1 and 27.
3
"Libya Suggests CIA May have Killed Ron Brown," The African Herald (Dallas, Texas,
May 1996), pp. 1 and 27.
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the U.S. Congressman Mickey Leland of Texas in East Africa in 1993 (See Chapter
6), perhaps best explains the high risk surrounding the striving toward black-white
equality in America.
Like Ralph Bunche who won the 1950 Nobel Peace Prize on his way
to becoming the highest ranking black diplomat in the history of the
United States, Brown was a man of great personal achievement in
whom African-Americans placed much hope. He was the bridge
builder. A problem solver, a mover and a shaker who helped black
followers get prominent positions throughout the Clinton
administration.
1
Summary
The media coverage of African-Americans supported the major research
queries employed in evaluating the Southern interaction of Nigerians and African-
Americans, that is: due to their racial background, both the descendants of the forced
migration and voluntary migration from Nigeria/sub-Saharan Africa in America
would share almost a similar degree of socio-cultural experience.
As found in this chapter, the Southern evidences of the content analyses of
the media opinions of Nigerians/Africans and African-Americans revealed the
existence of more positive than negative relationships between the descendants
of
forced migration and voluntary migration. On the other hand, their understanding
and misunderstanding or favorable and unfavorable media
attitudes were closely
linked to the differences in their socio-cultural/historical
circuits, both in Africa and
America.
'Ibid.
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Generally, the content analyses of the Nigerian community media revealed
that African-Americans and Nigerians/Africans complemented each other's strengths
as well as weaknesses. This was particularly evident in the emerging medium of
cultural interactions and exchanges—including political rapport, and socioeconomic
partnerships—and in ways yielding toward greater understanding than
misunderstanding, as well as favorable than unfavorable disposition.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
This study was designed to address the consequences of two historic
migrations of sub-Saharan Africans to the United States through the forced
separation of black Africans during the foreign slave trade and voluntary post-
colonial settlers from Nigeria. Throughout the chapters, the research questions along
with the assumptions employed in assessing the major themes of this dissertation
were closely corroborated. Given the nature of the issues involved in this study, this
author browsed across the major ethnographic regions that were active in the Euro-
African slave trade and slavery for further understanding of both the earlier as well
as the current trend in the discipline. Considering my earlier preparations, the
limitation of this approach was inevitable, yet immensely rewarding in understanding
the general relationship between the two historic migrations of black sub-Saharan
Africans to the U.S.
Retrospectively, of course, the exploratory study which preceded some parts
of this dissertation
1
suggested the futility of attempting to examine post-colonial
African migration to the U.S. in isolation of the historiography of the forced
migration of black Africans. Authur, for example,
2 provided some hints on some of
the current carry-overs of cultural traits via voluntary post-colonial African settlers in
America which were helpful in understanding the varieties of their emerging
communal characteristics within the mosaic.
'See Chapter 1 for interpretation of methodology.
2
For example, see Authur's Invisible Sojourners .
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On the other hand, however, the variant between Authur and Apraku 1 was
closely linked to how each attempted to explain the socio-cultural factors operative
in varying historical eras. Whereas Apraku attempted to embrace the colonial and
post-colonial backgrounds in explaining the crises surrounding emigration of the
African skilled class, Authur' s approach corroborated the much broader historical
context, thus illuminating substantial continuities from Africa to America. 2 Yet for
Apraku—as for Authur—the crucial racial crisis surrounding the black experience
via the forced and voluntary post-colonial African migrations was closely linked. 3
The preceding, in turn, suggested that post-colonial African build-up would,
in the long run, broaden our general knowledge about race matters in America.
Assuming this background, some further excursion had to be made into the Old
World as well as across the major regions of racial capitalism in the New World to
gauge the broader trend. This task was arduous considering the limited resources
and resulting worrisome length of this dissertation.
Based on the general examination of the Nigerian Diaspora of Colonialism
and Black Diaspora of Enslavement, some observations can now be made under
seven rubrics regarding their relationships and context of American world
development: (1)) The Historic Relationships between Forced and Voluntary
Nigerian-African Migrations to the United States (2) American Slavery and Reactive
'See, for example, Apraku, African Emigres in the United States , especially "Introduction"
and "Chapter 1."
2
Ibid., Authur, especially his emphasis on the role of black African women, pp.; also see
Apraku, African Emigres in the United States , especially "Introduction," chapters 1-2..
3
Ibid. For example, see Authur, pp. 3-4; Apraku, pp. 19, 110. For the development of this
background in this dissertation, see "Assumption" and "Context of an Existing Problem" in
Chapter 1.
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Pattern of Global Migration (3) The Nigerian Immigrant Community within the
African-American Context (4) The Black Diaspora of Enslavement and Nigeria
Diaspora of Colonialism in the Crossroads of American Sojourn (5) The Birth of a
Conciliatory Generation: American-born Offspring of Nigerian Immigrants (6) The
Nigerian-African Community Media vs. Nigerian Churches; and (7) Direction of
Coverage by Nigerians/Africans and African-Americans in Nigerian-African
Community Media in Southern U.S. Cities.
1. The Historic Relationships between Forced and Voluntary
Nigerian-African Migrations to the United States
One of the most interesting results of this study was the relationship between
the forced migration and voluntary migration from Africa south of the Sahara to the
United States. For example, Nigerians not only had their largest distribution in
Southern U.S. but exhibited a similar pattern of socioeconomic and cultural
development along African-American lines. Besides, they were also found to be
replaying some of the earlier survival patterns of black America. This strongly re-
confirms that African-Americans are their pathfinders in the U.S.
1
Based on the above result, one of the best ways in which to delineate the
prospects of success among foreign-born people in the U.S. requires a clearer
understanding of their varied historical backgrounds. This is especially the case
when considering the experiences of immigrants of non-European backgrounds.
Figure 10.1 summarizes the above context. A greater portion of
underdeveloped regions of non-European peoples in South America/Caribbean and
black Africa were involved in the Atlantic slave trade and other forms of exploitation
'This is molded in the old Pan-Africanist ideal; see especially Chapter 1 of this dissertation.
602
through colonization by the major European powers. 1 Going by the implications of
the data on Figure 10.1, it is well-known that during and after slavery these regions
experienced a corresponding cycle of development and underdevelopment, as well as
racial differentiations mostly in the interests of the major European states. Despite
the entrenched racial crisis, the pattern of human development in North America was
more satisfactory than elsewhere in the Americas, thanks mostly to the colonial
vision of sustained independent development of the English-European settlers. A
majority of the labor migrants entering the U.S. after slavery and colonization as well
as decolonization, were from regions where the negative effects of racial slavery,
colonization, conquest, and exploitation were devastating and deep-rooted.
With the preceding emphases, our analyses revealed clearer patterns of post-
emancipation immigration from Europe and the Americas into the U.S. followed by
Asia, which differed markedly from sub-Saharan Africa. This corresponded with
the attitude of the major European powers toward non-Europeans, especially toward
African descent people and regions.
So, as found in this study, the Nigerian context which served as our major
variable for explaining post-colonial African immigration to the U.S., was more
directly shaped by the general climate of white-black relations.
4
Too, our data
showed that the crisis of this background, which corresponded with the inherent
'For example, Winant's The World is a Ghetto has some keen insights in illuminating the
complex phases of historical changes traceable to chattel slavery, the racialization of color
through world colonization and later after decolonization. Especially interesting are his
emphases in Chapters One-Five, which mirrored the corresponding relationships of regional
and human changes from slavery to decolonization, etc.
2
See, for example, Chapters 1 and 3, especially Tables 10.1, 10.2; and Table 32 in Chapter 8.
3We discussed this problem in Chapters 1-2 and 3.
4
See, for example, earlier notes, especially Chapters 2 to 7.
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commonalities and differences between Nigerians and African-Americans, was due
more to their more peculiar historical experience. This supported an important
premise of the research queries and assumptions employed in this dissertation. 1
Figure 10.1
Map Showing the Major Geographic Regions and
Routes/Ports of the Atlantic Slave Trade in Africa,
the Americas, and Europe
Source: Hugh Thomas, The Slave Trade, The Story of the Atlantic
Slave Trade , pp. 16-17.
The preceding emphases, which can perhaps be fully explained in relation to
the residual effects of American slavery (Table 10.1) and colonial experience ,
represented the strongest historical links to the two migrations of sub-Saharan
'For example, see Chapter 1 of this dissertation for the major assumptions. For conflicting
historical context of the black experience, see Winant, The World is a Ghetto , pp. 81-98.
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Africans to the U.S. With the black diaspora of enslavement, the exploitation of
their labor was closely linked to the development of the early phases of American
capitalism. With the Nigerian diaspora, the problem was mostly traceable to colonial
dispossession, which in turn corresponded with the undermining of pre-colonial
African institutions during and after colonial rule. This background was closely
linked to the second largely voluntary historic settlement of Nigerians in the U.S. 1
Within the U.S., therefore, the leap from 399,000 imported slaves to
4,000,000 free citizens in the South alone following the Emancipation Proclamation
after the Civil War, marked a turning point in their struggle for equal status. 2 Since
the 1860s, this population has grown steadily through the varying phases of the black
struggle to over 36,000 by 2000. 3
The peculiar socio-cultural crisis confronting both the descendants of slaves
and voluntary post-colonial Nigerian settlers in America can be linked to events
beginning in the early 1440s along the West African coastal plains. But in the
British mainland North America, this can more specifically be traced to 1619
,
witnessing its slow and rapid leaps and ultimate transformation between the 1660s
and 1 840s. 4 This development marked both the beginning and maturing of a highly
differentiated order of race relations on the world scene. Again, back in Nigeria or
'This background was explained in Chapters 1, 2, and 3 of this dissertation.
2
See, for example, W. E. B. Du Bois, Black Reconstruction , p. 3; Ira Berlin, et al., Slaves No
More: Three Essays on Emancipation and the Civil War (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1992), pp. ix-x, 186.
3
See Chapters 1 and 2 for earlier emphasis on the population of African-Americans in 2000,
as well as distribution of African slaves in mainland North America. Also, see: Low and
Cliff, Encyclopedia of Black America , p. 685.
4
Ibid.
605
black Africa, this background stretched from the late 1440s to 1860s and again from
1880s to 1950s.
Not surprisingly, as a specific group, the development of Nigerian
immigrants revealed that the status of African settlers in America was being shaped
by both the positive and negative historical cycles of the descendants of slaves. 1
Going therefore by the peculiar ethno-regional historiography of the varied peoples
of pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial Nigeria currently in this country, it can be
safely concluded that, compared with Europeans and other non-Europeans, the
probable socio-cultural experience of the second migration of Africans via the
voluntary passage, is almost as peculiar as the first .
Furthermore, our data revealed that the almost irreconcilable socioeconomic
and politico-cultural attitudes of the major European states both among themselves
and toward non-Europeans
—
particularly between 1 700 and 1 800, had ushered in an
appalling pattern of reactive relations—markedly dissimilar from those in the era
when moral conscience was even less developed. This trend corresponded with the
general pattern of human disruption that followed the opening of the modern era via
the slave trade, possession of world colonies, and ultimately during decolonization.2
As Winant argues, the most important features of the preceding development
were in the relationships between race/cultural determinants and economic
exploitation, especially in their patterns of global exchanges with non-European
peoples.
3 The Winant position is especially important because of its strong rebuttal
'ibid.; including Chapters 3-7.
2
See earlier note on Winant, The World is a Ghetto .
3
Ibid.
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to the historical context in which the author of Migrations and Cultures mirrored the
relationship between cultural traits and the relative status of development among
some immigrant groups within the Western Hemisphere. 1
This means that the crisis of slavery had come to compound a new context of
reactive relations of non-European peoples to European world views and values.
Besides, it later transformed their inherent cultural differences under the varied
hierarchical orders of inequalities outlined by the ideological persuasions of the
European conquest and colonization of the world.2
The development of reactive relations thus requires an understanding of the
varying responses among the major Europeans states to both their internal as well as
external interests with non-European regions via world colonization. The emphasis
here is that, from the opening of the modern era to the beginning of the European
Cold War, the ideological contour of reactive relations, which walked hand in hand
with the expansion-contraction of the world system, also corresponded with highly
structured patterns of racial differentiations of the Europeans and non-Europeans.
Thus, accordingly, some part of Professor Immanuel Wallerstein's thesis on
the expanding-contraction of the world system has its basic tenet in the current
patterns of reactive responses to socioeconomic and politico-cultural forces shaping
'Sowell, Migrations and Cultures , especially, pp. 70-137, 175, 213-233, 332-344, 371-391;
Sowell, Race and Culture , especially pp. ix-xiv, 1-60.
2
For example, Professor Winant's current views in The World is a Ghetto , especially the first
five chapters, along with some emphases in Black Reconstruction and Democracy and
Color
,
including some emphases in Chapters 1-3—were useful in evaluating the links
between world colonization and reactive relations .
3
For example, see I. Wallerstein, Africa and the Modern World , pp. 68-9, 101; Immanuel
Wallerstein, Africa: The Politics of Independence and Unity (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 2005), pp. v-xvi [ix and xi]; Immanuel Wallerstein, "Foes as Friends?"
Foreign Policy , Number 90 (Spring 1993), pp. 145-146.
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the relations between the Northern and Southern poles. It does seem therefore that
his emphasis on the transition from "a typical Kondratieff A-phase of expansion of
the world-economy" to "a Kondratieff B-phase" are further deflections of reactive
imbalances via reactive relations. This is particularly the case where the ultimate
dynamic of changes corresponded with the reversal of earlier statuses among the
major global powers. 1
Certainly the European dimension of reactive relations was first evident in
the attitude of some European states against Portugal and Spain during the early
centuries of Atlantic capitalism. Their replacement after more than a century of
dominance had serious implications within the European theater of Atlantic
capitalism. This development directly transformed the worldwide pattern of reactive
relations . From this point, moreover, the internal circumference of European
rivalries shifted toward a greater desire among the major winners to secure their
international interests. By the time Britain succeeded in replacing the Dutch and the
French, particularly in the Americas and West Africa, a more mature outlines of
intra-European reactive relations had developed, which involved non-Europeans
under varying hierarchical orders.
Although these new traits of reactive relations were fashioned within a
continuum of the Old World and New World strands, their inherent differences and
similarities also united as well as separated both the winners and the losers around
the world. This development was influenced more by their control over the medium
of inter-European or intra-non-European exchanges around the world.
'Ibid.
2
See, for example, Chapter 2 of this dissertation.
608
Undoubtedly, by the time Britain emerged as the greatest power in the new
Atlantic system, it could not have been denied that the major regions of European
states that participated in world colonization, along with their conquered over non-
European regions, were being tied to differing levels of reactive relations: in the
military, commercial, and later in industrial matters. Collectively, these reactive
relations formed the basis of the exchanges between the new Atlantic capitalism and
the varying regions of the Old Worlds that were later to respond to the imperatives of
the New World: for example in the United States. 1
It would then be misleading to attempt to explain the pattern of global
linkages and exchanges that occurred between varied regions and peoples within the
new Atlantic capitalism without noting what type of medium of control each region
had across the processes of inter-active and intra-reactive relations. 2 Again,
considering the particular case of non-Europeans, our data revealed that the Atlantic
slave trade was the one indelible socioeconomic and politico-cultural feature of an
extreme form of intra-reactive stigma that later compounded all other reactive
relations. The highest stage of this crisis evolved out of the degradation of black
labor during slavery as well as after emancipation. Nearly all the phases of the black
struggle in America were found to be closely linked to extreme reactive relations .
This was evident in their struggle for equal status. The attitude of this background
re-echoed in chain-reactive relations, which shaped and continue to shape other
features of inter-American and intra European and non-European reactive unities.
'ibid. This would be the obvious conclusion based on some of the outlines we highlighted
earlier.
2
This term explains cross-cultural relations among groups with differing racial ancestries and
regional and international interests they were involved in the new Atlantic capitalism.
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Moreover, since then, the status of the most affected racial group in the
Atlantic exchange has continued to define the historical contest of post-modernist
relations, particularly as found in its more developed outlines in America. This same
background continues to define the patterns of reactive relations within the
expanding sphere of worldwide capitalism. Winant appears to have given one of the
most thorough contemporary expositions of the consequences of this continuing
crisis.
1
The above could not have failed to mean much for the Old World background
of West Africa and Central Africa, where the Atlantic slave trade had one of the
most indelible negative effects. Granted, this perhaps best explains why post-
colonial build-up of Nigerian settlers in the U.S. represented one of the most unique
phases of largely voluntary post-emancipation global migration.
The Nigerian variable therefore mirrors the bittersweet experience of
migrants from one of the most disrupted regions of the world after the Euro-African
slave trade and colonial rule. For example, the Ibo, who comprised the largest
population of the human cargoes from the Bight of Bonny, also comprised one of the
largest bases of post-colonial Nigerian settlers in the U.S. Next were the Yoruba,
Ibibio/Efik, Edo, and the Ijo.
Thus, within a specific context of reactive relations, this trend further
confirms the strong ethnographic similarities between the generations of forced
settlers and voluntary post-colonial settlers. Besides, it probably makes it much
'Winant, The World is a Ghetto : especially the first five chapters, including the conclusion.
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easier to understand the continuing pattern of the conflict of racial capitalism. 1 Yet
post-emancipation historiography of foreign-born settlers in the U.S. rarely suggests
that African representation constitutes an effective orbit of cultural and economic
exchanges. While the Ibos of Southeastern Nigeria have been credited for
possessing effective cultural traits based on Western values, the bulk of
Nigerians/Africans with similar talents were often excluded. 3
The problem with the Ibo traits might be due to how their cultural traits were
defined. First, as we observed in Chapter 5, there was no basis in which to deny the
admirable re-adoptive talents of the Ibo of Southeastern Nigeria.4 Second, as further
supported by analyses, the effectiveness of cultural traits of some migrants was
closely linked to how they exploited the hierarchical inequalities that existed side by
side with racial indifference. This appalling problem, we also noted, was
compounded by the nature of institutional assistances accorded some racial groups
over others.
5 Even for the Ibo, there were the likely problems of continuities, based
on the background of racial slavery. Moreover, for the Ibo, as for other West
Africans, their overall status as voluntary settlers, however their talents, determines
their American world success and related contextual development.
6 Often this type
of crisis is closely linked to how both the dominant racial groups and the more
'This is supported by the ethnographic features of the generation of sub-Saharans under
forced/voluntary migrations to the United States. See Chapters 1-2 and 3 of this dissertation
for the general outline on this emphasis.
2See earlier notes on Migrations and Cultures .
3
Ibid., pp. 27-8, 228; Race and Culture , pp. 54, 239
4
This was explained in Chapters 4-6 of this dissertation.
5
Ibid., especially Chapter 5.
6
Ibid.
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fortunate ethnic minorities perceived their aspirations in relations to their less
fortunate counterparts.
By all the available criteria, one of the most vulnerable ramparts of the
newcomers in America was from West and Central Africa. This development cannot
be separated from the earlier attitudes toward the descendants of slaves. 1 Yet,
collectively, the black African migrants from these regions were among the most
highly educated foreign-born settlers, and perhaps also those more rounded under
varying Western European and Euro-American historical affinities.
The above can perhaps be further understood by how the low population of
Africans admitted into the U.S. corresponded with the negative effects of slavery and
colonialism (Tables 1-2, 10.1-10.2, 32). Until 1960s, the U.S. Bureau of the Census
had no clear regional configuration on African immigration. 2 Nor were some of the
later revisions any clearer with regard to officially recorded population from black
Africa.
3
Recorded population of Africans in the U.S. accounted for a far lower
percentage of representation than evident in comparable demographic visibility.
This population also varied as recorded by the U.S. Bureau of the Census and as
known by African Embassies.
4
The claim then that Houston alone had about
100,000 Nigerians in 2000 may be extraneous, where the U.S. Bureau of the Census
'ibid., especially Chapter 5.
2
Ibid. See Chapters 1 and 3, where we discussed the historical context and patterns of pre-
colonial, colonial, and post-African immigration to the U.S. Based on our analyses, the
explanations associated with this development can be linked to effects of the Atlantic slave
trade.
3
For example, the fieldwork confirmed that more Africans were in the U.S. than reported by
the U.S. Bureau of the Census. (See Chapter 6).
4
Ibid. For example, see Chapter 6.
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recorded about 134,000 for the entire Nigerian population during the same period.
However, the fact that the total population of African immigrants was under
1 ,000,000 in 2000 raises some concerns, considering their strong build-up during the
1980s and 1990s. 1
One has then to understand the crisis of cultural indifference in America to
effectively explain the relationship between African-Americans and Nigerian
immigrants. This means that one can expect an intra-pan-Africanist fracture between
African-Americans and Nigerians just as evident in inter-continental African fracture
between Nigerians and other Africans—across closely related and unrelated lines.
This is further sub-divided into Afro-Arab-Asian fracture within the African-
American within the African base—all this within a continuum of the expressed
hierarchical inequalities shaped mostly by the sociopolitical dynamic of the Atlantic
slave trade and under the varying ex-colonial fragments of Europe. 2 Perhaps
scholars in the Bell Curve had most succeeded in capturing the socioeconomic and
politico-cultural implications of a much earlier circuit of historical crisis than
explanation of its continuing context.
3
Beyond the preceding emphasis, however, lies perhaps another understanding
of the extent to which colonialism in Nigeria, for example, was of beneficial in both
developing and incorporating the region into the modern world. Probably scholars
who emphasized that "the imperial system stands out as one of the most powerful
'Ibid.
2
For example, see earlier notes on Winant, The World is a Ghetto , especially pp. 152-175,
289-312.
3
Ibid., including Chapters 1-2 and 4, especially Countryman, Americans: A Collision of
Histories .
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engines of cultural diffusion in the history of Africa ...its credit balance by far
outweighs its debit account," 1 were not wrong in the general conception of the idea.
However, if what they viewed as "its credit outweighs its debit"2 constituted an
enduring human crisis in Nigeria during or in sub-Saharan Africa after colonialism,
and later corresponded with the inordinate-subordinate status of post-colonial settlers
in America, the thesis may require further explanation. This calls for a more careful
explanation of the proclaimed pattern of "cultural diffusion in Africa" within an
existing state of unequal global exchanges.
There are therefore some worrisome concerns as well as optimism with
regard to post-colonial migration of Nigerians to the U.S. Although this migration
was also triggered by the blunders and inexperience of Nigeria's leaders, it has
provided a basic framework for sustained interaction between the diaspora and the
homeland. The Nigerian equation is especially significant in that it has led directly
to the historic merging within the U.S. of the black disapora of enslavement with the
black diaspora of colonialism.
3
We can then return to the control over the medium of intra-active relations
and exchanges which we touched earlier in brevity. This is because our data found
strong support for an earlier thesis: that is, one of the major facilitators of global
development and underdevelopment between 1600s and 1900s, for example, was the
corresponding relationship between Atlantic slave trade and European colonization.
'Philip D. Curtin, "Black Experience of Colonialism and Imperialism," in Slavery,
Colonialism and Racism , ed., Sidney W. Mintz (New York: W. W. Norton and Company,
1974), p. 26.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid. Also, see chapters 4-7 for the emerging socioeconomic and politico-cultural thrust of
this alternately circumstantial phase Afro-atlantic relations.
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This development, as we also saw earlier, was closely tied to the economic
exploitation and cultural degradation of non-Europeans, and later still, to the sizes
and medium of worldwide exchanges with the major European powers.
So, in retrospect,
1
one has to take into consideration the kind of mutually
beneficial medium of global exchanges that existed between sub-Saharan Africa and
Europe, as well as with mainland North America during and after slavery.
Consequently, there seems to be a need for greater understanding of the medium of
exchanges between sub-Saharan Africa and the modern world during and after
colonialism. This is particularly the case with due consideration to its current pace
ofhuman development.
During and after the foreign slave trade, just like the colonial era, Africans
had one of the most constrained lanes of human exchanges despite the earlier
involvement in the development of Atlantic capitalism. For example, the small
population of African migrants allowed into the U.S. before and after decolonization,
compared to the much larger population of Europeans and other non-Europeans, can
be seen in the general context of constrained medium of exchanges. The effects of
this development were mostly unfavorable.
2
It seems unlikely that events could have
taken such a course without the socio-cultural effects of racial slavery. From the
standpoint of the historical experience of Africa south of the Sahara, there appears to
be a strong probability that, within a specific context, the second dispersal of
!
For example, this can perhaps be a more adequate intersection in which to re-adapt an
earlier response emphasis by Professors Gann and Duignan, The Burden of Empire . See our
earlier reference by Curtin, in Slavery, Colonialism and Racism , pp. 26.
2
See, for example, Chapter 3 of this dissertation. Also, see Sowell, Migrations and Cultures ,
pp. 1-49, 113-139, 175,213-227,332-344.
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Nigerians to the U.S. (1960s- 1990s), represents "the most powerful engines of
cultural diffusion in the history of Africa." 1
We can safely argue at this point that there is currently within the U.S., a far
stronger basis than ever before for understanding the ultimate unity between
historical eras and the patterns of regional as well as of the human development that
emerged out of Atlantic capitalism. This is not to disavow of some of the benefits of
modern development via the medium of slavery and colonialism. Rather, it is to
further explain the extent of an uneven flow of global exchanges into black Africa,
particularly since the same period, and collectively of its effects on the current status
of the region and peoples.
We conclude, therefore that, with a more favorable historical tide, along with
a clearer medium—the future of the U.S.-African relations at the current point is
more likely to lead to sustainable exchanges. If this scenario goes well for Nigeria
within a specific context, as its current evidences in the U.S.-African equation
suggest, it might be surmised that the medium of voluntary post-colonial
migration—more than the forced and colonial migrations—has positively influenced
the course of human development. This will likely be seen in the foreseeable future
as one important attribute of the positive effects of an historical era.
'See our earlier notes as well as the response by Curtin, Slavery. Colonialism and Race to the
emphasis in the Burden of Empire by Gann and Duignan.
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2. American Slavery and Reactive Pattern of Global Migration
The bulk of the preceding emphases then meant that the socio-cultural crises
of reactive relations in the modern world were more closely linked to chattel slavery.
Thus, chattel slavery and international labor migration are to be seen as two closely
related phenomena. This is because, with racial slavery came a more structured
historical cycle of reactive relations. Indeed during and after emancipation of the
slaves, this background expressed, and still continues to express its dynamic in
relation to the character of international labor migration into the U.S.
Surprisingly, however, only but a few contemporary works have shown much
interest in exploring the relationship between the Atlantic slave trade and
international labor movements. Among the much earlier ones were Du Bois's Black
Reconstruction and Williams' Capitalism and Slavery , for example, which explained
the background leading to the degradation of the black and white laborers, as well as
of the flow of the new waves of labor migrants following the emancipation of former
slaves.
1
Probably one of the most contemporary works on the complexity of the cultural
forces unleashed by racial slavery and world colonization in the Americas and later still, by
decolonization—came to the fore with The World is a Ghetto .
2 Much of the recurrent
waves of international labor migration into North America therefore had its clearest
take-off during the opening of the Atlantic capitalism. This development, later
closely supported by racial slavery, also influenced the flow of Europeans and non-
'For example, see earlier notes on Du Bois's Black Reconstruction; and Williams,
Capitalism and Slavery , pp. 28-9; and Winant's The World is a Ghetto, pp. 19-30,152-6.
2
Ibid.; Winant.
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Europeans into the U.S. both before and after the Emancipation Proclamation. 1
Winant—like Du Bois and Williams—argues that the explosive relationships
between racial slavery and colonization. Winant in fact goes father, arguing that, the
unequal status of non-Europeans as well as of their dispersal to the metropoles of
their former masters after decolonization corresponded with the disruptions resulting
from exploitation and conquest.2
Sowell, on the other hand, offers some useful insights into the economic and
cultural capitals involving Europeans and non-Europeans, which corresponded with
the positive attributes of labor migration to the Western Hemisphere. However, he
did not go as far as Winant later did in exploring the complexities of the inter-related
sociopolitical forces shaping the unequal relationships between Europeans and non-
Europeans, as important links to the reversed flow of human dispersal. 3
Yet, the socioeconomic and politico-cultural ironies implicit in a greater part
of the Sowell conclusions
—
particularly in the negative attitudes of Europeans to
non-Europeans—corresponded with most of the emphases expanded by Winant.
Probably the problem in the Sowell position lies in the attempt to merge varying
distinctive eras of reactive relations as well as of intra-cultural differences, as if they
were all driven by a similar dynamic of migratory exchanges around the world.
4
As we pointed out earlier, on the other hand, it would have been difficult not
see the medium of international labor migration of Europeans and non-Europeans
'Ibid.
2
Ibid; see earlier notes on Du Bois and Williams.
3
Ibid., Winant; Sowell, Migrations and Cultures ; and Race and Culture , pp. 204-225.
4
Ibid. For example, it is quite likely that the major phases of economic and cultural
exchanges from 1500s to 1900s around the world via migration were not all similar.
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into the U.S. as a major channel of world exchanges in the immediate decades
following the emancipation of slaves. 1 And, it would be difficult to ignore the fact
that this same medium of entry peaked up again even after decolonization, especially
during and after the Cold War. Collectively these waves of international labor
exchanges were driven by what we term here as reactive migration . 2
The preceding meant that there were corresponding reactive relations to the
new order of international exchanges into the U.S., which resulted from the dominant
role of the Europeans over non-Europeans around the world. Based on analyses, it is
conceivable that Professor Werner' s delineation of "five distinctive waves" of
international migration in the modern era3 belongs more to the socioeconomic and
politico-cultural gravitation of patterns of reactive migration. The intersection
marking the demise of racial capitalism seems to have been more closely linked to
the accumulated transformation of this potential development.
Surprisingly, however, Professor Weiner only refers to the historical cycle of
the Atlantic slave trade around "the second wave."
4
Yet, with the opening of the
modern era, the general pattern of global migration into mainland North America
was linked to nearly all the major waves of international labor migration, as well as
to the major landscapes of racial capitalism. The American patterns of these
'ibid. Also, see, for example, Chapter 3 of this dissertation, including Tables 10.1-10.2 and
the U.S. Bureau of the Census on European and non-European foreign-born immigration,
especially from 1800s- 1950s.
2
Ibid. For example, in the case of the U.S., most reactive patterns of international migrations
came from other parts of the Americas, Asia and Africa. Most of them, particularly from
emancipation of former slaves to decolonization, can be traced to the historical cycles of the
Atlantic slave trade and the effects of colonization and later still—of decolonization. See
Winant, The World is a Ghetto , pp. 151-8.
3
Weiner, The Global Migration Crisis , p. 2 1
.
4
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evidences were very strong, just as were those of human movements from Europe
into other parts of the Americas. 1 Elsewhere, it does seem that what historian
Kennedy saw more in terms of the socioeconomic and cultural implications of an
expanding worldwide population movements2 were at best events rooted in reactive
responses to historical forces.
3
Kennedy's earlier emphases in the Rise and Fall of the Great Power may
even have been more useful for understanding some of the backgrounds that shaped
the socio-political forces that Winant later explored. Similarly, they could help in re-
thinking some of the trends that Kennedy later positioned on reversed patterns of
global migration in his Preparing for the Twenty-First Century . 4 Of far greater
significance, however, is that both the Weiner and Kennedy observations
corroborated the period marking the most visible shift of labor migration after
decolonization from "technologically advanced societies to less advanced societies." 5
If the above is correct, then, our understanding of what Weiner terms "the
fifth Wave" of international migration requires a closer examination largely because
of its close links to decolonization. For, as Weiner argues, the "fifth wave of
international migration.... emerged in the 1950s and 1960s in response to the rising
demand for imported labor in Western Europe, the United States, and the oil-
'ibid. 121-25. See earlier notes on Sowell, Migrations and Cultures . Also see, the
demography of the forced and voluntary migrations of Europeans and non-Europeans in
Chapters 2-3.
2
Kennedy, Preparing for the Twenty-First Century, pp. 29-46.
3
Ibid.; also, earlier notes by Winant.
4
Paul Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Power: Economic Change and Military Conflict
from 1500-2000 (New York: Random House, 1987), especially "Introduction," and the first
seven chapters; Kennedy, Preparing for the Twentv-First Century, especially, pp.42-3;
Weiner in The Global Migration Crisis , especially pp. 21-24
5
Ibid.
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producing countries of the Middle East." 1 Kennedy, almost similarly, concurs that:
"contemporary migrations chiefly move from less developed societies toward
Europe, North America, and Australia."2
Admittedly, the "fifth wave" of international migration coincided with the
period marking the beginning of the "reversed" pattern of international migration. 3
Additionally, it corresponded with an era consistent with the increased flow of
foreign labor movements into the U.S. The "fifth Wave," therefore, formed the
crucible of a succession of other related migratory build-up of international labor
exchanges into the U.S., which was particularly stronger from the 1970s to the
1980s.
It is important to note at this point the more distinctive pattern of reactive
migration from Africa and Asia (Table 32). Why the supposed benefits of
decolonization occurred almost simultaneously at the intersection of the "fifth
wave," and with such extensive waves of reactive chain migrations, require a clearer
explanation than the emphasis often associated with the economic benefits of
advanced industrialized societies.
4
For, decolonization was supposed to result in a
somewhat more pliable context of human development and cohesion particularly in
Africa and Asia.
So, the particular intersection in which the "fifth wave" of international
migration occurred may not be explained solely on the basis of North-South
socioeconomic variant: that is, answers may have to be sought beyond the benefits of
'Weiner. The Global Migration Crisis , p. 24.
2
Ibid. Also, see Kennedy, Preparing for the Twenty-first Century , p. 42.
3
Ibid.; Weiner, The Global Migration Crisis , p. 24.
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advanced industrialized societies. Nor does this reasoning mean that the advanced
status of industrialized societies was not closely associated with international labor
migration into the U.S. The emphasis is that one should not rule out other factors.
First, within the context of this study, however, it is our view that the
strongest feature of this reactive pattern of international labor migration occurred
between the 1960s and 1980s, and relatedly during the 1990s. Second, most of these
waves—especially those associated with non-Europeans—were the result of unequal
development between the major European states and their ex-colonized
subjects/regions (Figures 10. 1).
1
Figure 10.2 summarizes the uneven status of the relationships between
underdeveloped and developed regions in the immediate decades after
decolonization. These regions embraced the bulk of the regions involved in the
brink of the Cold War contest, especially between the 1960s a 1980s. During this
period, the major regions of the underdeveloped worlds were in the Latin Americas,
Asia, and Africa. From these zones originated a majority of the black, yellow, and
brown labor migrants to the U.S.
Figure 10.2 can then explain some patterns of uneven reactive exchanges
around the world which later merged with the Cold War. Also, it can explain those
occurring between the more developed and less developed regions of the world, as
well as among historically exploited regions during and after the slave trade and
colonial imperialism (Figure 10.1).
1 Winant. The World is a Ghetto , pp. 140-158.
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Figure 10.2
Map of the World Showing the Major Geographic Zones of the
Developed and Less Developed Nations before and after the 1980s
What Winant terms "the "racial dimension of post-coloniality" 1 can then be
seen in the context of the unequal relationships arising out of the Southern and
Northern contest of post-Second World War status of reactive global differences and
inequalities. Winant writes that, in the aftermath of the Second World War and
during the decade-long Cold War came some changes which represented the
releasing of accumulated global "sociopolitical forces."2 Accordingly, it was the
unchecked dimension of this development which transcended the old world racial
system into "the metropoles, colonies, and ex-colonies alike." This same
background provided the basis for what Richard Abrams later termed as the new
'Winant. The World is a Ghetto , p. 141.
2
Ibid., pp. 133-7, 141.
3
Ibid.
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order of "liberal internationalism," which shaped American policies toward the
Middle East, the Far East, Europe, and Africa. 1 Similarly, it further shaped the leap
in the flow of reactive migration into the U.S.
At this juncture, however, it cannot be denied that the "fifth wave" of
international migration," or its links to the "reversed" pattern of international labor
migration—from the less developed to the more developed countries—was nothing
more than a corresponding transformation of reactive migration
.
2 The Middle East and
Australian ramparts of these migratory waves can be seen in the context of macro-micro
patterns of reactive responses to the North-South imbalances within the world system.
Table 32 is directly supportive of the transformation of the reactive waves of
international labor migration to the U.S.: that is, between 1960s and 1990s. During
the bulk of the period, the pattern of international migration corresponded with the
underlying foreign policy questions of the U.S. These were the strategic foundations
of most post-Second World migrations, particularly of non-Europeans. 3
Significantly, however, some waves of reactive migrations during this same
period (Table 32) were tied to the unequal margins between the North and South
poles. These were especially the case in the economic spheres, which were tied to
educational and technological inequalities between the underdeveloped and
developing, as well as developed regions.
'See earlier notes especially on Kennedy; and Abrams, America Transformed , pp. 320-1.
2
For example, see the explanations in Du Bois, Black Reconstruction , p. 632; Du Bois, Color
and Democracy: Colonies and Peace , especially chapters 1-3; Kennedy, Preparing for the
Twenty-First Century , pp. 38-46 [42]; Winant, The World is a Ghetto .
3Weiner. The Global Migration Crisis , pp. 31-2, 126-130.
624
Table 32
Foreign-born Immigration to the United States, by Region,
by Population, by Decade, 1960-2000
Year Europe Asia Africa Oceania Latin
America
Caribbe
an
North
America
2000 133,362 255,860 40,969 5,962 118,100 85,875 397,201
1990 4,350,403 4,979,037 363,819 104,145 8,407,837 532,497 753,917
1980 5,149,572 2,539,777 199,723 77,577 4,372,487 872,051 853,427
1970 5,740,891 824,887 80,143 41,258 1,803,970 741,126 812,421
1960 7,256,311 490,996 35,355 34,730 908,309 470,213 952,5000
Source: The U.S Census Bureau, 1960-2000
Further significant has been the fact that, from the opening of Atlantic
capitalism to decolonization and thereafter, most reactive migrations into the U.S.
have corresponded with the general after-effects accompanying European rivalries
and displacements of peoples from a dominant role either through conquest or
colonization, or through foreign policy related considerations. Others were closely
linked the old as well as emerging new alliances based on ancestral relationships and
ancient rivalries, or the undue influences of the major powers on the global scene.
Thus, to a great extent, some of the socioeconomic features of the pull and
push thesis of international migration—especially after decolonization—have a lot in
common with the flow of reactive migration around the world. The European flow
of this pattern of migration into the U.S. may have come mostly from those unstable
regions whose relationships with the more established industrialized regions were/
are less secure. Perhaps these are also mostly regions that were neither the big
winners in the era of world colonization nor highly established with modern facilities
catering for all their struggling peoples.
Table 32 is equally suggestive of some subsequent changes in the pattern of
reactive migration of European into the U.S. The data show that migratory
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exchanges were high and steady during the heights of the European Cold War,
although not as extensive as in the earlier eras (Tables 10.1-10.2). Given the
expectation of decolonization, Table 32 confirms nearly an all round pattern of
reactive migrations from non-Europeans regions—Asia, Latin America and the
Caribbean, and Africa into the U.S. These, as we saw earlier, were determined by
the effects of racial slavery and the corresponding attitudes of the host country. 1
Collectively, Table 32, Figures 10.1 and 10.2 are supportive of the links
between underdevelopment and reactive migrations. After decolonization, these
uneven relationships between the underdevelopment of mostly non-European races
and the development of Europeans—as mirrored via labor exchanges—intersected
with the "fifth wave" of international migration.
Granted, this particular phase of world migration represented the
transformation of "a new industrial slavery of black and brown and yellow in Africa
and Asia." For, both its offshoot as well as its demise lies in the effects of the
Atlantic slave trade.
Without the Atlantic slave trade and the possession of world colonies, it
seems probable that the "fifth wave" of international migration
4
would not have
comprised such an extensive dispersal of non-Europeans to the U.S. In other words,
whether we separated or included other waves of regional migrations into the U.S.
during this particular period, those from Africa and Asia would still have marked the
'This background was explained in Chapter 1 of this dissertation.
2
See, for example, Black Reconstruction , pp. 3, 15-16, 55-67, 632-4; Williams, Capitalism
and Slavery
, pp. 28-9.
3
Ibid.
4
Weiner, The Global Migration Crisis , p. 24.
626
most peculiar links toward the forewarned "problem of the color line in the twentieth
century."
1
If, therefore, Professor Weiner is correct in his periodization, it would then
mean that the "fifth wave" of international migration represented the most visible
intersection of cross-cultural transformation in the "relation of the darker to the
lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea."2 So,
what Winant later views as, "in nascent anticolonialism, pan-Africanism, and
diasporic consciousness, lay the problem of the 20th century, the problem of color
line,"
3
was molded mostly by reactive waves of global migration from non-European
regions into the U.S.
We argue at this point that the "fifth Wave" of international labor migration
represented the most identifiable contour of "the problem of color line in the
twentieth century." This phenomenon unfolded as a response to the existing global
inequalities between the Southern and Northern poles. This revolt by the ex-colonial
subjects after decolonization occurred almost as forewarned: "If this situation is not
frankly faced and steps toward remedy are not attempted, we shall seek in vain to
find peace and security; we shall leave the door wide open for renewed international
strive to secure colonies, and eventually and inevitably for colonial revolt."4
The above observation by Du Bois seems to have been like a-two edged
sword: first, it forewarned of the implicit effects of sustained European exploitation
]W. E. B. Dubois, The Souls of the Black Folk: Essays and Sketches (Greenwich, Conn:
Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1961), p. 23.
2
Ibid.; also, see Winant, The World is a Ghetto , pp. 81-106, about fifty years later.
3
Winant, The World is a Ghetto , p. 82.
4Du Bois, Color and Democracy: Colonies and Peace , p. 12.
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of the colored proletariat under colonialism, especially before and after World War
II. Second, it forewarned of an inevitable revolt in a world of unequal distribution of
the bounties of the earth resources. Collectively, both the former and latter emphases
anticipated the revolt of the ex-colonial subjects against their former colonial masters
before and after the post-world war era and decolonization. These emphases had
their historic origins in the historical responses by the descendants of slaves in the
Americas, in which the U.S. evidence remains the strongest.
Admittedly, within the U.S. this revolt was first embedded in the aspiration of
the descendants of slaves against unsolicited labor degradation: the resolution
formed the basis of the American Civil War and ultimately of their freedom. Since
that time, the inherent dynamic of the descendants of slaves has corresponded with
the hierarchic inequalities influencing voluntary exchanges through international
labor migration both of the European and non-European peoples into the U.S. as well
as other parts of the Americas, especially North America. 1
3. The Nigerian Immigrant Community
Within the African-American Context
Accordingly, as we hinted earlier, both the above emphases as well as the
socio-cultural context of the black experience, suggested a need for caution in
explaining post-colonial African immigration to the U.S. This, as also noted earlier,
was due mostly to the historical ties that black America had and still has with black
Africa, as well as with some of its influences on post-colonial African immigration.
Thus, based on the data examined, the black African immigration to the U.S.,
'Du Bois, Black Reconstruction , pp. 9-21. See earlier notes on Sowell, Migrations and
Cultures ; and Winant, The World is a Ghetto .
2
See, for example, Chapter 3, especially Tables 10.1 and 10.2, 12, and 13.2 for explanations.
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especially during the 1970s and 1980s, marked the first clearly identifiable historic
build-up in America. Thus, although the Nigerian variable exemplified the
uniqueness of a specific context of post-colonial African immigration, the general
trend during a similar period was somewhat like the pattern of Asians (Table 32).
However, a case can be made for the pattern of Nigerian or the black African
migration than that of Asian: that is, for the former, their contextual visibility in
America was foregrounded between the 1970s and 1980s. For Asians, on the other
hand, the small population of labor migrants, which began during the early decades
of the 1800s, increased steadily from the mid- 1850s to the Second World War, and
again to decolonization and thereafter. From decolonization to the 1 980s, the flow of
Asians to America compared to Africa was much larger (Tables 10.1, 10.2, 12, 13,
and 32).
Prior to the 1950s, the black African migrants comprised one of the smallest
proportions of both labor and students' sojourners entering America from the major
regions of the world. Similarly, prior to the 1960s, on the general plain of
international migration, they comprised a very narrow proportion of American
migrants.
1
Whether for Nigerian immigration, as a specific country, or the entire black
African immigration within a larger context
—
post-colonial immigration to America,
especially during the 1970s—was somewhat concomitant of the gains of black
American civil rights struggles of the 1960s.
2
Again, it is worth noting here that,
'This background is explained in chapter 3.
2
Ueda, Postwar Immigrant America, pp. 44-5. Hawk, "Africans and the 1965 U.S.
Immigration Law," pp. 88-91, 115-119, 156-164,260-273.
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prior to the 1960s, the black African build-up in America did not have any viable
demographic base. Based on our data analyses, even the extent to which the
provisions resulting from the 1965 U.S. Immigration Taw had benefited African
immigration requires cautious evaluation. 1
For example, in the first place, the medium of African immigration to the
U.S. after the passage of the 1965 immigration law continued to be constrained.
Compared to the population entering from other regions, African immigration had
one of the smallest population bases. In the second place, the result of the new law
favored the extraction of highly skilled class of African immigrants. This meant that
the gains were more likely to be asymmetrical.2 Third, and perhaps the most
important, the Hart-Celler Act of 1965, which amended the McCarran-Walter Act of
1952, ought to be measured against the pre- 1960s crisis of black America as well as
the general pattern of African immigration to the U.S. Unlike Asians, as we pointed
out earlier, Africans were more likely to have constrained demographic slots within
the mosaic for exploiting the benefits of the new immigration law. 3
Despite the above, however, the changes in American foreign policy toward
Africa during the late 1970s, along with the successive amendments of the U.S.
immigration law, proved somewhat helpful to the subsequent patterns of African
immigration. Therefore, it is quite probable that the real gains of the 1965 U.S.
immigration law for Africans were felt around the late 1970s. Neither should the
links between the historic appointment of Andrew Young—as the first African-
'Hawk, "Africans and the 1965 U.S. Immigration Law," pp. 88-91, 115-119, 156-164,260-
273.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
630
American U.N Ambassador to the U.S. and the visit by President Jimmy Carter to
Nigeria—be separated from this new cycle of Nigerian-American exchanges. This,
along with new patterns of immigration, marked the beginning of a different cycle of
Nigerian/African-U.S. relations since the demise of chattel slavery and colonial rule. 1
The Carter mandate, seeking to establish a more respectable bridge between
America and African countries, also corresponded with favorable black African
immigration to the U.S.
2
Further, besides the above and latter emphasis, the Carter
mandate toward Africa went beyond that of the Kennedy administration, which was
noted mostly through the peacecorps program.3
Significantly, during the 1970s, the demographic composition of Nigerian
immigrants in the U.S. was dominated by students; they were mostly males,
including a few females. Collectively, they formed the nucleus of the Nigerian
immigrant community. This community had its strongest visibility in areas with
dense population and presence of African-American institutions.
4
Considered side by side within a specific context,
5
post-colonial Nigerian
immigration to the U.S.—especially the 1970s and the 1980s waves—represented
the most distinctive largely voluntary concentration of Nigerian settlers since the
demise of slavery and colonialism. Due to the effects of racial slavery and colonial
dispossession, which affected the medium of African immigration into the U.S., the
'Roberts, Afro-Arab Fraternity: The Roots of Terramedia, pp. 100-1.
2
Udofia, Trotter Review , p. 32.
301iver and Atmore, Africa Since 1 800 , p. 304.
"This is based on analyses of demographic evidences in Chapters 2 and 3.
5See Chapters 1 to 3 of this dissertation.
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general pattern of the black African immigration during this same period represented
the most distinctive waves of world migration.
Correspondingly, therefore, the development of a Nigerian immigrant
community might have been slower but for the policies of two American
presidencies toward black America and black Africa: Jimmy Carter and Ronald
Reagan. Their policies were either favorable or unfavorable toward black America
and black Africa based on how they impacted on African-Americans and hence
African settlers in America. This, to a great extent, depended on the degree to which
the Carter and Reagan mandates had sought to influence the internal and
international changes within the American nation. 1
Not surprisingly, therefore, from the late 1970s to early 1980s, the Carter
policies made it somewhat much easier for Nigerians to converge on the American
shores. Some of the changes in the Reagan era, on the other hand, hastened the pace
in which they were confronted with crises, resulting in their search for alternate
means of contextual adjustment into the American mosaic.
The Reagan policies which affected black America in turn explained the
status of all African immigrants, and formed the core of the systemic unfolding of
the communal dynamic of Nigerians as the largest African group. The Reagan era,
moreover, notorious for weakening the black base and encouraging open bigotry,
also released new initiatives among African-Americans and Nigerian immigrants.
One of these was evident in the gains made by blacks through active participation in
'For example, see the explanation of this trend in chapters 4-6.
2
Ibid.
3
Apraku, African Emigres in the United States , p. 1 10; and Trotter Review, p. 32
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voter's registration and grassroots mobilization of varying electorates within the
democratic process. 1
For Nigerians, on the other hand, nearly all their strengths and weaknesses
were transformed either positively or negatively at the intersection between the entry
and departure of President Carter and President Reagan. The experiences of the
Reagan era—along with the negative effects of his deregulation policies on the
international monetary system—compelled most Nigerians both in America and back
in the homeland to begin seeking other means of securing their foothold. Similarly,
some of the policies of the Reagan era, along with those of his successor President
Bush, which affected the status of black America and black Africa, also
corresponded with increases in the number of Nigerians and African-Americans
involved in deviant activities.
Elsewhere, however, as Nigerians adjusted into the American mosaic, they
successfully developed the imperatives for collective identification, as evident, for
example, by their five leadership models. While all the five leadership models are
important, their women-type leadership and representative-professional-type
leadership appear at this point to be the strongest in welding the divisive historical
set-up of ethnic Nigeria in America and, to a certain extent, back in the homeland.
If, as we pointed out earlier, there is a strong likelihood that the Nigerian
women leadership exercised greater influences over the other branches of the
'ibid. Also see Janet-Dewart, State of Black America 1990 (National Urban League, 1990),
pp. 2-4, 25-52, 159; Rod Bush, ed., The New Black Vote: Politics and Power in Four
American Cities (San Francisco Synthesis Publication, 1984), pp. 1-11; Black Power in
Chicago: A Documentary Survey of the 1983 Mayoral Democratic Primary , Vol. 1
(Chicago: People's College Press, 1983), pp. 1-6.
2
For example, see some of the emphases on the Reagan era in Chapters 4 and 6.
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Nigerian immigrant leadership, this is perhaps due in part to its role and some
inherent attribute. First, it has a most natural inter-cultural closeness as the mentor to
the Nigerian offspring. Second, its inherent feminine attribute has accorded to this
branch of Nigerian leadership a distinctiveness that allows for success compared to
its male-counterparts. 1 Some of the effectiveness of the Nigerian women leadership
is due more to the fact that its functionaries are often gender specific.
Due to the strong racial resilience of American civilization, the Nigerian
immigrant communities examined in this study were found to be more effective
within the African-American context. Despite some differences in generational and
historical cycles, both the crisis of American slavery as well as colonial
dispossession corresponded with the differentiated socio-cultural experiences that
continue to affect the relations between the two related groups. 2
Also, the general distribution of the Nigerian ancestry group populations was
found to be strongest in the Southern U.S., and again within the African-American
context.
3
Yet, in the South or elsewhere in the U.S., Nigerians tended to have a
detached pattern of residential/neighborhood bonding with African-Americans. This
detached residential/neighborhood pattern of Nigerian immigrants toward African-
Americans was found to be influenced by the socio-cultural crisis of the black
'For example, Authur's Invisible Sojourners , pp. 110-124, does not quite accord to the
African male immigrants the same degree of extended role accorded their females in the
particular development of their American-born offspring. Nonetheless, his general
conception of the point referenced here seems good enough for understanding the agency of
the African women in the development of their American offspring. My research, however,
leans with some skepticism toward some of the conclusions reached by Authur.
2
This is based on general examination of the related data in this dissertation. See, for
instance the major emphases on this issue in Chapters 1-7.
3
For example, see notes on Allen and Turner, We The People: An Atlas of America's Ethnic
Diversity
,
especially "Introduction," pp. 143-150.
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experience in America. 1 These then are the social effects of American apartheid
which alluded to earlier in this dissertation.2
For, arguably, the fact that successful middle-class Nigerians—like African-
Americans—often chose to live outside predominantly black neighborhoods might
suggest that the general flight from the black neighborhood was rooted in their socio-
cultural experience in America. Therefore, situations where Nigerians chose to live
in predominantly white neighborhood can be a very misleading basis for claiming
that a majority of them had sustained intra-cultural collaboration with mainstream
Americans, or with their related agencies. Some aspect of this attitude can be traced
to the inherent crisis of individualism in American cultures. 3 Nonetheless, in the
particular circumstances of Nigerian/Africa immigrants, this development appears to
be closely linked to the socio-cultural problem of incorporating African descent
indices into American society.
An educated guess can then be made that, in a situation where Nigerian
immigrants are among the newest of the newcomers within the mosaic, they not only
confront crises that affect their collective unity but also one corresponding with
expressed inter-racial distancing from African-Americans.
5
This again seems to
confirm the negative effects of the varying degrees of intra-racial/socio-cultural
tensions associated with racism and discrimination in America impinging on African
decent people.
'For example, see our major conclusions in Chapters 4-7 of this dissertation.
2
For example, see earlier reference to Massey and Denton, American Apartheid, in Chapter
6.
3See earlier notes in Chapter 4 on Bellah et al. on "Individualism in American Cultures."
4
This conclusion is supported by findings especially in Chapters 5-6 of this dissertation.
5
This reference was supported by the general evidence in Chapters 4, 5, and 6.
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Nigerians therefore comprised one of the most inassimilable bases of
America's immigrants. Beyond this, furthermore, our analyses revealed that the
rigid tenacity of the unfriendly allies, which affected sustained partnerships of
Nigerians with African-Americans, also corresponded with their general pattern of
contextual instability.
1
Ultimately the preceding trend was found to correspond with
why Nigerian immigrants exhibited a selective pattern of neighborhood
incorporation in America. Similarly, it explains why most of them considered
themselves as "foreigner," and why their high levels of education were mostly
geared toward economic survival than necessarily the case with integration or
assimilation.
Unsurprisingly, our data analyses did not find very favorable support for
sustained inter-American incorporation of Nigerian or black African indices. 3 Even
the more established professional classes were often susceptible to deep-seated
socio-cultural crisis on the basis of their accent, which further reinforced the racial
indifference toward them, as well as set them apart as a group.
So, as found in this study, what constituted Nigerians' visibility within the
African-American context was far stronger in such Southern cities as Atlanta, Dallas,
and Houston. Within this context, Houston, in Texas, had one of the strongest
evidences of a Nigerian immigrant community currently in the diaspora.
'Udofia, Trotter Review, p. 32.
2
This is discussed in perhaps greater details in Chapter 6. Also, see Authur, Invisible
Sojourners
,
pp. 3-4.
3Gordon, Nigeria's Diverse Peoples , p. 237.
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4. The Black Diaspora of Enslavement and the Nigerian
Diaspora of Colonialism in the Crossroads of American Sojourn
What then were the benefits resulting from the forced and voluntary
migrations of sub-Saharan Africans to the U.S.? Based on the data examined in this
dissertation (Chapters 1 to 7), we approached this issue by looking at both the
general and specific contexts of African-Americans and Nigerian immigrants. 1 For
example, going by the Nigerian variable, this approach revealed that its comparable
edge with African-American from 1960s onward was least likely to support an all
round understanding of varying historical eras. With this revelation, it was found
that it might be more rewarding to focus more on the Nigerian physicians albeit with
some occasional forays into other related sectors of the Nigerian settlers.
If, therefore, some of the benefits derived from the forced and voluntary
migrations by African-Americans and Nigerians were taken from the 1960s to 1990s,
the conclusion would very likely be that they had not done too badly in their current
status of American sojourn. At the same time, however, the Nigerian variable would
have called for greater substantiation since the likely gains made in the U.S. were
almost simultaneous with the end of foreign rule back in the homeland. This would
then have meant that the end of foreign rule in Nigeria had perhaps no positive
effects on the internal cohesion of its highly trained and skilled classes of personnel.
Hence, given the undeniable crisis of institutional instability after alien rule in
Nigeria, along with the corresponding political and economic crisis, the simultaneous
emigration of its skilled class to the U.S. could even be seen as having facilitated
'The underlying assumption of this dissertation was that shared experiences of "racial
otherness" would correspond with relationship between the descendants of slaves and
voluntary migration from Nigeria in America. For further elaboration, see Chapter 1
.
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some prospects of human development. That is, as documented in this dissertation,
in the case of Nigerian physicians, the alternate result is rather positive.
Also, as shown earlier in the case of black America, despite continuing
problems, some tremendous gains have been made since it broke the chains of racial
slavery. Indeed, its racial indices are currently being represented in nearly all the
crucial features of American world development. This fact is particularly undeniable
in considering black features in such areas as popular cultures, academia, corporate
American leadership, politics, military leadership, and in the sciences. 1
Like their African-American kin—some sectors of Nigerian settlers in
America are beginning to achieve some necessary strengths within the capitalist
economy. With their current access to modern technology and ideas of collaborative
exchanges as well as philanthropic missions, the future of post-colonial settlers
points toward the possibility of sustainable development of their homeland from the
American shores.2 The ANPA efforts to integrate the Nigerian homeland and the
rest of Africa into an industrial age from the diaspora are clearly supportive of some
gains.
3
Other gains by Nigerians in America are to be seen across the American
landscape in their emerging independent entrepreneurships, legal professionals,
accountants, sport stars, engineering profession, academia, auto dealerships,
computer software, cultural institutions, and healthcare businesses. By all the
available criteria, their overall numerical potentialities represent the most
'Based on the literature review, see chapter 1 of this dissertation.
2
Ibid., especially chapter 4, which examines and discusses the role of Nigerian physicians in
America.
3
For example, see ANPA literature in Chapter 4.
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concentrated representation of any sector of the black African diaspora of
colonialism. This then is the central fact of the emigration which resulted from the
disruptions of post-colonial institutions back in the Nigerian homeland. 1 On the
other hand, however, the effects of American slavery and colonialism have continued
to threaten the gains made by African-Americans and Nigerian settlers.
First, it is probable that without slavery and its corresponding relationship
with colonialism, the context of the socio-cultural crisis that affect black Americans
and Nigerians in American society would either have been much different in
character or less visible in its structural tenacity. Second, as found in this study, the
enduring effect of slavery and colonialism is the most common predictor of
socioeconomic and politico-cultural crisis for African-Americans and Nigerians in
the U.S. This is the most serious indictment of their American sojourn. 2 This
background, along with the continuing racial indifference, further confirms why,
despite some economic gains—African-Americans and Nigerians are the least
assimilable enclaves of ethnic America.
The race crisis that confronts African-Americans in their country of birth
mirrors how most Nigerians can interact with them and among themselves within the
mosaic. It explains as well why Nigerians—like their kin—are increasingly
becoming attached to their indigenous institutions for socioeconomic and cultural
uplift, and longer-term security. Similarly, it explains why they are likely to employ
the egalitarian principles of the republic to advance their interests without necessarily
'See, for example, chapters 1 and 3.
2
Also, see, for example, Chapters 2, 3, 5-7.
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compromising their cultural foundations. 1 This feature is not exceptional to the
black experience in the U.S.: the struggle of multiculturalism is also an effort to
strengthen and retain some cultural identities within existing differences.
For African-Americans and Nigerians, however, the preceding trend appears
to be more peculiar. The extent, then, to which the descendants of forced migration
and voluntary Nigerian migration benefited from the crossroads of American
sojourn, is lopsided. There are still strong evidences of human and institutional crisis
in black Africa and black America that are traceable to the negative effects of these
two historic migrations. Beyond this, there are still no ways of ascertaining what
type of human developments might have taken place in black Africa and black
America had not the negative effects of slavery and colonial dispossession been so
rigidly sustained after emancipation and end of colonial rule. As found in this study,
the effects of slavery and colonialism were closely associated with the sometimes
tenuous relationships between African-Americans and Nigerians, all of which
corresponded with their current status of lopsided development.
Thus, there are evidences that the resultant benefits of the two historic
migrations of Africans to the U.S. are lacking in terms of relative balance within
'This conclusion is based on an examination of the demography of forced migrants and
voluntary Nigerian migrants in the U.S. We have emphasized aspects of this trend in
Chapters 1, 2, and 4-7 of this dissertation.
2
Also, for political and institutional retardation of Africa south of the Sahara, see Kennedy,
Preparing for the Twenty-First Century , pp. 211-219. For the demographic crisis of
European expansion and effects of slavery, see, for example, Walter Rodney, How Europe
Underdeveloped Africa (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1982), especially
Chapter IV; Manning Marable. How Capitalism Underdeveloped Black America (Boston"
South End Press, 1983), especially the "Introduction;" Inikori, "The Slave trade and the
Atlantic economies," pp. 76-80; Segal, The Black Diaspora , pp. 3-69; Blackburn, The
New
World Slavery , p. 4.
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their human and regional context. This is due largely to the inordinate-subordinate
status that the descendants of these two migrations occupy within the crossroads of
American sojourn. As suggested by the data analyses, the extent to which capitalism
underdeveloped black America is closely linked to the underdevelopment of sub-
Saharan Africa as well as to the lopsided development of Nigerians through post-
colonial migration.
1
This further confirms the relationship between the attitude of
historical eras on the pattern of human development and underdevelopment.
The Nigerian context in America, in particular, can further be explained.
Given the current state of poor healthcare services back in the Nigerian homeland,
the loss of its skilled class of medical scientists at a time they were needed in the
homeland was found to be a serious crisis. These populations were mostly males
just as during the forced migration. Back in Nigeria, solving even the most
common medical problem would still have required its best trained physicians
currently practicing within or outside the medical fields in the U.S. Despite efforts
to use their official status in the diaspora to uplift the poor healthcare system in the
homeland, and despite the prospect of continuing future gains in their American
expertise, they still represent a missing link in the overall human development of
Nigeria/Africa. 3
'ibid. Apraku, African Emigres in the United States , pp. 3-9; and Chapters 1, 3-7.
2
This is based on the ANPA profiles from 1994 to 2000. For the record of black Africa's
loss of males, see, for example, Segal, The Black Diaspora , pp. 4-5; Inikori, "The slave trade
and the Atlantic economies, 1451-1870," pp. 67-80. The same pattern of male loss was
characteristic of post-colonial African immigration to the U.S. (Levinson and Ember,
American Immigrant Cultures , p. 950.
3Apraku, African Emigres in the United States , pp. 19, 110. Also, see earlier notes on
ANPA missions to Nigeria, Chapter 4; and Apraku, pp. 3-9.
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Whatever the side gains of Nigerian physicians in America, one cannot
overlook the cost of shouldering their initial medical training by both the federal and
state governments, and ultimately of losing them and their services. Their enormous
successes in the diaspora are in sharp contrast with the appalling state of healthcare
underdevelopment in the homeland. This is made further problematic by the racial
indifferences that constrain their incorporation into the American medical
establishments. Only about 4,000 Nigerian physicians were certified in practice by
ANPA between 1994 and 2006, compared to an estimated 21,000 of them reportedly
in the U.S. by around mid- 1995. This seems to be a development that can be viewed
within the context of cultural constraints. 1
Our earlier emphasis that post-colonial African migration to the U.S.
represented the most distinctive phase of world migration (1960s to 1980s) can then
be viewed in light of the uneven diffusion of its indices due to racial slavery and
colonialism. Unsurprisingly, the general pattern of incorporating the black African
migrants into American society reflected almost a similar pattern of north-south
thrust of the races of Africa first evident in the shift from the Afro-Asian lanes to the
New World particularly between the 1500s and 1800s and thereafter. 2
Within the U.S., this trend mirrors a North African to North-East African to
South African to West African thrust of incorporating African migrants into society.
Thus, black African migrants from Western and Central Africa, where a majority of
the New World slaves were taken, are most likely to occupy an Unfavorable orbit of
inter/intra-American incorporation.
'ibid. Also, see Chapters 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of this dissertation.
2
See, for example, particularly Chapters 2 and 3 for some emphases of this trend.
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Further examination of the data revealed that patterns of misunderstanding
and unfavorable coverage of Nigerians and African-Americans in the media were
shaped by differences at their generational and cultural cycles. 1 However, the two
groups complemented each other's strengths and weaknesses in terms of cultural
exchanges, political rapport, and socioeconomic partnerships—in ways yielding
toward greater understanding than misunderstanding, and favorable than unfavorable
disposition.
2
Additionally, both the descendants of forced migration and voluntary
migration often differed in their perception of their inherent racial identities. As
found in this study, this was mostly at the intersection of the experiential negative
effects of slavery and colonialism.
To descendants of slaves, being forced out of the homelands could mean that
concise lines of conscious re-entry into the homelands were seriously undermined.
The umbilical cord, particularly in the language medium, had either been broken or
seriously destroyed.
To the core Nigerians/Africans, both the medium and consciousness of
exchanges with the homeland were found to be intact, even if often distorted. But, to
their American-born descendants, although the medium is still distorted, it is more
flexible and can allow for clearer lines of direct or an indirect re-entry into some of
the traditional cultures of the homelands.
3
This appears to be one of the most unique
'For example, this based on the content analyses of Nigerian/African community media. See
Chapter 7 for elaboration.
2
Ibid.
3
This conclusion corresponded with analyses of the direction of the general cross-cultural
data ofNigerian immigrants. This was supportive of the evidences in Chapter 5 to 7.
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features of the emergent new Afro-Atlantic relations in America. This also
corresponds with the birth of a more definitive medium of renewed exchanges
between the descendants of American slaves and voluntary African migration.
5. The Birth of a Conciliatory Generation:
The American-born Offspring of Nigerian Immigrants 1
Another interesting find in this study was that post-colonial Nigerian
migration to the U.S. has provided a more definite nerve of ancestral regeneration
between the descendants of forced migration and voluntary migration. This re-
confirms the birth of "a conciliatory generation." That is, there is now a growing
new breed of Nigerians/Africans of American birth, with a more distinctive historical
and cultural aptitude to re-link the two core bases of the forced migrants and
voluntary migrants from Africa, as well as others. Because they have a far lesser
degree of deep-seated consciousness of the negative effects of racial slavery and
colonialism compared to their forebears, it was found that the earlier experiences
White-Black relations had begun to intersect with an era of more amendable and
positive relations between black America and black Africa, as well as Euro-America.
As a result, these Nigerian/African offspring represented the strongest
dynamic of post-colonial African migration currently in America. Their populations,
similarly, represented the most direct indicators of natural growth of the
Nigerian/African ancestry groups in the diaspora. This trend was indeterminate prior
'See, for example, Udofia, "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp.
266-270, where this emphasis was first explored; Udofia, Trotter Review, p. 32; Udofia,
Research Report, pp. 40-1.
2
Ibid., Trotter Review , pp. 32-3.
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to the 1960s.
1
For example, the general population of immigrants from Nigeria in the
U.S. rose from 55,350 in 1990 to 134,000 in 2000. 2 This represented an increase of
about 41,950 over the one decade. During this same period, their ancestry group
population rose from 91,688 in 1990 to 137,002 in 2000—representing an increase
of some 45,314. This meant that, between 1980 and 2000, the general population of
Nigerians in America, along with that of their offspring, increased simultaneously. 3
This same pattern held for the entire sub-Saharan African ancestry group population,
which witnessed the strongest peak from about 260,000 in 1990 to about 1,500,000
in 2000.
4
As suggested by our data, the American-born offspring of Nigerian
immigrants represent a conciliatory generation to black America. 5 Given the
sometimes tenuous relations between black America and black Africa, this
development was found to represent a most assuring nerve of sustained future
partnerships. The generational and historical plateau of the Nigerian offspring was
also found to be markedly dissimilar from that of the core parents. Thus, they are
more likely to have faithful relations with the black base as well as with their
American origin.
Nigerian offspring have already accessed the American black base as carriers
of new hope. Within the black base, they are less likely to be faulted for their
complicity in the traumatic dispersal of their brethren in the era of racial slavery and
'See, for example, Chapters land 3, Tables 2 and 13.1.
2
Ibid.; including the U.S. Bureau of the Census Report, 2000.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
5
"The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 266-270; Trotter Review , p.
32.
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racial capitalism. A more faithful blending within the Nigerian and African-
American bloc forms the backdrop of this conciliatory impulse. 1
These Nigerian offspring are beginning to develop patterns of relationships
with both Black America and Euro-America that would be markedly different from
those of their forebears. They represent two or more strongly knit cultural amalgams
from which they could construct a more viable mechanism of urban survival.2 The
interactions of the Nigerian/African offspring would most likely stir some positive
inter-and-intra Euro-American and African-American and African cultural
transformation. For example, in the 1994 Miss America Beauty Pageant, an
American-born Nigerian, Miss Ohio, Titilayo Adedokum, 20, of Cincinnati, was a
second runner-up. 3
Other interactions which involve the collective interest of Nigerians in
America are also beginning to take place through the medium of their offspring.
Even if these offspring should be forced to return to the homelands of their migrant
parents, chances are that they would still represent much-needed talents of cross-
cultural and politico-economic linkages to Black America and Black Africa, as well
as to Euro-America.
While in the diaspora, their parents insisted on the sound education of their
offspring, with an understanding of the advantages of both inter-African as well as
American world developments. They adopted culturally effective empowerment
'Skinner, "The Dialectic between Diasporas and Homelands," p. 17; Trotter Report, p. 32.
2
Ibid.
3The 1994 Miss America Beauty Pageant in Atlantic City, New Jersey, had an American-
born Nigerian or related African offspring as a second runner-up. Udofia, "The Status of the
Relationship with African Americans," pp. 156-7.
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strategies aimed at making their offspring to succeed in the U.S. 1 An educated
guess can be made that the Nigerian offspring will most likely provide the basis for a
more definitive accords between Nigeria and America in the foreseeable decades of
the twenty-first century.
It can be speculated that the emerging bond between the Nigerian offspring
and the American black base and Euro-America will most likely be facilitated by
some degree of intermarriages. This development may depend, to a certain extent,
on the political forces shaping their American agenda. It may also depend on their
general status of incorporation within the mosaic.
Where the above development embraces all the American-born offspring of
African immigrants, then, it can be surmised that their collective numerical power
will very likely become influential in shaping inter-African-American as well as
inter-Euro-American policies toward Africa in the twenty-first century. 2
Given the strong lag in the pace of Nigerian/African world development, it
can be further be speculated that, as the twenty-first century unfolds, the American
dynamic of this "conciliatory generation" will very likely embrace the larger concert
of American and European-Asiatic collaborations toward Africa. Luckily enough,
the Nigerian offspring already possessed an advantage in their natural adaptation to
the English language and hence to the cultural skills needed to succeed. As such,
they are likely to represent the most effective lanes of exchanges between the
homelands and the Western Hemisphere. As the most natural representatives of
Nigeria/Africa, they are also likely to navigate the often troubling compulsions of
'
ibid.; Trotter Review , p. 32.
2
"The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 266-269.
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intra-American and European relations for Africa with a more genuine interest of the
homelands, the black diaspora of the Western Hemisphere, and their American
origin.
Additionally, these new generations of Nigerians/Africans Americans are
more likely than their core migrant parents to master the cultural implications of the
Euro-American linguistic traditions. A culturally mature propagation of the African
voice within the American as well as the larger global context will be pivotal to
constructive relationship between Black America and Black Africa as well as Euro-
America in much of the twenty-first century.
More than a decade ago, Mazrui and Nicol identified the Anglo-Saxon
English language legacy as the medium of universal translation. 1 While their
observation is well noted, the view here is that, the anticipated transformation of this
development does seem at this point to be more suited within the historical context
of the American-born offspring of the African diaspora of colonialism. An elaborate
evidence of their dynamic will probably mature by the mid-twenty first century from
within the American humanity.
Conclusively, with the birth of a conciliatory generation, the
Nigerian/African-U.S. relations entered into an era of sustainable relations as never
before—both within and beyond. This, as noted earlier, marks the beginning of a
more definitive medium of intra-American collaboration with Africa, as well as a
more rewarding epoch of cultural diffusion. Yet, comparatively, the Nigerian
'Mazrui, "The World Economy and the African/afro-American Connection," p. 43-45;
Davidson Nicole, "Response," in Dynamics of the African/Afro-American Connection:
From Dependency to Self-Reliance , p. 59.
2Udofia "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," p. 269.
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offspring either within a specific or the general context of the black African offspring
are only now beginning to do what others from non-African descent regions had long
done as Americans. Again, we see here how the attitudes of historical eras as well as
constrained medium of collective exchanges, can affect the character of human
development.
6. The Nigerian-African Community Media vs.
Nigerian-African Churches
Due consideration then was given in this dissertation to two structures of the
Nigerian immigrant community in America: Nigerian church and media. This was
because, for Nigerian immigrants, community power was found to gravitate more
substantially around their community churches and the media in the diaspora. As the
evidences found in the Southern cities showed, there were about five hundred major
Nigerian-owned churches: Houston alone owned about one hundred,
1
coupled with
its powerful network of the Nigerian community media.
While the role of the Nigerian community media was influential, particularly
in the development of Nigerians in Southern cities of the U.S., an overall data
analysis confirmed that the Nigerian-owned and pastored churches were the most
dynamic instruments in their current transformation. This phenomenon was more
operative within the African-American context.
2
This trend revealed evidences of
contextual partnerships between Nigerian-owned churches and African-American
'This is based on an exploratory survey of the Nigerian data in the South. For example,
the
population of Nigerian churches in the South would probably be much higher if every mock
assemblage of the Judeo-Christian congregation of Nigerians were counted.
2The evidences in this conclusion were in Chapters 3-4 but with stronger elaboration
in
Chapters 6-7.
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churches and some white churches, actively supported by the Nigerian offspring and
African-American memberships. 1 Within the African-American context, Nigerian
churches were found to be replaying some of the nineteenth century patterns of the
Negro Christian missionary crusade to convert so-called heathen Africans to
Christianity. This trend was found to be taking place between African and African-
American churches across international waters. 2
Generally, these churches represented Nigerian territories in a foreign land.
Even if they operated on an adversarial premise to the host nation, which was not
here even the case, they were the locales where Nigerians acted more in their terms
and in accordance with the revealed messages of God.
The Nigerian church adherents were particularly freer and more frank to one
another and as a collective cultural unit within their Judeo-Christian tenet. The
churches were found to be important economic vehicle in supporting the struggles of
the faithful brethren. Active economic support from the brethren's communities
often required sustained membership and participation in the necessary activities of
the church.
3
In other words, adherents must first demonstrate their faith, which,
according to our analysis, corresponded with welding and the re-direction of the
contextual divergence of ethnic Nigeria in the diaspora.
In another sense, the presumptions of power require not only an
acceptable territorial integrity but the potential to convert or will
people—related or unrelated—to the contending imperatives.
4
'Ibid.
2
Ibid. See, for example, excerpt entitled "Dr. Frederick K.C. Price in Nigeria," All Nations
for Christ: Redemption Faith Magazine , pp. 9-13.
3
Ibid.
4
"The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," p. 282.
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A case study of the Brotherhood Church indicated that its American Bethels
exude with a "messianic mission" to convert black Americans back to the
motherland. During the 1980s, this church took some black American members on a
religious crusade to Nigeria, with some reportedly willing to resettle in Nigeria. 1
Conclusively, the Brotherhood's message of "universal love" and "human
brotherhood," was found to be in furtherance of the ideals of Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr., the slain civil rights leader.
7. Direction of Coverage by Nigerians/Africans and African-Americans
in Nigerian-African Community Media in Southern U.S. Cities
As hinted above, the Nigerian-owned media, like the Nigerian church, had
enormous influences on the direction of the Nigerian immigrant community. Also,
as with the church, the influences of the Nigerian media were stronger in Southern
cities of the U.S. First, our data revealed that they were the medium through which
Nigerian voices converged on shared ideas within the American mosaic. Second,
they were crucial in informing their communities about available resources upon
which Nigerians identified themselves and their interests as a group in a foreign land.
As found in this study, their numerous influences were generally unquestionable.
3
Unlike the Nigerian-owned churches, the Nigerian media sometimes lacked
unifying themes. Apart from providing essential information on the Nigerian-owned
businesses, social events, and other developmental issues, the extent to which they
'The Herald of the New Kingdom. U.S. Special Edition (May, 1988); see examples excerpts
in the Appendix.
2
Ibid.
3
J. Nkrumah, "African Businesses Target African Customers," African Business Source
Magazine (June/July, 1992), pp. 7, 21.
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extent to which they had a unifying theme of an American as well as of the
homeland development was often mixed and indeterminate. 1
As found in this study, however, the published views of Nigerians/Africans in
their community media on the issue of race were much clearer. This seems to be a
similar pattern for the descendants of slaves. For example, the content analyses of
the published views of African-Americans and Nigerians confirmed to an existing
understanding on racial/socio-cultural matters between the two groups. This was
supported by how they employed their racial/cultural experiences to depict their
views. Further analyses revealed a trend toward greater understanding between the
two groups than misunderstanding as well as favorable than unfavorable
predisposition. Nigerians and African-Americans also shared almost a similar degree
of socio-cultural crises in America.
A careful examination of the data on the Nigerian media revealed that
existing misunderstanding and unfavorable disposition between African-Americans
and Nigerians were often based on errant grasp of their historical context rather than
deliberate omission based on personal desire. Nonetheless, the very element of
misunderstanding or unfavorable disposition should be reason for concern: such an
attitude operated in a socio-cultural setting as yet to develop a united vision of
collective Pan-African development.
Variations in the overall media weight levels and frequency of coverage on
African-Americans shown in both the Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the content analyses
'The problem of ethnic splits among Nigerians makes a clear definition of communal theme
of human development somewhat difficult through their community media.
2
See, for example, Chapters 4-7.
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were stronger in areas with dense concentrations of African-American and
Nigerians/Africans. These were mostly in the Southern U.S., enclaves with high
incidences of racism and discrimination. 1 The Good Hope News
. African Business
Source (Phase 1, 1990-1992) and The African Herald (Phase 2, 1993-2000) were
stationed in Dallas and Houston. Along with the dense concentration of black-
owned institutions and populations, the proximity of these two competing sister-
cities to each other, also corresponded with the intense social crises affecting
Nigerians and African-Americans.2
At this point, however, the Southern enclave of the Nigerian News Digest
(Phase 1, 1990-1992) and African News Weekly (Phase 2, 1993-2000), requires
some explanation. Asheville, in North Carolina, where the Nigerian News Digest
was first stationed before relocating to Charlotte as African News Weekly , had
neither as large a size of Nigerians nor of African-Americans as Dallas and Houston;
nor, moreover, as extensive a size of black institutions. This variant had a lot to do
with the design of its targeted audiences.
Recommendations
Based on the overall data examined in this dissertation, it is the opinion of the
author of this dissertation that the following questions are in need of a resolution:
1 . As found in this study, post-colonial Nigerian immigration to the U.S.
is unique in that the processes of its historical exchanges after slavery
and colonialism are markedly dissimilar from those of Europeans and
other non-African descent groups. Where Nigeria or black Africa as a
'See "Methodology," in Chapter 1, and Chapters2-3, 6-7.
2
See especially Chapter 7.
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bloc did not have any clearly sustainable control over the medium of
socioeconomic and cultural collaboration as well as of the diffusion of
its vital interests until the 1960s, would it be determined what the net
effects are/were on the later course of its immigration and the related
context of American world development, etc.?
If, as we have stated here, sustainable interactions and exchanges
were collectively linked to the medium of human exchanges as well
as to the attitudes of historical eras—since the opening of the Atlantic
system of world capitalism—would it be determined which historical
era Nigeria or black Africa really began to have an effective
interaction with the modern world after slavery and colonialism, and
why?
The Nigerian offspring found in this study represented a conciliatory
generation particularly to Black America and Black Africa, as well as
to Euro-America. How can we further explain the likely implications
of their generational transformation, which are certain to involve their
American and Nigerian-African backgrounds, and even far beyond?
As found in this study, one of the underlying implications of the
Nigerian-African build-up in America is that there is now a more
viable socio-cultural context to gauge the direction of race relations
between two historically related and almost similarly affected
generations. How then can scholars further explain or re-explain the
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similarities and dissimilarities between the two migrations, along with
those from Asia, the Americas, and Europe?
Answers to the above questions are certain to take us toward a clearer
understanding of the emerging new dynamics in the ancestral relationships between
the descendants of forced migration and voluntary African migration to the U.S.,
along with those of European and non-European regions. Such answers may suggest
the general direction of race relations for the two most affected groups, as well as for
all others in the twenty-first century. On the other hand, of course, they may lead us
toward a greater understanding of the still revolving demographic composition of
reactive patterns of global migration into the U.S. This dissertation is one step in
that direction.
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APPENDIX A
DEFINITIONS OF TERMS
Association of Nigerian Physicians in the Americas
African News Weekly
The loss of the skilled class of Nigerian/African personnel to
the U.S.
Civil Rights/Race Politics
The crisis of European colonial enclosure and dispossession in
Africa: the alienation of Africans from their lands and
cultures, and resources due to colonial exploitation.
The survivors/descendants of the Middle Passage, who were
forced to America against their will.
Voluntary Nigerian/Black African migrant-settlers in the U.S.
largely from the 1960 to 2000 who migrated due to the
disruptions of post-colonial institutions, etc.
This refers to an article(s) in a newspaper that expresses the
opinion of its editors or publishers.
Prominent news stories or articles in a newspaper that may be
opinionated.
The average number of times a given position or message is
aired or published over a given period of time.
This involves relationships of historical nature among
culturally/racially related, or sometimes among similarly
differing interest groups, etc.
This involves relationships among African descent groups
with racial/cultural, political, and economic affinities, as well
as of groups with differing but closely related regional and
global interests—who have shared collective vision of
achieving a common goal.
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Media Weight
Neocolonialism:
Negative News:
OFRSP:
OAAAB:
Positive News:
Reactive
Relations
Reactive
Migration:
RRR:
RSP:
SEBAP:
Straight News:
A net level of continuous concentration of information on a
subject.
Control of Africans by their former colonial masters,
especially in the spheres of economics, cultural, and political
development after decolonization.
News stories that reflect stereotypical tendencies and biases,
misunderstanding, and that lack the criteria of objective
journalism.
Opinion Feature Racial Solidarity and Pan-Africanism
Opinion-Attitude About American Blacks.
A news story that is objective and that embraces the essential
features of a rounded news/journalism.
A corresponding relations to an uncertain or certain event,
whose outcomes involves racial/cultural groups with differing
and often irreconcilable regional and global interests, mirrored
mostly from the perspective of Europeans to non-Europeans.
This involves differing reactions via migration which are often
of uncontrollable and unplanned responses/implications to
modern human needs, etc: since the opening of the modern
era, these kinds of migrations have been driven by the upward
and downward pulls of socioeconomic, political, and cultural
opportunities—for example, the pull of Europeans through
colonization to non-European regions—and the current pull of
ex-colonial subjects to the metropoles of the ex-colonial states
in Europe and North America, etc.
Race Relation and Racism
Racial Solidarity and Pan-Africanism
Special Events-Black American Personages
News stories that have clear objectives and that convey
understandable, broadly direct and known information.
SANPA: Students' Association ofNigerian Physicians in the Americas
TAH: The African Herald
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APPENDIX B
THE AFRICAN HERALD, 1996-2000
African Americans
News About African Americans: NAAA (2)
Vol 7 No. 10 October. 1996. p. 5 (Congresswoman Johnson Announces
NHTSA Grant to Dallas Organization for safe Communities)
Vol 7 No. 10 October, 1996, p. 5 (Sturns named Senior V.P. for Harris
Methodist Health)
Racial Solidarity-Pan-Africanism: NRSP (11)
Vol 7 No.7 July 1996. p 3 (African Chamber of Commerce Annual Event
held in Dallas
Vol 7 No. 11 Nov. 1 996. p. 5 ("African Adventure Day" in Dallas)
Vol 7 No. 1 1 Nov. 1996. p. 6 (Congresswoman Eddie Bernice Johnson meets
with Nigerian Leaders)
Vol 8 No.l Jan. 1997, p. 1 (Lawyer questions U.S. Refugee Ceiling on
Africa)
Vol 8 No 1 Jan 1 997. p. 3 (TPA Treasurer passes on)
Vol 8 No. 1 Jan. 1997. p. 3 (Kwanzaa's Last Day held in Style)
Vol 9 No 7 July 1998, p. 3 (San Antonio: A Place to be)
Vol 9 No 7 July 1998. p. 5 (Africans and Blacks in the Diaspora
Consultation. . . .Tuskegee)
1 Vol 10 No 3 March 1 999. p. 1 (Dr. AH Mazrui Speaks at UTA African
Lecture Series)
Vol 1 1 No. 2 Feb. 2000, p.3 ( 10 Things Black Folks should do Now)
Vol 1 1 No. 2 Feb. 2000, p. 5 (Our Focus is African American Missionaries)
News-Civil Rights Race-Politics: NCRRP (23)
Vol 7 No 5 May 1 996. p. 1 (Libya suggests CIA May Have Killed Ron
Brown)
Vol 8 No 1 Jan 1 997. p. 1 (Where Do We Go from Here?)
Vol 8 No 1 Jan 1997, p. 8 (Nyon Carrathers named Director of Outreach &
Health Ed....)
Vol 8 No 1, Jan 1 1997. p. 21 (Roster of U.S. White House, Cabinet
Appointments)
Vol 9 No 7 July 1998. p. 7 (Clinton Has New Rules for Minority Business
Preferences)
Vol 9 No 7 July 1998. p. 20 (43 Haitians Wash Ashore in Jamaica)
Vol 9 No 7 July 1998. p. 20 (Haitians Decry Unfair Treatment)
Vol 9 No 5 May 1998, p. 7 (Western Michigan University Names First Black
President)
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Vol 9 No 12 Dec. 1 998. p. 3 (Senator Royce West Expresses Concern over
States....Report)
Vol 9 No 12 Dec 1 998. p. 7 (MU Receives $2.4 million Grant to Train
Minority Professors)
Vol 10 No 1 Jan. 1999, p. 1 (Dr. King's Day Remembered: His Letter from
Birmingham)
Vol 10 No 1 Jan. 1999. p. 5 (Mississippi Head Start Program Receives $2 8
M)
Vol 10 No 1 Jan 1999. p. 6 (Man Becomes State's First Black Sheriff)
Vol 10 No 1 Jan. 1999. p. 6 (Lawmakers Still Grappling with Hopwood)
Vol 10 No 1 Jan 1999. p. 7 (Coroner: Woman Killed by Police shot 12
Times)
Vol 10 No 1 Jan 1999 p 7 (ATOKA County)
Vol 10 No 1 Jan 1 999 p 7 (Espy Friends Celebrate Verdict)
Vol 10 No 2 Feb 1 999. p. 1 (Dr. King's Letter from Birmingham Jail on April
16,
'63)
Vol 10 No 3 Mar. 1999, p. 7 (Clinton Honors Legacy of Thurgood Marshall
...Opening)
Vol 1 1 No 2 Feb. 2000, p. l(By Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Continues
. . . Strange Liberators)
Vol 1 1 No 2 Feb. 2000. p. 7 (Missouri Legislation Would Name KKK'S
Adopted Highway)
Vol 1 1 No 2 Feb 2000 p 8 (Montgomery's First Black Presiding Judge Sworn
In)
Vol 1 1 No 2 Feb 2000 p 8 (Panhandle Jury Convicts Councilman in
Corruption Case)
News- Black American Business: NBAB (1)
Vol 7 No. 8 Aug. 1996. p. 14 (Black Investment Trust seen by Year-end)
Picture-News Black American Socials: PNBAS (6)
Vol 7 No 7 July 1996, p. 13 (Texas State Technical College Ad)
Vol 7 No 1 1 Nov 1996. p 3 (Royal Rack Reggae Club Ad)
Vol 7 No 1 1 Nov 1996. p. 7 (Law Office of Ollie Jefferson, P.C.)
Vol 7 No 1 1 Nov 1996. p. 20 (The Power is in Your Hands)
Vol 8 No 7 July 1 997. p. 6 (Bullock and Senator Ellis)
Vol 8 No 7 July 1 997, p. 20 (Women Changing the face of the Workforce)
Picture-News Black-American Business: PNBAB - 30
1 Vol 7 No 5 May 1 996, p. 6 (Walter & Maxine Session of Cherokee
County... Informer)
Vol 7 No 8 Aug. 1996, p. 3 (Royal Rack Reggae Club Ad)
Vol 7 No 8 Aug. 1996. p. 7 (Immigration Law Office of Ollie Jefferson, P.C.)
Vol 7 No 8 Aug. 1 996. p 1 3 (Texas State Technical College - Waco Ad)
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Vol 7 No. 10 Oct. 1996. p. 7 (Immigration Law Office of Ollie Jefferson
P.C.)
1 Vol 8 No 1 Jan 1997, p. 7 (Immigration Law Office of Ollie Jefferson
P.C.)
Vol 8 No 6 June 1997, p. 7 (Immigration Law Office of Ollie Jefferson, P.C )
Vol 8 No 6 June 1 997, p. 9 (Southwestern Bell Ad)
Vol 8 No 6 June 1 997, p. 20 (Women in Technology)
Vol 8 No 6 June 1997. p. 9 (Southwestern Bell Ad)
Vol 8 No 7 July 1997, p. 7 (Immigration Law Office of Ollie Jefferson, P.C.)
Vol 8 No 7 July 1997, p. 9 (Southwestern Bell Ad)
Vol 8 No 7 July 1997, p. 32 (HUD Homes Ad- Affordable Home Ownership)
Vol 9 No 5 May 1998, p. 7 (Immigration Law Office of Ollie Jefferson Ad)
Vol 9 No 5 May 1 998, p. 9 (Southwestern Bell Ad)
Vol 9 No 5 May 1 998, p. 22 (Texas State Technical College - Waco Ad)
Vol 9 No 5 May 1998, p. 28 (The Associates Ad - Lower your Payments)
Vol 9 No 7 July 1998, p. 7 (Texas State Technical College - Waco, Marshall)
Vol 9 No. 7 July 1 998, p. 9 (Southwestern Bell Ad)
Vol 9 No 12 Dec. 1 998, p. 3 (Royal Rack Reggae Club Ad)
Vol 9 No 12 Dec. 1998, p 9 (Southwestern Bell Ad)
Vol 9 No 12 Dec 1998, p. 15 (Your Phone Bill by AT&T)
Vol 9 No 12 Dec 1 998 p 3 1 (Internet Access by AT&T Ad)
Vol 10 No 2 Feb 1999, p. 3 (Royal Rack Reggae Club Ad)
Vol 10 No 2 Feb 1999, p. 9 (Association of Electric Companies of Texas,
Inc. Ad)
Vol 10 No 2 Feb 1999, p. 15 (Consumer Choice by AT&T)
Vol 10 No 3 Mar. 1999, p. 31 (Access Charges by AT&T Ad)
Vol 1 1 No 2 Feb. 2000, p. 29 (Southwestern Bell Ad)
Vol 1 1 No. 2 Feb. 2000, p. 30 (In the Future, our past will be present by
AT&T)
Vol 1 1 No. 2 Feb. 2000, p. 31 (Go, World. Go. - TXU Electric & Gas)
Picture-News About Racial Solidarity-Pan-Africanism: PNRSP (6)
Vol 7 No 1 1 Nov. 1996. p. 6 (Picture of Attorney Charles Maduka & Victor
Emuakhagon)
Vol 7 No 7 July 1996. p. 3 (Picture of Mr. Breedlove, Gloria and Mr. Miller)
Vol 7 No. 1 1 Nov. 1996. p. 6 (Picture of Hon. Eddie Bernice Johnson and
others)
Vol 8 No 6 June 1 997, p. 4 (Picture of Mr. John and Mrs. Robin Yearwood)
Vol 9 No 7 July 1998, p. 3 (Picture of Dr. Nwachukwu with Gen. Lloyd
Newton)
Vol 9 No 7 July 1998, p. 5 (Picture of Dr. Inyama, Jessam, Dr. Monday and
Mrs. Eliz. Offem)
Picture-News About White American Business (PNWAB) (2)
Vol 7 No 1 1 Nov 1 996 p 24 (Lotto Texas)
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Vol 7 No 1 1 Nov 1 996 p 26 (Legal Matters by Attorney General Dan
Morales)
Editorial: Special Events About Black American Personages: ESEBAP (i)
1 Vol 7 No 5 May 1 996 p 4 (Brown Built Bridges for Blacks)
Editorial: Racial Solidarity-Pan Africanism: ERSP (3)
Vol 7 No 1 1 Nov 1 996. p 4 (Senator Moseley -Braun's Visit: Compliments,
Please)
Vol 1 1 No 2 Feb. 2000. p. 4. (Martin Luther King III in Dallas)
Vol 1 1 No 2 Feb 2000. p. 4 (Letters to the Editor by Sheila Cunningham)
Editorial: Civil Rights Race Politics: ECRRP (2)
Vol 8 No. 1 Jan. 1997 p. 4 (Blacks and Clinton's Cabinet Appointment)
Vol 8 No. 1 Jan. 1997 p. 4 (What Goes Around Comes Around)
Opinion-Feature: (9VQpinion-Feature Race Relations-Racism: OFRRR (2)
1 Vol 7 No 7 July 1996, p. 22 (The Judicial System is unfair towards African-
Americans)
1 Vol 8 No 7 July 1 997. p. 25 (Supreme Court Finds Company Guilty of
Racial Discrimination)
Opinion-Feature Civil Rights Race Politics: OFCRRP (5)
Vol 7 No. 10 Oct 1996. p. 28 (The Enforcement of Minorities Rights)
Vol 8 No. 1 Jan. 1997. p. 28 (Proposition 209 and Affirmative Action:
Whither America?)
Vol 8 No 7 July 1997, p 25 (Hall asks Congress to Apologize to Descendants
of Slaves)
Vol 8 No 7 July 1997, p 25 (The First Black Trustee Elected to IU Board)
Vol 10 No. 3 March 1999, p. 25 (Lee Named S. Carolina's First Female
Black Circuit Court Judge)
Opinion-Feature Attitude About American Blacks: OFAAAB (2)
1 Vol 8 No 1 Jan 1997, p. 24 (Explorations in the city of Light: African-
American Artists)
1 Vol 9 No. 12 Dec 1998 p. 28 (Retention among African American Students
in Predominantly White Colleges and Universities in America)
Race Relations-Racism: RRR(18)
Vol 7 No. 8 Aug. 1 996 (NIMH Wastes Millions on Psychiatric Racism -
creates violence)
Vol 7 No 8 Aug 1996 p 7 (NAACP Head Says Racial Problems of 1960s
Endure)
1 Vol 7 No 10 Oct. 1996 p 6 (Black Employees Sue Bell Atlantic)
Vol 8 No. 6 June 1 997 p 6 (Grocery Chain Settles Discrimination Case for
$4.3M)
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Vol 8 No 6 June 1 997 p 3 1 (Judge Rules Beauty Shop Discrimination Suit
Can be Class Action)
Vol 8 No 6 June 1997 p 31 (Lone Black Student Graduates From Gonzaga
Law)
Vol 8 No 6 June 1 997 p 3 1 (Black Businessmen Sue Over Municipal
Purchasing & Contracting)
Vol 8 No 7 July 1 997 p 7 (Alabama Executes Ex-Klansman for Lynching of
Black Teenager)
Vol 8 No 7 July 1997 p 7 (Egyptian Sues U.S. Government over His Race
Classification)
Vol 8 No. 7 July 1997 p. 8 (Lawsuit: Police using excessive Force against
Ethnic Minorities)
Vol 8 No 7 July 1997 p 1 (Former Principal Murdered in Nigerian
Seminary)
Vol 9 No 12 Dec 1998 p 7 (Police Chief Suspended, Demoted)
Vol 9 No 12 Dec 1998 p 7 (Slave's Descendants Feel Vindicated)
Vol 9 No 12 Dec 1 998 p 7 Attorney Accuses Judge of Being Racist)
Vol 10 No 1 Jan 1 999 p 3 1 (Pizza Hut Settles Hate Crime Lawsuit)
Vol 10 No. 1 Jan 1999 p. 31 (Denver Toughens its Affirmative Action Law)
Vol 10 No 2 Feb 1 999 p 7 (UNT Guilty of Bias Against Black Professor)
Vol 10 No. 3 Mar. 1999 p. 4 (A Lesson from Jasper, Texas)
Racial Solidarity-Pan-Africanism: RSP (9)
1 Vol 7 No. 5 May 1996 p 5 (Lawyer sentenced for bank robbery)
1 Vol 7 No 8 Aug 1996 p 16 (Michael Jackson Composes Song for Mandela)
Vol 8 No 6 Jun 1 997 p 4 (Apology)
Vol 8 No 6 Jun 1997 p 5 (The Nation's Largest Black History Museum
Opens in Detroit)
Vol 8 No 7 July 1 997 p 5 (African Community Honors Retiring Human
Rights Commissioner)
Vol 9 No. 12 Dec. 1998 p. 30 (Jackson ends Africa Trip Heaping Praise on
Ghana)
Vol 10 No 2 Feb 1999 p 6 (Ethiopian Trade Consul Visits Dallas)
Vol 10 No 2 Feb 1999 p 6 (African Americans Monitor Gabon Election)
Vol 1 No 3 Mar 1 999 p6 (Book Review - Book: Here and Now - Author
K.L. Roby)
Special Events Black-American Personages: SEBAP (9)
1 Vol 7 No 8 Aug 1 996 p 6 (Alone in a Crowd: Prints by African Artists of
the ... open at Dallas)
1 Vol 7 No 1 1 Nov 1996 p 5 (Dallas Links Inc. Nominate Eddie Bernice
Johnson )
Vol 8 No 7 July 1 997 p 2 1 (Tyson Takes a Mega Bite out of Boxing)
Vol 8 No 7 July 1997 p 2 1 (Attorney Files Class Action Lawsuit Against
Tyson for Cable Refund
)
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Vol 9 No 5 May 1 998 p 5 (Book Review: The Silent Cradle)
Vol 9 No 5 May 1998 p 7 (Wolpe Speaks about U.S. Policy Toward Africa)
1 Vol 10 No 1 Jan 1999 p 6 (Engler Honors Rosa Parks)
1 Vol 10 No 3 Mar 1999 p 3 (Cottrell Honored)
1 Vol 1 1 No 2 Feb 2000, p 1 (Black Inventors: Something to share during the
Black History Month)
Civil Rights Race-Politics: CRRP (21)
1 Vol 7 No 5 May 1 996 p 5 (California Initiative to bar Racial Preferences
Qualifies)
Vol 7 No 7 July 1 996 p 6 (
1
st
African-American Female Deputy Chief of
Police Recognized)
Vol 7 No 7 July 1 996 p 7 (Congresswoman Eddie Bernice Johnson reacts to
SC Decision...)
Vol 7 No 7 July 1 996 p 8 (Hope High for Mfume Leadership at NAACP)
1 Vol 8 No 1 Jan 1 997 p 8 (Nyon Carathers Named Director of Outreach &
Health Edu.)
Vol 8 No 7 July 1997 p 6 (Senator Ellis Praises Lt. Gov. Bob Bullock for
Service to Texas)
Vol 8 No 7 July 1997 p 6 (Black Administrator at Jail Sues County for
Discrimination
)
Vol 8 No 7 July 1997 p 7 (Bernstine Named as new PSU President; Some
Faculty says....)
Vol 8 No 7 July 1997 p 8 (Jackson Elects First Black Mayor)
Vol 8 No 7 July 1997 p 8 (Bar Disciplines Scheck, Douglas, not Cochran)
Vol 8 No 7 July 1997 p 20 (Florida's 'Little Haiti' honored for Restoring
Houses)
Vol 9 No. 5 May 1 998 p. 7 (Western Michigan University Names First Black
President)
Vol 9 No 12 Dec 1 998 p 3 (Senator Royce West Expresses Concern over
States ....Report)
Vol 9 No 12 Dec 1 998 p 7 (MU receives $2.4 M Grant to train Minority
Professors)
Vol 10 No 1 Jan 1999 p 5 (Rep. Thompson to introduce Legislation on
Independent Counsels)
Vol 10 No 2 Feb 1 999 p 6 (Calendar of the Month)
Vol 10 No 2 Feb 1 999 p 6 (Dallas Urban League and UTD president to salute
Youth)
Vol 10 No 2 Feb 1999 p 6 (Texas Publishers Association Holds Seminar in
Austin)
Vol 10 No 3 Mar 1999 p 6 (Dallas Mayor Ron Kirk kicks off Re-election
Campaign)
Vol 10 No 3 Mar 1 999 p 3 1 (Plans afoot for first N.C. Minority-owned Bank
in over 20 years)
1 Vol 1 1 No 2 Feb 2000 p 7 (Woman Ordered to repay $534,159 for stolen
chips)
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Opinion-Attitude About American-Blacks: OAAAB (16)
1 Vol 7 No 5 May 1 996 p 5 (Texas Publishers Association 10th Annual
Convention ... in Austin)
1 Vol 7 No 7 July 1 996 p 5 (African-American Leaders head to Austin)
Vol 8 No 6 June 1997 p 1 (Nations 100 Biggest Black-owned Companies)
Vol 8 No 6 June 1 997 p 6 (Senate Approves Proposal to create Juvenile
Crime Center )
Vol 8 No 6 June 1 997 p 2 1 (Golfs New Math: How many can Tiger Win?)
Vol 8 No 6 June 1 997 p 28 ( State Rep. Coleman helps TSU to remain
Independent)
Vol 8 No 6 June 1 997 p 3 1 (States with Fastest Growth of Black Buying
Power listed)
Vol 8 No 6 June 1 997 p 3 1 (Historic Black School appears on Verge of
Shutdown)
Vol 8 No 7 July 1 997 p 6 (Students "Reep" the Summer with science and
Technology)
Vol 8 No 7 July 1997 p 20 (Haiti seeks Loans for Electric Power,
Agriculture)
Vol 8 No 7 July 1997 p 20 (Former Barbadian Cabinet Minister Charged
..
Destroying Property)
Vol 8 No 7 July 1997 p 20 (Immigration Sends Illegal Migrants to Bahamas,
Cuba)
Vol 9 No. 12 Dec. 1998 p. 6 (Moseley-Braun loses tough Re-election Test)
Vol 10 No 2 Feb 1 999 p 5 (Southwestern Bell Offers Hope to South Dallas
Students)
Vol 10 No 3 Mar 1999 p 5 (The Making of a Legendary Dealmaker)
Vol 10 No 3 Mar 1 999 p 30 (North Texas Residents urged to open their Eyes
to the risk of Diabetes)
Opinion-Feature Race Solidariry-Pan-Africanism: OFRSP (5)
1 Vol 7 No. 8 Aug 1996 p. 26 (Immigration Issue as relates to Anti-terrorism
Law)
1 Vol 8 No 7 July 1 997 p 28 ("African" or "African-American" as a mere tag
is not Enough )
1 Vol 9 No 5 May 1998 p 25 (Towards Another breed of Black Americans)
1 Vol 9 No 7 July 1998 p 28 (Afrocentricity Thrives Despite Vicious Attacks
by Detractors)
1 Vol 9 No 12 Dec 1998 p 22 (The Persistence of Economic inequality in age
of Globalization)
News About Caribbean Affairs: NACA (6 )
Vol 8 No 7 July 1997 p 20 (St. Vincent man sentenced to death for drug
slaying)
Vol 8 No 7 July 1997 p 21 (Jamaican Government sells TV, Radio Station)
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Vol 8 No 6 June 1997 p 20 (Jamaica Agrees to let U.S. Narcotics Agents
help Police its Waters)
Vol 8 No 6 June 1 997 p 21 (Trinidad cancels airport construction contract
with Florida Firm)
1 Vol 9 No 12 Dec. 1 998 p 20 (South Korea closing its Embassy in Jamaica)
1 Vol 1 1 No 2 Feb 2000 p 21 (Haitians campaigning against disparity in
Immigration Policy)
Select Samples of Content Analyses of Nigerian Immigrants'
News-Nigerian Immigrant Community Crisis: NNICC (14)
Vol 7 No 8 Aug 1996 p 1 (Nigerian near dead due to Dallas Police Brutality)
Vol 7 No 1 Oct 1 996 p 1 (Nigerian allegedly killed wife, dragged her behind
van in L.A.)
Vol 7 No 1 1 Nov 1 996 p 7 (The tragic death of a Nigerian)
Vol 8 No 6 June 1 997 p 1 (Two Nigerian cab drivers killed two weeks apart
in U.S.)
Vol 8 No 7 July 1997 p 23 (Stress -The Silent killer)
Vol 9 No 5 May 1998 p 1 (A tragic death of a Ghanaian student)
Vol 9 No 7 July 1998 p 6 (The tragic death of Charles Oyekwe)
Vol 9 No 12 Dec 1 998 p 3 (The tragic death of Tianna Nzeakor)
Vol 10 No 1 Jan 1999 p 3 (The tragic death of Rebecca Abazie)
Vol 10 No 1 Jan 1999 p 5 (Stacy Nzeakor charged on children's death)
Vol 10 No 3 Mar 1 999 p 6 (The tragic death of a Nigerian in Atlanta)
Vol 10 No 3 Mar 1 999 p 1 1 (Nigerian woman, daughter granted asylum in
U.S.)
Vol 10 No. 3 Mar 1 999 p. 23 (My name is Cornelius Emeka Nnadi - an
African living in a Black Community in Gary, Indiana: My Ordeal
Vol 1 1 No 2 Feb 2000 p 1 (Nigerian woman, fights her wrongful conviction
in Dallas)
Vol 1 1 No 2 Feb 2000 p 3 (Dr. Abasika passes on)
Opinion-Feature Nigerian Immigrant National Crisis: OFNINC (17)
Vol 7 No 5 May 1996 p 28 (Critics of Africa's Crisis Situation need to be
Realistic)
Vol 7 No 8 Aug 1996 p 22 (Nigeria: A blueprint for Peace and Progress)
Vol 7 No 8 Aug 1 996 p 24 (Igbo & the future of Nigeria, and a United West
African States)
Vol 7 No 8 Aug 1996 p 28 (Nigeria's True Future Leaders must rid nation of
Military's Alien Culture of Madness and Death)
Vol 7 No 1 1 Nov 1 996 p 22 (The Igbos and their Future in Nigeria)
'The content analyses of Nigerian/African immigrants only included a portion of the data
that were relevant to an understanding of the relationships/cultural exchanges with African-
Americans. Thus, a greater part of the sample data shown here was not included in the
present study.
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Vol 7 No 1 1 Nov 1 996 p 22 (The Road Not Taken)
Vol 7 No' 1 1 Nov 1996 p 22 (Nigerian Federalism)
Vol 7 No 1 1 Nov 1996 p 22 (The Federal Military Structure)
Vol 8 No 6 June 1 997 p 25 (Nigeria on the Road for Democracy)
Vol 9 No 7 July 1 998 p 23 (What have you done to rid your country of
Despotism?)
Vol 9 No 12 Dec 1 998 p 23 ("It took the US over 200 Years:" A Comment)
Vol 9 No 12 Dec 1 998 p 24 (Nigeria: Another Future betrayed!)
Vol 10 No 2 Feb 1999 p 23 (Nigeria's transition program: Promises, doubts,
and impending perils)
Vol 10 No 2 Feb 1999 p 24 (Beware of February Mine Fields)
Vol 10 No 2 Feb 1999 p 25 (Nigeria and Low Self-consciousness)
Vol 10 No 2 Feb 1999 p 28 (Nigeria "Southernizing" the Presidency:
Viability, Desirability and Legality — 1)
Opinion-Feature Nigerian National Crisis: OFNNC (17)
1 Vol 7 No 5 May 1996 p 22 (Joe Garba's Fractured History: An Extended
Commentary)
1 Vol 7 No 7 July 1996 p 22 (Losing Nigeria)
Vol 8 No 1 Jan 1997 p 23 (Govt. Has no business doing business: a Recipe
for Privatization)
Vol 8 No 1 Jan 1997 p 23 (The Nigerian Economy - the Way out an open
letter tO Gen. Abacha)
Vol 8 No 6 June 1 997 p 22 (Vision 20 1 0: Agenda for the Nation)
Vol 8 No 6 June 1997 p 23 (Our Resolve will not diminish)
Vol 8 No 6 June 1997 p 23 (Will General Abacha transfer power to Civilian
or from Gen. Abacha to Abacha?)
Vol 8 No 7 July 1 997 p 22 (Vision 2010: Agenda for the Nation, Conclusion)
Vol 9 No 5 May 1 998 p 22 (No Peace without Reconciliation, No Progress
without Peace)
Vol 9 No 5 May 1 998 p 28 (Abacha must stay on as President, Carry out
Vision 2010")
Vol 9 No 7 July 1998 p 22 (No peace without reconciliation, No Progress
without Peace, III)
Vol 9 No 12 Dec 1998 p 23 (Shun Politics or Quit. Bamaiyi Tells Military)
Vol 10 No 1 Jan 1999 p 23 (Nigeria lacks a Solid Leadership Succession
Program)
Vol 10 No 1 Jan 1 999 p 23 (The Current Transition Program: A Review)
Vol 10 No 1 Jan 1 999 p 23 (Nigeria's Current Transition Program: A Roller
Coaster to Nowhere)
Vol 1 No 1 Jan 1 999 p 24 (My wish for Nigeria)
Vol 10 No 3 Mar 1 999 p 25 (Obasanjo, at NACCIMA Forum, suggests
spiritual rebirth)
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Editorial-Nigerian National Crisis: ENNC (11)
Vol 7 No 7 July 1 996 p 4 (Ogoni: Now one of the known names in the
World)
Vol 7 No 7 July 1 996 p 4 (Does Nigeria Deserve Sanctions Now?)
Vol 7 No 1 1 Nov 1 996 p 4 (A Disturbing Speculation)
Vol 8 No 7 July 1 997 p 4 (British Airways vs. Nigeria)
Vol 9 No 5 May 1 998 p 4 (The Coup Plotters verdict in Nigeria)
Vol 9 No 5 May 1998 p 4 (Abacha for President: Whose interest?
Vol 9 No 7 July 1 998 p 4 (General Abacha's death)
Vol 9 No 7 July 1 998 p 4 (Nigerian at the cross-road: What should be done)
Vol 9 No 7 July 1 998 p 4 (Gen. Abubakar: Welcome to the Front Line)
Vol 9 No 12 Dec 1998 p 4 (Obasanjo for President? Habah!!)
Vol 10 No 1 Jan 1999 p 4 (Dr. Alex Ekwueme: Please continue to stand tall)
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APPENDIX C
AFRICAN NEWS WEEKLY, 1993-1996
African Americans
News Racial Solidaritv-Pan-Africanism: NRSP (4)
Vol 6 No. 16 May 1995 p. 1 (TransAfrica vs Abacha)
Vol 7 No 17 May 1 996 p 2 (N'COBRA Award for Abiola)
Vol 7 No. 17 May 1 996 p. 2 (CPA Conference on Liberia Held at Howard
University)
Vol 7 No 3 Jan/Feb 1996 pi (Farrakhan on African Tour)
Picture-News Black American Business: PNBAB (4)
Vol 4 No. 24 July 16, 1993 p. 19 (-'Career Opportunities Available"- Mary
Kay)
Vol 4 No. 26 Aug 1993 p 19 ("Career Opportunities Available" - Mary Kay)
Vol 7 No 3 1 Sept 1996 (Mike's Restaurant Cooks up a Global Flavor with
AT&T)
Vol 7 No. 40 Nov. 1996 (Mike's Restaurant Cooks up a Global Flavor with
AT&T)
Picture-News About Racial Solidaritv -Pan-Africanism: PNRSP (1)
Vol 6 No 16 May 1995 p 21 (Photo News - African American Coalition led
by Randall Robinson, staged a rally in front of Nigerian Embassy in
Washington D.C.))
Editorial: Racial Solidarity-Pan-Africanism: ERSP (1)
Vol. 6 No 19 June 1995 p 7 (Know Your Mission, Go Do it!)
Opinion-Feature Race Relations-Racism: OFRRR (1)
Vol 7 No 6 Feb 1996 p 6 (Apartheid: Why it's so hard to forget)
Opinion-Feature Civil rights race politics: OFCRRP (1)
Vol 7 No 6 Feb 1 996 p 1 8 (The Black church: a core Institution in the
Black community)
Opinion-Feature Racial Solidarity-Pan Africanism: OFRSP (4)
Vol 6 No 16 May 1995 p 17 & 22 (Why Africa Matters: The case for
Continued U.S. Assistance to Africa)
Vol 6 No 19 June 1 995 p 1 8 (African American Heritage Awards)
Vol 7 No 3 Jan/Feb 1996 p 1 8 (Reflections on a Visit to Ghana)
Vol 7 No 24 July 1 996, p.l 8 (Center Honors African/African-American
Children)
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Opinion-Feature Attitude About American Blacks: OFAAAB (1)
1 Vol 6 No 16 May 1995 p 16 (In Retrospect: Professor John Hope Franklin
What a life!)
Race Relations-Racism: RRR (0)
Racial Solidarity-Pan-Africanism: RSP (9)
1 Vol 4 No 22 Jul> 1993 p 2 (PAMUSA Plans National Conference)
1 Vol 4 No 24 July 16 1993 p 18 (Reconnection with the Motherland)
1 Vol 4 No 24 July 16 1993 p 26 (Jesse Jackson on Weekend Visit)
1 Vol 4 No 26 Aug 6. 1993 p 18 (Jumping the Broom)
1 Vol 4 No 34 Oct 8, 1993 p 3 (Summit Brings Trade Pact, Goodwill)
Vol 6, No. 19 June 2, 1995 p. 6 (A Rich African Cultural Excursion)
Vol 6 No 19 June 2, 1995 p 7 (Most Nigerians Support Randall Robinson)
1 Vol 7 No 3 Jan-Feb. 1996 p 2 (Symposium on Entrepreneurship in
Chicago)
Vol 7, No. 1 7 May 1996 p. 32 (Tyson needs to stay out of trouble)
Special Events Black American Personages: SEBAP (1)
1 Vol 7 No 1 7 May 1 996 p 32 (Tyson needs to stay out of trouble)
Civil Rights Race-Politics: CRRP (2)
Vol 7 No 40 Nov 1 996 p 2 (Lincoln Prez Chair of PACU)
Vol 7 No 3 Jan 29-Feb 4, 1996 p 2 (NAACP to Honor Harvey Gantt)
Editorial: Civil Rights Race Politics: ECRRP (2)
Vol 6 No. 36 Oct 1 995 p 1 (O.J. Puts America on Trial)
Vol 7 No 31 Sept 1996 p 7 (Immigrants: Handwriting on the Wall)
Opinion-Attitude About -American-Blacks: OAAAB (7)
Vol 6 No 16 May 1 995 p 2 (Fight of the Century: Mandela vs Tyson)
Vol 6 No 1 9 June 1 995 p 2 ( Who Am I?)
Vol 6 No 19 June 1995 p 2 (Serving Two Masters)
Vol 6 No 19 June 1995 p 1 8 (Winning in Africa Makes it Special for Miss
Universe)
Vol 6 No. 36 October 1995 (Colin Powell: Nigerians are
Scammers)
Vol 7 No 3 1 Sept 1 996 p 2 (Senator Sees Abacha)
Vol 7 No. 31 Sept 1996 p. 32 (Fredericks challenged by Johnson; Big Purse
at Stake)
Picture News Opinion Attitude About American Blacks: PNOAAAB (3)
Vol 6 No 36 Oct 1995 p 21 (U.S. Commerce Secretary Ron Brown Delivers
opening remarks)
Vol 7 No 3 1 Sept 1 996 p 2 1 (Legendary Entertainer Ray Charles-red carpet
treatment)
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Vol 7 No 36 Oct 1 996 p 21 (U.S. Senate Candidate Harvey Gantt at a
campaign appearance)
Select Sample of the Content Analyses of Nigerian Immigrants'
News-Nigerian Immigrant Community Crisis: NNICC (5)
Vol 4 No 24 July 1 993 p 4 (Community Pulls Together During Tragedy)
Vol 4 No 24 July 1 993 p 4 (Nigerians Shot in Robbery Attempt)
Vol 4 No 26 Aug 1993 p 20 (Biafra War Revisited)
Vol 6 No 36 Oct 1995 p 3 (Nigerians Abroad Speak Out)
Vol 7 No 6 Feb 1996 p 2 (Nigerian Killed in Work Place)
Opinion-Feature Nigerian Immigrant National Crisis: OFNINC (16)
Vol 4 No 34 Oct 1 993 p 6 ("Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death")
Vol 4 No 34 Oct 1993 p 6 (Now that Babangida Has Left the Scene....)
Vol 4 No 34 Oct 1 993 p 7 ("If the horse is crazy, At Least the Rider is Not")
Vol 4 No 34 Oct 1993 p 7 (The Nigerian Political Crisis)
Vol 4 No 34 Oct 1993 p 8 (What is Wrong with the Nigerian Economy... and
How to Fix it)
Vol 4 No 34 Oct 1993 p 16 (Africa: Whither Nigeria?)
Vol 6 No 19 June 1 995 p 6 (Abiola Should Get out of Politics, Period)
Vol 6 No 19 June 1995 p 9 (When Our turn Comes)
Vol 6 No 36 Oct 1 995 p 6 (Nigeria: The Consequences of Apathy)
Vol 6 No 36 Oct 1 995 p 6 (Abacha's Regime Has Lost Credibility)
Vol 7 No 3 Feb. 1996, p. 7 (President Mandela to Rescue Nigeria)
Vol 7 No 24 July 1996 p 6 (Military Kleptocracy: An Obstacle to Sustainable
Democracy in Nigeria)
Vol 7 No 24 July 1 996 p 9 (Once Upon a Country. .
.)
Vol 7 No 26 July/Aug 1996 p 6 (The Death of Saro-Wiwa: Human Liberty in
Nigeria)
Vol 7 No 36 Oct. 1 996 p 6 (Celebrating the Nigerian Independence Day?)
Vol 7 No 36 Oct 1 996 p 6 (Nigeria: The Real Cause of our Problems)
News Nigerian National Crisis (37) NNNC
Vol 4 No 22 July 2, 1993 p 1 (Election Results Suspended)
Vol 4 No 22 July 2, 1993 p 3 (Ogoni Rights Activist Says Passport Seized)
Vol 4 No 22 July 2. 1993 p 4 (Nigeria's third Attempt at Civilian Rule)
Vol 4 No 24 July 1 6. 1 993 p 1 (Babangida Explains it All)
Vol 4 No 24 July 16, 1993 p 5 (SDP. Others seek Passive Resistance over
Poll)
Vol 4 No 26 Aug 1993 p 1 (Supreme Court Kills Abiola's Suit)
Vol 4 No 26 Aug 1 993 p 2 (Chinua Achebe Speaks Out)
Vol 4 No 26 Aug 1 993 p 6 (Swear in Abiola to Avert Catastrophe)
'For example, the earlier explanation noted on the Nigerian data also applies to this section.
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Vol 4 No 26 Aug 1993 p 8 (Political Crisis Haunts Nigeria's Economy -
Shonekan)
Vol 4 No 34 Oct 1993 p 1 ( Abiola" s Return)
Vol 4 No 34 Oct 1 993 p 3 (Diya: Soldiers to Remain in Barracks Forever)
Vol 4 No 34 Oct 1 993 p 9 (Nigeria Records N26 Billion Deficit)
Vol 6 No 16 May 1995 p 3 (No Bail yet for Abiola)
Vol 6 No 16 May 1995 p 3 (Rebels try Nigerians, Guineans)
Vol 6 No 19 June 2. 1995 p 1 (Abiola to stay in Jail Indefinitely)
Vol 6 No 1 9 June 2, 1 995 p 8 (Petrol Price Issue Resurfaces)
Vol 6 No 19 June 2. 1995 p 23 (Nigeria Dips into Food Reserve)
Vol 6 No 19 June 2. 1 995 p 28 (Govt. Aims to halt Foreign Divestment)
Vol 6 No 36 Oct 1995 p 1 (Abacha's Exit: Oct. 1, 1998)
Vol 6 No 36 Oct 1995 p 28 (NALICON Launched in London)
Vol 7 No 3 Jan/Feb 1 996 p 1 (Terror in Nigeria)
Vol 7 No 3 Jan/Feb 1996 p 3 (Nigeria winning Drug War)
Vol 7 No 3 Jan/Feb 1996 p 4 (Nigeria Tells EU "Let's Talk")
Vol 7 No 6 Feb 1996 p 1 (Ethnic War in Nigeria)
Vol 7 No 6 Feb 1996 p 24 (Farrakhan Calls for Patience with Abacha)
Vol 7 No 17 May 1996 p 1 (Abiola's Wife Arrested)
Vol 7 No 17 May 1996 p 9 (Nigeria Problem Banks Rescued)
Vol 7 No 17 May 1996 p 23 (Showdown over Bakassi?)
Vol 7 No 24 July 1 5. 1996 p 1 (Abiola Weeps over Kudirat)
Vol 7 No 24 July 1 5, 1 996 p 29 (Abacha urges Vigilance)
Vol 7 No 26 July 29, 1996 p 3 (Nigerian Opposition Accused of Murder Plot)
Vol 7 No 31 Sept 1996 p 1 (Commonwealth Visit Cancelled)
Vol 7 No 40 Nov 1996 p 1 (Saro-Wiwa Rallies Banned)
Vol 7 No 40 Nov 1 996 p 3 (No Decision on Abiola Lawyer)
Vol 7 No 40 Nov 1 996 p 3 (Abacha Says He'll Quit in '98)
Vol 7 No 40 Nov 1 996 p 4 (Nigeria's Vision 2010)
Vol 7 No 40 Nov 1996 p 4 (Shell to Provide for Ogoni Hospital)
United States Nigerian Relations: USNR (7)
Vol 4 No 24 July 1 993 p 1 (U.S. Expels Nigerian Military Attache)
Vol 4 No 24 July 1993 p 3 (Govt. Accuses U.S., Britain of "Plot" against
Nigeria)
Vol 4 No 24 July 1993 p 4 (Political Chaos Threatens Foreign Image)
Vol 4 No 26 July 1 993 p 2 (Fickle Ruler Wrecking Nigeria)
Vol 6 No 36 Oct 1995 p 3 (Global Reaction to Abacha's Speech)
Vol 7 No 26 July 29. 1996 p 3 (U.S. Group Wants Journalists Released)
Vol 7 No. 36 Oct. 1996 (Govt. Protests Ikimi's Delay at Airport)
Opinion-Feature- United States Nigerian Relations: OFUSNR (1)
Vol 7 No 6 Feb 1 996 p 1 6 (CNN: An Unfair Report on Nigerians)
Editorial United States-African Relations: EUSAR (2)
Vol 7 No 26 July 1996 pp.1 & 7 (NBC Shuts Out African Olympians)
Vol 7 No. 6 Feb 1996 p 7 (Leave Seychelles Alone, Hypocrites).
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APPENDIX D
NIGERIAN-AFRICAN IMMIGRANT
COMMUNITY RECORDS 1
Selected Samples of Major Portions of the Nigerian
Community Media and archives, 1980-2000
1. Photo Copy of Olumba Olumba Obu of the Brotherhood and Star
Church
2. Brotherhood of the Cross and Star, Miracle in the Classroom, etc.
3. Brotherhood Church of the Cross and Star: Herald of the New
Kingdom, Bishop Ellerbe, 2 others attend Kingfest '8, etc.
4. Brotherhood Cross and Star Holds Anniversary
5. Houston: Akeem Roast and Toast Events and Banquet, etc.
6. Akeem's Day of Glory (Nigerian Community House, Houston)
7. Hakeem Olajuwon: A Nigerian Earns $4 Million Annual Salary in
U.S.
8. African Products Shine at Black Expo, USA (Houston)
9. Titus K. Oniya, Publisher of African Business Magazine at Black
Expo, etc.
10. African and Afro-American Extravaganza, etc.
11. Nigerian Democratic Movement, Washington, DC
12. Song by Akwa Ibom Youth Christian and Cultural Group
13. "Heart-to-Heart: A Stranger in the Midst:" Fictional Recreation of
True Nigerian-African Romantic Stories/Crises, May 1991).
14. "Heart-to-Heart All in the Name of Love:" Fictional Recreation of
True Nigerian-African Romantic Stories/Crises, July 1991).
15. A Peak at African and Afrocentric Fashions.
16. Proclamation of Akwa-Ibom State Day by Mayor Lee Brown of
Houston. Texas.
1 7. 1 998 Mbuk Akwa Ibom State: National Transfer of Power from NY
to Houston and traditional mask display of "Ekong" masquerade.
18. Miss Akwa-Ibom State National 1997/1998.
19. Dr. Frederick K. G. Price, an African-American Preacher, in Nigeria.
20. African offspring/African-American Judeo-Christian Connection.
21 . Association of Nigerian Physicians in the Americas, Inc.
22. ANPA Redemption Mission to Anua General Hospital, Uyo, Nigeria
led by Dr. Nsidibe Ikpe.
23. Cultural Photos, etc.
'This phase comprises mostly evidences of selected samples of the Nigerian community data
employed in the content analyses of Nigerian and African-American relationships in the U.S.
from 1990 to 1992, and from 1993 to 2000. See Udofia, "Toward an Understanding of
Nigerian Immigrants in the United States: The Status of the Relationship with African
Americans," as well as the sequences in Appendix D of this dissertation, pp. 673-716.
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Select Samples used in the Content Analyses of
African-Americans by the Nigerian Media
The Good Hope News: African Perspective, 1990-1992
1. Debby Turner, Miss America, 1990. (Did you know?)
2. The Civil Rights bill and Its Importance
3. African-American: A Journey Through the Niger
4. Mike Tyson and Rape Trial
5. L.A. Shame
6. The Young Black Males in the 1990s
7. Confirm Clarence Thomas
8. History in the Making in the United States
Nigerian News Digest (African Weekly News), 1990-1992
1. Abacha Honored by Collin Powell
2. Clarence Thomas: Mainstream Media-Hype
3. Professor Hill/Judge Thomas: An Epic Saga
4. Race: America's Quagmire
5. Race: America's Quagmire - A Rebuttal
6. Dr. Martin Luther King: His Dream and Legacy He Left Behind
7. The Problems Lies with Teachers, Not Their Underlings
8. Election Year Politics: Black Power in an International Perspective.
African Business Source Magazine, 1990-1992
1. Africans Have High I.Q. Says Houston Attorney
2. Nigerian Businessman Gives $100,000 to Atlanta Institute
3. The King Verdict
4. Up in Smoke Goes U.S. Credibility Abroad
5. Dork Noble: Casting a Niche
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LOCAL NEWS
^Brotherhood of the cross and star holds anniversary
By $01 EDDIE CO. OSUAGWTJ
Members of the Brotherhood o(
Um Cross and Star Iram ail over
North America, including Canada.
glLhcrcd in Dallas. Texas (or a
lwo>oar anniversary The -Uth an-
niversary at Brotherftood m Hie
United Stales «u held on the aih
It 2M at September. 1991.
The Good Hope News was
specially invited with a note sug-
gestive of the importance of the oc-
casion. 1 wu assigned to cover the
Sunday session of (he event,
I approached the Boihel or
Church with caution, because
many 'Junes have been said aoout
the organization and its leader,
Olurnna Olumba Obu At
the door of the Bothel, I wu asked
to remove my shoes. I obeyed and
went inside- The whole house "as
painted white and white Lace
materials were used to cover the
altar pan of the wall and windows.
Olumba's portrait hung all over
the place.
At the altar was the father's
representative" in the US.. Orlan-
do Obu. He conducted the service
The service was essentially
reading some verses o( the Bible
which they call lessons: they also
sing songs which are unmistakabK'
praises and glorification of
Obu. Meanwhile, as people came
in. they knocxed their heads on the
ground three times. The knocking
of the head on the ground signifies
total suomision and adoration lo
the father, son and holy snint. [t IS
aiso a demonstration of how the
jr.ccs worarup Sod in Heaven.
This information was .jiven to us
by Propnet David Jumoo. one of
the !eaders of the Dallas Bothel.
The Uieme of Olumba s sermon
was that love is the most important
virtue. With love, all the world's
problems can be solved he said.
He a iso said that human bemysare
small gods connected with the
Almighty God. To tie connected ta
God people have <o oeiong to the
brothernood wmch is not a cnurch
but a school, a school where the
qua niies of God is taught, and
*nere humans are snown the no-
way to eternity.
The second part of the occasion
was the mintstnai fund raising
Ortjnao Obu stressed the imnor-
tunce of the fund raising. Accor-
ding to him, God's work must he
done whether people like it or not.
Ana it is the responsibility- of the
Brothernood to teach the *on<J
about God's Kingdom on earth.
Hymn books, tracks and -trier
materials were launched.
in another development. 1 was
given a copy of a semen delivered
by 0. Obu wnere 5t revealed the
meaning of Brothtrr.oou. Cross
and Star
According to 0.0 0..
Broiherhood is founaed by God
Srotherhooa is Cod. Chris! and the
Angels, it means everything acove
and below, including the iky, (he
wind, '.he moon, the sun. and (he
stars. It also means oneness. In
snort. "God ano everything
creaied by Him put together are
Brotherhood " Brotherhood Is
owned ana run by God. The Ange la
are trw. servants in Brothernood.
while peopie are workers. Uvuif
and non-living things work in
Brothernood. 0.0.0, teaches.
The "Cross means bearing
another man s burden without
i-ompiainuig; tolerating all kinds
of sinners. To carry the Crass
means complete self resignation to
Gud. And 'jus is accomplishable
.inly if one is loving, humble, pa-
tient forgiving, unassuming and
Uiienvious. Jesus Christ was able
to earn' the Cross ol our salvation
because He passed these virtues."
0.0. says.
On the Star The Star radiates
liyhL The star is Christ (he glory
of God ami Clinst, The Star in-
dicates the remn and the glory at
Christ." The Star means other
Unrigs sucn as the brightness of
God. the power of His reign, and
r>eace .if the .Almighty God."
When 0. Obu speaks, the
lather spea\S. and that is Jesus
Clinst - Gud. What is 0. Obu s
mjiiion on earth* He says (hat he
has come to "lead man. angles and
ill thul God created to honour all
sorts of men. fear God and to have
.'or the wnoie association of
brethren..." In a sort of contradic-
tion, 0.0 abo says that he has
*ot come as a man. spirit. God,
Jesus. .Angel, or Propnet. but as a
demonstrator of love for (he whole
-isociation J Brethren i and I...as
a tescner."
Proohei David Jumbo, one of the
CELEBRATION
Continued (roen Page J
tions n Nigeria an based on
nepotism, favontum and other
social and political vices. All these,
he empnasiied. impede progress
because business tycoons who
have little or no education, have
taken the run of the government.
Above all, uncompromising
ideologies, tribal conflicts and
o(her social barriers have led (o
unaccepiabtuty of ideas that would
help nuke the country a better
place to live.
Prof. Ihonvbere berated the
country on its disparity between
policy making and irtil implemen-
tauon. To put Nigeria us the proper
position it ought to be in the world,
he advised that there must be men-
tal decolonization, political
decolonization, and social
dertlomiauon, he concluded, amid
deafening applauses.
This august speech was followed
by cultural dances and mas-
querades presented by (he Igbo
Community Association of
Nigeria, among others. The closing
Masquerades entertain Ihi audience
remarks of the event was done by
Richard 0. Nwachukwu. the Vice-
Chairman of the ONN Care-Taker
Committee. The symposium and
cultural phase of the celebration
came to a close at S ti p m All
night party continued at (he Club
Serengeti till < a m
What a ceiebrauon, particularly
when the organizers started <»iih
little or no cash, but ended up with
a surplus (hat would keep ONN
afloat for a while The credit. Good
Hope News learnt, goes to Richard
Nwachukwu. Herbert
Nwsnkwo. Robert Ellen. Kehinde
Udaoo. and others like Or Sony
Uiuh. The Nigerian independence
celebration was (he last official act
at Club Serengeti beiore it was sold
to non-Afr.cans by Ihe
management.
OlumDa Olumba Obu
leaders of Dallas Bothel Is quick to
attest that Olumba Olumba Obu is
everything. According to Jumbo,
all true believers in 0.0.0. will in-
herit the everlasting Kingdom. He
happily discusses the wonders 0.0.
Obu had performed, including ms
ability to talocate - that is, be m
more than one place at « tine. He
prophesues and heals all kinds of
diseases. Jumbo claims.
As a saying goes, faith in
anything is personal. For further
questions on the Brotherhood,
Cross and Star, call David Jumbo
dt III 362-9710.
•Liquor *Besr *Wfne -Cordials -Party Kegs' Available
J&B "DISCOUNT" LIQUORS
PROVIDING COMPETENT A COURTEOUS SERVICE
10am-9pm Mon-Sal (214) 821-0740 Fax (214) 828-2477
Lawson C. Emarauwa. B.A M B.A - President
4201 GASTON at HASKELL • SUITE 112
i oiocm Eut ol O4,o Maoicu Camon. Neil lo Coil P'uii
CONSULTANTS AVAILABLE. TO ASSIST YOU - OCBBINA U. WILLIAMS
Salons In The Park
•Permanent Waves
• Hair Weaving 'Relaxer
•Waxing 'Curls 'Haircuts
•Sculptured Nails 'Manicure
•Pedicure 'Facial 'Color
(both Blacks & Caucasians)
SHAMPOO & SET ... '15.00
THURSDAYS ONLY
Call:
VICTORIA NWACHUKWU
Cosmetologist
an
(214) 528-1715 (H)
(214) 503-3513
Please call tor appointment*.
You ara guaranteed the beat.
We have eom* special* now.
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Akeem, the dream, delivering a speech at the Banquet
and John Shanu
Akeem's Day Of Glory
The atmosphere was tense, the
air wore a look ofovergrown antici-
pationand thevenue wassome how
in a festive mood. A drop of pin
. would have caused a stir and the
audience, a few hundred Nigerians
and non-Nigerians alike sat withall
the attentive air of expectation.
That was the setting at the Ball-
room of the WcstinGallcria Hotel in
Houston, Texas where the basket-
ball superstar, Akeem, the Dream,
Olajuwon was roasted and toasted
rSTa dinner organized by the Nigc-
' rian Foundation, a Houston based
organization, to raise fund for the
$150,000 Nigerian Community
House, a cultural centre essential
forentcrtainmcnt.rccrcationand the
promotion of African culture
throughculluralactiviticsand exhi-
bition. I
The night was indeed a gran-
doise affair that saw an impeccable
turnout of the crcme-dc-la-cremc of
By Lai Adelagun
the Nigerian Community in Hous-
ton.
,
The dress code was predomi-
nantly Black tie on dark suit except
forsome few Nigerianswhodonned
their native attire.
The whole arena started bub-
bling at exactly 8:15 p.m. an hour
and a quarterbehind schedule when
Akeem, the dream, arrived in front
of the Wcstin Calleria Hotel and as
he trudges towards the ballroom,
doorman, bell top and maids at the
hotel freeze in recognition of his
domineering presence.
The business of the day got on
the way when ihc Mayor of Hous-
ton, Honorable Kathryn J. Whitmirc
got on the rostrum to trumphct the
good qualities of Akeem.
Shcdcscribed the basketball su-
pcrstarasanoutstandingrolemodel
for young people not only in Hous-
ton and the United States but nil
over (he world. She said of Akccm
| "The City of Houston commends
members of the Nigerian Founda-
tion and Akeen Olajuwon for their
contributions to the economic and
cultural life of the City of Houston".
The Mayor therefore in recog-
nition of the role Akeem plays both
on the basketball courtand business
declared "Friday, November 30th"
1990 as Akeem Olajuwon s day."
A number of other dignitaries
which included theowner of Hous-
ton Rockets, Mr. Charlie Thomas,
Rockets Coach, Don Channy, Jim
Follcy, Dr. Walter Oji, Dr. Youmey
Ogboso, Dr.Ozurumba. Bill Worrel
of KLA Radio, all spoke at length
about Akccm, his game and rela-
tionships with thosewhoknow him.
What seems to be the most in-
teresting part of the whole event
came when Akeem, thedream, with
his 610" height and 250 pounds
weight stood up toacknowlcdgeall
that have been said about him by
Earns Whopping S4 Million and
Nigeftan
Annua!
African Businsss Sourca Magazine - July - 1991 - Page -19
$5 Million in Commercials
lams $4 MMm
Salary in U.S.
Super Star Hakeem Olajuwon, receiving proclamation
from Houston Mayor, Katky Whihmre during a dinner
organized recently by Hie Nigerian foundation in
Houston
A Nigerian, Hakeem Olajuwon of the Houston Rock-
ets Basketball team has been named one of the highest
paid Black athletes in the United States.
Hakeem, who was recently quoted while defending
himself against allegation by his employer, Charlie Tho-
mas during a dinner organized by the Nigerian founda-
tion in Houston that 'Hakeem keeps asking for a raise"
said "I believe in asking for what I deserve" afterall he
said, "I am not the highest paid player in the league.
Hakeem trailed fourth in his category with S4 million
annua! salary behind New-York Knicks Star, Patrick
Ewing, who contractually bags $4.2 million pay checks
annually.
Olajuwon, in an unconfirmed report is also said to be
aiming an extra $5 million for his "Apple Tree" /
commercials now showing in several television stations
across America.
But it is in the boxing category that the richest pay-
checks among blacks is recorded.
. The top earner in all categories is the current world
heavy weight champion, Evander Hoh/field, who reigns
as the undisputed earnings champ, with a whopping $25
million so far this year. He pocketed the largesse from just
one fight this April 19 battle of the ages against George
Foreman.
Two former Champions follow Holyfield in the earn-
ings arena.
Foreman, 42 years old, collected $125 million and
some change for his part, in the 12 round fight
Third is Mike Tyson, who went smiling to the bank
with $5 million for his seventh sound TXO. of Donovan
"Razor" Ruddock, on March 19, 1991.
EXPRESS PACKAGE SERVICE
PLANE LETTER up to 1/2 pound $29.00
PLANE PACK up to 1 pound $34.00
Each additional pound $5.00
PLANE ECONOMY is available for general cargo
and personal effects at tower rates.
PLANE MAIL is available for international bulk
mailings.
Service to all countries is available.
Please ca
U.S.A.:
PLANE CAXO INC.
300-765-4700
Contact: Chris Oraguzja
for details.
NIGERIA:
LSFPAC (NIG) LTD.
2A MEDICAL flOAD
'KEJA, LAGOS 01-965779
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Us
sees
Shr said her (t* includes scaling down
wedding coil in accordance with avsil-
•Me moneta ry budget
Gloria believe* there is a growing
need among young blacks wishing to
get intomarriage toknow how to spend
less on wedding ceremonies while
•creevmg the necessary grace and ele-
gance.
She described the black Expo as a
eerycuWng eventadding tha I the time
b now (or blacks lo learn how to spend
their money Into the black community
an order to become economically free.
Another partldpant, who wish to
remain anonymous said there was a
quiet movexnent afoot to aetdndlc the
spirit and power of the black econonuc
independence, remarking that there
werea few whoworked morediligently
towards that endthan )eny Roebuck,
Mr. Tim Jacobs at "cool" cigarette stand at the Zrpo
President and founder ol the Black ExpoU-S.A. Earlier on, the mayor of Houston, KalhrynVVhirmircdc-
Mosto/ri«visltonwetolkedwimalmcEKpo«ejcedthBt claring the expo officially opened said theory of Houston
the qua Hry of the products displayed at Ihc exposition stood has been veTvaggn-ssivc irnupporriagmmann, tusinwst-s
out u the greatest attributes of the modem black maris en- The exposition also featured musical concerts, seminars
DepiermsflNp. and svmposmma-
Mrs. Arocf A Lyra of original African Fashion
and Cynthia HitL, owner ofAfrican Fathim
at iU Best At Black Expo.
.~j£t% "The Black Community must remain supportive of Black
ntreprraeurs and Business Persons if Black Businesses are to compete fully in the
[
National Economy.'1
- Mickev Leland
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NIGERIAN DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT
IIMBU
3700 Georgia Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20010
Phone (202) 397-7052
Fax (202) 398-3875
August 26, 1993
PRESS RELEASE
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
All Nigerians abroad share the pain that most Nigerians at home are
undergoing as a result of the political impasse in Nigeria. We commend our brothers
and sisters for the patience they have exercised so f.r especially for their wise conduct
since the annulment of the presidential results.
All Nigerians are grieved by the wanton disregard of the peoples' wishes and
ceaseless effort to circumvent their June 12, 1993 decision at the polls, by General
Babangida and his cronies. We abhor and condemn the brurz'. killing of hundreds of
innocent Nigerians who exercised their right to peaceful asscnwly in Lagos. We
repudiate the actions ofthe Association for Better Nigeria rrA vll other Nigerians who
have collaborated with the regime of General Babangida in their efforts to rape
Nigeria. We applaud all Nigerians who successfully ground to a halt all government
and business transactions in Lagos and other major cities in Nigeria from
August 19 - 21, 1993.
The decision of General Babangida to annul the results of June 12, 1993 and
to create an interim government is totally unacceptable. It is a reckless attempt by a
military junta to thwart the yearnings ofthe Nigerian people for Democracy, and
impose its will on the Nigerian people who have overwhelming rejected miliary
interference in government.
It is time for a decisive change in governance from an appointed Leadership to
an elected Leadership. Nigerians elected a president on June 12, 1993. It is
therefore the obligation of all Nigerians andfriends of Nigeria, to ensure the execution
ofthe democratic decision ofthe Nigerian electorate. W<! therefore urge and
recommend the follcwing actions:
• We urge all Nigerians, friends ofNigeria and true believers of
democracy to shun the interim government. Asfar as we are concerned,
the interim government is a surrogate ofBabangida and as such, an
extension ofthe military dictatorship.
Committed to a United and Dem-icraac Nigeria
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I .1 AKWA IBOM YOUTH CHRISTIAN AND CULTURAL GIMUP
' 15526b SCHUMANN LANE.
HOUSTON. TEXAS 77083.
I. WE ARE NIGER I AH S FROM AKWA IDOM STATE.
-7 ARE SO AFRICAN-AMERICANS.
CHORUS = = = = =
2.
THE BLACK MAN MAS THE FIRST MAN ON EARTH,
THE BLACK MAY LIKELY bE THE FIRST HAN Ifl HEAVEN.
«==3ri.CHOBUS ======
3. we ruled the WORLD ,WE HAD KINGDOMS
,
WE WILL LIKELY RULE THE WORLD AGAIN,
FOR WE WERE AND STILL ARE A STRONG AND DETERMINED GROUP
OF PEOPLE.
======CHORUS=======
4. PRINCES AND PRINCESSES SOUGHT KNOWLEDGE IN AFRICA.
WE WERE A POWER TO TIE RECKONED WITH.
=======CHORUS=======
5. AFRICA HAS A RICH HISTORY,
WE HAVE TO UNCOVER AND WRITE OUR HISTORY.
= = = = = = = = =C|(ORI!S = = == = = = = =
6. OUR PEOPLE R -.'TAME CAPTIVES IN A FOREIGN LAND
.
THEY WERE TORTURED. BURNT AND KILLED.
JOT THANK GOO FOR HIS LOVE STRENGTH AND FAITH,
V SURVIVED , BUT WE MUST BE FREE.
,
uiiK FATHERS AND MOTHERS WORKED THE LAND,
THEY SACRIFICED A LOT TO BRING US TO WHERE WE \BE TODAY.
WE THANK THEM FOR THEIR LOVE AND STRENGTH
,
WE THANK THEM FOR THEIR SCSACR IFICES
,
WE WILL NEVER. NEVER FORGET THEIR STRUGGLE
.
= = = = == = = = =CI10RUS = = = = = = === = =
D!<- BOOKER T. WASHINGTON
,
DR. NKWAHE NKURUMA,
DR. HARTIN. LUTHER KING.
DR. UDOH UDO-AMA.
MALCOM-X, MICKEY LELAND,
WE LOVE YOU ALL.
OUR YOUNG PEOPLE MUST NEVER FORGET.
THAT WE HAVE A DUTY
:
TO CARRY ON THE STRUGGLE OF OUR FATHERS AND MOTHERS
TO RECOVER OUR DIGNITY AND GLORY
= = = = = = = = = C(10RUS = = = = = = = = = = = =
To BE ABLE TO DO THIS,
WE MUST BE WELL EDUCATED
.
WE MUST HAVE SELF CONFIDENCE,
WE MUST LOVE ONE ANOTHER.
HOST OF ALL. WE MUST BE COD'S CHILDREN.
=CIIORUS =
11. US MUST STOP SELLING AND TAKING DRUGS
DRUGS DESTROY THE MIND, THE BRAIN
=========CHORUS=========-==
12. OUR FUTURE IS IN OUR HANDS.
OUR DESTINY AS A PEOPLE IS OURS TO SHAPE.
GOD HAS SUSTAINED US THROUGH THE DIFFICULT YEARS.
HE MUST HAVE, A PURPOSE FOR US ON" EARTH.
= = = - = - = = =CHORUS- ===========
685
Heart-to-Heart
Stranger in the Midst
"Kedu," a stranger at the table
said, greeting me in her
native Nigerian language, Ibo.
"Hi," I responded.
"Oh you're a foreigner!" she said
with disappointment.
"No! I'm from Africa," I said.
'That's what I mean, you're not
from Nigeria." she said.
"But I'm an African," I insisted.
Turning rudely away from me.
she said to her friend, " I told you.
Nigerian men would marry 'any-
thing' as long as it's a woman. I
can't understand their problem."
The two friends continued their
conversation in Ibo, ignoring me
totally. Meanwhile, my husband
OIu was chatting with some
friends at a corner in the party
hall.
As I stared into the air, thinking
of the appropriate words to say to
the women, a gentleman at the
next table leaned toward our
table and said, "My name is
Mba." Addressing the two other
women in particular, he contin-
ued. "Six years ago, I fell In love
with a woman from Cameroon.
Yata was the woman of my
dreams. She offered all the quali-
ties I wanted. She valued her
African traditions, and she sup-,
ported me at every level of my
struggle to survive in America.
But my family wouldn't accept her
because she wasn't from Nigeria.
After years of dealing with my
family and friends who always
treated her like a stranger in their
midst, Yata began to feel like a
stranger. At the same time. I
couldn't deal with the stress of
having a fiancee that wasn't
accepted by my family. I eventual-
ly left Yata, losing my true love.
Shortly after the breakup. I went
home to Nigeria to meet the
woman my family had selected for
-Amie Joof
me. I came back to America after
taking care of the necessary tradi-
tional arrangements that would
lead to our marriage. I paid over
$10,000 in cash and material
goods to win her hand in
marriage. I drained all my savings"
to pay for Ify's bridal price and to
give her the lavish wedding she
wanted. London was her choice
for honeymoon. One month in
London cost me a lot of money.
Joof
granted we had much fun.
We got back to Nigeria only to be
advised by the U.S. Embassy that
Ify's application for a visa to the
United States had been denied.
Upon my return to America, I
incurred huge debts in legal fees
to get Ify here. Frustrated by Ify's
impatience to come to America, I
reluctantly gave up my Nigerian
citizenship for an American one to
speed up the process of bringing
Ify here. Within months, she got
her visa to the United States.
Shortly after Ify came to this
country, problems developed in
our marriage. She was very mate-
rialistic. She wanted to live up to
her fantasies of America -- in her
actions, manner of dressing and
speech. Our communication suf-
fered. She eventually started hav-
ing an affair with another man.
She told her friends that she
wouldn't file for a divorce because
she wanted alimony from me. She
accused me of being too posses-
sive and provoked me into grant-
ing her a divorce.
My ordeal with Ify turned to be
a very costly lesson in my life. In
trying to marry a woman from
Nigeria, I ignored an important
factor in choosing a life-time part-
ner - getting to know her well. AI11
I knew was that Ify was from
Nigeria and was an Ibo.
In retrospect, nothing should
have prevented me from marrying
Yata. She loved me for who I was,
and she cherished her traditional
values. She was always content
with what we had. She under-
stood more than I did that our
aspirations and value systems
were more important than our
tribal backgrounds."
At this point, Olu returned to the
table. Putting his arm around
Olu, Mba said, "My brother, I
believe you've found a great
woman. Don't let any of these nar-
row-mined people convince you to
let her go because she is not from
the same tribe or country." Olu
accepted the compliment with a
smile and said, "When I was mar-
rying her five years ago. I refused
to listen to anybody, and I don't
intend to do so now.'^ Olu's words
were most reassuring to me. Since
he and I have known each other,
he and his family have never
made me feel like a stranger in
their midst.
Author's Note: The use of the Ibo
tribe in Nigeria was only intended
to illustrate the unnecessary limi-
tations Africans impose on their
relationships. The characters
could have been any other nation-
als.
Editor's Note: Our staff columnist. Amle Joof.
uses fictitious names to capture African rela-
tionships. If you have a story to tell send it to
the edilor. African Newbreed.
African Newbreed, May 1991
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Heart-lo-Heari
AMIE JOOF
All in
the
Name
of Love
a I rw-^
a b>'. we need to plan our
1
* *
I J-C future. I can quit medi-
cal school and work, or
you can be the bread
/inner until I finish school," said
dusa.
"What about our wedding plans?"
asked.
In between kisses, Musa managed
o say, "I think the best thing is for
is to live together until we can
ifford the wedding you deserve.
Vhen I marry you, I want the whole
orld to know...."
"I'll quit school myself, and " I
said, swallowing the rest of my
words with his mesmerizing kisses.
Not too long after this incident,
Musa moved in with me. I quit my
own school and took a full-time job
to pay the rent and the bills. My job,
however, couldn't cover school
expenses. Musa tried to hold a part-
time job, but found himself on aca-
demic probation after his first year.
Again, he suggested that we make a
decision about the future. I took
another full-time job so he could
concentrate on school. I also became
Musa's housewife without a ring. I
did all the cleaning, laundry, cook-
ing and attended to all of Musa's
personal demands.
As a medical student, Musa's
lifestyle was very demanding. He
was in school all day and spent most
of the night studying. To better
manage his time, we had to sched-
ule every minute of the day. His food
had to be ready when he needed it;
his clothes were cleaned and ironed
when he wanted them. The schedule
was hectic, but I didn't mind, for as
Musa said, "we need to alter our
lifestyles for a better future."
I scheduled my jobs to keep my
weekends free. On Saturday morn-
ings, I did errands like banking and
cnose to mane tne sacrifice because I
loved Musa, and as he said, "we are
working for a happy future that was
to come after he finished medical
school."
Two months after Musa got into
his residency program, he bought
himself a corvette as a graduation
gift from the two of us. I continued
working my two jobs so that we
could make payments on the car.j
Right after the corvette was paid for.i
Musa bought a BMW, which he
called the family car.
By the time he finished paying for
the BMW, he was sent to
Washington, D.C. for a program on
cardiology. The night before he
returned from the program, I
received a "dear John" note from
him:
"Dear Ndelia:
Let me begin by inquiring about
your health and jobs. I hope every-
thing is well at that end. Things are
going well for me. I've passed my
course with flying colors, and I've
also met somebody who has
changed my life forever. Ndelia, I
hate to hurt you, but I am now
I chose to make the sacrifice because
I loved Musa, and as he said, 'we're
working for a happy future that was
to come after he finished
medical school.
'
running to the dry cleaners. On
Saturday afternoons, I did laundry
and cooked a special dinner for the
two of us. We would have dinner
between 6:30 and 7:30 p.m.; and
after dinner we tried to make time
for love- making and a nap. Sex was
straight to the point and fast,
because the clock was ticking. On
Sundays, I ironed clothes and
cooked five different_antrees to last
us the whole week^JThe household
chores and Musa's demands turned
me into a robot, but I didn't mind. I
real love. I've
fallen in love
with one of
the students
here. The two
of yOAi are
alike in so
many ways, yet different in many
respects. I cannot explain it, but
she's brought a totally different
dimension to my life. I'm sorry. For
all it
means, I will never forget you.
I'll be over tomorrow to pick up
my things. Thanks for everything,
and good luck.
Love,
Musa."
(To be continued...)
African Ncwbreed, July 1991
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Trends
A Peek at African and
Afrocentric Fashions
its coat-
tail.
Today's
trend, how-
Trican fashion*, have now
;made their way into live
United States with spunk,
Fashion gurus are no
longer settling for the simplistic
dashikis, agbadas, (traditional
gowns) iros and bubas (traditional
female attire popular among the
Yorubas of Nigeria) that corporate
America frowned upon years ago
Present fashions adapt traditional
patterns for use
in western
styles. Kente.
batik, aso-oke
are now
designed in con-
temporary west-
ern styles suit-
able for offices
and after -five
formal wear.
The craze for
African fashions
is nothing new
in America.
Afrocentricity
was quite "IN" in
the early 60's
and thereafter.
However, pride
in Africa then
had rebellion at
ever, has
appreciation for the intricate
designs by brilliant craftsmen
and women in Africa. It gives
a touch of African culture
without being overwhelming.
Whatever happened to
African fashions in the true
sense of the word? Are the
styles that were considered
unhip'" in corporate America
out of our closets
and boutiques for
good? No. These
same styles are
now making their
ways into high-
fashion runaways
with a dab of
western sophisti-
cation. It is obvi-
ous that the
breeze of pride in
Africa is blowing
again in the African-
American community.
This time however,
the fashions are here
to stay. African fash-
ion business is boom-
ing in Chicago.
Boutiques readily dis-
play authentic fash-
ions that are fit to
flaunt. Check them
out!
African Newbreed. Julv !W I
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As a non-profit organization, the purpose of the Akwa Ibom State Association
of Nigeria, USA, Inc., is to unite Akwa Ibom families and citizens together
throughout the United States and in Nigeria; to promote the political, economic,
educational and social needs of Akwa Ibom families and citizens; to preserve the
cultural identity and heritage of the people of the Akwa Ibom State of Nigeria; to
act as a liaison between governments, Nigerian and American, and to support
American charitable organizations.
On Saturday, August, 5, 2000, the Akwa Ibom State Association of Nigeria,
USA, Inc., will host its 13 th Annual National Convention in Houston, Texas.
The City of Houston is pleased to congratulate and commend the Akwa Ibom
State Association of Nigeria, USA, Inc., on this auspicious occasion, and extends
best wishes to all for a successful and rewarding event.
Therefore, I, Lee P. Brown, Mayor of the City of Houston, hereby proclaim
Saturday, August 5, 2000, as
Akwa Ibom State Day
in Houston, Texas.
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In Witness Whereof, I have
hereunto set my hand and have
caused the Official Seal of the
City of Houston to be affixed
this 27"^ of July, 2000, A.D.
Lejrr. Brown
J^iiyor of the City of Houston
MAYm *sv vu
The National Power Transfer From New York to Houston (August 8, 1998)
690
8 <^&m "
'
;'* > -.
-if-.', //if.- -r^r.K-
Y-.--.--t-. i:
. .
..
Mbuk AKWA IBOm!
INTRODUCING MISS AKWA IBOM-NATIONAL- 1997/98
Miss Emem S. Udo
On August 9, 1997, Atlanta Chapter produced another
Queen for Akwa Ibom State Association, USA, Inc., National.
She is Miss Emem Udo. On this day, at the National
Convention held at Atlanta, Georgia and hosted by the Atlanta
Chapter, was the crowning of the most beautiful girl in Akwa
Ibom community here in the Americas, Miss Emem Udo, 16, of
Atlanta Chapter. Emem has become the fifth Miss Akwa Ibom -
National. She is the third winner of this Noble Title from
Atlanta Chapter in the past three years. Miss Udo is the
daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Samuel Udo of Atlanta Chapter. "It's
a great honor to wear the crown as Miss Akwa Ibom-National",
says Miss Udo. Emem is also the Secretary to the Akwa Ibom
Youth Association, an affiliate of Akwa Ibom State Association
of Nigeria, USA, Incorporation (AKISANUS). It would be a
mistake not to mention to the public that Emem was determined
to be the next Queen that day. Apparently she had determined
that, no ill shall stand in her way as long as she participated in
the contest. No wonder Emem performed of head on the floor
when her musical tape failed to play for her. Emem danced
without it and still came out a winner. As much as some people
tried to insinuate that Emem was being sabotaged, the Queen to
be continued to do what she determined to do, try and win the
crown! ! And she did very brilliantly. So when she sent words of
advice to the youths, she did so because she knows how to
overcome the life's obstacles when you least expect them. So
youths, learn from our Queen. When Mbuk Akwa Ibom asked
her for some advice to the youths, the Queen replied without any
hesitation, "...stay in school and learn all you can for your bright
future!", she added. She also has some words for the adults,
"Educate us please!" Commenting on the decision to eliminate
the Swimsuit from the annual Beauty Pageant competition,
Emem quickly added, "..Brains NOT skinny body!"
Since becoming the current reigning Queen, Emem has
attended the 1st National Council and Board of Directors
Meeting in New York on November 1, 1997. In Atlanta where
she lives with her parents, she has joined the Food Drives
campaigns organized by the Atlanta Chapter of AKISANUS to
feed the hungry. To do what she loves best- Talk! She has
visited schools in Atlanta and proudly educate fellow students
on Nigeria and Africa.
On inquiring about whether she finds the title
meaningful and worthy of all the efforts she put into it, she
replied that it was very worthwhile! Balancing Title with school
work enhances her leadership skills. "We need leaders and
encourage others to do same and learn, she plans to visit some
Chapters including Dallas, to encourage the youths.
When asked about her relationship with the past
Queens of Akwa Ibom - National, Emem stated that the past
On inquiring about whether she finds the title meaningful
Misses Akwa Ibom are "my rich resources and they are
always there for my moral support. Sometimes with their
crowns when we visit.".
Emem was asked about her plans after her time is
up as the National queen in August 1998. The answer was
very simple. She will continue to speak about Nigeria, was
her answer. "Title never ends just because you give up the
crown," added the Queen politely with great admiration.
The other past Akwa Ibom - National Queens from
Atlanta Chapter were, Miss Ofonmbuk Uyo, (1995/96), and
Miss Nelly Otu, (1996/97), who crowned the new 1997/98
Miss Akwa Ibom-National. There were seven beautiful
contestants at the Beauty Pageant which was staged on
Saturday evening before the whole convention. The First
Runner-up was Miss Ubong Akpan, of Washington DC
Chapter.
Emem is a student at the Tri-City High School In
Atlanta. She hopes to become a Pediatrician someday.
Emem is the fifth reigning Queen of AKISANUS.
Contestants always come from different Chapters of
AKISAMJS throughout the United States. However, to
qualify, they must meet certain requirements including their
chapters meeting all their financial obligations to the
National body.
Emem is a recipient of the BarkJey Forum
Scholarship for Excellence in Debate. Congratulations,
Emem!!
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ANPA Office
Association of Nigerian Physicians in the Americas, Inc.
Incorporated in 1995 as a non-profit Charity
(a tax-exempt organization under section 501 (c)3 of the Internal Revenue Code)
Main Office
6876 Indiana Avenue, Suite F
Riverside, California 92506
Phone: (909) 778-0716 • Fax: (909) 778-0717
www.anpa.org
(Lagos)
Nigerian Office
234-1-775-3049
OUR VISION:
A Healthier Nigeria in a Healthier World
MISSION STATEMENT
To foster personal and professional growth of its members through camaraderie and unselfish
exchange of ideas.
To promote altruism, professionalism and scholarship among its members.
To identify and stimulate interest in all matters affecting the health of Nigerians and provide the
forum for debating evolving health issues.
To encourage the development of practical solutions to Nigerian health care problems through
strategic initiatives and field activities inside Nigeria.
To seek collaborative research opportunities in the international medical community and
contribute to improved health care in the Americas and world-wide.
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DELIVERY
TOP' Dr Nsidibe Ikpe, owner of The Majesty Hospital who led a
team of Medical
'
Practicioners to Nigeria, listened to the accounts
of a patient for medical at Anna
General Hospital.
BELOW: Dr. Ikpe's Associate fits a pair of eye glasses on a patient
at Anna General
Hospital .
_ _ _
_.
[
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Cultural Photos
Oghu Festival
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WORLD NEWS
EUROPEAN
.-.I h n.m I'aiif Ml
Eastern European nations that
adapt democracy and surt moving
toward market economies.
Bui those decmonj were over-
shadowed by the agreement on
pouUcal union, a remarkable sup
even in a year in which historic
development* in Europe have come
at dizzying speed.
The proposal was put fomard
April 19 by French President Fran-
cou .Mitterrand and West German
Chancellor Helmut Kohl Nine days
Later, the 12 leaders bought iL
The concept and the speed were a
victory lor Mr. Mitterrand and Mr.
Kohl and a odeat lor Mrs. Thatcher.
She spent the day insisting on wfial
political union must not be.
"There's far too much rhetoric
and lar too Jttle wiiy-griny, ' Mrs.
Thatcher said. She insisted that any
political union not undermine the
7 Did You Know?
Do you bio* that the beauty
crowns of Mis* America and Miss
USA are worn by Alrican-
AmeneaiB for the Qrn time ever.
Miss Debbie Turner is Miss America
'.990, while Miss Carole Gist is Miss
USA 1990 What a »ay « »y 'ha 1
America has come a long way and that
3Liu is reaJy beautiful.
"God did do better on His second
thoughts when He created Eve.
"
Bntish nsonarcny. Parliament, na-
tional legal systems or other rights
of governments.
"If God had tried to define what a
man isn't, I don't think Adam ever
would have been created.*' quipped
Community President Jacques
Delors.
Mrs. Thatcher retorted: "God did
do better on his second thoughts
when he created Eve."
Mr. Mitterrand, askea about Mrs.
Thatcher's ob|ecuons. said: If I
had to summarize what she said, it
was. I don't know wliat you re talk-
ing about.' I said. 'We'll see about
that in two months.
"
"They don't know what they
mean," Mrs. Thatcher compiamea
'It astounds me."
In their April 19 statement. Mr
Kohl and Mr. Mitterrand said
pouticai union must maude not only
a stronger European Parliament
and more powers tor the Commis-
sion, the Community 5 Belgium-
based uureaucxacy, but "a common
foreign aim security policy."
The "Vest German and Frencn
leaders seemed to have no idea * cut
they meant Dv this. They didn't clear
the proposal first with their own
foreign ministries, anu their aides in
Dublin said the details — which
would seem to aJfeci the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization and
the U.S. pouti on in Europe — were
vague.
Irish Prime Minister Charles
Hauflhey. the summit's nost said
the Community wants "NATO to
continue m being for the purposes
for wnic.nl *as created." But ne ad-
ded European security is evolving
Irom its Western European base into
an ail-European security system.
To a $reat degree, the debate
reflected we age-old cultural dif-
ferences Miween France, with its
love of ~rano designs. Germany,
with its romanticism, and Britain,
with its traditional suspicion of con-
tinental visions. Mrs. Thatcher at
various times has caiieo loeas for
greater E_rooean union esoteric"
ma airy-fairy"
congress nil make
pouticai union possible *ill start at
the same time as one on economic
and monetary umon-
Askefl i( aJ this *asn t biting on*
more than CieCommunitvcantnew
Mr Haugney said. Fortune favors-
the crave
'
JU ->
"Each atCana sxranf hwause te*
itS tlffBCf Ifld btfl rp.nrH \oQ
tor nation ptnsomM J inch
Lueno ao oat h*« an opparaau-
tf u (Tosrufl.
"
•President Mikhail Gortvacnev, in
a i uncheon at the Sovi et EmbajST
ji the USJl. be invited eairaor-
diniry oallecttBn of taiesis: ic-
lors, artists, writer), and
academics.
"The am* comesU to* life of any
aaoon. when there remains only
rwo cbveta • mount or fight
That am* has now com* to South
Mr.a. We saiil not submit and
we nave oocnaee out to All ate*
by ill toons io our power in
defence of oor people, our/ufurt
ana* our freedom.
'
Nelson Manceua. Quoting part o(
Umxhooto We Siiwe. the Military
arm of the aNC manifesto.
'The Jesson of the iDorave coup
(ia .Vigena> u thai the greatesi
security of anv govtnuaeaL
nuflUrj or anitafl is dm arms
iaa uoBUiDiQoc hui *he ic'fc-
aoa. support and cnafideace of
the people it governs.
'
Part * Editorial of Use Lagos
based Daily News on April
1990 published by .'aba West
Pabucaoora which ni banned
by the government for the
"Doof ,tbt compau} aboot *
Bpuoon; do socaftfiihg ahoul il
'to a posQve *ar;. Things don T
jas happeD; peopy* maxe a
•Rlchird 0. Nwacbntwu an
author.
'[odinduaJ uj eeruxa rtn>
daiixraau ngtus woicO masx bt
respecial To* protecDoo ce* tot
CQQB1P300P enenos a ni a
those wno spe*k other lingufes
u weJas those boro witfl English
ag the tongue. Peratp* it would
be otghJy adviougeoui ti aii oad
ready jaOtirunthag of our or-
diaa/7 speech, btd this aaoot at
coerced 9/ methods nuch coo»
thct with "Jx coosotinaoo • a
desraoJ* end caonot be pro»
moua ay anaibitets means.
'
-The US Supreme Court oo the
case of Meyer Vs Sute of
Sebraska 1 193), in the renew of
a contmersal suaia forbidcuhg
any teacher to Teach any ruhject
to any penoD ji any anguage
oiber tbaa the.Eagujo
language."
LOUIS
nur.l From I'ajje
them a teacher." He told his au-
dience mat "The tune is setting lor
white supremacy and eurocentnc
thought.-"
Minister Lous Ttms±Ma is a
very cocaroeerjiii figure. Bom on
May 11. 1333. he wis raised in Bosun
Mauaaetaieetti Al the age at 11,
wmle vuliag his rciatrves, he was
shown a picture of the Honorable
Marcos Gamy. He was told what
this man meant to the Black peocue.
The idea to sem bis people grew
and [nteflsj flat! in
In February ItU, a frtend iorited
Farraknan ts the Naooo of Islam's
animal Savior's Day Cocrenflcri in
Qucago. QlUwis. This was the Qrst
tuae be bad the opportuoity to bear
the Honorable Elijah Muhammad.
Prom thu encounter, a relationship
developed berweeo Fimahao and
trie Honorable Elijah Muhammad
that would Last forever.
However, il 1975, Eli|ab Muham-
mad departed wtucn caused the Nt-'
Uon of Islam ts (all lo 1977. Minister
Louis Farrathan began to refiuild
the Lnsutuuoo. through the teacrungs
of his idol Muhammad. Their Moe*
que and Muhammad University of
Islam on Stoney Island in Chicago
were repurchased. Thus, the Nation
1 1 of JsLam. according to the followers,
is on the move again.
Carrying a Koran on the right
hand and Bible on the left hand.
Minister Ftrraihan quoted the
definition of -Time" from both holy
bookj Chapter lO of Koran and
Ecclesaates m the Bible.) Just like
the Bible. Farrakhan defined God as
the One Whom all things began and
to whom all things *ul eventually
return.'
As controversial as Minster Far-
rakhan was, he drew an in-
precedented crowd as if it was
Michael Jacksoa's concert. He
acksowiedged this wtten be said.
''Dallas, yon an inaking aisaory
tomgbL I dant think then has ever
been a Black leader to come in this
cry and draw this many people.
"What dots uaa show the world?"
he askea. In in utrwer to his own
question, he said. "It shows there is
a hunger and thirst m the Black
Community (or the rrmh that wul set
us tree.
"
Later in his "lecture." be told bis
audjence. "Dont accuse me of bong
a raosL That is act what I am
t&ouL.J don t fees comfortable saw.
iog ail thai E say, Gut cm cum toss
bt tout. I am oot a raost bigot, or
infl in iri in I am your crocher.''
Weil be may be ngia. box yw art
the one to Judge.
Louis FtTMkntn say OmIIss. you trw making hiMtorf tontgfii."
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EDITORIALS
*The civil rights bill and its importance
RICHARD 0. NWACHUKWU
The LF_S. Cbn^resa thu AufDSt.
will approve or may have approved
cml rights act of 1990. As we go to
the pres. to rewording 3 the bill
wu suil bong negotiated between
the bill's anion and to White
House to avoid a preadenual veto.
Any veto will be »ery unpopular.
President Busn warts to sign it,
but he claims mat he would not sign
any cml ngnta bill that has "quota
"
in it. One tiling .s dear: This civil
rights bill ibelort the U.S Con-
gress 1 does not have a quota 111 iL
Those opnoaerl to civil arms laws
ore We ones unm> ing the word an iL
The bill is for equal opportunity for
all
The irnnortance of a civil rights
bill, especially one authored by
Sen. £darard Kenneav. D-Mass and
Reo. Augustus Hawtins. D-jki.
cannot be over^mnmsized. It is
even more significant that a person
at Sen. Kemedy's calibre would
sponsor such a relief 10 theminonry
/J Over the past two yean, the U S
^ Supreme Court, majority of which is
nude up of President Rtami ap-
pointees, has rolled back to hands
of to dock of judicial protection tn
to U.S. The court has made it vir-
tually impossible lo prove on to ;ob
discrimination. In our opinion, it is
an exhibition of sheer ignorance, a
acre idiocy, or a play of stupidity
for any one to think Hut doennuna-
Oon ooes not exist id America,
capecuily at to corporate America
and its esubaahrnenL
~J
As to NAACP ngbtJy panted out
is July, to two recent supreme
Court decisions - Wards Cove
Packaging Co. Vs Atorio and Patter-
son Vs. ULean Credit Union pro-
mpOfl dismixsals of over 3X1 ran
discrimination suits nationally. The
Wards Cove decision made it more
difficult to use statistics to prove
discrimination The Patterson deci-
sion barred a cavil war era bias
sttatute from bong applied in cases
other nun biased hiring practices.
Just last June il990>. toSupreme
1 irt Irt stand to tlsmusai of a
T'Maj case because African*
An (ncui workers it Port Arthur
Res in fry could not tasprove their
employer') content!an tot a bused
job dauwflcatMnmum was an etfi-
aeat method of boldmg down
workers trauing cost.
The Kennedy-Haw inns bill seeks
to overturn thtai Supreme Court's
daemons as well 14 expand tefal
protections [or worsen, racial and
religious minorities and victims of
intentional discsimiriadon. Said Sen.
Kennedy during to senate debate ui
July: "We have seen to damage
caused by these Surpetrat Court deci-
sions, and wt most repair iL_We
cannot leave millions of worker:
vulnerable lo imcrjmnauon. '
Thu bill which should become law
would malte s easier for workers to
prove discniranation in a tnde range
of Job-related actirttitt For to Oral
am*, to law would allow Junes to
award iaon«tai7 damage* to ethruc
and reUpous rrunontiee. as well as
women who art victims of pur-
poseful or intefioonal ^iKn ni na-
tion. No wonder to rag corpora-
Qoru. well trewn for their disdain
and intentional torture of their
minority etrjatoyees. an lobbying
hard against thu much iiaeded law.
It is only minorities, especially
people of African descent, that cu
tram and/or help rare a person or
persons who would ui turn oecome
their boss or bosses in no distant
time. (1 13 when it comes to to
minorities that aducabno which toy
harrt, ia no longer unportavt for rar-
ing or promoaon. They become "nn-
qeauBed" when thry 40 oot bare
education, and 'TTer-iuanIjed" ta
many cues when toy nave it. Ia
[act toy ban to prove ihenuelvea
ta some pasahoni before toy get to
title and the cocomenauraia pay, u>
staadof net versa.
As President Bosh said ta to
businessmen in Ma . ~We seek civil
rights legislation that a more effec*
Ore, not less. The focus of employers
in this country must be on providing
equal oc-porturuty lor all workers,
not on developing strategies to avoid
Litigation."
It is very urportant that President
Both ngni to MIL, not only that be
coroyaa btgb rating among Afxieaa*
Arnencaai now. but lor to tad that
to law is necessary There u no ex-
coat to dilute to btlL Abort ui. the
tall does not advocate quota: rather
it advocates equal opportunity for
As Houston. Texas Congressman
Craig Washirsjton said, faiaara to ap-
prove ton bill would send a message
to empioyen tot discrunurion on
to 'oc is tolerable in an already ris-
ing tide of racial intolerance In
America. AS to Democratic Con-
gressman suied. and we strongly
agree, "That is not be road to a
kinder, gender nauon."
The formation of ONN is long overdue
Nigerians in Dallas, on July 7,
1990. lormed a unified organization
that embraces social, economic,
political and cultural characteristics
that beiil their African heritage. The
name of the j't^13 """ is Organiza-
tion of Nigerian .Nationals <0NN1.
Such an orsjanuation is long overdue
in Dallas/Fort Worth metroplex.
The success of sucn move was not
without some actors. Richard 0.
Nwachuawu must be congratulated
lor his lores ighiedness in initiating
such a meeong that brougnt to
unification of the existing organiza-
tions, as well as Jerry I'gokwe, the
president of the defunct New
Nigerian Forum who saw the need
for i unification. Tony Nwanne, to
president of the defunct Nigerian
Peoples Union. Herbert Nwankwo
who provided a list of names in
which one was enoawn from. Freddy
Ngwu. Amn Nieaxor. Attorney
Obinna Dunit who not only provided
a space for the meeting, but
moderated it as wed, and a host of
others who helped make every effort
successful.
Nov that a viable organization 11
in place through a democratic and
legal process, it ts now up 10 to
care-taker executives to prove
tomselvex. Luckily, Jerry Ugokwe
who was the president of one of the
defunct organizations is the presi-
dent of the newly formed one. His
ability for the job cannot be con-
tested. We hope he wiQ not let
Nigerians in Dallas down.
There ts no lime to waste in mov-
ing on. Nigerians in Dallas should
celebrate October 1 independence
day for the iirst time iras year. That
j why the executives must move
Fait to consolidate tou* prograau,
including a call for general meeting
of "all" Nigerians in Dallas. There
is no excuse for procrastination.
Ghanaians in Dallas will celebrate
the first anniversary of tbeir
association - Ghana Leadership
Society - on September L That
should be an encouragement to
Nigerians in Dallas.
We encourage a move towards
unity among Africans. Urury, as it is
said, is strength. And Africans
anywhere need ad to strengths they
can get. With lite present political
A betrayal by
Senas John Ukpanah
A high level Nigerian Trade
Delegation was supposed ta be in
Dallas on July T7, 1990, but to visit
was officially canceled by Mr. CO.
Uba, to cocnmeraaJ Consul at the
Nigerian Consulate ofrke in New
York It was not only a blow; it was
an insult and a betrayal, not only to
to Citv of Dallas, but U Nigeria as a
nation.
The word had gone out that inert
was a trade delegation visiting
Dallas. A lot < money and man-
hours were invested. Most of the
lime !o£l minot be quantified m
\ dot
«li!
llars like that of Herbert
and Jerry Ugokwe.
Mr. Uhu rurnself who cancelled the
it after it was certain that tou*
rust to Houston was a failure vis ted
Dallas several umes to cement the
plans. In fact, he went to Austin too
to make an arrarigenMnt for Senas
John Ukpanah'i audience with to
governor of Texas Bill dements.
Who tnows if he ever called to
Governor J aiTice 10 cancel to
icftedujed vial.
,
The most disturbing though, was
Sec BETRAYAL Page U
near future corn* together to form
an or^antxauoa or association
geared toward that end. It could be
in form of African Chamber of Com-
merce. With Nigerians sow on
board, we believe that won't be long.
CORRECTIONS
There were a few typos we did rax
catch in our July 1990 coition. Pro-
minent among torn were Arrun
which was typed as Amirei on where
Kenneth Onyima ts from, and CS
tulljon as IS million 00 Dr. Obinna
Dunn's wnifrup on The IMF and
African UnderaereJoomenL 1 ' Duniji
meant to write "...The IMF is to
key stone of a total system. Its
power is made possible not only by
to enormous resources wtucn it
con troll 1 over £3 bdlioni in national
money tn to lorm of fecial Draw-
ing Rights 1SDR1. bat more
significantly as a resull of its func-
tion as an iniemauoaal credit
agency ..."
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Living in
Fantasia
By tFEANYl OBNEGBO
For whatever reasons we come
over to the Li. nunly to add lo
**rui we already bio*, the coming
usually turns lo be a fantasy. No
matter the shape of our departures
Irom cur countries in terms cf the
j
preparMness- there is always et-
I cit£menL amotury and most inv
poruntly. enthusiasm Whichever
way we interpret our spoken and
t ow unspoken intentions, goals and
our aspirations, inert is also that
uncenunry When our ships sail
j and anchor, or our pianes use off
and land, we are greeted with that
mystery of the Fantasy bland.
1 remember very vividly m*
first erpenence in America when J
ruiveiy arrived at Qucago Ohare
Airpon in 1991 . ] wanted to call the
foreign j&idenu advisor of the
University of Wisrarmn Lo oe in-
formed of my next aepo on how to
|et lo Wisconsin. 1 was Ien with the
only option in doing that with a
puhlic telephone. To be honest with
you, 1 could do i differentiate bet-
ween quarters, dimes, and even
luckJeo. I did not enow what com-
puter recoroed voice messages
were When 1 had tried several
limes without any measure of suc-
cess. 1 became trusmteo and 1 did
a lot of funny things with my coins
that when I look bar* at Ihem now,
I Ltufh at myself. 1 laiigh because
pnor to mv arrival lo Lb* US. I did
not think in a fantasy island such
as America, that 1 would be faced
with any type of problems like us-
ing t public telephone. I tell you
that from that pouit on 1 realised
that even m America, with all the
efforts to enhance dlecuve com-
muroealiotis, one could still be
Stuck. There have been Jtor.ca ol
similar circumstancei which
I
omen have narrated u: me wfucf.
can-American
A journey through the Niger River
By HERBERT NWANTWO
|*TrT recent years, particularly
•wiiran the pas: 6n or m yean, the
Americans with claims of African
heritage are ntmaj a miuc last
over reanJTh*' have coma a long
way. but apparently, have traveled
the long count with continued
search for a more befitting identity.
Until recently, the term "blacks''
has reigned with certain grip on the
minds of many — (or some
mysterious reason. I have ill along
fallen tola Use same tract as una of
you there, until my daughter pro-
tested. She holds it religiously thai il
j insulting to call people "blacks".
First, it isn't a fancy color, Like ptnx
or red or yellow. Secondly, it takes a
colorblind person to think people are
black. II co. or ol skin is the main
measure, taen the woric must be
aupid if they Lbmi somebody like
Gen. Powell .she saw rum on TV],
the (J i strongman, is black. She
laughs harder at the point that the
coior is his (Powell's i race.
may never make sense to her.
She knows what she is. • Nigerian-
American, not a Black. Her advice
for Gen. Powell? Find out what
country your parents come from,
j than your heritage
There is more to this childish talk
than can be seen trnmediateiy What
I intend lo do here today is run you
Herbert E. Nwuir*o
{
through my mind's version of the
AJncan-American "history"- My
hypothesis is that too many of (hem
may have originated from Nigeria,
especially in the area with 200 miles
or less raoius of the entire stream o,'
the River Niger, which strides
Nigeria.
You must understand that this is a
history man in, ano some reflections
would not do us much harm.
How bard we wort as people can
fairly be seen by retracing a path of
where we have Deen. wruu items we
droppeo along the way — even the
foods we cat have a tunory in them
fblackeye pea is a poouiar food in
southern Nigeria and fitswry credits
its origin here to blacks.. Hiswry is
not just political history. Often times
that's what wt sec being eeleorated
here There is more lo where wt
bavt been than jam the politics or tt.
Uwazrr&ila, ks a laxe a Lace m
the bsaurf of Samoa tmo Negro to
/Airicac-AmenCBD In* name
"Negro", Bidcabubhr. mar hart
bees BBpaaod try the wist* master,
following Bfliilaf lpjObcU thai gave
as Nigeria and Niger u names of
r»o Desghborutg Wen African coun-
tries. The coutctdenct m ctimoina-
bon of letter) ant be accidental
1 (fldun weight u Ifasj i*i * i r" is the
laet that the white slave masters
and their t oce pronounceo
"Negro" as "Nuga " Given bow well
tvames from Africa are pronounced
here, one may logically claim thai
the River Niger may have
something to do with this name.
The Niger River was used exten-
sively for stave trades from the
Dcranttary towns in the east, west and
north of iL The Orutsha areas have
been aled as one of the principal
markets and gathering centers for
dealers and middlemen enroute to
places as faru OpoOo and Degcma. -
Orutsna is located by the Niger
River and has remained a key
market center for local traders
today.
Niger pronounced "Nu)el" u the
country located north of Nigeria to-
day. That the two have names Ded to
the nver ta also not a eomadencx-
Unbelief is dangerous
somenmei portray our un-
preparedness for the shocks
cuirrunaiuu; from trance o' en-
vironment and systems.
See FANTASY Page 13
By REV. N. S. OKEREKE
A man was traveling on his motor-
cycle on a far tourney he saw a
tram approaching opposite his direc-
bon. The train driver blew his horn
for the motorcyclist to dear from
the road. Adamantly be did not
move for the train. He did not either
see the train or could not hear the
bom, then the train crushed turn, he
died.
Humanly we can lay the blame on
the motorr or the train, or the
driver. '. ootarcycJis has to
carry the v lie of blame because
be refused to clear for the train.
Host of us are like the niotnrrrdisi.
Traveling is a part ol life We travel
around the world but re I use to listen
or cannot hear the horn We refuse lo
tee acknowledge, and believe in
God.
God revealed Himself through
f tiers, revelation You mow as I
know uui unoeUe.' isdancerous. The
eariv prophets were a nom for us:
re Heard mem. but did not believe
joo revealed HimseU to us tnrougn
His Son Jesus who is a horn lor us
Rev. NJi. Ot<
Preachers are the modem bom we
have today. Bible ii a horn that is us-
ed to instruct m. U we cannot hear
these horns, we will be crushed.
Jesusuyj. "He that believelhon the
Son hath everlasting Life, and he thai
believclh not the Son shall nol see
Lie, but the wrath of God abidclh on
rum' — John J.3S
Do we have eve lo sec ant' ear lo
hear? The boms art blowinc in
everywhere but one maior factor is.
are we ready U lister.* Is the ham
blowing strong! v uiio our ears" Or
are we aoproacmng the oTain of
See UNBELIEF Page H
may bav* label-
ed a grow of ilavca ti the "Nigers"
as a ease* bJ Qwar pert of origin. Tbu
protscibrt csuuth) up and bwcamt
what bub slaves were called the"
Save tradifig took a macn larger
proportion to the eastern part of
Nigeria, ted remained m vanous
'
farms ihrtai/h aereraJ decades after
It was abolished u Europe and (be
Americas.
Personal knowledge as a cc and
op until the late «Ue» stnund that
slavery was ataJj goiog on (hen.
Then were then news of some
mystery fatnapcwTs called "Ndi nu
madu": nnaaim Unse wtu bdnap-
ped people. Parents used Uus as a
scare tnck u send kids running to
their rooms airtight.
Even though ''ille*aJ''shjpmeot to
America supped I probably around
the first quarter of the 1990s l, there
remained local dealers tar into the
60s. like today'] "open adoption"
market, during this final period, it
changed tram Ciosed lecrecve u an
open trade with parental and
sometimes personal consent of the
person traded. Poor families traded
their children for money, the money
wu never returned I as was the case
of Jaui of Opooo. who later succeed-
ed his master as bng of the area
because he was able to corn-
See AMERICAN Page 14
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S. African referendum
President Frederick de Klerk of Africa m an uncertain future. He
SouLb Africa, in reaction to Ml has suited a campaign in favor of
party's substantial loss ui a mid- the referendum- We hope that the
term election to a conaerraBve white South Africans would not be
- /*» 10 i-w "i*f ivji* «no gn m* « m*nr**f* in ino nrv oun <v» vm mm mo
•w «v tuinorung mo *n*w 10 gomm i imv kcw rev rwuKt.*
- Prnidari ndanca w o» «im m •rwxmarwg Mwcfl 17. '993 u in* ma*o/ffT
itinnoun out on *>• vouM connnu* in* COwatlWian iiu iam tjoukd
party, announced on Wednesday,
February IS. 1992. that hia negoua-
stupid again to vote against bis
constitutional negotiation. Their
Hon with the Black majority on the first stupidity and unforgettable
new constitution that will ant was uutiaUag apartheid In the
fUtraotM the sharing of powers first place,
with the disfranchised Blades, This showi that apartheid Is still
would be sent to whiles (only) alive in the rrundi oi many whites
referendum Aa expected, the ANC in South Africa. As such, the inter-
condemned it. national community should not
Upon reflection, we think that de relax and think that everything is
Klerk, me moat pragmatic and fair okay in that sub-region. Spike Lee.
minded president the apartheid the African American movie direc-
South Africa has ever had, made a tor, confirmed after visiting South
good more. He wis elected by Africa to January that apartheid is
whites ld the first place. No matter still alive and well.
We support de Klerk's move, but
we don't support abandoning the
negotiations midway. If the
the whites are oil constituency referendum is approved, as we
first- He Li using the powers en- think it should, de Klerk would get
trusted in him to make South stronger mandate for this unoor-
Oram Biteu a u touMJiv.
how ulegal the wnitea-only vote for
a national president is. it is im-
material at this juncture. As such,
Africa a better place for ail He has
threatened to resign if the referen-
dum fails, thus putting South
tant future of South Africa. He has
acknowledged that failure of the
llCHAflDO NWACHUKWU
referendum would bring
"piaster."
To the ANC. they should be
strong and ready for any eventuali-
ty. We remain hopeful that apar-
theid whites should choose the
ngbt path to their nation's future
— peace and freedom The conse-
quences of otherwise may be bet-
ter imagined than described.
"Ol» cwuiwi c*vK* yo to eft* ic*rx>< of t~fn on»a) icu< or 'W
ffMerwuf rWJmowaJMaoaffneML ' "um tn -*nmwn*wwoui avm--
to o* oaueoim • io e*t ">• oooonumry tnot row noro. '
- ljJw Cu«f M*noou<r-j Gaimu taiiuwi. ounng rvi nwt io OaNat on Monoar.
toman >o. iN2.
"Uojj aocotit o*oo»*. if tnoy ao tomttning inooeom, i
aocooev to incmsa/tee.
~
- mhu Rovu. on Ma. BewanV tuaoM mi H'am wiih
'Oma Slocamen. 41 now pew* otmof id tno Siacarofw Grew *i Immtmnt
'
sanxing tin*, nu to vuva nmoonnotUiy let Amona t (eoacv ot rocJn* - j nmtonoi
Oea> currmitr u S3 Ionian. Sloumm ramootl unutloo as mnotx wry in mo WMpaa 1
ampliation, *nt* no >m no narcoreo mctm oouMi aeaul h i o«n_0uoo*r
,
tmeuioiiont one ino tiioetnonooa oi ino mMtmi acondnwc pfop/wn"
- Pmx Magazmt ol Foomorr Z3. 1991 on "Mow Hmonr win Vi** in* Coninbuuon
ol Oa*<d Slocmun.' Siocmuvi n in* tuootv-oO* *conarTun wna (iiwm led u Pnw*
o*m Ha*0*A'l full QinKlor ol in* OIHc* 01 Mto*g*m*nt *no Booj*i
41
~My country 90 not tone mo T.0O0 moot to von ino tOtymttcj n
-nun* *iii oo oniy i vngio nvator ooilon tna oiftot pnjwewnrs win not postoxt n_
01 COtPM w* livol . -i. i outlon must nortt OO UIH. '
- Boni Yeiltin, Huisian Preoatni. ari*f Pmiaani Goioasn** patHd nuctaaf coo* io
^-Mike Tyson and rape trial
The raoe inai that led to Mike
T^ion iconncuon on February 10-
1991 was very unfortunate. And we
hope that the conviction be over-
turned ai the higher court.
Under normal circumstances, a
conviction should be beyona any
reasonable and/or shadow of
doubt. On Mike Tyson's case, tt left
more questions than answers.
Even as Miss Desire* Washington,
IS. the so-called rape victim, ap-
peared on AfiCs 31/3) with Bar-
bara Wallers on Friday, February
21. 1991 the situation became
cloudier.
She claimed that Mike Tyson
was yen and should be sentenced
to prison "for as long aa it lakes for
turn to be rehabilitated." Asked
what the would say if she could
talk with Mr. Tyson, she said: "Ii
would letl htm. You need help, you 1
know — I didn't do this to hurt you.
I didn't do this to take your career
away. I did it because you need
help..." Well, who knows when
Oesiret Washington became a
psychiatnst.
n must be recalled that It was
this young Lady, a Slack American
Beauty Pageant contestant In July
1991 that looted for Mr. Tyson at
about 3 o'clock Id the rooming at
Mike Tyson's hotel room. Unlike
Mr. Kennedy Smith's case. Mr.
Tyson did not convince and/or take
ber from a club. She apparently
did not go to his room by any in-
fluence of drug or alcohol. As she
admitted, she went there willingly
and knowingly. She probably did
not get what she bargained for,
although she was happy io have
gone out on a date earlier with a
celebrity her parents uould be pro-
ud of,
In Mr Kennedy Smith's rape
trial, he was acquitted. On the one
that looked much less like rape.
Mike Tyson was convicted
Perhaps, the (act that Mr Smith
was a medical doctor from a
celebrity family and, of course, a
while, helped exonerate rum. Mike
Tyson, although a world boting
champion, has a terrible
bacaground. He probably was pre-
judged and convicted before the
case even came up for tnal
It must be recalled that Miss
Oesiree Washington participated
fully in the pageant contest a lew
hours aiter the alleged rape. If she
was raped
_s claimed, wny didn't
she report to the police sooner. Her
cscuse for continuing the pageant
was that she was not a "quitter".
What a good excuse (9 someone
who must have lost a personal
pride through this "felonious act"
This argument should not be
misconstrued that we uo not sym-
pathize with rac« victims- To the
contrary, we certainly do. The only
problem we have wiih this u thai a
lot of doubts still cloud ;L
Miss Washington sounded very
intelligent at lha ABCi 3/2) inter-
view, her Lawyer's presence not-
withstanding. Her intelligence
came out clearly when she said
that she planned to study law and
perhaps go into politics. Well, this
exposure may have given her a
future political weapon. And who
knows, she may be called to act m
a movie portraying a rape victim.
We wish her welL But to Mike
Tyson, it is about lime be learns
that to whom more is given, more
is expected, especially as his box-
ing career is not managed
anymore by the establishment. At
23, he should settle down and be
more careful. Perhaps, this is hu
greatest lesson yet
LETTER TO THE EDITOR
Dear editor:
The article and interview that
you conducted with Dallas County
Commissioner John WOey Pncc
was even banded and obrtctivt.
You presented a side of Commis-
sioner Pncc that the other pruu
media never do: Joan Wiley Price,
the person — not just Ot* protestor.
When people get an opportunity
to read about John WUey Price, the
person, they will then understand
why he protests.
The article *u paramount! The
foremost piece of Journalism I've
ever read about Commissioner
Price.
Your idea to make the interview
a question and answer one was also
a good idea. That way on* doesn't
have to worry about being mis-
quoted or having their words
tnisconstrued
Thank you for panting that
story. The two pieces on Mix Win-
nie Mandela were also very
enlightening and educational. I
bad never known that up until rwo
years ago, the executive members
of the African National Congress -
weren't allowed to vub t the United
States, as the ANC was perceived
to be a "terrorist" organization.
But we have to rtm*mber ihu is
the same United States that was
responsibite for (he incarceration
of Nelson Mandela in the first
place!
Respectfully yours,
Danny L. Suggers
GOOD HOPE NEWS
"The African Perspective"
Editor-in-Chief / PuDllsher , .
Richard O. Nwachukwu
Editorial Board Member
. ,„
Dr. John llokwu
'
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Dr. Marshal Madu (Oklahoma)
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The unforeseen consequences of war
Tim might be power tunica there
Id the long run. Toe atugu' era
ere more open no* tain ever. 3m
ofliv tune will Uil an mat ooe.
La jt* ITTOi or any LMOe. u.
Gen. Theophilu Danjuma irtd. a
Nigeria, advised that country's
leaders to avoid anything that would
drag them into another avil war.
Geo. D&B]uma woo was one of tot
architects of the counur-coup that
resulted in the assassination of Gen.
Thomas U. Aguiyilronsi (an Iboi on
July 29. 1966, and sufasequently into a
JO-moom cml war, told the leaden
that no nation in notary had wrm-
What happened in
The Guif war has come and gone.
The victor and Um vanquished are
no more a secret. But wnat is next?
It ii our opinion that President
Saddam Hussein of Iraq
miscalculated on the United States'
reactions co his invasion of jttle
Kuwait. He auto miscalculated no
how the war should be (ought and
its eventual outcome
The Soviet Union miscalculated
too. The authorities there end not
realize that a ddeat of Irani army
woud be a defeat of Um Soviet
weaponry, ana that the US. would
see* a permanent base in Um Gulf.
According u the statement credited
to the American C-rmmtr^ff w
Operation Desert Storm Gen. Nor*
man Schwarzkopf on Sunday, March J~ •
H. the U-S. j closer than ever to- '—\
establishing a permanent military -
—
headquarters on Arab sul. a goal
Arab governments nave blocked (or
many years. Well, as we said m our
earlier editorial the Arabs would
never be the same again after the
war.
To the U.S. government, then-
were some miscalcuiauons too. The
United States, we assume, did not
want to destroy Iraq to the extent
that it would become a prey to its
neighbors Like Iran. 8ut it ended uo
doing so. According u the United
Nations report released retencly,
Iraq nas been set baa to the pre-
indusinal develooment era. On top
of thai, the war has not supped in
Iraq; tha country is soil having in-
ternal rmfe, and Iran ls said to be
sponsoring il The United States,
again, did not want to conquer Sad-
dam Hussein so that an extremist
Shut* Moslem would take over the
country. But with Um conditions Um
United States is semng lor Um yet-
lo-oa-signed permanent cease-fire,
that might happen.
Overall wnat has Saddam Hu> and other eleven officers looked an.
setn gained from Um war other than
\
Luckily for Mr. King, an amateur
drawing mention u> the Palestine video shooter. Mr. George HoUiday,
ed two (crrU) wars within 10 yean.
Perhaps someone courageous
enough witrxm the Iraqi canines or
party should have advised Saddam
Hussein this before he defied Um
United Nations r<*»nii« And aa
Dungs stand now. with the country
"decimated", people divided accor-
ding to religious and ethnic lines,
and Iran standing to prey on her. in
retaliation of the past acts,
Theophilus Dan|uma may nave been
proven right with the Iraqi
miscalculation. As mch. nations
should tram now on, learn from
others' past mistakes. RICHARD 0. NWACHUKWU
The L.A. Shame
Los Angeles,
California on Sunpay. March 3, 1991
between police officers and a
moionst, Rodney Glen King, was a
shame, not omy to Um LA. Police
Department and j Chief Dary!
Gales, but to law enforcement
agents across the United States
and/or the world. In fact, the inci-
dent iooked more like what had been
going on in the apartheid South
Africa, or what had happened tn the
US. m the 1990s and early 1960s,
especially in the deep South-
On that date. Police Sergeant
Stacey Kaon. 40, and officers
Lawrence Powell 23. Timothy Wind.
10. and Theodore Bnseno. 31. 'all
whites i, supped Mr. Rodney King
(an .'tin can American} who was
allegedly speeding,
.is soon as Mr
King stepped out of his car, Sgt.
SUcry Kooo fired a SO.QOCtvoa Taaer
stun gun on aim, while the other
three officers took cams to beat,
dub, and kick him as Um sergeant
question? He could have done that
by polling out on the January IS
deadline. What did he gain tram the
Iraq-Iran war? Nothing! All Um land
Iraq gained was given back to Iran
when be invaded Kuwait. Now Iran
haj moa of Um Iraqi wirplanes that
were sent there during the Gulf war
to avoid the US bombers' leeVuc*
tton. Nov we are hearing that Iran
intends to keep those warplanes.
Kuwait did not gain other Almost
ail in oilfields are on fire, and ther
may lake about two years to be est*
tinguished. AS we write Uus, the
country has no power supply, no
good drinking water, no good
breathing air, and it is Littered with
war debna. In other words, the coun-
try has gone bacx to the primitive
stage until things are rebuilt again.
And stability is not assured there
either Remember, there used to be
man of [ran: that no more exists.
was crying bis newly bought home
video camera when the incident oc-
curred. He snot the footage of Che u>
adent from his borne- The actions of
tboe* police officers were, and soil
are, gjuesocne. By Um tun* the of-
ficers finite having "good time"
on Mr. King, he had suffered eleven
fractures in bis bead, a broken leg, a
crushed cbeeshooe, a broken ankle,
injuries to both knees, internal in-
juries, a burn on bis chest, a concus-
sion, nerve damage, a shattered eye
socket, and possible brain damage.
On top of that, they tried to charge
him (or resisting arrest. The Los
Angeles District Attorney's office,
understandably declined to file the
charges. Rather, those officers were
charred.
j
,
/ What a shame in the United
States' What apparent racism and
pre|udice: it id written all over
their conversation and common)ca-
tions to the police headquarters. And
yet, an African American. Tom
Bradley, is the city's mayor.
The ponce chief of the aty is not
helping the atuaaon either. On Mon-
day. March 11. 1991, he said. "We
regret what took place. I hope he
i the victim I gets his Life straighten-
ed out. Perhaps Uus will be Um vehi-
cle to move him down the road u a
good Life instead of the life he's been
involved ui (or such a long time,"
Well, that was how regretful the
duel was.
Now. the FBI and the Justice
Department are looking into all
police complaints nationwide that
have not passed the statute of Umita-
bon. Meanwhile. Sgt Koon. Officers
Powell, Wind and Bnseno have been
indicted on felony charges of assault
and laanaU under the color of
authority.
The tnadeni tn Los Angeles, a dry
relatively more modents and pro-
gressive Chan many aQes in the
^Tith ls not flnttina. Such incuienta
are regularly reported to Miami
New York, Dallas, Houston, and
various other big dries. What is uni-
que though, is that it was caught by a
video camera — thanks to Mr
George Holliday, who deserves an
award.
Hera Id Dallas, African
Americans, partlculaxty African un-
rmgranta, report Qagrant those of
authority by pole*. We have gotten
many reports of police, insults, racial
slur, unlawful search and seuure
and IstDBDce of unwarranted
tickets. We ban beard thy when a
ear aceident occurs between
Africans and Caocasians, the police
officers Chat amve at the scene, par-
ocularly white officers, ask only
their fellow whites to tell how the in-
cident happened, and then write
ther report solely on such one-sided
accounts. One attorney mid the Good
Hope News that when his cueru, wno
was involved m a car acaaent, was
rushed Co the hosniUJ unconscious.
the police who arrived at the scene
hist wrote a one-sided report without
hearing from the victim.
While we do not diminish the in-
herent danger Che police officers
face each day on their Quaes, ft is
very necessary that they treat peo-
ple uke human beings. It is omv
through chat process ihat chey will
get the respect they tru'y deserve.
Simply put, you don't eniorce taw by
breazing the law. and we are glad
that the new Dallas ponce chief.
William Rathbum, incidentally
from the Los Angeles Police Depart-
ment, has put it ui wnong to his
police officers and he said chat he
will lead by example.
Dear Editor - -—
I am always enthused to read Um
"Personality Of This Edition,'' one
of the best Informative aod
edueatlve columns in your
newspaper, it is very rxeomeadehU
of you to bring into the llmtUgM
such persons that are really annua
user para la oar comment. Africa.
To those persona who have been or
will be recognized m Uus column, I
tender my ceetjioiuirions for ex-
ceiling in their various eapeaOea.
They are the good hopes and inspxra-
bona to their country's men and9
We an proud of the Good Hope
.Vewj and Um chosen personalities of
each edition of the newspaper. Your
I
she are worthy of emulation. Please
keep up your good works:
EricUmeh
Dear Mr. Nwacnukwu:
Your book makes a pil ing ~
reading. It is a very Lucid in-
telligence u bear on a demystifying
creativity and you've managed to be
highly informative without obscur-
ing the great darkness of your
subject
It is indeed an informative book
that captures in human terms the
difficult transitional period as our
country embarks itself, yet again, on
a deznoeraUc model
Apparently, you are committed to-—
thoughtfully analysing thought, and
you are. quite fraruily, one of
Nigeria's best cornrDentators on
these matters. You inssired me.
Please do not let up.
Sincerely,
Henna Anokwuta, Jr.
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& The young black males in the 1990's
By JOSIAH OP AT A
la the book of Heorewi. Chapter
rtna 7-9. n read. "If yi endure
diajunini, God dealeth with you as
sons: for wtiai sod j w wtum Lie
father duuteneth not? But if ye be
without chastisement, whereof iU
are partaken, then are ye bastards,
and not son."
Furthermore we nave had fathers
of our flesh which corrupuo us, and
w* gave them reverence: Shall weM much rather be in subjection un-
co the lather oi xpu-its, and live'"
To be able to deai fairly with our
theme, the young ma i m in tie 1990s,
we would need to recapture the out
of the male, especially the African
American male; aiagnose the work
of our parenta and oat them on the
back if vre feel that thev have done a
good job. On the other hand, if we
find my pathology or defect in our
children, sons) then we would need
to prescribe a cure or a panacea or a
remedy
! First of all, my personal obser-
vance ol the black men from the mid
TO's lo the nineties, is that we live in
a very fractured or divided society.
With the coming of Ronnie Reagan
into power m the I SU's, the African
American firmly failed through
governmental policies and agendas.
For erample, Die average under-
employed famii) who toon welfare
or fwd stamps, was not served,
unless the father was evicted from
the home. At the same tune, the
Rev. Jesiah Opals
fathers were dented meaningful
jobs In Texas. Mexicans. .Asians
and other mum grants replaced
African American men who wonted
manual or less stilled ;obs. The men
alio went lo coueee ana beneiued
from government quotas to obtain
jobs in the private sector, were aiso
denied jobs as the government o>
posed quotas. Thus tne onty employ-
ment avenue left for blacx males
was in the miularv sales commis-
sion jobs, teacrung and preaching, or
service lype ;obs. io we nave »
*noie lot of prescners *ho were
eailed by circumstances beyona
their coatrol. who were called try
man and not by God. Their pockets
and their stomach*, which were
empty, drove them to 0110x07. So
even in the ministry, they have no
compassion, no mercy, no Love and
no Holy Ghost, ill we fail to writs
down wtiat we are saying today,
there will be no history of our
preacnmg to posterity or future
generations. 1 Those who tot into
By IKENNA ANOKWUTE
The triumphant vuil of African
National Congress reader Nelson
Manoeia to the United States last
summer raised an interesting but
largely overlooked paradox about
African politics as a whole.
Mandeia. rrpresenung an oppressed
black maianty speanmg out against
their wnjteminonrv, enjoys massive
world-wide support. Yet beyond the
borders ot South Africa, the tyranny
inflicted by btacit rulers on their
blacK subjects is on a par with that
of Pretoria's despised apartheid
regime.
And with the cold war winding
down, the world has turned its back
on oUck Africa Because there seems
tu tie no compelling political or
economic reasons 10 pav attention.
Most 0: :he traditional hard-headed
commercial and miiitary reasons
the military, were driven to
genocide, either Mad. or frumtsd
after they were dischar|sa cms the
service, by bong denied meaningful
jobs. So often they turned to drugs,
because their wives became
material minded, that thcu* sole aim
of marrying the CIs wis not baaed
00 love, but u steal their military
benefits.
Those who turned to drugs became
fx pouring money into Africa'* poor
countries — keeping communism
out of the third world, making poor
countries sale tor economic penetra-
tion and exploitation of their
resources — have oegun to sound oid
fashioned or beside the point. The
Soviets are busy at borne. Resources
turn out to be well-distributed
around the globe, and. increasingly,
synthetics can be substituted- Cheao
labor 13 available almost
everywhere. Poor peoole do not
mace good custocnen, and not very
many of them get rich.
Much western aid to Africa has
come througn trie World Bank,
which funds huge development pro-
jects with the dubious idea that the
benefits will 'trickle down" to the
poor World Ban* poucies contribute
to Africa's misery by forcing
African leaders lo make 'structural
criminals, wwt to (ifl and latcMM
public enemies instead of public -
.
defenders. Thctr counterparts who 1
served in the military, wen tola to
'
ttathevGXBlQlogoucoUegeand 4
*eri ahforoed into pnvu* and ',
public industry, wtatr* trsey art la
middle management or other 1
leadership roles. - ' jJ?
So in their agonies, they wC7*'
Sec YOUNG, Page U -
adjustments'', deraloarloa of cur-
rency, reduction of government
payrolls, etc, that harm me poor. I
The World Bans has fallen tnu a eo- . i
dependent relationship with awn- '
tries whose officials regularly rake '
Id to li percent off on big projects.
;
Furthermore, the World Bank
cr-arter is "above politics" —
dutifully servicing any government 1
that meets it's conditions however
repressive, however corrupt, that
government may be.
.African governmental leaden
tend to take care of themselves and
their tnenOL They either ignore or
air unable to provide medical and"
educational services 1 just to name a
few 1 for their cttiiena. The answer, I
suggest, is increased awareness of
the world economy. Africa adrift
from the rest of the world's
See DICTATORS. Page II
Dictators still dominate Africa
Failures: Stepping stones to success
By JOE WALKER
The notion that success Has a thou-
sand fathers and failure 11 an orphan
is a vital part of human deveiopmeni
and adjustment. That's prooably
why trounlea and challenges have a
way of showing up on a more routine
baas than happiness and the good
life.
But look at the bnghier side.
Failures are the stepping stones to
success. It's so simple it's complex
Think about iL Show me an in>
dividual that has never made a
mistake and 111 bet my last penny
that it will ether be a brand new
baby or someone that never quite
mastered (be technique of
breathing.
Most people walk the narrow back
roads of Ufa by trying to avoid
failure at all cost. That's like going
without air for about two weeks. The
reality is failure is the one reading
which allows genuine self-reflect!on
with a quest for understanding. It
begs the question, "where did I go
wrong?" Additionally, failure adowi
a cleansing of the soul in that most of
the bottled up frustrations find easy
ventilation channels once the idea is
accepted.
Failure is also therapeutic It
slows the burn rale, reduces
momentum and superimposes an in-
voluntary regrouping process which
is regulated by an inner-clock syn-
chrormed (0 the 'soul beat" as op-
posed to the Heartbeat. That's -m
most people do a lot of soul sear-
ching after experiencing defeat. It
hurts, but more 1moorun1Jy.it heals
and preoares you for a greater
challenge and a better day ahead.
The hidden key to enioymg the
benefits of failure is to make quota
on mistakes and ihen take advan-
tage of the extended recuperation
plan.
Failure also promotes honesty.
When people have nothing to lose
that's when the truth generally
comes out. Countless public figures
have gotten their nouses back n
oner after stepping forward and
acknowledging their failures as a
preiude 10 picxmg
-ip the pieces
again. One of the most glaring ex-
amples is the success cf Alcoholic
Anonymous, a moo*!, snowcase pro-
Jee Walker
gram built upon In* principle that
the truth will set you free once you
acknowledge your shortcomings and
accept your failures as challenging
stepping stones.
Failure is the equaliser that
realigns egos while keeping humility
alive. Peopie brag and boast when
things are going good. Once they sup
and fall ih«y have a tendency lo be
tinda quet about iL Not only does
failure cut egos down to size but it
also aUinsti the iron! view mirror
See FAILURES. Page It
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EDITORIALS
It is Africa's turn at the UN letter to the editor
The past of Secretary-General of
Lb* United Nations will be vacant
some Umt this year. Africa
bciieva it Is her cunt u Oil the past
sum she is the only continent that
has not produced one. This reason-
ma is appropriate For several
Africa produced Salim Ahmed
Salim of Tanzania when the pos-
tion ra vacant ui 1982, aut Salim
was refused the )ob because of the
United States vein. African conti-
nent does not bave a permanent
member at the United Naoona
Security Council, dot does it have a
veto power Due to what happened
in 1982. Africa deeded to product
four candidates for the post this
ame around. We hope that one of
them will get iL
The diplomats Africa produced
for this position this year are peo-
ple of high calibre and substance. we >
For example, Gen. Olusegun
Obuanp was a former Nigerian
head of state; Bernard Chidzero is
Zimbabwe's Finance Minister:
James Jonah of Sierra Leone is
currently the Assistant Secretary-
General of the United Nations and
Kenneth Oadse of Ghana is the
head of the United Naoona Con-
(erisct on Trade and
Development.
Each of the African countries in-
volved in this diplomaoc guigle is
jxlepenoently pursuing the in-
terest of its name, repuuQon and
power. Our hope is to see an
African elevated to thai executive
posidoo of the United Naoona.
Africa ean no longer be
marginalized in the world affairs.
It has been for uw long. Whether a
Zimbabwean or Nigerian or
Ghanaian or Sierra Leonean. what
about is for an African to
HICMAflO NWACHUKWU
talre the snot light Lucaaly, each of
Lbem is uniquely qualified to lead
the world body. This might not
solve Africa's economic and
political problems, but it sure
would position Africa to be beard.
Dear Editor:
First. Let me thank you for
your prompt response to my re-
quest in forwarding to ma the
moat recent copy of Uw Good
Hope Newt. Please fine endow-
ed a cheque in the amount of til
UJS-) covering an entire one
year's tubmenpuon for me.
Second, on reading through
tama; of the articles and news
items in the Good Hope News I
noticed that there are several
references u the Igbo people
with the derogatory term
"lbs*". Please let me stress
that the term "Ibo" has been an
anglicised reference for Igbo.
apparently by the British and
other non-[gbo dementi wbo
nmise to employ the proper
term Igbo. The reference "Ibo"
is resented by many well mean-
ing Ighoa, and I ballwn thai It la
only proper that yoa may pay
attenoon u tbla and use the pro-
per and correct term of tden-
tiflaoon for the Igbo people
I do not object to roar
publishing letter in the n*n
edition of the Good Hope News.
Keep on the good wart, as your
efforts m [imfUartftBg us m far
away North Amanca with
arena in our dew home land is
apureciated.
Sincerely yours.
Dr. Fldeiis H. Ezeaia
SL Jobs, New Brunswick
Editor's Nate: Thanks Dr.
Exxsia fer ywar owaerndaw. We
wtn take ooie.
et?
Confirm Clarence Thomas
Judge Clarence Thomas, the se-
cond African American ever to be
appointed to the U.S. Supreme
Court — the highest court of the
land — is a conservaove. To most
African Americans, it is unbecom-
ing of anybody from Judge
Thomas' background io be so un-
concerned with minority plights in
this country- He eaniLiiled a non-
chalant attitude to the minorities
problems when be was the chief of
the Equal Employment Opportuni-
ty Commission. As such, the Na-
tional Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People (NAACPl
strongly opposed him then. So it is
no surprise (hat the association op-
posed him again as he is appointed
to the Supreme Court NAACP's
position was made public on
Wednesday. July 31.
["""After reviewing Judge Thomas
background very, carefully, we feel
that he should be confirmed to the
highest court. It is well established
in politics that the devil you know
is better than the one you don't
know
Judge Thomas was born black
and poor. According to the Tune
Magazine, '"Thomas was born with
the help of a midwife s> 1344 in
segregaied enclave without paved
streets or sewers. His mother
Leo la Williams, only IB when he
was born, already had an infant
daughter When Thomas was two.
his father walked out an the fami-
ly, heading to Philadelphia in
itarcti of a better life. Pregnant
with a third child, Thomas mother
lived in dirt floor one-room shack
that belonged to an aunt and went
to work at the factory .Text door,
picking crabmeat for S cents per
lb " Continued the Time. "The
children wore hand-me-down
clothes from the Sweet Fields of
Eden Baptist Qiurcn and aiten
without shoes..."
That is not alL Judge Thomas at-
tended rigorous Catholic schools,
mciuomg St John Vianney Minor
Seminary in Savannah- He was the
oniy btacx m the 1967 graduating
class He also attended Im-
maculate Conception Seminary for
one year in Conception. Missouri.
It was reported that he could not
stand the unfair racial snub his
white colleagues were giving him.
The nuns that taught him in the
Cathode schools reportedly were
called "rugger nuns." Even when
Rev i Or. i Martin Luther Km g, Jr.
was assassinated in 1961, he
reportedly heard a fellow undent
say something like "It's about time
you got the s.o.b.
'
' At another occa-
sion, ona student yelied at him
when light was out, "Smile,
Clarence, so we can see you,"
reported the Time. And the list of
his racial encounters continued.
Judge Thomas once married a
fellow African American. That
mamage ended in divorce He is
now mamed to a wrote lady. He
was once a Catholic; he is now an
Episcopalian. He was admitted in-
to Vale Law School under affir-
mative action plan. And after he
graduated from law school, he was
not able to get a job in the white
law firms m Georgia. Ail these
show that Judge Thomas. tf. has
seen discrimination, segregation,
Hardship, and a host of other suf-
ferings of blacks in America. Hav-
ing suffered all these, it would be a
hypocrisy for rum to say or believe
that it is easy for blaca people in
.America.
It is true that he is a conser-
vative. He advocates self—help
among Afncan Americans. He was
in July 1903 quoted in the
Washington Post as saying "I'll
put the bottom Line on you: I don't
think we i African Americans)
caused our problem, but were
damn sure going to have to solve
it." In February 1987, Atlantic
magazine quoted him assaying: "I
don't see how the civil rights peo-
ple today can claim Malcolm X as
one of iheir own. Where does he
say bLack people should go begging
the Labor Department for toba. He
was hell on integral!ousts. Where
does he say you should sacrifice
your institutions to be next to white
people." Turning to white racism
he said, "There is nothing you can
do to get past black skin. I don't
care how educated you are, how
good you are at what you do, J you
are a black, you'll never be seen as
equal to whites."
It is our hope that Judge Thomas
be confirmed. But if not him.
another African American. We
share the concerns of those who op-
pose his nomination. His past ut-
terances were starkly contrary to
the legacy left behind by Justice
Thurgood Marshall. But we have to
hear what fas mother said recent-
ly. Said her: "Black people, they
don't nave to Uun* alike, they don't
have to look alike, they don't have
to talk alike. And that Clarence, he
always did have a mind of his
own." President Bush needs to be
praised for at least finding an
African American who meets his
predetermined test He could have
chosen a Hispanic like Judge Gar-
ta. or a white. In our opinion, no
matter how conservative Judge
Thomas is. be would surely be bet-
ter than another conservative who
has not been a black. As such, we
want turn ctntirmed. unless it is
certain that another qualified
African American would be
nominated. This may be very
unlikely, having watched Presi-
dent Bush in the past ...
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<History in the Making
In The United States
Sam« nimr baman wera
*r>«ktd dawn iatha Umtad
Suua «/ Ajawna duruf tna
recent NmtBbr 7, Iff* aW>
uons. L. OsufUs Wilder, u
A/nafrAatn csft, • Inwyw/,«4
tha Ll GnwMrrfthi
.
eomtadaraey Vlrfuu«, i
3uwnw mf that iuta. And Demd
Dinkina, alae aa Mri— 4—ti
can. a lawyer, and tna Manhnt<
tan Beraa«h pTaaideatr*waa
tlaned Dm first black aajw W
Saw York City. Wbai a varury
far Afncaft-Aititnaana.
s fan nutim liun|. Blackian
inmajuifty bamgjudgad by the
canuni oftheir eharactar nthar
than by tha piffmrnudaa eftbatr
ikin.
Althea,ch Mr. Wilder wat
:ha Sm A/rican*Ajnanenn mr
tlectad aa a feverner in Lba
United Suua biasery. bam
aet tha first black caverna*. In
1170 Plnckney B-S. ftachhack
wu appelated tna Lauaiann
anaac r**«nnraAartnaincua»-
bani vma iaanaaanacl
Other AMna-AjMnau
eiwaed auyan far tna ftm thai
wen Neman Kim in Seattle,
Waahnfian llafa, Tibn DuhU
in New Hino. CannacxicBi
, nti-
ckaaJ WXrta ai Cawknd, Oban,
and ChaaUfJanknu in Dwnaas,
Narta CanUna,
When tbaaa newty tUcUd
laka tbair rmcaactin
Lhcn wOl beat »e*t 314
man auyan in tna
Uinud Sutaa, aceardiftf La tna
Nauanal Conference •/ BUck
Mayan
Faur at*tna aauen'a ita huf
estdun will Have black tuyere.
They an New Yark which u tha
Urftet arf, Ua Annlee, Phila-
delphia and Detrat. This i*
aew Amenta,
Nigerian Made
Cars Displayed
,
Oho ol ma Ognu Festival masquerades aancaj 10 tna lattifaction of tna audlanca.
Racial Slur Backfires In Houston
Tha tight- lens Houston s
city councilman * raeiai liur or
biacki. aacuired an '-nt No* em -
bar". 1989 eier.ioni Bacus -Jier
had Lne ia»L laugn
Tht at iargr cau ncum r trap
-
Jim Wtsimartiani nac iuC'
gOUd renaming HsuitJr : in
tarcontinenui Amort "N c'^e*
International, ' at a "jo**" i.
what he cb> ed an af-Lhe-recarJ
conversation ciunnr; Lne ceur.n.
dtaau on no* u> mii horar _*<
Uu US Rep. Mic»*> U- jr..
wnodiidm jD.jnr --in
T, I9a9 n E;hionia VI ;* •
Le.and »:io »a i "-ir c"J' •—
"
the Usui* SuO-Cj(Tffl t i
Hunger »en : m Lir.u. ..
th e i « m i n f * : ~ » ' •"
"
Tha flm batch of 100 can
manujacturad in Nipma «ara
oUplaytd tawardi tha and ofSap-
' urnoar 1989. in Abuja, tha Cu-
I :ura Niftnaa capiuL
' On a tjrpa af tha can «nu tha
?routypa af a thn*-whaal ear
eapabla «f Hcamttiadabnf thraa
SaaaaninrxTftoarrpawaadaval--
oo«d by tha Kwara Stau Poly
uchruc.
Tha athartypawu a four-wbaal
vchicla with mom far tin peepla.
Daaipiad by a Lafaa^auad anp-
^ (itmareianij iatcf cUiratd wa«
"Ncfro Inierr.atia.-.j. maj»
nauanal hcaa::nci
Cir. Novrfr.ac? " '.he
!(.u>Laman> •*- jl.*;-* u;*
ji-cr: ana ir. ken t rac:ai
rrurii By ; rr. 3 n at"
W«fLmoreianc * iuu'f. ja**
.tim a poi.tjeji aeitn »enwnct
T"t\, in etTrct, cirstac J a^ac*
cnar. Brve'itf* Ciar** "'»o
..u» mm i
: r acx.i-:
Mem in b
,mo«- 'J.
mar« ta b« unacetpubia Htaat-
r'eat aiao icnt a clear message
lhat no one vtn iueh vifwi
t>» illawed ta so«aW i'ar:~ ;:;y
"
Th* «ditonai runner tuittd
tnat "Mr *'«itmofn»nd i re-
eiecuon bidnotwiihiuindtng, hit
reman could nat hav« coma at a
wont time. It mace » nen
HousLan wsi ba(innin( ts neal
from the tragic iaaa oi » paouiar
^ngrtsiman Tne aver: rigctP.1
of ihe councnma.i k fo—.men:
*as inicnsiuve. no: zr y -.a tae
memory a:' Lfte >at« 'f~:*.e"l3'
live out ciso to m* — t
l/iared vense c:'
ra;
^ eil.*nore!ji'
: Java
natnng Ann, tha car has Taur
farward (tan and ana rrtraa.
It has a nar*whaal independant
auspanaian, a paytaad af 300
kilapama and an anladdan
waifhi af JGO kiWfraraa.
Uannwhila, tha
duacry baa avolvad aaw fuida-
Unaa far tha auuaaabila aactar,
with tha um *( empbaaiainf tha
pradocoan a/ a Nifwnan auta-
asabila that ia abaap bat tuiubla
far pnaraJ uaa. "
Sufiacrlba to tha Good Hop* n&wk.
Qna yaar la only and w* dallvar.
Your Adortaa-
ay tana Pnona_
Evantng Pnona-
uau to: daoa Hooa Atawa
P.O.Boi 23»4, Oaoaa. Taiaa USA
Pnona; (2141 S31-HOFE
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Ethiopian
President Flees
With rebels chasing him.
Kfhiiipiii'.'i VliiniM President.
\kii^:>ui tl«itic .-laruiiii.
resigned and fled into exile
on May Z\ ending an iron
-
fisied 14-year rule over one
of Africa's poorest countries.
The Stale radio an-
nounced that a former de-
fense minister. Li. General
Tcsfaye Gelue-Kidan, had
taken over as acting presi-
dent of ihc country. The
government said it would try
to arrange a cease-fire with the rebels, who had long sought
Mcngistu s ouster and an end to human rights abuses.
The rebels, who control the northern third of Ethiopia,
expressed skepticism about the government's readiness tu
chanec anil vowed 10 continue fighting. However, they
liave agreed to attend a US-.pon.sorcd peace conicrcncc
which was >cheJuled 10 start in London on May 20. The
rebels have c\ pressed the desire to negonaie a broad-based
transitional government that would hold elections.
Diplomatic sources said Mcngistu was likely to have
gone to Zimbabwe where he is said to own a villa and to
have kept his lamtly die last six months. Other sources said
he Hew to Nairobi. Kenya.
Continued on page 18
fABACHA HONORED BY
COLLIN POWELL
President Mengistu
hy A/uhuikc
lAuchukuu-Nwui,
Nigeria's Deteiiac Min-
ister and Chairman. Joint
Quel 01 Stall. General Sam
Ahacha paid an ul filial visit
to die United SuL:a liom May
$ to May 1? at the invitation
ni General Collin Pnwell.ihe
Chainnan. Joint Cltiel ul Stall
of the United States.
General Ahacha was
greeted upon arrival at An-
drew's Air Force Dasc by
General Collin Powell Greets General Sam
Abacha at the Pentagon
l7n,->T?»ft.rhii-'h* int.'.'.'w'...'i -V-iitd
NIGERIAN NATIONAL NEWS 1-1. IS-IH
COMMENTARY ->-5
Ui;.SINI:.SS 6-7
STATUS" NLWS «-ll
AHtlCAN NEWS 12-13
L.F.lSl'UE/.SOCIALCAl.UNDAR M-'IS
IMMIGRATION NLWS lh
sitmiN i' 1 -<»
C.Jerome Jones. Deputy Director for Strategy and Policy.
His next slop was at Las Vegas. Nevada where he inspected
military installation*. He was received in Nevada by Major
General Billy G McCoy, ihe Commander ol US Airlorcc
Tactical Fighter Weapons
Center. From Nevada,
Abadia visited military in-
stallations in California.
'"' '
He came back to Wash-
ington, D.C. to an Armed
Forces Full Honor Arrival
Ceremony on Wednesday,
May 15 at the Pentagon Rjver
entrance hosted by General
Collin Powell. He partici-
pated in other ceremonies
held to honor him including
.the laying of a wreath at the
Nduonal Cemetery in Arling-
ton, Virginia.
General Abarha reenved commendation from the
ted States fo. Wca African
Continued on page 18
Armed Robbery:
Kids Stolen With Car
Unbelievably true! On
May 2. around 7..10 a.m., Bi-
sula Savage and Tomi Mak-
indc. huh 6-year olds were
j Nine icd by armed robbers
while rvmg cruiiikuied to their
school. Navy Town Primary
School. Ojii Ti iwn ui a Toyota
I-uul Cruiser belonging to
UMCEF.
Tlie cruiiiifcur. Mr. Sugbo.
had st(i|i|wl at Vntkswagcn
bus snip alun^ ll.nlai'ry La- Sisoia Savage Tomi Maklnde
pressway, Lagos to let off
one of his riders, one Ronke
Osaicwe. Before the driver
could puil away, gun-iouung
hoodlums shot their way out
of die crowd and emptied
their bullets into the driver
and a soldier who had come
to his rescue.
The barTdits, thereafter,
escaped through Iba Road in
die Land Cruiser with regis-
Connnued on page 18
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Clarence Thomas:
Mainstream Media-Hype
PART ONE
by Kwame Okoampa-Ahoofe, Jr.
While ours, as a newspaper, has been 10 mainly
troublesboot, debate and attempt a multi-angular reso-
lution of continental African problems, the intrinsic
relevance of African- Americans to the composite Af-
rican cultural and racial dilemma, vis-a-vis global
human relations, cannot be controverted. It is for this
reason, coupled wirfi and consonant to his active
interest in Amencan affairs, that this writer spotlights
the discussion of the Airican personality at this junc-
ture on the recent nomination of appellate coun judge
Carencc Thomas. If the man's surname (or last name)
could be sind, facetiously, to be controvcnablc. this
aspect would be tackclcd in the follow-up pan to this
discourse. But, perhaps, die raiicr unfathomable molding
impact of Anglo-Amencan media in die definition,
choice and character of African-American political
potentates (if there i.s anything really as suchj is the
greatest hurdle in the endless track towards racial self-
liberation and destiny Traditionally, the mainstream
has always arrogated itscl f the n ghi to validate or annul
the substance of those who will pretend to articulate the
collective ideology and drive of Afncan-Amcncans:
which brings us to the recent edition ai in The New York
Timei. entitled "A Justice Until :030" (July 2, 1991 ).
A The above-mentioned editorial smacks of sheer
racism, in adnumbrate die least. In asking that ihc U.S.
Senate accurd Thomas us toughest scrutiny ever, the
cdiional purveys a dual moral standard - not surpris-
ingly -- in view of the fact that the Times did not
demand a similar high-handedness when bonafidc
white con.se rvaiisi justice David Soutcr was nominated
to the same United States Supreme Coun by President
George Bush. To this effect, the Times' editors write:
"Presidents arc entitled to a presumption in favor nf
their nominees for transitory appointments to the
executive branch positions. Qui lk&££ Cflfl hf Oli ULCh
presumption for lifetime .wnnintmrnti 10 the timr.ii.
nute utiiiiM tmimJL Exul mi iiiwwitii bcwiw oat
nut a mirnstin hut fl rnnttitutionnt resoonstbilirv"
{This writer's emphasis}. J
/"^""Whatever 'constitutionaHrcsponsibriiiy'' these
/ editorsarc talking about, dieirsingularmcssagccannot
easily be mistaken; as long is the majomy of appoint-
ees to the executive branch of government is white, the
legislature should maintain a laxity in confirmation
scrutiny but, perhaps, what is even more disturbing is
the hypocritical attitude taken by die nmw'cdiiorsen
emphatically demanding "cxira scrutiny" of Judge
Clarence Thomas on the dubious grounds of the nomi-
nee's African-Airican racial identity While lauding
the vnluntaniy truncated tenure of Justice Thurgood
Marshall on the U.S. Supreme Coun. ihc Times forks
its tongue by pretending to belong to the much touted
liberal camp of the venerable retired black judicial
pioneer, nothing could be fanner from the truth.
Whenever The New York Times has supponed civil
rights measures, it has almost always been with the
supposed speaai interests of its "non-paralleled" long
suffenng ethnic constituency in die back of its com-
posite mind. Indeed, a gianng case in point is the
rimej ' rather condescending aturude towards Afn-
can-Amcncans encapsulated by that paper's snicker-
ing front-page report less than twenty- four hours after
Justice Marshall's rcsicnauon, attributing die indis-
putably aging adjudicator's voluntary abdicaaon to
sheer anger and frustration generated by the coun's
conservative majomy. Needless to recall, in a rather
apt reposie, Marshall called the Turns repon a "double-
barreled lie. " This is the very newspaper which while
assiduously championing the cause of other non-
black, supposedly oppressed groups, has almost con-
sistently denounced relief programs onemed towards
the inirastruciural rehabilitation of hisioncaily.siy-"
mied African-Amencans.
The foregoing asscruon can be borne out by The
Nov York Times' systematic and "loyal", if not blind,
suppon for recent arbitrary and rampant tuition hikes
imposed on the increasingly heavily minonty-en-
rolled city and state universities of New York, as well
as other public institutions that lean considerably
towards the sound education of the poor and racially
.
marginalized at reasonable expenditures. The Times,
it is intcresung to note, has yet to launch a similar
campaign against the clearly over-inflated salanes -
between $60,000 toSlCO.lXX)--or the faculty of these
universities, and the latter* consequent msensiriviiy
tothegnm gnps of these rambunctious hikes imposed
on us students.
Thus, when The New York Times calls for the
extra-scrutiny of Judge Carencc Thomas -- and it is
important to note that this wntcr is not in any way a
stanch supponer of the Supreme Coun nominee -- it is
simply engaging oniy or\e of its mynad traditional
anu-Afncun gimmicks. Consequcndy, when die Times'
editors state that: "If Thomas is confirmed, and
remains on the Coun uniil die same age as Justice
Marshall, this (i.e.. Marhsail's) seat won't be filled
again until die year 2030." they are only crassly
qucsuoning the propnety of electing an Afncan-
Amencan to serve on die Supreme Coun of the United
States lor such a promisingly protracted tenruc. as-
suming this stereotypical paralleling of Marshall and
Continued on the following page
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by Angelbenh Ugochukwu Ezeogu
Professor Hill/Judge Thomas
An Epic Saga
Anita Hill
Professor of Law, Anna
Fayc Hill - young, single, a
good student while ai Yale
Law School, intelligent, am-
bitious and laden with advice
• Hies from little Norman,
Oklahoma to Washington,
D.C. She flies tn to testify of
her alleged seaml harassment
by her former boss, Judge
Clarence Thomas. She sits
before more than 100 law-
makers of the greatest coun-
try on eanh. They are clad in
dark business suits. Their eyes
arcaglare. Mercilessly. Inquisitively. Foramomeni I think
1 see die professor shudder. 1 think. I see a glimmer of
perspiration on her intelligent forehead. She ismeuculously
clad, color and all. The screen lends the impression of a
robin-egg's blue. A red or black outfit would have taken
from her credibility. She is laden with advice.
Theprofessorsuppressesihe little glint of ttmidny.She
thrusts her lower jaw forward and commences her testimo-
nial. During the hearing/in terrogauon she reminds us that
this is not a legal suil Rather, she is doing her country a
service by stepping forward to testify when called upon. She
is here to lesiify to the bad character of the Judge at large.
Thai's what she states before mil lions of viewers and listen-
ers. Professor Hill is also very muchaware that ihedefendant's
opposition is on her side. Heavyweights tike Joseph Biden,
Lloyd fienisen, Alan Cranston, Dodd and why not, Ted
Kennedy, are on her side. For a moment Professor Hill is
oblivious of the ferocity of the defendant's support. Ltitle
docs she know that the defendant's supporters could do
damage in whai will meiamorphtsize into a bipartisan not.
There is stubborn Omn Hatch There is Robert Dole, John
Danfonh, D' Amaio, Arlene Specter, ct. al. They are glaring
at her. Poor Professor Hill finds herself in the middle of a
bipartisan brass- knuckle brawl. She is in the very center of
the Pumsian wax. She is surrounded by the Canheginians
and Sparuns alike under the spectaiorship of the whole
world. Only this war is bloodless. The baulefield is within
the hallowed walls of the Senate Caucus Room. The thick
rarpeungubk>od-red. The tablecloths area sobenng green.
The audience is mouonless. Nobody leaves. Nobody eniers.
Somebody insinuates that Professor Hill's testimonial
is a brain child ofher fantasy. Another wickedly brandishes
acopy of the Exorcist and propounds that she ispossessed by
Comes the timefor he who has not
sinned to cast the first stone. Senator
Kennedy is careful not to be the one. The
Republicans have ammunition too, you
see. Ferocious Orrin Hatch, gentleman
from Utah, offers to sell us a bridge in
Massachusetts. It is Arlen Specter who
offers to sell us the Kennedy estate in
Palm Beach, Florida?
a demon. The hearing takes on a trial canopy. Chairman
Biden had earlier emphasized the incredibility of the
professor's credibility.
But Professor Hill knows Judge Thomas very closely.
Are you kidding me? They worked together in very close
proximity. She was single and young and had a Yale law
degrecShewasnoibad loakingatall. She wasan intelligent,
career orienied young woman. Judge Thomas was divorced
at the umc. He wielded power and influence. Somewhere
along the line, Professor Hill probably nurtured fantasies of
getung hitched with the Judge. Despite her alleged sexual
harassment, she follows htm from the DepartmentofEduca-
tion to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
She states that it was because her position at Education was
not guaranteed. She did not bother to find out, though. She
is intelligent and ambitious.
The dream of getting hitched blurs when the Judge
decides to get hitched to anotherwoman of a different race.
Professor Hill's telephone messages stop. Her pnde is
Clarence Thomas
wounded. Retaliation lurks.
A decade later, a grand
opportunity knocks. Vindi-
cationhas to rearitshead.lt is
the eve of the Judge 's confr-
maiionas ChiefJustice of the
Supreme Court of the United
States of America which is a
classy, honorable, life-long
echelon. The professor steps
forward. Wouldn't you? She
scares the lights out of Judge
Thomas and places his ca-
reer, uitegnty, reputation and
t-v -*—.. -j- ... ..perhaps, fiwjlyjif£pn A hpi.
wire. Or so it seems. I am so glad that Judge Thomas stood
real tall, lam glad I did noi catch him whimper. He shoinghi
back christening the hearing a high-tech lynching of the
uppity black.
Comes the time for he who nasnoi sinned to cast the first
stone. Scnaior Kennedy is careful not to be the one. The
Republicans haveammuniuon too. you see. Ferocious Orrin
Haich, genilcman from Utah, offers to sell us a bridge in
Massachusetts. It is Arlen Specier who offers ic sell us the
Kennedy estate in Palm Beach, Florida?
We the bystanders are led to believe that Judge Thomas
is highly qualified for this new position. He is only a victim
ofthe process. He. like Professor Hill, is tn the middle of this
fisi fight; His opposiuon has been unable to dig up more
grotesque skeletons from his long past. Rather they bring
pubic hairs, breasts, penises and long dong silvers into the
celebrated Senate Caucus Room and the homes of millions
ofAmencan men, women, teenagers and snouy-nosed chil-
dren.
"Hey mom. what's Long Dong Silver?" Since nothing
anyone says has mattered hitherto, may everyone for ever
zip their lips.
Congratulations to Justice Thomas and a pat on the
shoulder for Professor Hill; 1 admirenercouxage. The Senate
will never be the same again.
Angelbenh Ugochukwu Exeogu, a contributor to
the Nigerian News Digest Is based In East
Orange, New Jersey.
Q It's Our Anniversary. Nigerian News Digest is One Year Old.^U; To acknowledgeyour unJUnchjhg support, weart offering special adrertising ralesfor the month ofNovember. 3. Reach an international marker as savings aJ VP TOSC^o. £ - '" t''. * W. v^lThe deadline isfast approaching, sokurry upand call us at (704) 2SB-984SC-\ [
707
Pago 4 Nigerian Nsws Digest, December 27, 1991
Opinions expressed in this column do not necessarily represent the views of the Nigerian News Digest.
Contributors to this section are columnists who express their personal views for our readers.
e Race: America's Quagmire
by ikenna E. Anokwuie
A generation ago, America convulsed its society and
changed its laws to tree Black America from discnmina-
jon Legally and socially, no country on eanh cries so hard
to be tree of racism, yd no nation is so obsessed with race.
It infests almost every debate.
GMrgeBushmakcsacompaign television commercial
about crime, but it features a Black criminal, so he iscallcd
racist. The FBI prosecutes a cocaine-using mayor and is
accusedofracism because he is Black. Thearmy that fought
in thcGuifwosdisproporuonatcly Blaek.so there wcrccnes
that Blacks would die for a white quarrel. Car dealers are
found toolfer better dealsto White people than Black. AIDS
kills more Blacks than Whites. The high blood pressure ui
Black men was blamed by a medical report on discrimina-
tion. Race is sull America's top domestic issue.
NORWEGIAN
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Despite all its cfTons.
Amcnca suit has its racists,
fn January a national poll
found thai most Whites think
Blacks arc lazy, less intelli-
gent and less patriotic than
Whites. David Duke, a
former Ku Klux Klan Grand
Wizard, wun almost two-
thirdsof the white vote in the
Louisiana Senate race last
year, and 55% of the White
vote in the governorship
^ runoff election last month.
And in unc pull 29% of
Bljwks were willing to countenance the idea thatAIDS was
ereauMJis wluus to eradicate Blacks.
Bui is racisnuho cause ol Black peoples deprivation?
Historically, yes [Blacks would have been beiicroli" now if,
after being dipped to America in chains, they had been
allowed the same freedom to prosper as willing immigrants
here. But * hat about today?Tlie progress America has made
in dismantling discruninauunisexiraurdinary. A generation
ago m the South, Blacks could not even go to the White rest
rooms or be buried in White cemeteries- let aJonc compete
lor good jobs or live in White neighborhoods. Sine then
Blacks have not caught up at all. in taut, in recent years they
have fallen back. Is that because discrimination lingers on?
Many Blackcivil rights groupclaim that Black deprivation
is the result of continuing racism, and that reversing dis-
crimination will rescue Blacks from poverty. A growing
numberofBlack intcJlcciuais,and White poliucians, disagree,
Ending what remains of racism isemincnily desirable, ihey
say. but u will do litde lo improve the lot of the poorest
Blacks.
The irony of Black power is that just as Whites once
used skin color as a source of pnvdege, so Blacks now use
it as a suurccofentitlement. At one college, professors have
demanded higher pay for Black professors because they are
Black. At another, Btackstudents (but only Blacks)arc paid
for improving their grades, a Paviovian training in the
mentality of entitlement and a perpcitiauon of the idea of
Blacks as victims. Are we?
In recent years, policy has increasingly turned to "af-
firmative action" (American word for positive discrimina-
tion) in hope that better Black role models will emerge. But
affirmative action is a two-edged sword. It suggests 10 the
Black who gets the job. and the White colleagues he meets
thai ho did not get there on merit, but because of the colorof
his *kin. Racial resentment follows. In 1990, Jesse Helms
defeated a Black opponent. Harvey Gantt, in a senate race
in North Carolina after running television commercials
showing imaginary Whites being rejected lor jobs because
affirmauve action had given those jobs to Blacks. Job
preferment stigmatizes those who do not need help, starts a
"blacklash" from Whites and reinforces the mydi of racial
inferiority, the most pernicious effect of which is that
Blacks have believed it as much as whites. Above all,
affirmauve acuon assuages white guilL
For some individuals, affirmauve action may still do
more good than harm. Bui the real problem is that it reaches
mainly those who need it least. The chief beneficiaries of
affirmative action arc university students and Black busi-
nessmen,who are the Blacks most likely losucceed anyway.
It does not touch the lives of most poor Blacks, and ycu it
dominates the debate. Blacks need to realize thata/firmauve
action cannot solve their most scnous problems. Whites
need to remember in at affirmative action does not make it an
advapugetobebomBUck. — •>
ZTwo bad ideas clutter the debate. The first is Black
scparausm, in vogue in univcrsiues led by extreme Black
activists. Racially separated degree-ceremonies and frater-
nities are popular wiin the people most angry at apartheid.
But who can doubt that, if the two races were to "separate",
the Blacks would be the poor? Integration is the best hope for
both Black separatism islikethefrec East Germanschoosing
io rebuild the Berlin Wali.J7
The second bad idea is reparations. A few years ago
Japanese-Americans were compensated for being interned
during the second world war, and some (mostly White)
people have begun to point out that Blacks have yet to be
compensated for centuries of slavery. In other words, far a
steep sum ofmoney, whitescould buy therighiio forget their
guilt. In reality that would only increase White racism ami
try to solve with money a problem that cannot be bribed
away^.
TAbettcr idea is to forget such racially minded solutions
altogether. If America were to attack the reasons for the
underclass's existence, the beneficiaries would be dispro-
portionately Black. Whites need to recognize that Blacks
cannot hope to prosper in any numbers while they are
confined to ghettos.and housing projects nddled with crime.'
poverty and lousy schools, and that it is society 's duty to do
something about iL ~mm*
That means the same law enforcement m inner cities
thai the restofthecountry expensand receives. Firmnesson
crime is what most inner city Blacks cry out for. Their lives
arc madc'miscrable by muggers, pimps and drug dealers.
(FourLosAngcIespolicemenbeaongaBlackman56urnes
after stopping htm for speeding does not count as good law
enforcement.jdTmeans gun control, which urban Black;
want, butmany Whites illogicaJly hate, ft means treatment
not just punishment for drug users, it means expensive
continued on page 2~
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Race: America's Quagmire - A Rebuttal
by Sennet Axpa
M/.lkcaAiAnokwute*iamcleuiJed"Rict America's
Quagmire'' fNigenan News Digest. December 27) wu
indeed very interming. Apart Iron rehashing some of the
hackneyedwnotypa and speaaung in broad fewralizaoorts
about Black people. Be failed to come up with any concrete
aaluuons to ine problems facing Blacks in America.
Mr. Anokwuie a undoubtedly i*ire that there are
iuiy Nigerians in tfus country who. despite having rwoor
three degrees, dnve cabs of work at menial tasks. How does
ae explain that'1 He also must be aware of AJncan countries
rut. oeipue decades and m some cases centunes of self-
jovemmem. nave made verv little progress. In fact many of
ihosc countries were better of f under colonialism How docs
be account for that .'
I don 'i know thai an of us from Africa has the moraJ
hi|tigTDundiopcmiiricaicarx>uithcprt>babiesoluQonsu>iM
problems facing African-Amencans Remember thai it was
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our ancestors who sold them into slavery in cachaoge for
such simple things as a boule of gin or shiny pieces of
jewelry Besides, we haw a whole COflUneni nddJed with
problems and many of us have not the vaguest idea bow to
solve them.
Betore we talk about Aifncan-Americanproblcms. lei's
make an aitempt toundcrsiand the people. Let's joinsome of
their associations and sil around the table with them and
ajiowihcmioopcnupious. Ii we do we would be surprised
loftndoui tnatihemgjorut'Of Black peopie work everyday,
are not on welfare, do not push drugs, have close families,
have good things to say snout AJncans (despite whai we did
to ihemj.andconijnbuieposiuvclvio the American economy.
We might also learn thai although they came io this
couniryassbves.Alncan-Amencaruas a group are wealthter
and have a higher literacy rate than any single Black country
intheworld.Ccrmoarcu^cirprofnrtxsio thai of Blacksonthe
Airican conuncnt *ho have never teen enslaved and you
will see the greaicsicomebackeveraiiempicd by any people
m history.
/ don 'l know thai any of usfrom ,
Africa has the moral high ground to K
pontificate about the probable
solutions to the problemsfacing
African-Americans. Remember that
ii was our ancestors who sold them
into slavery in exchangefor such
simple things as a bottle of gin or
shiny pieces ofjewelry.
AlihoughAfncan-Airicncanshavegcodreasofuiofccl !
;reseniful toward Africans, their organizations (remember J
I TiansAfnca?),churc hcj and colleges have made huge con-
tnbuuons toward the advancement of Black people world-
wide^.
—
fOI course it is possible that one's perception of Black
people depends on the level of Black tocreiy that such a
person has access to Many of us are in positions where we
cither do noi meet Black people, or have very 1 1 id e contact
wiih successful Blacks I remember taking- a fellow Nigerian
on a d/i\t outside Balumorci Maryland* metro Upon entering
Howard County, he remarked ihai he did not think an>
Blacks lived mere, whereupon I look him on lour ofColumOia
and Ellicou Cily There, in Bbu neiphOornood^ where
homes id I in excesi of S250.O0f!. *ou will find BUck
Americans. Hainan*. and yes. Nigerians living the Amen-
candream . N
s>
/ If I may vesture to comment oo the problems of Black
people, I dare say thai being bom. and growing up Black is
America, is sot somanmg any of us Afncaru could ever
understand When we came here, we were already fortified
wiih high self-esteem and driven by ambition and the de-
termination lorcium io Africa richer than when we lets. But
cons tder beia g bom B lack in this country . From the very first
day, you arc presumed to be incapable of accomplishing
anything You hear such nonsense n home (from sotae
leiaiives who ihemse Jves are vcurns f the b ig lie j . you hear
u at school
,
readn in newspapers. Iisienioiionradioandsee
iton television.
You learn to live with the tact that whenever such
cliches as welfare, inner city, gneuo. murder. AIDS, credii
card fraud, hunger and starvation art uttered on TV, use
accompanying photograph is more likelvihannoitobethai
ofa Black person H: orshe could be from the United Statu,
Haiu , EthlOpia or N igena, butme person would most cenamty
be Black.
When news announcers talk acout high blood pressure
and sickle cell anemia, n is almost always followed by the
disclaimer thai it is a Black disease. However, when the
i same announcers talk aooutmutuplexlcrosis, Alzhcuner'l
l disease and cancer, they fail to remind us that ii strikes
I mostly White people. When they talk about welfare and
poverty. th:y fa | lomcnuon thai there are more poor Whiles
I on we I (are than B lacks (w hich is one of ihe reasons they will
I never abolish welfarej.
"Tn the English language. Black is uxi often associated
with somethingevilanddiaboJicaJ. Thus White peoplebave
black days, tell black lies.are afraid of Uieir dark sides, fear
the black cat. and engage id blackmail. Many of us even use
and accept these words. The problem is that most White
people, especially those in posiuons to hire and fire of who
uisomeother wayinHuenccyourchancesofsuccesa.caririci
differentiate between a black cat and Black person. The
only way that you stand a chance is to peddle your skills for
less money than a White of equal or inferior eiperuae
Without affirmative actron. a Black Pti_D could earn less
than a Whue high school graduate.
The deiamation of Blacks as a people, because of
problemsaim butable to a few. has the same negative efTecu
onempioyen and school admmtstrators tha t the defamation
of Nigerians has on potential employers and business as-
soc iates Thus when a Black penon waJiuinioaroom. he or
she is assumed to be Urn or thai, without any Dene fit of a
riouhjwhaisocvcr
rTnagine these kinds ofupenences being ihe only ining
you've ever known. Imagine being used as > perpetua.
scapegoat for all of America's ills. Asa Nigerian, anv tunc
I am tired of the harassmem and suspicion. I can pack m>
continued on poo* 20
ee Nigerian Airports
the localizer for the Instrument Landing Syitm OLS) are
expected to amve us early January
The arrival of ibe crnjiprncni u apecied to coiradc
wun the prevalence of the harmarian which is oamperuig
•wbtlirymtnefuuicn'sairspace.Thepre^^
led to a series of flighi delays, diversions, and outnght
cancellations by many rurlines in ihe last weeks of Decern-
The move is pan of efToru by ihe FCAa to siandartue
navigauooal aids ai Ul die nauon s airports June ending.
Race: America's
Quagmire
A Rebuttal
continued (nam page a
togsanJIeavc.andmae will toaplace forme io jo Bui as
a Buck Amencan.sucn an option is limned or nonexistent.
II alt laws mandating die employment of Blacks were
repealed, the number of Black working people will decline.
President Bush sometime ago talked aooui mating immi-
gration rules io encourage East Europeans to immigrate to
the tinned States. There is 2 1 perceni unemploymentamong
Black youth, but he would rather tmpon Europeans to wo*k
in America. Thai is eucilv the type of mtnd-Ki thai makes
affirmative acuon a necessity (Note that ne is not trying io
impart Afncans or Asians, who are hardworking, by the
63 Does he know something that Mr Anokwute does
cot'1 ' Affirmauve acuon does not mandate Use hinng of
unqualified people. It is ihe responsibiini of ine employer io
choose the most qualified Blacks- and there are indeed
l
qualified Blacks. believe iiornoL
I Asjor the demand for reparations I believe u is a valid
one feiih tne escepuon of a relation* small number ol
J
BUc^wnoarmedinwispanof incworldbelcreandaficr
i Columbus, the overwhelming nutoniv of Black people did
I Dot volunteer to come here. They were lorcibly uprooted
where ihey endured ce&uines ol oenumaniamg condiuaaa
sanctioned by law As far as i im concerned, they have a
tegi umaie ngh t todemand that wose who broug ht them here
lake care of them foriheienol Uieirlives.^ndiiisnciionly
againa the Unned Stan thai they havea Claim. They musa
demand reparauon from Afnca and 1 believe thai ibev arc
enuiled to the land and resources of Bui coalmen l
Although Mr. Aookwuie doa not dunk so. uwse who
teach about Egypt are aoempung ta present a version of
history uui was conveniently *efi sat by European wnien.
If Socraies studied ta Egypt- un't a reasonable io assume
thai he teamed sncaethtng'>
I do agree, though, thai to succeed m this countrv one
oceds io prepare cd ucauonaiiy and learn io be thnfi>[Fo*us
iAlncanj there uanaddiiK^requiiuiienL we musi team to
jctnini Alncan-Amencans as our allies not enemies Who
know s w ruu ihe ouicone would have been ifB lac k grassrcKia
organuauons had m ob i i ited to suppon Ihote N i gen au w no
were fighting deumauon in Dallas. Tea as.
Bennet Akp, ja s pU Dlian«r basod in Wc ^diawn.
Itaryiand,
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Okocha Talks Tough
• Withdraw troops from Liberia; Restructure the Embassy, etc.
by Eyobong ita
EmmaOkocha, Publisher ofUSA Africa
magazine and a new senatorial aspirant is
calling for the withdrawal of Nigerian troops
from Liberia 10 save the economy of the
nauon. "The civilian regime cannot afford 10
keep our troops outside the country. We can-
not play the sort of power poiiucs the United
Slates is playing because we don't have the
means. •
"We must resolve it through the AU or
determine tt by war. We should have allowed
them 10 f eh i and end it since they didn 'i want
peaceful solution, just like u happened in
Angola, Chad and Zimbabwe. As it is now we
haven '(achieved anything in Liberia. There's
no war and there's no peace."
The publisher- turned-politician is jIso calling for the
rcstruciuringof the Nigerian Embassy in Washington. D C.
Emma Okocha,
Publisher-Turned-
Politician
He recommends ihe replacement of civil
servants by trade experts and other experts
who would understand Nigeria's foreign
policies better.
"We cannot move into the 21st century
without link with die world economic power
and we can't at unci enough economic market
because of poor personnel in Washington.
Some departments at ihe Embassy should be
closed down. The most effective department
there is the Visa department. The Press Atta-
che should be recalled, he docsn 't know w hat
he's doing. We have to reconstruct Nigeria's
image abroad."
Cm the domestic front, Okocha's first solution to the
mismanagement of public funds is to ban public officers
from getting involved in contract deals. "Public officers
should no longer be involved in contract deals because our
economy suffers that way. Public officers normally spend a
fortune to win elecuons only to pursue contracts and * ck
the economy.
"Contracts in the Third Republic should be handled by
a Tenders Board which should comprise of retired teachers,
judges, clergymen and community leaden of integrity.'*
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Dr. Martin Luther King
His Dream and The Legacy He Left Behind
Almost a nuancr ut a century after an
infamous assassins bullet snuffed the life out
of him. the voice of this black charismatic
leader and champion of the human rights
movements Mill echoes throughout Amcnca
and around die worldprubing ine conscience
of man and calling for social justice, equality
for all. and the rights ofa man to be judged not
by his color but by the contents of his charac-
ter. A dream that is still far from realization
judging by the surreal and poignant acts of
viofence that sweep through urban centers
every day to the disillusionment of civil rights
leaders and activists.
"It seems tome that hate is becoming kindofa fashion."
die frustrated mayor Dmkins of New York City, said at a
church service in commemoration of Dr. Martin Luther
King's birthday. Hate, this ugly appellation is sticking out its
head in many souls and we must be combatant in its eradi-
cation from our society and most especially from the youths
who today arc willing to paint one's face with intent to
dehumanize.
Dr. Martin LuihorKing'steachingsofnon-violence had
a profound influence across all color boundaries. His wis-
dom and vision exemplify him as an icon of
freedom and justice for millions of people all
over the world. His struggles in the United
States led to the mtroduction ofihecml rights
bill, which till this say benefits millions of
immigrants from impoverished countries,
who, classified as minorities are exposed to
several kinds of government assistance.
Dr. Martin Luther King may be gone but
his dream sull lives on and we must keep the
faith and hope alive.
"/ am convinced that ifwe are to get on
the right side ofthe world revolution, we as a
nation must undergo a radicalrevolution ofvalues. We must
rapidly begin the shiftfrom a 'thing-ortentea" society to a
'person-orientea* society. When machines and computers,
profit motives and property rights are considered more
important than people, the giant triplets ofracism, materi-
alism. and miiuarism are incapable ofbeing conauered."
OR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR
1929-1968
(Exe*rpt» from hit famoui "I H«v« A Drwrn" »p««eh.)
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y The Problem Lies With Teachers, Not Their Underlings
by Kwame Okoampa-Anoote. Jr.
in a miner amusing recent article on this country's
educal iorul ensw uilal "Solving Our Elducauon isic) Cnsis,"
American Federation olTcachcrs president Alben Shankcr
atuibuics Lhc generally declining stateofsiudcni performance
lo what the writer terms, or rather implies, as the inordinate
prolilcrauonol universiitesand colleges in the United States.
This state of affairs, Shanker thinks, docs not motivate
students to study hard, since regardless of whether they
perform poorly or not students will always get a college to
attend and graduate with a degree.
Ideally, more colleges should mean enhanced standard
of living for the general populauon. This is attested by the
fact that living standards in Amen ca are significantly higher
than those ofmastcounmes where such healthy faci lures are
lacking in abundance. Those of us coming from Africa and
the so-called Third Worlddonotneed to visiiany of the local
libraries here to verify this fact. Most of us have lived it.
The proliferation ofcolleges in the United States, while
it may have a flipside with regard to the general level of
academic standards and performances, does not in reality
account for the low level of the average American student's
knowledge: neither does Shanker's implied blame on lax
admission requirements account for this country 'sdcclimng
educauonal standards. Indeed, there art records ofhundreds
of thousands ui students who had maintained a lackluster
precoilege performance levels (mainly in the high school),
but who had gone on to rank among uic best and finest
Amraca has ever had in academia.
£ JThe problem, to at least my limited imagination, lies
widlihccompeicnccofLhccducaiionaJ personnel the system
hircs.and the nature of the curriculum, and also how fair and
firm teachers arc with grading systems and other require-
ments. Albert Shunker's statement that "The fact that students
in other industrialized countries know more than our kids
means they work more" may be quite true. But what iseven
more significantly true is that students in most of these
countries arc not cursed with the son of narrow-minded and
ethnocentric teachers and policy formulators that we have in
ihiscountry- The squcamishnessofShanker himselftowards
a mum-cultural educational orientation is a case in point.
Howcvcr.Slunkcrahohits on lhc right point for debate
when he states inter alia (regarding the educationally in-
sensitive U.S. job market) thai: "...(by) going to work from
high school, all students know that employers don't ask to
sec high school transcripts and don't even offer decent jobs
to high school graduates until they arc iwcnty-four or so, if
then, adding apdy "So a student who has worked hard at
rigorous courses will be competing for the same low pay as
a siudcnt who has filled his schedule with soft courses that
he barely passed. These bad lessons arc being learned by
students in public and private schools alike" (sec The New
York Times. Sept. 15, mi).
What Shankcr by vinue.orihc vice, ofhisrace naturally
docs not add is (hat most employers arc more concerned
about the color or physical characteristics of those whom
they choose to employ rather than sheer competence. Thus
whert umploycrs even clioosc 10 ignore academic or intel-
lectual competence, the rule still almost exclusively favors
white people The few "affirmative action" beneficiaries
who gain access almost invariably tend to be far better
academically than the bulk of their European-Amencan
professional colleagues. A Iso the fact ihai. isA Iben Shankcr
states: "I've (that isShanker) presented evidence from die
NauonaJ Assessment ofEducauonal Progress (NAEP) math
exams and elsewhere indicating that private schools do not
out-perform publie schoob''(tdcrn.).iniisclfdcbunks,aIbcit
unintentionally. City College of New York's Neo-Nazi
Professor Michael Levin's assenion that the declining
standards m the quality of American education is due to the
integration of African-Americans, as well as other raciaJ
minonues, into the system.
if In an article published in the Australian journal
"Quadrant" in February 1988 titled. The Trouble with
Amencan: And not only Amencan! ," Levin stated, among
other Lhmgs that: "Since 1954 staggenng energies have been
expended to bnng American Negroes (sic) into the educa-
uonal mainstream. Yet." adds Levin, "they continue to
exhjoit disproportionately high rates of illiteracy, dropping
out, absence from the morepresugeo us disciplines and other
forms of academic failure." The fascist Jewish philosophy
professor in the foregoing does not give the cause of black
exclusion from the so-called U.S. educational mainstream
unul 195-t.^ecdlcss to say. African-Americans have been
presentstnee the founding of colonial America, long before
the ancestors of most contemporary Amencan Jews. Bui
one thing is indisputably ccrui n, f\fncan-Americans were
not excluded from the "mainstream" educational system
because ofany proven intellectual crcLimsm, but rather sheer
appearance, my own kindly way of charging racism. Thus
Levin is grossly wrong in staling that since 195-J ".. .adjust-
ments have been made to eliminate any measure on which
blacks underpcrform.iialway5 being assumed that blacks on
avcragcareasintclligcntaswhitcsand as capable ofpassing
any fair ten in proponionate numbers. But (that) there is
now quite solid evidence that this assumption is not correct;
(and that) the average black is significantly less intelligent
than the average white. Therefore (contends this nco-nazt),
theonlyadjustments in educational measures thai will allow
blacks their due number of successes amounu^to making
course-work and tests easier and casicr"(idcmj ~\
In bncf.Lcvin docsnot provide asingle iou ofevidence
to prove his case. No adjustments whatsoever have ac-
companied thc"physical"inciusionof the African*Amencan
in this country's curriculum. The fact that thiscouniry does
not seem to be poised for curriculum revision — or the
currcnUy topical Multi-Cultural Curriculum Revision belies
Levin's assertions. As an educator.Levinatso Demonstrates
his acute incompetence by basing his sense of academic
success on the so-called "standardized" tests.
For his pan, as a soluuon for die decadent and
ramshacklcd educational system, Shanker writes as
followsTheonly way to do that is todesign incentives thai
would reward the enure staff of a school for success in
consistently improving student achievement and single out
or even punish die staff of a school where students consis-
tently failed iOimprove"(Times. Sept. 15. 1991).
If Albcn Shankcr seems to reason almost exactly like
New York City College's Michael Levin. Shankcr also
continued on page 20
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This page is for our readers to express their opinions on any issue.
Election Year Politics: Black Power in an International Perspective
by Emma S. Etuk, Ph.D.
^^Most likely, experts in tbe field of"current history" will
remember 1992 as tbe year of two presidential elections on
bo Lb sides of tbe Atlantic. Almost coinciden ally. Afncan-
Amencans. wiib a population of 29.986,060 (according to
tbe 1990 census) and Nigenans. wiib a population of
88.25001 (according to tbe 1991 census) will go to tbe
polls ibis fall. Toe Americans will elect a new president on
November 3. and ibe Nigerians, hopefully, on December 5.
African-Americans consuaiteaminonry.aboui 12.5%
of tbe population of tbe United States. Nigerians, on the
other hand, constitute about 25% of all people living on the
African conunenL African-Americans and Nigenanscom-
bined consutute tbe ninth largest population group in tbe
world, coming after China. India, the United Slates. Indone-
sia, brazil. Russia. Japan and Pakistan. This combination
produces a figure of 1 18-500.561. This is the group which
will elect two important presidents this fall, one white and
American, the other black and a Nigerian, an African.
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'Caw • Opportunity* __
It is said thai, at umes, there can be power in sheer
numbers. The combined numbers of Afncan-Americans
and Nigenanscm produce some political strengib if ibey are
united in mission and action. This combined acuon can
signal a significant change of direction in world affairs.
Barely ihiny-iwo years ago. most Nigenans were
strapped in the chains of colonialism and foreign domina-
tion. They could not vote for tbeir sons and daughters to
represent them in world affairs. And 127 years ago. many
Afncan-Americans were still in slavery, helpless, and un-
able to vote. Until after the civil war. no Afncan-Amencan
was selected as an Ainencan diplomat to a foreign country
The parucipauon of a large segment of peoples of
Afncan descent in the elecuon of ibeir people to represent
them, cither on the continent or in the so-called New World,
should fill every one of ibem with pnde and hope ibat the
issues which affect Lbcm wdl not always be brushed aside by
non-Afncans. They would no longer be treated merely a;
objects and observers of die intemauonal scene. This isone
reason why every eligible Afncan-Amencan and Nigerian
should vote this fall.
The persons who struggled for the franchise, whether in
Nigeria or in the United Siaies. did snout of a deep faith and
belief in the power of the vote to make a difference,
nationally and intemauonal ly. Viewed from the tangent of
sheer numbers, a united people can bnng about important
socioeconomic and political changes.
There is no doubt, in my mind, thai the 1 18.5 million
figure ofcombined African-AmertcunsandNigenans, united
by some mutual interests, can bnng about a significant
impact upon our world, for the benefit of the black race as a
whole. After all, we are bound also by some histoncai and
cultural ucs that go deeper than geopoliucal differences.
Consider the following:
1. YVIiai would have happened if Afncan-Amencan
leaders of thought and Nigenans worked faithfully together
in lobbying the United States Congress and tbe Senate, the
mega-com panics, and the military industnaJ complexes to
pay closer attention to Ibetr sheer numbers as a market,
consumers, and as an important demographic group of the
black race?
2. What could have happened ifA rncan-Amencansand
Nigenans provided a united voice to tbe United Niuons on
some mailers related to their interests, such as war, poUuuoo.
health, unmigrauon, resource exploitauoo, racism, trade,
and world pnees of commodiues? Here I include massive
puhlic demonstrations on some matters of mutual concern.
3. What would have happened if Afncan-Amencans
and Nigenans col labors ted and cooperated in the areas of oil
exploruuon. space technology, space engineenng. automo-
bile mjnuijciunng, university personnel transfers or ex-
chnn2r>, and m agro-economics?
'V But.ilaj.. alas, n is not sndone. And why not? Because
among many Alncan-Americans and Nigerian;, theage-old
stereotypes, fear-., suspicions and misapprehensions suli
. . .
thirty-Two years ago, Nigerians were
strapped in the chains of colonialism.
And 127 years ago, many African-
Americans were still in slavery and
unable to vote. Until after the civil war,
no African-American was selected as an
American diplomat to a foreign country.
exist. These are ai the rooi of our power! essness. As long
as these misapprehensions exist, we ihall never be able io get
united and wield the kind of political power that we should.
There is sulJ an oral code of conspiracy of distrust
among us. This is often expressed in different forms. For*
example, "you sold our forefathers" is often a charge which
many Nigenans have been confronted wiib in the United
.
States. Some Nigenans also have been alleged to possess
certain degrees ofarrogance and airs ofsupenonry. No one
seems to honestly and frankly deal with these marters of
distrust. There is a lot of hypoensy and preiense while we
claim that we are "brothers" and sisters " There seems to
be more talk than acuon.
In tbiselecuon year, Afncan- Amencans and Nigenans
should think senously about the bisionc turn of events in
which 1 18.5 million of them will provide two presidential
candidates, an event thai will impact upon theixdesumes for
good or evil. Given ibe strength of their numbers, and the
areas of their mutual interests, I suggest that a nauonal
congress ofNigenanand African-Ainencan leaders of thought
be convened as soon as possible for adeclarationof purpose
and acuon. This congress can also issue a manifesto which
would highlight future areas for action.
There are thousands ofwell-educated Nigerian profes-
sionals in the United S tales with resources that can be tapped
in order to lay the foundauon forthis kind of congress. There
are also many Nigenanorganizauons to be bamessed for this
purpose. All that is needed now is a commitment and
dedication to work together.
it ismv coaienuon thai unless the Nigenans and Afn-
can-Amencans get their bouses m order they shall conuoue
to remain powerless, complain, and blame the whites for all
their vicissitudes. They tend to forget that the North
Koreans, who are not is many as 118J million, have begun
to change their destiny in today's world.
I hope that Afncan-Americans and Nigenans will re-
memberthat their destinies are in theirown hands. Now is
die time to begin io prepare for the twenry-fint century. The
ume to begin to work together is not tomorrow but NOW.
Or. Etuk is a regular contributor who teaches
World History at DillartJ University In New
Orleans. Louisiana.
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Africans Have High I.Q. Says Houston Attorney
ATTORNEY T. P. JAKABOSKI
A white Houston immigration-
Attomey.TheodorcP. Jakaboski has
said that Africans are equal to if not
superior to an average Americans
when it comes to the question of
testing I.Q.
Africans he said also posses
exceptional abilities in interpersonal
sensitivities, spontaneity, commu-
nication skills, arts and music
Mr. Jakaboski was reacting to a
conventional thinking of some sci-
entistswho postulated tha t African-
Americans lag about 15 pointsbe-
low whites on standard I.Q. test, a
situation they claimed was due to
their heredity. This hypothesis was
contained in a new book written by
Charles M urray"]
~"1 hS Houston Attorney was of
the opinion that for Mr. Murray to
have made such an outrageous as-
sertion, he must have been overly
influenced by his negative experi-
ences while serving in the Peace
Corps in Thailand where he was an
"outdoor toilet expert."
He mentioned further that Mr.
Murray book lacks firm grasp of
relevant terms, inaccurate.incorrect
and bedecked with preconceived
ideas when talking of the concept of
"I.Q.","Success"asitaffccts African-
Americans.
Attorney Jakaboski who
claimed to have researched into the
subject matlcr.iffirmed that he had
found Africa ns with whom became
into contact to be persons of out
standing intelligence with excep-
tional gifts in the right hemisphere
areas such as perception, human re-
lationships and creativity.
TheHouston lawyer continued
"MurTay'sdcfinitionofI..Q.isflawcd
because it does not consider these
factors-probably because of the
ingrained lock step nature of Mur-
ray's Harvard-acquired philosophy..
He contends that conventional
"Western" philosophy has gone off
the right track ever since Descarte
turned the previously group cen-
tered thought intoegocentric tracks.
This, combined with the rigid no-
tions of irrevocable forms, along
withanautomaricpairingofan ideas
into opposites, carried Western
thought away from its roots in
Middle Eastern philosophy, which
he hrlr| more fluid views".
I Jakaboski also argued with
Murray's analysis of "American
Blacks." How he said, is it that I see
every day scores of Africans from
Africa who do not fit Murray's stere-
otypes of Blacks?" fThe answer,"
confided Jakaboski isthattheBIacks
who came to America 300 years ago
did not remain pure and that Afri-
cans may be better off seeking to
maintain racial purity?" What Mr.
Jakaboski is saying in effectwasthat
"Mr. Murray's reference to
America Blacks is not
correctly applicable to real
Africans, to people who have
not been diluted through
intermarriage, and who have
not shown any dip In their
collective I.Q."
The Houston Attorney picked
holes in Murray's ideas of "success"
saying that it was culturally biased,
incorporahng completely the worst
in Anglo-Saxon and Judeo-Chns-
tian thinking, too materialistic, and
rejecting the idealistic parts of white
traditions.
"Surely, we affirmed suc-
cess should be measured in
ways other than counting
ones material assets and
those trappings of 'success'
that Murray peddles."
"Inmanyculturcs.including tra-
ditional African, said the. Hous-
tonian, success includes a strong
moral and spiritual element,
whereas he went on Murray makes
the conventional mistake of accept-
ing material and dollars as the sole
'
criteria. One of the curses of our
civilization he stressed wastheun-
scupulous grasping of money by
businessmen, bureaucratsand poli-
ticians, regardless of the means.
Jakaboski noted with dissatis-
faction that the November 30thNew
York Times reported Murray' team- ;
ing up with Professor Richard
Hcrmstein, a Harvard psychologist
famous for his connection I.Q. wi th
race were ungenerous and flawed
to begin with, parochial, lacking a
broad international vision orexpe-
'
rience.and narrowly political in the
sense of secking to ju sri fy conserva-
tive Republican social policy.
In closing, Jakaboski remarked
tha t "the time hascome to disregard
Murray's kind of ideological gar-
bage the same way Communism
has been rejected:" what isneeded,
he went on, "is a single view of all
mankind without thedivision dual-
isms and selfcenteredness of much
of 19th Century European philoso-
phy-"
Americans, he said needs to
revitalize its basic philosophy, to
incorporate new ideas from all cul-
tures and religions that can con trib-
ute toa flowenngofour nation, and
"1 expect the African contribution to
bea largeone,"concluded Jakaboski.
READ AFRICAN BUSINESS
SOURCE MAGAZINE
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Mrs. Coretta Scott-King graciously receives the noteworthy gift
» Nigerian Businessman
Gives $100,000 to
Atlanta Institute
/"Vneofthe untrumpeled stories of
the African society has been its his-
tory of generosity and kindness espe-
cially to visitors and strangers irrespec-
tive of his or her status.
Hence, it was a big source of emo-
tional pride to all Africans and African-
Americans alikerecently in Atlanta, when
a Nigerian prominent businessman and
philanthropist, Chief Moshood Ka-
shimawo Abiola gave out a whopping
sum of $ 1 00,000 to Martin Luther King,
Jr , Center for Non-violent Social
Ch,-,ge.
Receiving the check on behalf of the
Ce~ier. :ls founding president and chief-
executive, Mrs. Coretta Scott-King, said,
"Chief Abiola's support wiil helpthe King
Center to carry forward Martin Luther
King's unfinished work of non-violent
change. It would help us to educate and
train people 'rom African, America and
other nations in non -violent strategies in
the years ahead," she said.
She praised Chief Abiola's "commit-
ment to developing leadership training
programs in non-violent conflict-resolu-
tion and social changes in Africa."
Ch ef Abiola is the founder and chair-
man of the Concord Group ol Newspa-
pers and Magazine and also president
of many multi-million c":'!ar organizn-
Phon bfM Idagaai
L-R-Martin Luther King III. Chief '*
Abiola, Coretta Scott-King
,
Andrew Young and Dr. Young during
the check presentation at Atlanta. -
tions which include among others, Rad
Communication, ITT (Nig)) Ltd., Wot
der Bakery, Abiola Book Shops and'of
ol the biggest mechanized agrfeuhur
projects in Africa, Abiola Farm Ltd. .3
Chief Abiola is also in the tore-fro
of many charitable organizations in;3
nca, Asia and Europe.
"Live a life of self-less
service to mankind"
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THE KING VERDICT
f an Oscar award is presented in the category of the "Most
sensational verdict of the Year," the Rodney King verdict
dwarfs competitors like the Kennedy and Tyson verdicts.
Neither will the Clarence Thomas' confirmation saga put
•p a strong showing in this imaginary category.
In retrospect, I still have very good recollection of the
very moment that a friend told me that the verdict had just
been announced and that most major and local media have
confirmed the verdict. For several days whenever my
mind wondered to the verdict, I sort ofpinched myself to
see whether or not I was dreaming. When 1 regained my
composure I started wondering, and
I am still wondering, how such a
verdict could have been rendered by
"impartialjurors," as required by the
Sixth Amendment of die United
States Constitution?
My biggest impairment in un-
derstanding the verdict is that, like
most people, I was overwhelmed by
the brutal scenes in the video tape
that was recurrently televised after
the beating incidence. I concluded
that what I saw constitutes excessive
force given the fact that Mr. King was
on the floorand repeated baton blows
were being delivered to his body by
an officer while others stood and ———
—
watched. Quite frankly, I expected the trial
process to entail a mere formality in compliance with due
the process clause of the Fifth Amcndment.
Unlike the televised Clarence Thomas confirmation
hearing, few people saw the trial of (he four Los Angeles
officers. The latter trial places the highest burden ofproof
(beyond a reasonable doubt) on the prosecutor (a govern-
ment attorney whose duty is to bring justice upon those
who have committed crimes, which arc deemed acts
against the State and its people). Meanwhile, the judicial
system presumes all indicted persons innocent until proven
guilty. A crim inal defense attorney docs not have a burden
to prove the innocence of a defendant. This is probably
one of the reasons that the defense attorneys in the Rodney
King case repeatedly replayed the videotape in slow-
motion, framc-by-frame to attack the prosecutors' key
evidence in an effort to create reasonable doubt in the
minds of thejurors. Such creativity or manipulation must
By Patrick Chukelu
have influenced thejurors to some extent The lead prosecutor
even conceded during a post-verdict interview that he did not
agree with this rendition of what happened, but could not do
much about it since it is the same video tape that he had intro-
duced into evidence and had played it to the jury.
Ideally, Jurors are supposed to be impartial, but realisti-
cally, attorneys have a duty to zealously represent their clients
and will generally pick jurors that they think will be sympa-
thetic with their client's cause. Several books have been
written on how to pick a winningjury. Some people have even
gone as far as calling themselves experts in this field. This
practice may have influenced the defense
attorneys' choice toremove the trial ofthe
four officers to an area with sparse minor-
ity population. The presiding Judge is
presently considering areas with differ-
ent demographics in the retrial ofone of
the officers on a count in which thejurors
could not reach a verdict.
After the verdict, several outraged
persons interviewed on television and on
radio indicated that the verdict was unac-
ceptable and that it should be thrown-out
or appealed. Such statements manifest an
insufficient understanding of the Ameri-
can jurisprudence. Generally, in criminal
cases, a judge can rule that a defendant is
not guilty even when ajury has returned a
guilty verdict; meanwhile, ajudge cannotrule
that a defendant is guilty after ajury had returned a "not guilty"
verdict. While discussing the King verdict, an attorney friend
of mine practicing in the are of medical malpractice indicated
that the prosecuting attorney should appeal the verdict. I had to
remind her that it is the defeated criminal defendant, not the de-
feated state prosecutor, that has the right of appeal in criminal
cases under the American Jurisprudence.
Some people disappointed about the verdict have sug-
gested that the four officers be retried in an urban area, with
more diverse demography. The constitutional problem raised
by this view is that the Fifth Amendment provides that no per-
son shall be subject to "double jeopardy" for the same offence.
There fore, the four officers cannot be retried for the same state
'
offenses for which thejurors returned a "not guilty" verdict
In few politically charged cases, an exception had been
made to the double jeopardy rule to allow the Federal Prosecu-
Conlinuei om pagt 39 .
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c^^^wMo you are a prosecutor who puts people in jail for
VSk^^B beating up their wives and children? Meanwhile
| J^r at night, in the privacy of your home, you tie-up
your wife and children and beat them up because
they arepowerless against you. Unfortunately for
you, a stranger is testing hisnew Sony camcorder,
he accidentally picks your hideous acts up. When
the issue comes to court, you and your friends get
together and
UP IN SMOKE GOES ST2S. «p
suiting in
U.S. CREDIBILITY »»» N0T
ABROAD
GUILTY
VERDICT.
Sounds famil-
iar? Welcome
to the real United States of America.
Whatever credibility that took centuries and
countless number oftop secretoperations, special
agents, foreign policies and public relations ma-
noeuvres to build by the United States govern-
ment start to go up in smoke thanks to George
Holiday's Sony camcorder. This case would
have died a quiet death like several others about
which we usually tend to second-guess the possi-
R bilities; "maybe they didn't really beat him up
7: like he claimed because the evidence in court
y proves otherwise." This time, it was there for ev-
j eryone with eyes to see. Yet ten neutraljurors had
e
the nerve to tell the whole world that except for
r
them, everybody else is blind; what we saw didn ' t
Yl actually happen. "Rodney King was in control of
3 the situation." Despite all those baton blows, he
j could have laid there calmly and endured the pain
n like the 260 pounder he is. Despite all the taxpay-
e ers money spent on training police officers, ten of
them averaging 200 pounds each, cannot arrest
N one 260-pound-man unless they beat his energy
k out of him.
r Yes, you're right; Rodney King was in con-
U Lrol, and so were the Chinese protesters who were
HI beaten up and killed by theirgovernment's forces,
"3
rind whom the United States govcmmc.11 sup
" ported. You could say that was a peaceful ilr n.
Whatever credibility that took centuries and
countless number of top secret operations,
special agents,foreign policies andpublic rela-
tions manoeuvres to build by the United States
government start to go up in smoke thanks to
George Holiday's Sony camcorder.
onstrarion against the Chinese government, but then according
to the lawsofChina, thatwas civil disobedience. Youcould say
that was by government forces whereas this was by police
force, but that difference could be drawn only if you naively
believe the U.S. government is not aware of police brutality
towards minorities in cities across this land.
Now everybody has seen what happened here in America.
There is no second-guessing this one. The reaction from the
international community is right on the money. Says a Japa-
nesejournalist: "United S tates ofAmerica is supposed to be the
number one democracy in the world, and this happened in the
United States." France President, Francois Mitterand, the no-
nonsense, I-kiss-no-one's-buttNATO pal, indicated that what
happened in Los Angeles is the resultofsocial problems that the
Reagan and Bush administrations refused to deal with. For
once Libya's muamma Gadaffi has a point; he says it's obvious
he cannot trust thejustice system in America to try the two men
accused of bombing Pan Am flight 103. To crown it all,
Saddam Hussien has called on the United Nations Security
Council to condemn the human rights violations by the U.S.,
something the latter would have undoubtedly done if it had
happened in someone else's backyard.
£The repercussions of this chain of incidents are going to be
enormous. Even though the U.S. stood up for human rights
abuses everywhere except when it concerned people of color,
the effort is still applaudable. Dictators always look over their
shoulders to see if the world's police was coming. Hence, they
thought twice before they abused people's human rights. Now
that this has happened, who do they have to worry about? The
world has seen America's closet, and it didn't look good. You
think the same credibility with which America went around the
world preaching the need to respect human rights still exist?
Unfortunately, not any more.
It is tempting to draw the difference between L.A. police
and the U.S. government. However, federal government offi-
cials had two good hours to comment on the verdict. They
didn't. After the riots, it got their attention. Even then, Vice
President Dan Quayle is still the highest ranking government
official to come out against the verdict, which is unanimously
thought to be a rape of the justice system.
It is hoped that governments all over the globe do not take
advantage of this human rights violations and continue or
increase theirs. That will clearly suggest the fact that cvery-
b )dy follows in America's steps, a notion no government wants
'••
'
•'
".sociatcd with.
African Business Source Magazine —May, 1992
—
-i'age'f,
716
afc/ DORIK NOBLE:—
CASTING A NICHE
To most people in the United. Stales, it is almostunheard of tofind a black man as C£.0 ofa large
construction company talkless of an indigenous
African man
, whose lotsare regardedas uninitiated in the highly
competitive American construction industry.
Dorik Noble Construction md Drifting
Company founded by Mr. Noble M. Uch-
endu, remain* the farthest point Africans in
America have font in the struggle to inte-
grate and have a fair share &om the economy
proportionate to their inputs.
Bardy eight yean after setting footon U.S.
soil.Dank Uehendu achieved one ofhis life-
long ambition having • viable construction
outfit (hereby easting a niche for himself
within the African-American community.
Bom thirty-eight years ago at Nnewi,
Headquarters of Nnewi Local Government
area of Anambra State in Nigeria. He is the
secondh ofseven children by Late ChiefIsaac
N. Uehendu and Agnes Uehendu.
Young Noble started his education at
Government Primary School, Pen Harcoun
and laterhad his secondary education at Christ
the Kings College m Onitsha. It was m the
middle of his Secondary education that the
Nigerian Civil War broke out dunng which
he was drafted into the Biafran Army. He
later came out of the army at the only surviv-
ing male child among three in his family. His
immediate senior and junior brothers died in
action.
Immediately after the civil war, young
Noble went back to his formercollege, CJC.C.
to complete his Secondary education. He
finished m flying colon.
When Noble came
to the United States,
he was not totally new
so construction. In fact
his romance with the
construction industry
began nineteen yean
agowhenhe was hired
by VINCENT! ENG1-
NEERING.arcpuuble
construction firm m —
—
Nigeria where he was directly in charge of
plants andmachinery during the construction
of terminals of the MmalaMohammed Inter-
national Airport in Lagos, the Calabar Inter-
national Airport. Calabar, and the Port Har-
coun International Airport in Pan Harcoun,
Rivers State.
Smart Noble knew that education was the
fastest mono-rail towards his desired goal
hence he pursued it with a tenacity of pur-
pose. First he worked diligently and bagged
two Associate degrees, one in Architectural
design and the other in Architectural technol-
ogy from the Miami Community College,
i His pursuit did not stop there. He pro-
ceeded to Florida International University
where heagainbaggedhisB.S.C degree with
a major m Architectural Technology and
Minor in Construction Management.
NOBLE M. UCHENDU
PrttuUnllCEO Dorik S'obit Comantaion and Dm/tint Com-
gmmy
,
Houston
In
the
1985,
same
year he
floated his
construction
firm; Ueh-
endu bagged
his Masters
in Architec-
ture from the
University of
Houston,
Texas.
Today Dorik Noble Construction and
Drafting Company has blossomed from its
initial %5 ,000 capital outlay into a six figure
annual turn-over outfit.
This year alone, the com-
oanx has landed contracts
worth overS250.000. these
include amonp others the
S7S.000 iust completed
Ceco Buildine in Houston.
Among its many clientele are the Metro-
politan Trenail Authority, the Harris County
Housing Authority, the City ofHouston and
the Houston Independent School District
(HISD).
In addition to his construction firm , Dorik
Noble has other subsidiaries, these include,
the Dorik Import and Export and the Dorik
Ink currently doing business with the Nige-
rian Polios and other manufacturing com-
pany m Nigeria and Uganda.
Elegant Uehendu is a teetotaler, highly
regarded within his social circle. He holds
the treasurership of two reputable social or-
ganizations in Houston which include the
African Chamber of Commerce and the
Nnewi Union.
Noble Uehendu is married to prcuy Nkasi.
a beauueian with four kids.
CeCo Buildings, Houston
African Business Source Magazine— December, 1991
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